Turing’s Three Philosophical Lessons and the Philosophy of Information

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Abstract

In this article, I outline three main philosophical lessons that we may learn from Turing’s work, and how they lead to a new philosophy of information. After a brief introduction, I discuss his work on the method of levels of abstraction (LoA), and his insistence that questions could be meaningfully asked only by specifying the correct LoA. I then look at his second lesson, about the sort of philosophical questions that seems to be most pressing today. Finally, I focus on the third lesson, concerning the new philosophical anthropology that owes so much to Turing’s work. I then show how the lessons learnt are taken up by the philosophy of information. In the conclusion, I draw a general synthesis of the points made, in view of the development of the philosophy of information itself as a continuation of Turing’s work.

Keywords

Fourth Revolution; Level of Abstraction; Philosophical anthropology; Philosophy of information; Shannon’s information theory.
Introduction

When one looks at Turing’s philosophical legacy, there seems to be two risks. One is to reduce it to his famous test (Turing 1950). This has the advantage of being clear-cut. Anybody can recognise the contribution in question and place it within the relevant debate on the philosophy of artificial intelligence. The other risk is to dilute it down into an all-embracing narrative, making Turing’s ideas the seeds of anything we do and know today. This has the advantage of acknowledging the greatness of this genius. In both cases, however, we are less likely to identify which conceptual contributions by Turing have helped to shape our contemporary philosophical discourse, and which can direct its future development. In order to avoid both risks, in the following pages, I shall concentrate on three specific philosophical lessons, which seem to be particularly significant in view of the emergence of the philosophy of information and its subsequent development. I shall offer not a philological or scholarly analysis, but a minimalist, hermeneutical exercise. It is part of Turing’s extraordinary genius that other interpreters will learn more and different lessons from his intellectual legacy. I wish one day Turing will become as central to our philosophical canon as Frege is.

The three philosophical lessons to which I wish to attract the reader’s attention are: how Turing’s work on the method of levels of abstraction (LoA) can teach us to ask philosophical questions properly; what philosophical questions are most pressing today, as a consequence of Turing’s work; and, finally, Turing’s influence in shaping our new philosophical anthropology, what I shall call the fourth revolution. I will then connect these lessons to the development of the philosophy of information, the philosophical field concerned with the critical investigation of the conceptual nature and basic principles of information, including its dynamics,
utilisation and sciences, and with the elaboration and application of information-theoretic and computational methodologies to philosophical problems. The philosophy of information appropriates an explicit, clear and precise interpretation of the classic “ti esti” question, namely “what is information?”, the clearest hallmark of a new field. As with any other field-question, this too only serves to demarcate an area of research, not to map its specific problems in detail, which we have only begun to address. In the conclusion I shall argue that even if Turing never developed a philosophy of information, the latter would be inconceivable without his legacy and the three lessons outlined in this article.

Lesson one: fixing the level of abstraction or how to ask philosophical questions

Imagine the following scenario. You ask the price of an item, let’s say a second-hand car, and you receive the following answer: 5,000. The question concerned a variable, the price $x$ of the car in question, and you received an exact numerical value for $x$, yet something is missing. You still have no idea about the price because you do not know the type of the variable: is it British pounds, US dollars, euros…? Of course, the context usually helps. If you are in England and you are asking a car dealer, your question should be understood as concerning the price in British pounds and so should the answer. This is trivial, you may think. Grice’s conversational rules obviously apply. It is, and they do. But this is also a crucial assumption, easily forgotten. In November 1999, NASA lost the $125m Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO) because the Lockheed Martin engineering team used English (also known as Imperial) units of measurement, while the agency’s team used the metric system for a key spacecraft
operation. As a result, the MCO crashed into Mars.\footnote{"Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board Phase I Report" (Press release). NASA: \url{ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/reports/1999/MCO_report.pdf}} Assuming that contexts will always disambiguate the types of your variables paves the way to costly mistakes. So what has all this got to do with Turing? Quite a lot, as it turns out. To show you why, let me introduce a slightly abstract model of factual information.\footnote{For an introduction, see (Floridi 2010), for a full philosophical analysis see (Floridi 2011).}

We can treat factual information of the kind illustrated above by the price of the second-hand car as a compound of question + answer. If some theoretical simplification is allowed, the question may be reduced to a Boolean one, followed by a yes or a no answer. In the original version of our example, the price of the second-hand car then becomes: [is the price of this car 5,000? + yes]. You see immediately that the problem lies not in the answer, but in the question: it contains no indication of the type of the variable being handled. The correct piece of information is of course: [is the price of this car £ 5,000? + yes]. We have just introduced the correct level of abstraction or LoA, represented by the symbol for British pounds, not, for example, by the symbol € for euros. Now Turing was the first to understand the crucial importance of expressing the LoA at which sensible questions may be asked. It might seem amazingly obvious, but the second example above, regarding the MCO, shows how easy and dangerous it is to forget about implicit LoAs. The importance of being clear about one’s own level of abstraction was as obvious as the fact that the earth is round, and that America was just there to be discovered. Yet it took Turing’s genius to bring it to light. Of course, Turing’s contribution was not that of introducing the concept of typed variables, or that of establishing the need for frames of reference. These ideas were already common at his time. His lesson was to make clear for the first time how philosophical and conceptual questions too could be answered only by...
fixing the LoA at which it would then make sense to receive an answer. This is one of the greatest and lasting contributions of his famous test (Turing 1950), far more important than the wrong predictions about when machines would pass it, or what consequences one should draw if they did pass it (Floridi, Taddeo et al. 2009). It is sometimes forgotten that Turing refused even to try to provide an answer to the question “can a machine think?”, because he considered it a problem “too meaningless to deserve discussion”. Using our simple example, it would be like asking the price of the second-hand car in absolute figures, insisting that no currency is used in order to express it. Nonsense. Likewise, Turing objected that the question involved vague concepts such as “machine” and “thinking”. In other words, it lacked a clear level of abstraction. So he suggested replacing it with the Imitation Game, which is exactly more manageable and less demanding because it fixes a rule-based scenario easily implementable and controllable (Moor 2003). By so doing, he specified a LoA—the “currency” he chose for the game was human intelligence, but could have been something else, from animal intelligence to human creativity, as many other versions of the Turing imitation game have shown—and asked a new question, which may be summed up thus: “may one conclude that a machine is thinking, at the Level of Abstraction represented by the imitation game?” After half a century, philosophy is still learning such a crucial lesson.³ We can now turn to the second lesson, which will require a much longer premise.

Lesson two: focusing on the most important problems or which philosophical questions to ask

³ On the use of the method of levels of abstraction in philosophy, see (Floridi 2008) and (Floridi 2011). On Turing’s crucial role in the development of the method see (Floridi forthcoming).
On 23rd of April 2010, Bill Gates gave a talk at MIT in which he asked: “are the brightest minds working on the most important problems?” By “the most important problems” he meant “improving the lives of the poorest; improving education, health, nutrition”. Unfortunately, the list should probably include improving peaceful interactions, human rights, environmental conditions, living standards… and this is only the beginning. Clearly, the brightest philosophical minds should not be an exception, but turn their attention to such pressing challenges. Of course, one may stop philosophising and start doing something about this messy world instead. We may, in other words, close down our philosophy departments and never corrupt our brightest youths philosophically. Yet, such a solution smacks of self-defeat. It would be like deciding to burn the wicker basket in which we are travelling, because our hot air balloon is descending too quickly. Philosophy is what you need to keep in a good world, not what you want to get rid of in a bad one. Athens is a better place with Socrates. So there must be a different way forward. The fact is that philosophy can be extremely helpful, for it is philosophy, understood as conceptual design, that forges and refines the new ideas, theories, perspectives and, more generally, the intellectual framework that can then be used to understand and deal with the ultimate questions that challenge us so pressingly. In the team effort made by the brightest minds, the philosophical ones can contribute insights and visions, analyses and syntheses, heuristics and solutions that can empower us to tackle “the most important problems”. Every little effort helps in the battle against idiocy, obscurantism, intolerance, fanaticisms and fundamentalisms of all kinds, bigotry, prejudice and mere ignorance. If this sounds self-serving recall that the longer the jump forward is, the longer the run-up to it should be. Or, with a different metaphor, philosophy takes care of the roots, so that the rest of the plant might grow more healthily. Suppose we accept all
this as a reasonable assumption. Which ideas, theories, perspectives and, more generally, which intellectual framework should philosophers be designing now and for the foreseeable future, so that their contribution will be timely and helpful? Which philosophical questions should they be addressing? The answer would be inconceivable without Turing’s legacy, for it lies in the conceptual threads that run across so many of our “most important problems”. In a global information society, most of the crucial challenges that we are facing are linked to information and communication technologies, in terms of causes, effects, solutions, scientific investigations, actual improvements, conceptual resources needed to understand them, or even just the wealth required to tackle them, as Bill Gates’ example clearly shows. Obviously, information resources, technologies and sciences are not a panacea, but they are a crucial and powerful weapon in our fight against so many evils. The second lesson to be learnt from Turing therefore concerns the sort of questions that the brightest philosophical minds should be addressing. Information and Communication Technologies have profoundly changed many aspects of life, including the nature of communication, education, work, entertainment, industrial production and business, health care, social relations, and armed conflicts. They have had a radical and widespread influence on our moral lives and on contemporary ethical debates. Examples come readily to mind, from trust online to phone hacking, from the digital divide to a dystopian “surveillance society”, from privacy and freedom of expression to Wikileaks, from artificial companions to cyberwar. In short, we live in an infosphere in which behind the most important problems often lies a Turing machine. It is a new world in which we have begun to re-conceptualise ourselves, a third lesson we have learnt from Turing, as I shall argue in the next section.
Lesson three: developing a new philosophical anthropology or from which perspective to approach philosophical questions

Oversimplifying, science has two fundamental ways of changing our understanding. One may be called extrovert, or about the world, and the other introvert, or about ourselves. Three scientific revolutions have had great impact both extrovertly and introvertly. In changing our understanding of the external world and how we can interact with it, they also modified our conception of who we are and may expect to become. After Copernicus, the heliocentric cosmology displaced the Earth and hence humanity from the centre of the universe. Darwin showed that all species of life have evolved over time from common ancestors through natural selection, thus displacing humanity from the centre of the biological kingdom. And following Freud, we acknowledge nowadays that the mind is also unconscious and subject to the defence mechanism of repression, thus displacing it from the centre of pure rationality, a position that had been assumed as uncontroversial, at least since Descartes. The reader who, like Popper and myself, would be reluctant to follow Freud in considering psychoanalysis a strictly scientific enterprise like astronomy or evolutionary theory, might yet be willing to concede that contemporary neuroscience is a likely candidate for such a revolutionary role. Either way, the result is that, today, we acknowledge that we are not immobile, at the centre of the universe (Copernican revolution), we are not unnaturally separate and diverse from the rest of the animal kingdom (Darwinian revolution), and we are very far from being Cartesian minds entirely transparent to ourselves (Freudian or Neuroscientific revolution).

One may easily question the value of this classic picture. After all, Freud (Freud 1917) himself was the first to interpret these three revolutions as part of a single process of reassessment of human nature (Weinert 2009). His hermeneutic
manoeuvre was, admittedly, rather self-serving. But it does strike a reasonable note. In a similar way, when we now perceive that something very significant and profound has happened to human life after the computer revolution, I would argue that our intuition is once again perceptive, because we are experiencing what may be described as a fourth revolution, in the process of dislocation and reassessment of humanity’s fundamental nature and role in the universe. This has been going on since the fifties and Turing is undoubtedly the representative figure of such a revolution. Computer science and the resulting technological applications have exercised both an extrovert and an introvert influence. They have not only provided unprecedented epistemic and engineering powers over natural and artificial realities; by doing so, they have also cast new light on who we are, how we are related to the world, and hence how we understand ourselves and who we might become. Today, we are slowly accepting the idea that we are not standalone and unique entities, but rather informationally embodied organisms (inorgs), mutually connected and embedded in an informational environment, the infosphere, which we share with both natural and artificial agents similar to us in many respects. Turing has changed our philosophical anthropology as much as Copernicus, Darwin and Freud ever did. This has had a significant impact on what it means to do philosophy after Turing, the last point to which I wish to call the reader’s attention.

**Lessons learnt: establishing a new philosophy of information or how to make sense of the world today**

What can enable humanity to make sense of our contemporary world, respect it and improve it responsibly, and hence help in solving “the most important problems”? The answer seems quite simple: a new philosophy of information. Among our
mundane and technical concepts, information is currently one of the most important, widely used yet least understood. The brightest *philosophical* minds should turn their attention to it in order to design the philosophy of our time properly conceptualised *for* our time. This is a quick and dirty way of introducing the philosophy of information (PI) as a much needed development in this history of philosophy. Let me now sketch the longer story that links it to Turing.

Admittedly, it would be too much of a stretch to attribute to Turing the foundation or even the beginning of a new philosophy of information. After all, he never focused on the concept of information itself, or on problems about communication understood as *information flow or transmission*, despite the fact that he and Shannon knew each other’s work. Thus, the Index of (Turing 2004) does not even contain an entry for ‘information” and a book like (Luenberger 2006) mentions Turing only once, in relation to Bletchley Park. And yet, I would argue that without Turing, his groundbreaking work on *information processing*, the scientific and technological consequences of it, and the three lessons outlined above, contemporary interest in the philosophy of information would be very hard to explain. Turing shares with Shannon and Wiener the merit of having called our philosophical attention to the world of information and its dynamics. Without his three lessons, there would be no philosophy of information. The fact that nowadays we are more likely to treat computers as communication machines rather than powerful calculators and mobile phones as mini computers only indicates how deep the influence of Turing’s work has been on our world.
Conclusion

The development of new philosophical ideas seems to be akin to economic innovation. For when Schumpeter adapted the idea of “creative destruction” in order to interpret economic innovation, he might as well have been talking about intellectual development. Philosophy flourishes by constantly re-engineering itself. Nowadays, its pulling force of innovation is represented by the world of information, computation and communication phenomena, their corresponding sciences and technologies, and the new environments, social life, as well as the existential, cultural, economic and educational issues that they are bringing about. It is a new scenario that owes very much to Turing’s work and intellectual legacy. In the previous pages, I have sketched three philosophical lessons that we should learn from Turing. I suggested that the philosophy of information, insofar as it brings to fruition Turing’s legacy, can present itself as an innovative paradigm that opens up a very rich, helpful and timely area of conceptual investigations. PI seeks to expand the frontier of our philosophical understanding, by providing innovative methodologies to address our most important problems from a contemporary perspective. It relies on Turing’s intuition of the crucial importance of the method of abstraction to ensure that such problems are addressed in the right way.

The scientific revolution made seventeenth century philosophers redirect their attention from the nature of the knowable object to the epistemic relation between it and the knowing subject, and hence from metaphysics to epistemology. The subsequent growth of the information society and the appearance of the infosphere, as the environment in which millions of people spend their lives nowadays, have led contemporary philosophy to privilege critical reflection first on the domain represented by the memory and languages of organised knowledge, the instruments
whereby the infosphere is managed – thus moving from epistemology to philosophy of language and logic – and then on the nature of its very fabric and essence, information itself and its dynamics, including communication, flows and processing. As a result, Information has arisen as a concept as fundamental and important as Being, knowledge, life, intelligence, meaning or good and evil – all pivotal concepts with which it is interdependent – and so equally worthy of autonomous investigation. It is also a more impoverished concept, in terms of which the others can be expressed and interrelated, when not defined. This is why the philosophy of information may explain and guide the purposeful construction of our intellectual environment, and provide the systematic treatment of the conceptual foundations of contemporary society.

The future of PI depends on how well we engage with Turing’s intellectual legacy, with “the most important problems” of our time, and with classic philosophical issues. I am optimistic. Thanks also to Turing, the Baconian-Galilean project of grasping and manipulating the alphabet of the universe has begun to find its fulfilment in the computational and informational revolution, which is affecting so profoundly our knowledge of reality and how we conceptualise it and ourselves within it. Informational narratives possess an ontic power, not as magical confabulations, expressions of theological logos or mystical formulae, but immanently, as building tools that can describe, modify, and implement our environment and ourselves. From this perspective, the philosophy of information can be presented as the study of the informational activities that make possible the construction, conceptualization, semanticisation (giving meaning to) and finally the moral stewardship of reality, both natural and artificial, both physical and anthropological. The philosophy of information enables humanity to make sense of
the world and construct it responsibly. It promises to be one of the most exciting and beneficial areas of philosophical research of our time. Its development will be an appropriate way to continue Turing’s work and honour his legacy in philosophy.
References


