The Epistemology of Know-how

by
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Abstract

There is an as yet unacknowledged and incomparable contribution to the philosophical debates about know-how to be found in the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It is sourced in his investigations into knowledge and certainty in *On Certainty*, though it is not limited to these late passages. Understanding the ramifications of this putative contribution (even if one does not agree with it) highlights the extent to which (i) there is now a new range of issues pertaining to know-how which no future philosophical consideration of the topic can ignore, except on pain of failing to engage comprehensively with the subject; (ii) the topic of know-how has been inappropriately marginalised by naturalized epistemology, and may well be as central to epistemology as the propositional knowledge which currently dominates epistemology’s attention; and (iii) any engagement with these potential Wittgensteinian contributions will need to be conducted in tandem with a reflection on the meta-philosophy of epistemology, since their potential impact extends to epistemology’s main methodology, i.e., naturalized reflective equilibrium. These three conclusions, together with a diagnosis of where and why all the current intellectualist accounts of know-how are either internally inconsistent, or irreconcilably flawed on their own terms, provide the motivation and the opportunity for a New Epistemology of Know-How.

These conclusions established, I offer one possible Wittgensteinian-orientated version of the New Epistemology of Know-How, providing the first example of a non-naturalized philosophical approach to the topic since Gilbert Ryle.
The Epistemology of Know-how

Contents

1. Introduction ................................................................. 6

2. Anti-intellectualism .......................................................... 11
   1  Preliminary Tensions .................................................. 13
      1.1 One Challenge, Two Regresses ............................... 15
      1.2 An Intellectualist Response ................................. 17
   2  Performances and their Rules, Criteria & Standards ...... 23
      2.1 Knowledge-how as Ability: Intellectualist Responses .... 27
   3  Complex Skills & Dispositions .................................... 32
   4  Ryle’s Priority Thesis ............................................... 35
   5  Alternative Anti-intellectualists ................................. 37
   6  Concluding Remarks ................................................. 39

3. Propositional Intellectualism ........................................... 41
   1  Stanley & Williamson’s Positive Account ................. 42
       1.1 The Syntax of Know-How .................................... 43
           1.2 The Semantics of Know-How ............................ 50
           1.3 The Mode of Presentation of Know-How ............ 57
   2  Propositional Intellectualism: Responding to the Challenge ........................................ 70
       2.1 Three Objections .............................................. 70
       2.2 Fresh Challenges .............................................. 74
   3  Concluding Remarks .................................................. 78
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Connective Analysis</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Reflective Equilibrium by the Light of Naturalized Philosophy</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Chomsky’s Shuffle</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Reflective Equilibrium Revisited</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Reflective Awareness: A Non-Naturalized Philosophy</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Wittgenstein’s Epistemology &amp; Wittgensteinian Epistemology</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Know-how: The Beginnings of a Perspicuous Presentation</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Abilities, Actions, Activities and Practices – Know-how</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Know-how: Characterisations &amp; Contrasts</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Know-how: Ways of Knowing</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Know-how: Conceptual Connections</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Endnote</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Introduction

Human beings are knowledgeable. Our human knowledge is typically taken to divide into at least three pre-theoretical categories: *propositional knowledge* (the knowledge that such-and-such is the case), *acquaintance knowledge* (our knowledge of a person or a place) and *know-how* (the knowledge we have in knowing how to do something). Contemporary philosophical consideration of know-how tends to pursue one of two major activities. One is to argue that know-how cannot be reduced to, or regarded as, either propositional knowledge or acquaintance knowledge, but is its own kind of knowledge. The other is to argue that know-how is reducible to, or more accurately regarded as, either propositional or acquaintance knowledge, notwithstanding its apparent distinctiveness. The purpose of this dissertation on the epistemology of know-how is to do something quite different.

Its purpose is to articulate a perspicuous presentation of (some) of the reticulations of the concept of know-how. In so doing, I engage in what I take to be one of a number of possible examples of what might be called ‘Wittgensteinian Epistemology’. I do this in a philosophical environment where there is, as yet, no such thing as Wittgensteinian Epistemology. There are exegetical discussions between Wittgensteinian scholars concerning how best to characterise what Wittgenstein understands by our notions of knowledge, doubt, relativism, etc. There is also some, though not much, discussion by contemporary epistemologists as to what, if anything, Wittgenstein’s work might contribute the task of providing philosophical theories about knowledge. Neither of these, I think, are best described as Wittgensteinian Epistemology.

In pursuit of such a fresh quarry, my strategy is threefold. Firstly, I consider the main contributions to the debate about know-how as currently conducted. I reveal the extent to which each falls prey to internal inconsistencies and confusions. Individually these critical encounters expose the vulnerabilities inherent in the various specific accounts that constitute the ongoing discussions. Collectively these encounters add up to a clearing of the philosophical decks in readiness for an alternative approach.
Secondly, I identify an as yet unnoticed but potential (and potentially revolutionary) contribution to the debate. This is Wittgenstein’s insight that there is a kind of know-how that is neither separate from, nor reducible to, the rest of our knowledge, but which is *implicated in it*. This not only cuts across the intellectualist/anti-intellectualist confrontation which has thus far shaped the philosophy of know-how, but its ramifications reach into the very methodology of epistemology itself. For it brings into question the extent to which the methodology of reflective equilibrium (one way of characterising contemporary epistemology’s methodology) is capable of functioning in the solely propositional, intellectualist way it appears to think it can. This reveals the extent to which a Wittgensteinian contribution to the philosophy of know-how has meta-philosophical implications, even if one doesn’t agree with the full thrust of Wittgenstein’s insights. This entails that some of the unexamined tenets by which naturalized philosophy functions can no longer be taken for granted.

Thirdly, I clarify the extent to which the apparently neutral vocabulary in which contemporary epistemology is conducted harbours a series of inescapably intellectualist commitments. In so doing, I reveal the reasons why any non-naturalized, non-intellectualist philosophical approach to know-how, would benefit from eschewing the terms ‘epistemic’, ‘cognitive’ and ‘competence’. In executing these three manoeuvres, the decks are now cleared, the meta-philosophical considerations raised, and the jargon found wanting. The dissertation is at last ready to engage in its raison d’être: the assembling of reminders about know-how in the pursuit of a (partial) surveyable representation of (some of) the relevant conceptual connections and distinctions.

Specifically, this tri-partite approach takes the following form. In Chapter 2, I consider Gilbert Ryle’s challenge to intellectualism and his articulation of a kind of *sui generis*, non-reducible know-how. Showing that now, as then, Ryle is forced to defend not just his conclusions but his method against a variety of misguided characterisations. In Chapter 3, I examine Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson’s debate-reigniting intellectualist claim that knowing how to do something is just a case of knowing a fact under a particular mode of presentation. This is followed, in Chapter 4, by critical engagement with John Bengson & Marc Moffett’s so-called ‘Non-Propositional Intellectualism’ which turns out to be not only entirely propositional, but thoroughly Platonistic. The problematic nature of all these (and
other associated) accounts having been established, I turn, in Chapter 5, to Wittgenstein’s putative contribution to the debate.

Not only have no participants in the discussion thus far either acknowledged or engaged with Wittgenstein, none has even considered the possibility about know-how which he identifies. This is Wittgenstein’s insight that our empirical propositional knowledge is enabled by a particular kind of certainty which is itself a kind of know-how. Prompted by Danièle Moyal-Sharrock’s non-propositional understanding of what she calls ‘hinge certainty’ in Wittgenstein’s final writings *On Certainty*, I show that the very possibility of this know-how offers a fresh way to cut through the intellectualist/anti-intellectualist impasse that has now been reached. Although my engagement with Moyal-Sharrock is not uncritical, what it brings to light is the realisation that any philosophical appreciation of know-how in the future would no longer be deemed comprehensive were it to fail to engage with the issues raised by Wittgenstein and the non-propositional readings of his work.

Inevitably this highlights differences between the kind of meta-philosophical principles which frame naturalized philosophy and the more non-naturalized Wittgensteinian understanding of what philosophy is and seeks to achieve. In Chapter 6, I argue that this clash of meta-philosophical orientations is given an invigorating new shake-up through the investigations into know-how. For, it transpires that the kinds of Moorean truisms that Wittgenstein identifies in *On Certainty* as non-propositional expressions of our know-how, are similar in kind to a number of the so-called ‘intuitions’ which are taken to be the propositional raw material of epistemology’s own main methodology, i.e., reflective equilibrium. So the bite of the philosophical challenge from Wittgenstein concerning know-how extends to the very methodology of epistemology itself.

Having shown the internal problems which undermine all the intellectualist accounts of know-how, and revealed the importance of the meta-philosophical implications of Wittgenstein’s involvement in this topic, I conclude that the need for a new approach to the topic is now warranted. With this as a springboard, I offer, in Chapter 7, the first non-naturalized philosophical approach to the topic of know-how since Gilbert Ryle. In so doing, I am no longer merely trumpeting the need for, or the value of perspicuous presentations, but offering the beginnings of one; in this instance, for know-how. At this point, I take myself to be engaged in one possible version of what Wittgensteinian Epistemology might be.
Before I begin, a few house-keeping points. On the matter of hyphenation conventions, I have followed the more or less standard practice of hyphenating the nominalisation ‘know-how’. Where this features in the titles of chapters or sections, or is used as part of a name, I also capitalize the ‘h’ in ‘how’. When ‘know how’ is used as a verb then no hyphen is used. Exceptions to this rule are a consequence of conforming to the punctuation choices of a position for which I am providing an exposition. Similarly I standardly use intellectualism (and its cognates) with a lower case ‘i’; exceptions being those cases where I follow the practices of others when explaining their positions. I avoid all use of Greek letters, formalisations or mathematical symbols myself, except again where articulating the views of others. In such situations, I follow the letter and formalisation choices of the third parties. Given that the New Epistemology of Know-How I pursue is a non-theoretical, non-naturalized philosophical approach, I deem the use of formalisations and symbolization to be inappropriate. On the matter of gendered pronouns, I do not use ‘she’ instead of ‘he’, except in cases where I’m referring to another philosopher’s example within which ‘she’ was original used. When referring to the third person singular, I prefer to use, ‘he or she’.

A number of the philosophers I refer to are connected by an ampersand (e.g., Stanley & Williamson and Bengson & Moffett). Where an ampersand is used, this denotes joint authorship of a particular paper; where ‘and’ is used to connect two or more philosophers, this connotation is not intended. I apologise in advance for the reduction of philosopher teams to their initials (S&W, B&M). This is solely to facilitate the readability of the text.

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I very much welcome this the opportunity to acknowledge the importance of the British Wittgenstein Society and Shell for this work. This dissertation would not have been possible without the opportunities facilitated by the BWS/Shell Bursary. I am also extremely appreciative of the incomparable annual conferences of the BWS and its bi-annual lecture series which together contributed enormously to my understanding of Wittgenstein. I would also like to thank Peter Hacker and Joachim
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Doing jigsaws, inventing and enjoying jokes, boxing, behaving appropriately at funerals, cooking omelets, conducting battles, persuading juries, pruning trees, speaking Swedish, multiplying numbers, untangling wool, writing plays, clowning, reasoning, designing dresses, reading maps, playing chess, performing surgical operations, ice-skating, shooting targets, composing Latin verses, humming a tune, playing tennis, fishing, giving advice, map-reading, swimming, teaching, tying knots, driving cars, playing hide-and-seek, and philosophising, are, according to Gilbert Ryle, just a few of the myriad of examples from the vast repertoire of our intelligent activities. For it is not merely in those more intellectual activities, such as theorizing or deducing conclusions from propositional premises, that our intelligence is involved or shown. To think that these presumed paradigms of intellectual activity have a monopoly on our intelligence is, on Ryle’s view, to make a conceptual mistake. It is to confuse our intelligence, our rationality, indeed, our very mindedness itself, with that limited spectrum of intellectual practices whose operational currency is propositional. This misguided conflation of intelligent and intellectual activities, invites the further conflation of our knowledge how to do something with our knowledge that something is the case.

Confusion over these matters is, Ryle argues, indicative of a commitment to the so-called ‘Intellectualist Legend’; an insidious philosophical myth which is haunted by, and perpetuates, what he christens the ‘dogma of the Ghost in the Machine.’ Ryle’s examination of the relation between knowing-how and knowing-that is but one of a number of tasks in the service of his primary aim to undermine this legend and exorcise its ghost; an ambition he takes to be best served by mapping the ‘logical geography’ (1945, 201) of our mental concepts, in general. As such, not only do Ryle’s specifically epistemological insights interconnect with his wider investigation into what it is to be minded, they are intimately bound up with his particular philosophical method and its meta-philosophical commitments. Any alternative account of the epistemology of know-how, be it sympathetic or hostile to

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1 All of these particular examples are Ryle’s own; appearing repeatedly throughout his writings.
Ryle’s orientation, is not only obliged to engage with Ryle’s original articulation of the relation between knowing-how and knowing-that, but must also, I suggest, be alert to the extent to which meta-philosophical allegiances are unavoidable. This relation between Ryle’s philosophy and his meta-philosophy will provide a double legacy whose twin threads are woven throughout the coming investigations.

In this chapter, I examine Ryle’s distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that, drawing primarily on his original 1945 presentation on the topic to the Aristotelian Society, first published in (1946) together with the further exploration of this work in Chapter 2 of (and throughout) his (1949) book, *The Concept of Mind*, in order to establish the continuing philosophical credentials of his own anti-intellectualist orientation. To achieve this, I also exploit Ryle’s (1963) and the several decades’ worth of articles now gathered together in (2009a) and (2009b) including his particularly important, ‘Why are the Calculuses of Logic and Arithmetic Applicable to Reality’ (1946b). In so doing, I lay the groundwork for a fuller acknowledgement of the importance of Ryle’s appreciation that our human know-how is indeed distinct from our propositional knowledge and that this is a matter of the grammar of our concepts, not one of empirical discovery.

In Section 1, I provide an exposition of Ryle’s distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that, focusing particularly on the regress argument and *reductio ad absurdum* it generates for an Intellectualist view. I then articulate Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson’s dismissal of Ryle’s regress argument, identifying where and why it fails to undermine Ryle’s distinction. In Section 2, I evaluate the central role taken by the notion of rules, criteria and standards, in what I prefer to characterise as Ryle’s *normative performance* account of knowing-how, rather than his *ability* account. I show why the two major counter-examples proposed by Stanley & Williamson, ultimately lack any power to drive a wedge between our knowledge-how and its constitutive rule-involving performances. In Section 3, I criticise Ryle’s supposedly dispositional explanation of performance, arguing that he operates with too broad, indeed too unfamiliar a notion of dispositions. I identify the motivation for this move and show that one can avoid its pitfalls by returning to the rationale for its pursuit, i.e., the investigation into our human ‘second nature’, that product of our inculcation and education into the rule-involving activities and practices that are constitutive of our humanity. In Section 4, I explore Ryle’s reasons for offering not merely a categorial distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that, but the view
that knowing-how is prior to knowing-that. I argue that this Priority Thesis is not only mistaken but unnecessary, given Ryle’s own project. In Section 5, I briefly consider several alternative, supposedly Rylean-friendly, anti-intellectualist views. Recent developments in cognitive science are, in some cases, embracing anti-intellectualist (rather than the more typical intellectualist) views, and overtly acknowledging Ryle distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that. Yet though they share Ryle’s conclusions they do so for very different reasons; reasons that may well run entirely counter to Ryle’s meta-philosophical orientation. In the Concluding Remarks of the final section I draw the lessons of this initial investigation together and identify the journey ahead: its outstanding argumentative and thematic challenges and the philosophical tasks to come.

1 Preliminary Tensions

From a non- or pre-philosophical point of view, I take it to be uncontentious to say that there is a difference between what it is to know how to do something and what it is to know that something is the case. To know how to play the piano and to know that you do so by striking the black and white keys with your fingers, are, we might say, two different kinds of knowledge. To know how to play Chopin’s Prelude No.4 in E Minor, Opus 28, is somehow different, in kind, to knowing that the sheet music is in the piano stool. Notwithstanding this seemingly straightforward distinction between our know-how (or the kinds of things we can and can’t do), and our know-that (or propositional knowledge of truths), both are taken to be familiar examples or evidence of the fact that people are knowledgeable, educated and intelligent.

Yet pre-philosophical thought about the richness of our knowledge and the breadth of our intelligent activities, sometimes pulls in a different, more narrowly circumscribed, direction. Gilbert Ryle reminds us of the father who, “after spending the morning in teaching [his son] Tommy to swim, to dribble the football, or to diagnose and repair what is wrong with the kitchen clock, in the afternoon cheerfully writes to the newspaper letters which take it for granted that all lessons are strings of memorizable propositions.” (1967, 467) This example is supposed to point to the not uncommon assumption that although we do engage in a host of different kinds of practical activities, which are indeed learnt, taught and practiced, they are neither the purpose of a ‘proper’ education, nor the stuff of ‘genuine’ knowledge. ‘Real’
intelligence is exercised solely when engaged in theoretical or intellectual activities; something perhaps optimally done when seated in a classroom. Pen, or perhaps, head, in hand.

This pre-philosophical tension concerning what it is that might be regarded as ‘proper’ knowledge, is echoed in two broad and contrasting philosophical approaches to the nature of knowing-how and knowing-that. Broadly speaking, so-called ‘intellectualist’ views hold that all knowledge is, and is only, propositional knowledge. On such intellectualist-orientated views there is no such thing as non-propositional knowledge, or non-propositional know-how. Putative candidates for any such putative non-propositional knowledge, or know-how, are dismissed in one of two ways. Either all such non-propositional know-how is claimed to be propositional knowledge after all; appearances notwithstanding. Thus it keeps its status as a kind of knowledge. Alternatively, it is claimed that non-propositional know-how is not a kind of propositional knowledge, and given that it is only propositional knowledge which is knowledge, this non-propositional know-how is, strictly speaking, unfit to be awarded the status of ‘knowledge’. On this second option, non-propositional know-how is thus downgraded to some kind of sub-epistemological or epistemologically irrelevant category; usually that of ‘mere’ ability.

By contrast, Ryle’s own anti-intellectualist holds that non-propositional knowledge or know-how and propositional knowledge or know-that are mutually irreducible types of knowledge, each meriting the status of knowledge, each contributing to the epistemological confederacy. Furthermore, it is only in virtue of both our know-how and our know-that we human beings exemplify, manifest and articulate our human intelligence. As Ryle reminds us, “‘Intelligent’ cannot be defined in terms of ‘intellectual’ or ‘knowing how’ in terms of ‘knowing that’.” (1949, 32) Intellectualists are, according to Ryle, misguided in their assumption that, “intelligence equates with the contemplation of propositions and is exhausted in this contemplation”. (1946a, 225) In so limiting knowledge to “this dry and chilly propositional arena” the result is an impoverished, “one-sidedly Academic human nature”. (1962, 430). Intelligent activity is not the privilege of overtly intellectual activities and accomplishments but is to be found across a whole range of flourishing areas of human life, be they, “moral or artistic, conversational or commercial or sporting, and so on indefinitely.” (1962, 432).
This philosophical contrast between the intellectualist and the anti-intellectualist should not, therefore, be understood as the opposition of some particularly philosophico-theoretical view against what might be regarded as a more pre-philosophical, common-sense position (as Glick (2011) presumes). Rather, the philosophical consideration of the nature, extent, status, value, source and detail of our know-how, in tandem with its relation to our knowledge and intelligence, in general, consists in resolving tensions at play in both the philosophical and pre-philosophical arenas.

Furthermore, whilst these two camps mark out the general territory of the central debate, not only does each play host to various more nuanced views, they do not represent an exhaustive division of the field. In addition, there are two approaches which cut across the standard dichotomy just outlined. The first is a recent proposal which severs the marriage between intellectualism and its long-serving propositional partner. This proffers a non-propositional yet nonetheless intellectualist account of know-how. The second potential alternative view is that Rylean anti-intellectualism and intellectualism are both mistaken insofar as they set out the relation between knowing-how and knowing-that as a polarity: either knowing-how reduces (entirely) to knowing-that or is (entirely) distinct from it. The former I consider in Chapter 4, the latter in Chapters 5 and 7 as part of the consideration of one alternative conception of know-how that Wittgenstein illuminates. For the moment, however, I focus on the original intellectualist and anti-intellectualist divide, around which the contemporary debate revolves.

I now evaluate in detail why Ryle thinks that intellectualist views about know-how are not only misguided, but generate a reductio ad absurdum.

1.1 One Challenge, Two Regresses

Ryle characterises intellectualism as the view that intelligent activity is that which is not only, “accompanied by […] internal acts of considering propositions” (1946a, 222), but “is exhausted in this contemplation” (1946a, 225 emphases added). This would appear to fit well with two familiar presumptions: (i) that knowing is the paradigmatic example of intelligent activity, and (ii) that knowledge is knowledge of

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2 Bengson & Moffett (2007) and (2011a) and Bengson, Moffett and Wright (2009).
true propositions. Almost the entire edifice of contemporary epistemology is constructed around this view, together with its vast array of investigations into the nature, sources, structure and value of what it is for a subject, S, to know a particular proposition, \( p \). The suggestion that intelligent activity, or knowing, is exhausted by the appropriate engagement with propositions requires that any supposed non-propositional knowledge, or know-how (be these either the same or different), must be either *propositional* knowledge of some sort, or fail to be *knowledge* of any sort. The intellectualist conception seeks, “to reassimilate knowing *how* to knowing *that* by arguing that intelligent performance involves the observance of rules, or the application of criteria”. (1949, 29) This is done not by using something other than propositions, but rather by the identification and incorporation of a particular type of *regulative* proposition. Thus the assumed distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that is *illusory*, given that both are actually propositional knowledge. This conflation of the intelligent with the propositional brings in its wake the subsumption of knowing-how by knowing-that\(^3\).

Having identified this intellectualist approach, Ryle argues that it generates a *reductio ad absurdum* because it entails that propositional knowledge is itself impossible. For if the exercise of one’s capacity for propositional knowledge is something which itself can be done intelligently or stupidly, then this must also require the preliminary consideration of the relevant regulative propositions. But in order for this to be done intelligently, it too requires the consideration of yet further appropriately regulative propositions. In the attempt to begin the supposed process one is launched upon an infinite regress; ruling out the gaining of any propositional knowledge, at all. Yet we do have such knowledge, hence the relation between knowing-how and knowing-that cannot be as the misguided intellectualist supposes. “If the intelligence exhibited in any act, practical or theoretical, is to be credited with the occurrence of some ulterior act of intelligently considering regulative propositions, no intelligent act, practical or theoretical could ever begin.” (1946a, 223)

This ‘Starting Regress’, is associated with a second equally *reductio*-generating ‘Janus Regress’, (as I distinguish and call them.) The Janus Regress

\(^3\) Cf., the parallel intellectualist conflation of ratiocination and rationality, which denies Ryle’s point that, “Ratiocination is not the general condition of rational behaviour but only one species of it.” (1946a, 229)
focuses specifically on a presumed epistemological gap which seems to stand in need of crossing. “If a deed, to be intelligent, has to be guided by the consideration of a regulative proposition, the gap between that consideration and the practical application of the regulation has to be bridged by some go-between process which cannot by the presupposed definition itself be an exercise of intelligence and cannot by definition, be the resultant deed.” (1946a, 223) But this “schizophrenic broker” (1946a, 223) is inevitably paralysed; trapped between contemplation and activity, between theory and practice, between consideration and execution. The only way to cross this no man’s land is with something that will bestride two things whose very incompatibility is supposedly definitional. Thus, both the impotence of the Starting Regress and the paralysis of the Janus Regress reveal the conceptual confusion which Ryle diagnoses as “misconstruing the ‘logical type or category’ of intelligence concepts, making a ‘type-mistake.’” (1946a, 224)

1.2 An Intellectualist Response

Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson (2001) provide the most substantial attempt to counter Ryle’s criticism of intellectualism. Stanley & Williamson (henceforth S&W) claim that the supposed (Starting) Regress⁴ fails to show that knowledge-how cannot be a species of knowledge-that. Their counter-argument aims its bite, not at the first level of Ryle’s descriptive articulation of the Regress Argument, which S&W take to be sound but, rather, at a deeper level. They attempt to show that the prose expression of the Regress Argument is superficially deceptive, masking a problematic and ultimately undermining tension. Specifically, they claim that the only way Ryle’s two necessary premises can both be true is for each to pick out a different, mutually exclusive, type of action. Thus, with no univocal notion of action operating in both premises, the reductio does not go through. This works, supposedly, as follows.

According to S&W, the descriptive articulation of Ryle’s argument can be roughly paraphrased, thus:

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⁴ S&W do not acknowledge the distinction I am making between the Starting and the Janus Regresses. Rather they take Ryle’s announcement that he relies on “variations of one argument” (1946a, 223) to justify ignoring any of the variations in favour of focusing on what I dub ‘the Starting Regress’ and they call ‘the [sole] Regress Argument’. (2001, 412)
If knowledge-how were a species of knowledge-that, then to engage in any action, one would have to contemplate a proposition. But, the contemplation of a proposition is itself an action, which presumably would itself have to be accompanied by a distinct contemplation of a proposition. If the thesis that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that required each manifestation of the knowledge-how to be accompany by a distinct action of contemplating a proposition, which was itself a manifestation of knowledge-how, then no knowledge-how could ever be manifested. (S&W 2001, 413)

S&W claim that this argument uses the following two premises:

(P1) If one Fs, one employs knowledge how to F

(P2) If one employs knowledge that φ one contemplates the proposition that φ

This generates an infinite regress, making it impossible to ever F. The assumption for reductio being:

(RA): knowledge how to F is knowledge that φ(F).

S&W argue that for (P1) to be true it requires the notion of intentional action. The truth of P2, however, requires that the relevant action be unintentional. As such, (P1) and (P2) cannot refer to the same type of action. Therefore the Regress Argument fails to show that (RA) is false.

With regard to (P1), S&W point out, in the first instance, that its truth is vulnerable to counter-examples. Consider, they suggest, such actions as digestion. A

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5 S&W also point out that though Ryle is committed to a Priority Thesis (that knowing-how is logically prior to knowing-that) this is not a requirement for his Regress Challenge. For one might equally well wish to argue that P1 and P2 are simultaneous, rather than sequential considerations of an infinite number of distinct propositions.

6 In discussing S&W’s challenge I follow their use of the terms ‘action’ and ‘intentional action’ rather than Ryle’s preferred ‘activity’, though this shift in nomenclature which they impose upon Ryle is not simply the substitution of different terms for the same concepts. As will be discerned in Chapter 7, action, intentional action and activity are not identical concepts.
person might well successfully digest his or her food, but this is not to say that he or she knows how to digest her food. This illustrates the need to limit the applicability of (P1) to certain kinds of action. S&W take it to be uncontroversial that the scope of those actions one knows how to do is, thus, restricted and indeed should be restricted to those actions which are intentional.

A second counter-example is proposed in order to reveal the sensitivity of (P2) to scope issues. S&W use a suggestion from Carl Ginet in which he claims that one might well employ knowledge that \( p \), without, after all, needing to contemplate the proposition that \( p \). Ginet’s particular example is that of his opening of a door, by turning its door knob. According to Ginet, this action is something which he does “quite automatically”. (1975, 7) It reveals, supposedly, that whilst, as he puts it, “I exercise (or manifest) my knowledge that one can get the door open by turning the knob and pushing it”, this is done, “without formulating (in my mind or out loud) that proposition or any other relevant proposition.” (1975, 7)

This suggestion looks, potentially, like one that might well be reconciled with a more anti-intellectualist orientation. Yet rather than take Ginet’s example as open perhaps to a more Rylean interpretation, S&W take it to be evidence that the exercise of one’s propositional knowledge need not require its overt contemplation. Indeed, they embrace an intellectualist reading of Ginet, holding that the example confirms that, “employments of knowledge-that are often unaccompanied by distinct acts of contemplating propositions.” (2001, 415) Thus, (P2) is false. According to S&W, this is only the case, however, on a reading that takes the action of contemplating a proposition, to be an intentional action. For were contemplating a proposition an unintentional action, then (P2) would be true. The truth, then, of (P2) might be maintained by restricting its scope to the unintentional act of contemplating a proposition. Given, then, that the truth of (P1) requires the relevant act be intentional and the truth of (P2) requires the associated act be unintentional, there is, according to S&W’s argument, no univocal reading in virtue of which both (P1) and (P2) can be simultaneously true. Therefore, contrary to the initially tempting descriptive presentation of his Regress Argument, S&W claim that their deeper analysis of Ryle’s argument reveals that it fails. The reductio does not go through.

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7 This is not a claim Ryle does, or would wish to make. On the contrary, he already anticipates the mistake. “It would be interesting to consider how far epistemologists and psychologists have, unwittingly, yearned to describe thought after the model of digestion.” Ryle (1953, 312)
Such is S&W’s sole challenge to Ryle’s Regress Argument. For this counter proposal to be successful, however, several things have to be the case. These include, but are not limited to, the following three requirements: (i) S&W must be accurately re-presenting Ryle’s Regress Argument with their (P1), (P2), and (RA) analysis; (ii) The notion of an unintentional act of contemplating a proposition has to make sense, and (iii) The Ginet Objection to the truth of (P2) has to withstand scrutiny. Now, whilst I do think there are serious concerns about (i), I will nonetheless accept S&W’s articulation of Ryle’s account, as presented, in order to engage with (ii) on their own proposed terms.8

In (ii) then, S&W suggest that one way to rescue the truth of the claim that if one employs knowledge that \( p \) then one contemplates the proposition that \( p \), would be to allow for non-intentional contemplation of the relevant proposition. Such non-intentional contemplation is captured, perhaps, by Ginet’s notion of ‘automatic’ action. Here, a person opening a door is not, as such, intentionally contemplating the proposition that he or she can leave a room by turning its doorknob. But what, exactly is this unintentional contemplation to which they are alluding? Having tabled the notion as viable, S&W limit its further elucidation to two potential options. The first is that, “perhaps there is a sense of contemplating a proposition’ in which it refers to an action that is no more intentional than is the action of digesting food.” (2001, 416) Their second suggestion is that of a new “deflationary sense of action”, but once mooted is then un-pursued. With these sketchy indications, S&W leave the matter alone; perhaps not unsurprisingly.

I would like to suggest that S&W are here engaged in a rhetorical, rather than argumentative, strategy of presenting a faux rescue attempt on Ryle’s behalf in order to suggest that the only way his Regress Argument might work requires torturing our notions of contemplation and action into unrecognisable shape. But any such

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8 Cf., Hetherington (2006) who does choose to question S&W’s initial presentation of Ryle’s argument, claiming that they have, “misunderstood both the focus and the form [and] the force of Ryle’s reasoning.” (2006, 72) Hetherington then proceeds to present his own Knowledge-as-Ability Hypothesis (distinct from either Lewis & Nemirow’s Ability Hypothesis (see Lewis 1990) or Mellor’s Knowing How Theory (1993). The Knowledge-as-Ability Hypothesis is not, however, as might be anticipated, a Rylean-friendly approach, but rather one which characterises all knowledge as, “the ability – the know-how – to register accurately that \( p \),” a view which “from the outset” ensures that “knowledge’s traditional truth condition is retained.” (2006, 77) Having stepped in to defend Ryle from the S&W’s misrepresentations, Hetherington ironically helps himself to a thoroughly propositional conception of knowledge. This provides more evidence (from an altogether unlikely source) for what I argue (in Chapter 5) can be described as ‘the propositional presumption’ that the focus of epistemology is thoroughly propositional, or truth-related.
conceptual manhandling is entirely the work of S&W, and not anything needed, let alone pursued, by Ryle. This is simply a diversionary tactic designed to distract attention from an appreciation of the precariousness of their Ginet Objection. The reason for this is that the Ginet Objection is doing not just doing some of their argumentative work, but all of it.

Consider then, (iii), the Ginet Objection. For this to contribute what S&W’s argument requires, S&W need to accept that Ginet’s two notions, (exercising propositional knowledge and manifesting propositional knowledge) are the same. Furthermore, such exercising (or the supposedly synonymous manifesting) of propositional knowledge needs also to be the same as what S&W call employing propositional knowledge; an identity that one might have thought to be constitutive of the very question at issue. A second conflation occurs with S&W’s requirement that formulating propositional knowledge and contemplating propositional knowledge be the same. That S&W require so much synonymity between key terms in order to map the Ginet Objection on to their own analysis of Ryle’s Regress Argument, already suggests their position may well be frail. Let it be noted, though, that the minimum cost of any attempt to make sense of the unintentional act of contemplating a proposition requires both the interchangeability of the supposedly synonymous trio: exercising, manifesting and employing propositional knowledge, together with that of the supposedly synonymous duo: formulating and contemplating propositional knowledge. Once again, I allow these questionable conflations to go unchallenged, in order to allow S&W as much of the preferred apparatus of their argument as possible.

The Ginet Objection from the automaticity of our action is, then, supposed to show that when successfully opening a door, the relevant propositional knowledge, i.e., that one can open a particular door by turning its handle, need not be contemplated/ formulated though it is still exercised/employed. But can just such an automatic action be taken as indicative of, or justification for the possibility of side-stepping the contemplation/formulation of the supposed relevant propositional knowledge? If the answer is no, then S&W have made a mistake in appealing to the Ginet Objection in the first place. If the answer is yes, one need not contemplate/formulate the relevant propositional knowledge, then why does this not also indicate it is similarly possible, or at least plausible, to side-step the exercise/ employment of such propositional knowledge? Why doesn’t the (unarticulated) reason that serves to justify the irrelevance of contemplation/formulation of the
relevant proposition, not also justify the irrelevance of the exercise/employment of the relevant proposition?

There is only one answer to this question which can provide S&W with the argumentative clout they require. This is that the exercise/employment of propositional knowledge is a necessary requirement for action. But this is the very question at issue. So the Ginet Objection only works by presupposing the conclusion that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that: i.e., the (RA) claim at the heart of the debate. Contrary to the presentation of their challenge, S&W do not, therefore, have a viable counter-argument to the Regress Argument. All they have is a straightforward denial of Ryle’s argument, purporting to be an argument against it.

In so far as one can open doors by turning door handles, then according to the Ginet Objection and indeed, according to Ryle, one need not be contemplating the relevant propositions. But for Ryle there is no reason to presume that one need be employing any particular propositional knowledge, either. One simply knows how to open a door. S&W follow Ginet in denying this, presuming that one must always be employing or exercising the appropriate propositional knowledge. To repeat: this is not an argument against Ryle, it is just the re-statement of the opposing intellectualist position. Thus even allowing S&W full use of their own (dubious) premises and strategies, the above demonstrates the inadequacy of their attempt to respond to Ryle’s Regress Argument against Intellectualism.

Furthermore, S&W’s challenge represents the only known attempt to tackle the Ryle’s Regress Argument. Those who claim that Ryle’s Regress Argument does not work, such as Jeremy Fantl (2008), tend to piggy-back on the presumed success of S&W’s argument. They accept it, and its key Ginet Objection, without qualification or further investigation, in their presumption that the Regress worry has been dismissed. It falls to Ryle himself to suggest a putative strategy for slipping out of the grip of the Regress Argument. He proposes that one might resort to a notion of implicit rather than explicit propositional knowledge; something he describes as a ‘not unfashionable shuffle’ (1946, 227); a route he takes to leads only to deeper intellectualist quicksand.9

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9 Cf., Schiffer (2001) “[A]lthough understanding is indeed a practical ability, it may none the less be characterized as an instance of “knowing that” – providing we recognize that the knowledge is implicit” (2001, 312, footnote 5.) I return to this shuffle in Chapter 6, as part a consideration of the propositionality that constitutes the intellectualist paradigm under and with which Naturalized Philosophy operates.
As there are no other intellectualist attempts to de-rail Ryle’s Regress Argument, I now turn to his own positive account of the relation between the two distinct kinds of knowledge: knowing-how and knowing-that

2 Performances and their Rules, Criteria and Standards

For Ryle, knowing-how cannot be reduced to propositional knowledge. The very possibility of propositional knowledge requires some kind of non-propositional knowledge; on pain of generating an infinite regress. “Effective possession of a piece of knowledge-that involves knowing how to use that knowledge.” (1946a, 235 emphasis added) Furthermore, it is not merely those proposition-involving, or more theoretical, intellectual activities which require some such know-how. Indeed it is a “ruinous but popular mistake to suppose that intelligence operates only in the production and manipulation of propositions, i.e. that only in ratiocinating are we rational.” (1946a, 228) Ryle’s account of and interest in know-how is not simply a pre-occupation with some narrow or (potentially marginal) epistemological issue pertaining to a discrete kind of non-propositional knowledge. It is intrinsically related to, and demanded by, any proper understanding of what it is to be human, to be intelligent and to be rational. Any account of our knowledge and rationality that does not engage in the consideration of know-how is not just mistaken, but woefully inadequate.

Ryle’s own positive account of know-how turns not, as near-ubiquitously described, on the notion of ability per se but on a twin-pronged conception which rejects the intellectualists’ preferred proposition in favour of that of performance; a notion of performance that is, constitutively, normative. Specifically, Ryle argues for the view that (i) a person’s know-how is a kind of knowledge that is “actualised or exercised in what he does”, and (ii) all such “performances” are “in some way governed by principles, rules, cannons, standards or criteria.” (1946a, 228)

This normative aspect of our performances is one that immediately invites comparison with the intellectualist suggestion that know-how may simply be propositional knowledge of the appropriate regulative propositions. There is, however, a crucial difference between such regulative propositions and the kind of
performance rules which Ryle identifies. For whilst he does not rule out the fact that certain regulations, maxims and indeed rules can be put into propositional form, they remain inert unless they are coupled with the ability to use such rules intelligently, to know how to select amongst the rules, and to appreciated the applicability of an appropriate rule, etc. One “might accept any set of hypothetical propositions and still not know how to cook or drive a car.” (1946a, 230) No amount of propositional knowledge of the rules of an activity will serve in place of the knowledge of how to use those rules. “[P]ropositional acknowledge of rules, reasons or principles is not the parent of the intelligent application of them; it is a step-child of that application” (1946a, 228)

In rejecting the intellectualist proposal that our knowledge of rules is but a sub-division of our propositional knowledge, Ryle aims to offer instead not only an understanding of what these rules are, but how it is that they constitute our know-how. The detail of this position turns on distinguishing two broad types of rules and the two associated types of education whereby they are learnt. ‘Performance rules’, as he calls them are, according to Ryle, “criteria according to which performances are characterised as legitimate or illegitimate, correct or incorrect, suitable or unsuitable, etc.” (1946b, 238) They can be divided into two main categories: (i) Procrustean rules and (ii) “rules or canons of style, strategy, prudence, skill and taste.” (1946b, 240). The first are rules which are learnt by conditioning, the second by a particular conception of practice; the first are involved in generating our blind habits, the second in the formation, acquisition and on-going development of our skills, abilities and generally intelligent powers. Though we are disciplined in both kinds of rule-involving activity, it is the Procrustean rules whose observance is, “inculcated by sheer drill” becoming “automatic or habitual” in normal circumstances. By contrast, the non-Procrustean rules are “taught by criticism rather than rote and we have never finished learning them.” (1946b, 240) Hence Ryle discriminates between those performances and activities achievable in virtue of habituation involving merely Procrustean rules, such as spelling, sloping arms, chanting the multiplication table, fastening buttons etc., and those requiring education and training in the second kind of

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10 I use the expression ‘rule-involving’, which though not Ryle’s, is, I trust both a fair and neutral way of highlighting the centrality for Ryle of the normative performance aspects of know-how without imposing on his view any of implications behind the more familiar locations of ‘rule-following’, or ‘rule-governed’. It is not the task of this dissertation to argue for a particular understanding of our rule-following practices, or what it is to engage in normative activity, though clearly this is a task whose importance is exposed by much of the argument that unfolds here and in Chapters 5 and 7.
rules; such as writing flowing prose, reading maps, constructing mathematical proofs and designing dresses. Whilst the former skills and performances are sometimes described as “mere competences”, only the latter skills involve “craftsmanship” and thus have a, “place for originality, ingenuity, taste or flair.” (1993, 60) This distinction notwithstanding, it is the case that “a performance is an exercise of a skill”, (1949, 33) whichever kind of rule or rules is involved. Hence Ryle’s insistence that “[k]nowing a rule is knowing how.” (1946a, 227)

Thus, for Ryle, knowledge in general includes not only propositional knowledge but this irreducibly non-propositional knowledge, or normative know-how. “The advance of knowledge does not consist only in the accumulation of discovered truths, but also and chiefly in the cumulative mastery of methods.” (1946a, 234). That said, having identified the notions of normative performance and the mastery of methods, as key to his account of know-how, Ryle leaves the crucial aspect of what it is for a performance to be rule-involving, tantalizingly incomplete. Intellectualist-orientated critics, almost invariably avoid engaging with the question of what it means to engage in a rule-involving performance or practice, preferring to reconstruct Ryle’s account of know-how in terms of ability. There are three main exceptions to this; one intellectualist, two anti-intellectualist. The first, historically speaking, is the intellectualist D. G. Brown, who though arguing for the view that “all knowing how is knowing that” briefly raises the topic of rule. He then goes on to pose but no answer one of the key questions any such discussion prompts, namely, “if knowing a rule is said to be exhibited in performance, one has the analogous problem of why it is called knowing rather than being able to act in accordance with the rule.” (1970, 219). These notoriously difficult issues surrounding rule-following,

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11 Roland (1958) is a rare and early example of questions being raised (if not answers given) about the issue and importance of normative practice.
12 This is in contrast to Snowdon (2004), the first major article to reconsider Ryle in the wake of S&W (2001) which barely acknowledges the notion of rule-involvement, but takes Ryle to be proposing, instead, a “Capacity Thesis” that “knowing how to G does in fact consist in being able to G, in having the capacity to G.” (2004, 2) This fails to discriminate between capacities that are one, as opposed to two-way powers, as well as missing out the rule-involving issues. See also Brogaard (2011), who takes Ryle’s view to be an ability account, which, like S&W she then seeks to challenge by counter-example, whilst ignoring any characteristics pertinent to normative performance. (In this respect she reveals her Chomskyan linguistic heritage, as will become clear in the wake of Chapter 6).
13 Brown (1970, 219-221) makes an further distinction between what he calls the “English use” of know-how, whereby if you don’t know how to do something you aren’t able, e.g., to run a projector, or build a house, as opposed to the “standard use”, whereby though you don’t know how to do properly something you are still able to do it, after a fashion, e.g., move about in a canoe, address a magistrate.
acting in accordance with a rule, and the possibility of rule-skepticism\textsuperscript{14}, do muddy the waters for Ryleans and critics alike.

The original anti-intellectualist engagement with this central issue of rule-involvement is David Carr, who is unique in his appreciation of the importance of understanding “knowing how as a partly a matter of grasping the rules of an activity.” (1981, 55) Unfortunately, Carr does not seek to investigate further this matter, himself, instead he offers his own a tripartite account of knowing-how analogous to the justified, true belief account of propositional knowledge, which turns on being able to entertain an action and being acquainted with a set of success-involving practical procedures.\textsuperscript{15} Of course, one could suggest that any account that analyses know-how into ‘success-involving practical procedures’ without further illumination on the crucial matter of rule-involving matter has not moved on much further than Ryle. Not to mention it risks conflating success and correctness conditions, which would, of course, be a counter-productive step.

The second (more anti-intellectualist than intellectualist) engagement with this difficult element of Ryle’s view, is offered by Ian Rumfitt (2011). But though Rumfitt entirely agrees that the rule-involving activity of “deduction itself is not piloted by the knowledge of true propositions”, this being the very “moral of Lewis Carroll’s fable” (2011, 358)\textsuperscript{16}, he does question whether or not “a deductive capacity is a form of Rylean know how to.” (2011, 359) He regards the lack of clarity on this

\textsuperscript{14}Cf., Gellner (1951) for the worry that whilst Ryle is correct to bring in rules, he still needs to address what it is for a rule of inference (say), to be a correct rule. Of course, Ryle might respond to this challenge by pointing out that this is to misunderstand his notion of a rule. For a rule is not itself correct (or otherwise) rather it is the standard against which rule-involving behaviour can be compared and thus adjudged correct or incorrect.

\textsuperscript{15}This proposal has, more recently, been picked up by Hawley (2003) who similarly suggests that there is a, “structural analogy between propositional knowledge and know-how” (2003, 20) where “knowledge-how can be understood in terms of successful actions plus warrant.” (2003, 19) Though she takes her version to be a framework for further investigation which leaves open whether or not know-how is a “subtype” (2003, 20) of propositional knowledge.

\textsuperscript{16}See Ryle (1946, 226-227) for the original discussion of Lewis Carroll (1895). In personal conversation (October 15\textsuperscript{th}, 2009, Geneva) Stanley declared that he was “discomforted” and “annoyed” by Carroll’s puzzle and remained unclear as to what it sought to show. His attempts to engage with Carroll’s discussion though drawing on Rumfitt’s nice distinction (in Rumfitt’s 2011) between deducing and inferring show that he still struggles to understand the Carroll point. “If the moral of the Lewis Carroll case is that there is a gap between standing epistemic states of the agent and the manifestation or application of those states on a particular occasion, appealing to more standing epistemic states of the agent, whether propositional or not, is no solution at all.’ (Stanley 2011a, 31) This reveals the source of the problem, for Stanley interprets the question at issue as being about the status of some supposed ‘standing epistemic states’, whereas for Ryle (like Carroll), the question is not about the status of these states, but the supposed fact of them in the first place. Given Stanley (as will be discussed in the next chapter) operates with a propositional (and indeed a Fodorian computational) theory of mind, then, inevitably, the idea that Ryle doesn’t cannot be accommodated.
subject to stem from unresolved issues concerning the source, and codification of, the relevant deductive principles. Which is, I think, yet another way of highlighting worries about just what it might be engage in a normative activity somehow governed by, or in accord with, rules.

Standard anti-Rylean criticism starts with the assumption that Ryle is providing an ability account of know-how, possibly along the lines of (or as identical with) what epistemology textbooks sometimes characterise as ability knowledge. Having given Ryle this ‘ability account’ construal, critical attention is then typically trained on issues pertaining to what it is to be (usually physically) able to do something. Although there is, for Ryle, a normative aspect to his know-how, it is almost entirely ignored under cover of this emphasis by others on ability, rather than performance. To the extent that ‘performativity’ is sometimes a characteristic invoked, normativity again remains un-considered. I trust that the above, however, motivates the importance of undertaking this task, not merely as part of a proper understanding and characterisation of Ryle’s position, but for any proposal that seeks to build on, or incorporate a Rylean perspective into their own account of the epistemology of know-how.

With this caveat in mind, I concede to the more conventional terminology and characterisation of Ryle’s so-called ‘ability’ account, and consider the specific intellectualist criticism that is proposed.

2.1 Knowledge-how as Ability: Intellectualist Responses

Intellectualist criticisms of Ryle’s supposed ability account of know-how seek to show that know-how and ability come apart. The general strategy employed is the challenge-by-counter-example favoured by Stanley & Williamson. S&W’s original ultra-brief critique states that Ryle claims “knowledge-how is an ability” (2001, 411). In the space of one paragraph, they then challenge this view by tabling two supposed

17 The distinction between propositional and ability knowledge (and often also acquaintance knowledge) is typically presented as the starting point for epistemology in the introductions to contemporary textbooks, only to be immediately put aside and never mentioned again, as propositional knowledge becomes the focus of the all further consideration. The importance of this contemporary practice for the current debate is articulated in Chapter 5.

18 The thoroughly naturalized philosophical environment of today’s epistemological landscape, however, makes the possibility of a reconsideration of the normative aspects of Ryle’s work look increasingly unlikely.
counter-examples (the ski-instructor and the armless pianist) to show that “[i]t is entirely false, however, that ascriptions of knowledge-how ascribe abilities.” (2001, 416) In both cases, S&W insist that the ability supposedly entailed by Rylean know-how is not present. For, whilst a ski-instructor might know how to perform a complex stunt, she may, nonetheless, be herself unable to perform it. An armless pianist, the victim of a terrible accident, may at one time have been a virtuoso, and thus though she can reasonably be said to know how to play, she is no longer able.

Neither case is, however, as straightforward as S&W’s swift dismissal might suggest. Consider the ski-instructor. The proposal is that whilst she does know-how to do some particularly complex stunt, she is nonetheless unable to actually do it, and as such Ryle’s (or indeed, any putative) ability account of know-how fails. Presumably, though, for S&W to think it makes any sense at all to ascribe know how to the ski instructor, in the first place, there must be some feature or criteria that makes the know-how ascription, itself, plausible. The only viable option here would seem to be that this know-how is what she possesses in virtue of being an instructor, rather than a skier. I take it that it is an uncontroversial (and necessary) feature of this scenario, that the ski instructor teaches, trains or coaches other skiers such that they can and do progress from be unable to do the stunt under consideration, to being able to do it. And that this is as a result of her direct involvement. This looks to be required by S&W’s view that the ski instructor knows-how even though she’s unable to do the stunt. Yet, if this is the case, then are S&W not mis-identifying the ski-instructor’s particular type of know-how, perhaps in virtue of their failure to appreciate a conventional ellipsis in our natural speech?

For, it is not that the ski-instructor knows how to perform the stunt, but rather than she knows how to teach someone else how to perform the stunt, or knows how to train someone else to do the stunt, or knows how to coach someone, or knows how to advise, guide or otherwise, correct someone who is learning how to do the stunt. Insofar as the ski-instructor can help a stunt-Novice learn how to achieve a complex stunt, the ski-instructor can be said to know-how to teach such moves and to be able to teach, train, coach, advise, guide or correct someone such that they, themselves, might come to have the ability to do it. So the instructor knows how and is able, to

\[19\] Note S&W’s challenge, here quoted, also indicates the extent to which they move indiscriminately between both targeting or providing an account of nature of know-how per se and an account of the nature of know-how ascriptions.
teach a skier how to perform the complex stunt. If, in her entire teaching, training, or coaching career, not one of her students had ever achieved the particular stunt under consideration, then we would not be tempted to say that she knows how to teach the stunt, and thus the supposed counter-example could not get off the ground.

This reading, which goes unacknowledged and unexplored by S&W, is perhaps ignored because of the conventional ellipsis in our natural speech. It is unexceptional to refer to those teachers, trainers and coaches of our abilities, activities and skills, as people with the relevant knowledge of those abilities and skills; whether or not they are able to exemplify those abilities and skills themselves. Indeed, the mark of a great teacher is often taken to be the extent to which he or she is outstripped by his or her own pupils or protégés.

Unfortunately for S&W, the opportunity to respond to this counter-challenge, is limited by the constraints of their own general methodology. For, (as will be seen in the next chapter), S&W cannot favour, let alone acknowledge the elliptical version, because of the demands of their own positive account of know-how. This turns on their principled rejection of ordinary speech as any kind of legitimate guide to the issue at hand. Instead accurate, detailed and comprehensive analysis of the supposed deep linguistic structure and content of the relevant know-how sentences is the central tool of their own grammatically sourced propositional account of know-how. So the only viable response S&W might make here is closed off to them, on pain of inconsistency.

This leaves S&W’s challenge to Ryle’s ability-based account resting entirely on their second counter-example: the armless pianist. The claim here is that, having suffered a tragic accident, in which she loses her arms, the now armless pianist still knows how to play, whilst being unable. Thus Ryle’s supposed claim that to know how to F is to be able to F, is false. The apparent force of S&W’s armless pianist example confuses: (i) being able to do something, as a personal skill, capacity or ability, and (ii) being able to exercise one’s ability to do something because one has the right equipment, facilities or associates.

One might well know how to knit, but without needles and wool one cannot exercise one’s ability. One might know how to dance the tango but, similarly without the appropriate resources, in this case music, together with a dancing partner, one cannot exercise this ability. In such contexts one might say the knitter and the dancer have lost the ability to knit and tango, though their know-how remains undiminished.
But, in another sense, neither has lost their particular ability, rather they are (temporarily) deprived of the equipment, facilities or requisite colleagues.20

What of the armless pianist? S&W insist that though her ability to play the piano is lost, as a result of losing her arms; her know-how, however, remains intact. Though she no longer possesses the necessary equipment (albeit bodily) required to strike the keys, her know-how is undimmed.21 Her predicament, like that of the ski instructor, supposedly shows that know-how fails to entail ability, as Ryle’s account is deemed to require. According to S&W, the pianist, “still knows how to play the piano […] but has lost her ability to do so”. (2001, 416) Unlike the knitter, temporarily deprived of wool & needles, or the currently partner-less tango dancer, the pianist cannot regain her ability by changing location, meeting a fellow dancer, or doing some shopping. Were the pianist to be on stage at Carnegie Hall, seated in front of the world’s finest Steinway she would still, unfortunately, be unable to play. Perhaps S&W are right. If one’s equipment or resources are personal physical attributes, then their loss is a genuine loss of ability, whilst the associated know-how is retained.

For S&W’s counter-example to undermine Ryle’s supposed ability knowledge several issues, however, need to be resolved. First of all, Ryle needs to be providing, or attempting to provide, necessary and sufficient conditions for know-how; which he is not. Alternatively, he would need to be proposing that know-how and ability are synonymous; which he is not. Furthermore, an argument would need to be supplied to justify why one extreme counter-example, on the fringes of the normal usage of the word ‘ability’ should de-rail our countless unproblematic applications of the word. No such argument is offered. These three considerations point to a meta-philosophical tactic which I will call ‘the Domino Strategy’. The Domino Strategy proposes that possibilities from the extremities of unproblematic use, are capable of undermining or even destroying our regular and familiar understanding. Rather than seek for an even more outlying (and outlandish) domino in an attempt to supply some kind of an antidote (perhaps the pianist could have radical prosthetic surgery, etc…) I reject this

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20 Cf., Maier (MSS and 2010) for a recent articulation of a familiar distinction between what he calls having a general ability (to say, play tennis) and the specific ability (to serve right now, because one is on court, racket and ball in hand.)

21 In personal conversation with Williamson (June 23rd, 2010, Geneva) he suggested that the pianist’s know-how might fade, as a result of deterioration in what he took be the necessary associated brain states. This indicates that the metaphysics behind Stanley & Williamson’s views which were unarticulated in their (2001), but have recently come to light in Stanley (2011a) are indeed shared by Williamson.
modus operandi, on the grounds that it is self-defeating. If we cannot work with the idea that the concepts of know-how and ability run – if not always – then for a substantial amount of time – along parallel tracks, then neither term would have any of its usual meaning for us, and the concepts involved would no longer be recognisable. Were this to be the case, neither the intellectualist nor the anti-intellectualist would have any idea of the subject-matter they were attempting to discuss.

More importantly, however, the armless pianist example crucially brings home the importance of distinguishing between some supposed general ability account which Ryle is taken to be championing, and the normative performance account he actually is. For part of this normative performance account is that it holds that knowing how to do something is a matter of knowing how to do a range of things. This involves not just having one, but a set of interconnected skills; not all of which need be lost, in cases of bodily harm. For in knowing-how to do something one not only is likely to utilise one’s own physical abilities, as part of one’s skillful performance, one has a collection of skills and abilities which relate to and involve other performers and practitioners. So a knitter, or a tango dancer, not only knows how to knit or tango themselves, but they can evaluate the individual rule-involving performances of other performers; detect their faults, predict their moves, appreciate the quality of their creative responses to the particular situations or circumstances encountered, and much more. So for Ryle, when a person knows how to play the piano, one is not simply saying that their fingers can hit the keys in some appropriate way, nor is one saying that they have a further range of skills such as, inter alia, being able to play a number of different pieces, hearing when they have hit a wrong note, sight-reading, discriminating major and minor chords, etc. It also acknowledges that as someone with know-how, a person possesses a range of skills and abilities that enable one to detect mistakes in other pianists’ performances, distinguish the interpretative choices made by other players, advise on or correct other players’ technique, tell if another’s performance has improved, etc. Thus, whilst S&W’s armless pianist may have lost her own physical ability to play the piano, as a result of a tragic accident, she need not have lost the ability to perform these other skills which
are also part-constitutive of her piano-playing know-how. So even if S&W’s Domino Strategy is admissable, it only works if their initial characterisation of Ryle’s view is (i) an ability account, rather than a normative performance account and (ii) a very thin ability account, at that. As this misrepresents and under appreciates both the principle and the detail of Ryle’s account, I conclude that S&W’s challenge-by-counter-example, like their criticism of the Regress Argument, fails.

That said, there are two features of Ryle’s account which do appear to be more vulnerable, neither of which are given any scrutiny by S&W. In the next section I consider the first of these, namely, the role of dispositions as they relate to normative performance.

3 Complex Skills & Dispositions

Key to Ryle’s account of knowing-how is the notion of normative performance. Given this involves skills, abilities, competences, capacities, knacks, tendencies, and bents then it does makes some sense to speak of Ryle’s account as an ability account of know-how. This conception is, though, parasitic on his more fundamental claim that know-how is constituted by normative performances.

In his wider-ranging elucidation of the logical geography of mental concepts Ryle categorises the notion of these rule-involving skills as being kinds of dispositions. He approaches the concept of dispositions from two perspectives; that of the skill itself and that of the individual performer. “[T]he skill exercised in a performance […] is a disposition, or complex of dispositions.” (1949, 33) “The way in which rules, standards, techniques, criteria, etc. govern his particular performances is one with the way in which his dispositional excellences are actualised in those performances.” (1946a, 233) Thus, for Ryle, the contribution dispositions make is crucially and directly related to the rule-involving character of our know-how. As

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22 Cf., Hornsby’s (2007) reminder that “it is the variety in the ways for someone to act which can display her knowledge of how to participate in some one activity”, (second emphasis added), and thus it is implausible that complex activities like pruning roses should just be the kind of “series of token events” presumed in standard action theory. (2007, 179) Though she does not explore the normative dimension of performance directly, Hornsby takes her point to explain why, perhaps, Ryle focusses on activities rather than more paradigmatic actions (like turning on light switches). “The same sort of considerations that lead to seeing the inadequacies of an account of actions as belief-desire-caused bodily movements (the “standard story”) would seem to serve to show that there is knowledge how which is not propositional.” (2007, 180) Somewhat confusingly, however, in Hornsby (2011), however, she talks about “standing in the relation of knowing-how to an activity or type of action”, which looks in danger of instigating an epistemic gap that sits awkwardly with the rest of her account.
such, it is not immediately obvious whether Ryle’s notion of a disposition is one and
the same as those perhaps more familiar metaphysical or scientific conceptions of a
dispositions \textit{qua} some kind of state or property of physical substances. Nor indeed
does Ryle introduce his notion of disposition as a preliminary to some possible
ensuing naturalistic reduction from the normative to the non-normative. Rather, Ryle
uses the notion of dispositions specifically to further explore normativity; to
investigate the often law-like, features of (some of) our mental concepts.

Just as, “to say that this lump of sugar is soluble is to say that it would
dissolve, if submersed anywhere, at any time and in any parcel of water” (1949, 119)
so to know that someone speaks French provides one with a licence to conclude a
variety of further things about that person. These include, but are not limited to, if
“he is ever addressed in French, or shown any French newspaper, he responds
pertinently in French”, or were he not to do so, then one might reasonably infer that
he is might be drunk or in a panic. To say that knowing how to speak French is a
disposition and that it therefore has a law-like aspect, is not to say that there is some
singular and particular state in existence that will bring about some singular and
particular further state of affairs, but rather that one is licensed to make certain
inferences. This is because, for Ryle, “Dispositional statements are neither reports of
observed or observable states of affairs, nor yet reports of unobserved or unobservable
states of affairs. They narrate no incidents. But their jobs a
re intimately connected
with narratives of incidents.” (1949, 120) Instead, statements about dispositions are
statements about law-like, hypothetical statements, what Ryle calls, “inference tickets
which license us to predict, retrodict, explain and modify” as opposed to describe,
“actions, reactions and states.” (1949, 119). Thus to find out that “John Doe knows
French”, one “needs no further ticket to enable him to argue from his having read a
telegram in French to his having made sense of it.” (1949, 120)

I suggest, however, that in so articulating the notion of skill as a dispositional
concept, Ryle’s is doing two things, each of which pull in different directions. On the
one hand, particularly in the specific context of knowing-how, he is doing too little:
for the move to dispositions looks to be simply a more confusing \textit{re-expression} of the
characteristic rule-involving aspect of his view of skillful performance. Not one that
gets closer, however, to resolving the various open questions that are prompted by the
problematic issues of rule-following, and what it is to act in accordance with a rule.
On the other hand, Ryle is doing too much, by bringing in a term that now looks to be
so liberal and diverse in its potential applications that it risks failing to provide any real traction, at all.\textsuperscript{23} As Ryle acknowledges, “many of the cardinal concepts in terms of which we describe specifically human behaviour are dispositional concepts”, though such terms are also used “just as much for describing animals, insects, crystals and atoms.” (1949, 112)

Being both too narrow and too broad in its scope, as well as too mired in a raft of competing metaphysical theories and presumptions, this dispositional aspect to knowing-how is a hindrance rather than a help to our understanding.\textsuperscript{24} Indeed those intellectualists who choose to aim their critical blows at the dispositional part of Ryle’s account, do seem to have identified its most vulnerable feature. I suggest, however, that this difficulty with Ryle’s account is not as damaging as might be thought. For the introduction of dispositions is not an attempt on Ryle’s part to hitch his conceptual geography to a particular metaphysics. On the contrary, it is his chosen route into the issues and difficulties involved in the notion of rule-involving, normative performance. Though this road proves to be counter-productive, pursuit of its quarry remains of genuine value, given the connections it helps to establish and consolidate. Specifically, those links between human nature, indeed our second nature, and the rule-involving education, training, practices and activities which contribute to its inculcation. That a dispositional account is not the way to articulate this, makes it no less the case that, “rules etc. are the living nerves of that second nature.” (1946a, 233)

By tackling the rule-following considerations and their relevance to our know-how, \textit{without} involving dispositions, one might sidestep the troublesome waters of Ryle’s account, rather than surrender to them. For the avoidance of doubt, this is not a task that can be attempted or accomplished here, but the need for and value of it, is becoming unquestionable.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{23} See Ammerman (1956) for the impossibility of providing a coherent account of dispositions in general, and thus \textit{a fortiori} of providing a dispositional account of knowing-how, together with Carr on the, “intractable problems about dispositional analyses” (1981, 55) in general.
\textsuperscript{24} Cf., Hartland-Swann (1956) and (1957) where the difficulties with the nature of dispositional concepts cause Hartland-Swann to rescind his initial account that all knowing is a dispositional know-how under pressure from Ammerman (1956). Though the dependency relation comes into question in the work of Maier (MSS) for whom, “a false presupposition that dispositions are more fundamental than abilities.” Yet further evidence that a move to dispositions looks unlikely to be of any explanatory benefit.
\textsuperscript{25} Even for those naturalized philosophers who might think that rules can be reduced to non-normative properties, some commentary, as opposed to silence on the topic, would seem to be warranted.
4 Ryle’s Priority Thesis

Ryle not only makes a categorial distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that but claims that knowing-how is prior to knowing-that. In insisting, however, that, “knowing-that presupposes knowing-how” (1946a, 234) he may be in danger of making the kinds of confusions he charges the intellectualist with. I complete my critical evaluation of Ryle’s account of know-how by considering what I will call his ‘Priority Thesis’.

Ryle’s claim is that propositional knowledge is not merely different in kind from know-how, but subsequent to any such knowing-how.

To know a truth, I must have discovered or established it.
But discovering and establishing are intelligent operations, requiring rules of method, checks, tests, criteria, etc. A scientist or an historian is primarily a man who knows how to decide certain sorts of question. Only secondarily is he a man who has discovered a lot of facts. (1946a, 234)

But as already seen with Ryle’s Regress Argument, propositional knowledge alone cannot get going without knowing how to engage with and use propositional knowledge. In rejecting intellectualist approaches which not only prioritise propositional knowledge, but make knowledge exclusively propositional, Ryle swings the pendulum in the opposite direction, and prioritises knowledge-how. A scientist, he insists, “is primarily a knower-how and only secondarily a knower-that. He couldn’t discover any particular truth unless he knew how to discover.” (1946a, 235)

Yet, in the very next sentence, Ryle challenges this own Priority Thesis. “He [the scientist] couldn’t know how to discover, without making this or that particular discovery”. (1946a, 235) This indicates a central tension in Ryle’s work, for though he repeatedly insists on the necessity for the priority of knowing-how, he simultaneously appears to propose a more interdependent view of the relation between knowing-how and knowing-that. Furthermore, the idea of what David

26 The irreducible (but noticeably intertwined rather than prior) nature of a scientist’s imaginative ‘know-how’ is a topic pursued by Michael Polanyi. “I regard knowing as an active comprehension of the things known, an action that requires a skill.” (1958, vii) Furthermore, “[T]hrough the exercise of his skill [the scientist] shapes his scientific knowledge.” (1958, 49)
Wiggins characterises as the, “manifold relations of interdependence” (2009, 263) is not, he suggests, a view that is undermined in any way, by the suggestion that knowledge-how and knowledge-that are distinct. Just as it is difficult, “perhaps, impossible ‘cleanly to apportion’” the role played by self-love and benevolence in the motivation of action, nonetheless there one can still be actions motivated by “genuine benevolence.” (2009, 267) So too, according to Wiggins, with what he describes as Ryle’s “back-and-forth” view of the two types of knowledge. That said, it is indicative of the mixed signals in Ryle’s writings on this point that Wiggins chooses to support his interdependent reading with a substantial quote from Ryle in which the priority thesis is, yet again, re-stated. (2009, 266) Ryle’s own claims of priority notwithstanding, I do agree that regarding knowing-how and know-that as conceptually twinned better fits the meta-philosophical framework of Ryle’s self-professed task.

The danger for Ryle is that in resisting the forces of intellectualism, he unwittingly steps away from the principles which guide his method of mapping the logical geography of our mental concepts. For a conceptual relation between knowledge-how and knowledge-that is not the same as an empirical relation. Where it might make sense to talk of a priority thesis in an empirical context, there is an atemporality to conceptual relations, which Ryle is here failing to acknowledge. Yet the rest of work is a constant reminder that his points are to be understood conceptually and not empirically. As Ryle reminds us, the “mind is not even a metaphorical place. On the contrary, the chessboard, the platform, the scholar’s desk, the judge’s bench, the lorry-driver’s seat, the studio and the football field are among its places. These are where people work and play stupidly or intelligently.” (1949, 50)

I will not attempt to arbitrate further on the priority thesis, but merely acknowledge the relevance of the question it raises, for any epistemology of know-how, and the extent to which its very use acts as a litmus test for the appreciation of a distinction between empirical and conceptual approaches. In Chapter 4’s investigation into the notion of concept mastery this issue will again be considered, as

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27 Cf., Christopher Winch (2009) for the concern that far from having an interdependent conception of the know-how and know-that relation, Ryle “tends to disparage the role of propositional knowledge in expert practices” and “seriously underplays the role of the propositional.” (2009, 88)

28 The interdependency of knowing-how and knowing-that is perhaps the insight that Wittgenstein appreciates and articulates in On Certainty (which will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 5).
part of the task to provide an argumentative step towards my own understanding of know-how in which any attempt to prioritise one of the conceptual pair (of our know-how and our know-that) risks making both unrecognisable (as will be articulated in Chapter 7).

5 Alternative Anti-Intellectualists

According to Ryle’s own autobiographical note, *The Concept of Mind*, “is a philosophical book written with a meta-philosophical purpose.” (1970, 12) Part of this purpose is, I suggest, to engage, directly and in detail, with the kind of conceptual clarification that Ryle regards as the primary task of philosophy. Part of Ryle’s task is to develop, practice and demonstrate the skills involved in philosophizing, not only for himself but for the wider philosophical community. A decade prior to this major work in logical cartography, Ryle is already sensitive to the distinction between the task and methods of philosophy and science. “[T]he philosopher throws new light, but he does not give new information.” (1937, 173)

This view was (and still is) at odds, however, with the growing naturalistic priorities, preferences and presumptions that emerged in the post-War period and were consolidated in the second half of the twentieth century. This orientation is one in which philosophers seek to diminish or eliminate the distinction between philosophy and science.29 Such a climate is anathematic to Ryle’s suggestion that, “To suppose that a philosopher’s propositions can be falsified or corroborated by a new empirical discovery is to annihilate the difference between philosophy and the special sciences.” (1937, 169-170) Indeed, to so suppose would be to fall prey to conceptual error. It is unsurprising, therefore, that such affiliations between philosophy and science tend not to occur in the work of those philosophers of a more anti-intellectualist flavour. Having said that, there are a few philosophers emerging who are seeking to harness experimental evidence to the service of anti-intellectualism in general, and Ryle’s specific views on knowing-how, in particular.

Garry Young proposes that the findings of neuroscience provide evidence for Ryle’s distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that. It is a distinction, he claims, which is scientifically ‘proven’ by comparing the “key neurological pathways

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29 I pursue these meta-philosophical distinctions further in Chapter 6.
said to subserve visuomotor action – the ventral and dorsal projections from the area VI of the visual cortex” (2009, 355) in patients suffering from visual agnosia. In one such visually-impaired patient, DF, who cannot indicate with her hand the angle of a narrow slot, can nonetheless successfully post a letter through the same slot. By comparing DF’s damaged ventral streams and the undamaged dorsal streams, Young concludes that she retains a know-how that is more than mere ability, and yet is irreducible to propositional knowledge. But this already requires Young to be working with the very conceptual distinction he wishes to prove. “It is my view that DF and similar patient are able to engage with their environments, in a manner that is distinguishable from a mere physical ability to G, precisely because their movements are knowledge-based.” (2009, 342) Young’s repeated use (in both 2009, and 2011) of the idea that know-how is knowledge-based (my emphasis), in tandem with his insistence on localising knowing-how in particular parts of the brain, point to the very confusions which Ryle, took as part of the problem of the Intellectualist Legend, not the solution or dissolution, he was aiming to provide.

That said, Young is not alone in seeking to provide evidence for anti-intellectualism. Similar localizing and causal approaches can be found in Kumar (2011). “In order to intelligently guide behaviour the cerebellum represents in some way how the body is to be positioned. Plausibly, however, the cerebellum does not encode information propositionally. So knowing how to keep balance on a bike does not consist in having a propositionally encoded representation”. (2011, 147) This claim is designed to serve the connectionist approach to mental representations favoured by Kumar. Thus, “[t]o know how is to possess descriptive representations of the world, perhaps, but it also requires a connection with the structures of the mind responsible for guiding behaviour.” (2011, 153 emphases added)

Both Young and Kumar succumb to what Bennett & Hacker call, in full Rylean spirit, ‘the mereological fallacy’ (2003, Ch.3), namely the mistake of ascribing to the part, a characteristic or property which can only be ascribed to the whole. For, it is not the ventral stream that knows how to do something, nor the cerebellum, but

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30 In Young (2011) he compares the know-how supposedly had by a visual agnosia patient, to the know-how supposedly lacking in a patient suffering from optic ataxia.
31 Confusion between conceptual and empirical matters are also to be found in Adams (2009) who claims, “Despite Ryle’s unsuccessful refutation of intellectualism, it seems his positive argument for the distinction has, in the end, been vindicated by empirical research.” (2009, 112)
32 Though see Fodor & Plyshyn (1988) for a challenge to the supposed non-representationality of connectionist approaches to mental representations.
the person (and only a person) that knows how to do anything. A point to which I will be returning in subsequent chapters when considering the commitments in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science to see what views wider afield, maybe constraining the epistemology of know-how. The point being here, however, that one cannot understand Ryle’s legacy without appreciating the relevance and the inextricability of the meta-philosophical commitments that are at work.

It suffices for the moment to acknowledge that there are philosophers who, though sharing the principled distinction between know-how and know-that and thereby claiming to be either heirs to, or supporters of, Ryle, nonetheless appear to be using methods that manifest the conceptual confusions that he wishes to dispel. They risk doing the very thing Ryle is proud to have managed always to avoid, what he characterises as, “committing any metaphysics.” (Wood & Pitcher 1970, 10)

6 Concluding Remarks

Ryle’s conceptual distinction between knowing-how and know-that is supported by an argument that reveals the absurdity of the intellectualist presumption that knowing-how might be reducible to knowing-that. The most important substantial attempt to show that the Regress Argument for this reductio does not go through, itself fails; leaving the Regress Argument unassailed and apparently invulnerable. Intellectualist criticism of Ryle’s view tries to drive a wedge between know-how and ability, on the assumption that Ryle’s position takes ability to be the necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge-how. But this is mistaken, because Ryle is not engaged in supplying necessary or sufficient conditions as part of some supposed ‘analysis’ of know-how, rather he is pursuing the non-metaphysical task of establishing the logical geography of our mental concepts. Furthermore, the account Ryle does present about the nature of know-how takes rule-involving normative performance, not ability, as its primary notion.

33 Cf., Hutto’s suggestion that there is a difficulty for those profess anti-intellectualist leanings, “to make sense of practical knowledge without falling back on the representationalist paradigm for support.” (2005, 390) An example of which is to be found in Brogaard (2011) who argues that by articulating ambiguities surrounding, “the two ways in which a knowledge state can be grounded”, the apparent conflict between Ryle and S&W can be shown to be “partially resolved”. But this requires the kind of (metaphysical) mental states and mental representation which Ryle eschews. So yet again, the supposed solution just reinstates the problem.
Ryle’s own attempts to provide greater illumination about the rule-involving nature of knowing-how turn down something of a cul-de-sac, however, with his move to involve dispositions; a strategy that rightly comes in for criticism. Nonetheless, I take it to be indicative of the centrality of the involvement of rules; motivating the need for further consideration of this matter. Similarly, Ryle’s claim that know-how is prior to know-that is noted, together with the internal tensions that would speak for a more interdependent relation between knowing-how and knowing-that. I resist the urge to adjudicate on which view is correct exegesis of Ryle, but take it as motivating the importance of acknowledging and further clarifying the priority vs. interdependence tension for any non-reductive account of know-how. (A point to which I return in Chapter 5 with the entry of Wittgenstein into the discussion.)

I now turn to the leading contemporary intellectualist proposal about knowing-how: that of Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson. For, whilst S&W have not provided any successful arguments against Ryle, perhaps their own positive account is similarly impregnable.

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Propositional Intellectualism

Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson deny that knowing how to do something, and knowing that something is the case, are two distinct kinds of knowledge. According to their leading propositional intellectualist\textsuperscript{34} account, know-how is a species of propositional knowledge. Whether it be our knowledge how to ride a bicycle, play the piano, dance the tango, make a roast dinner, tell jokes, do long division, compose symphonies, play hockey, read, write, or speak one’s mother tongue, all know-how is propositional knowledge or knowledge-that. Stanley & Williamson argue that their conclusion is justified by the deliverances of linguistics, specifically the linguistic theories of embedded questions. Furthermore, not only does their account run counter to the supposedly misguided claims of anti-intellectualist Gilbert Ryle, for whom knowing-how is deemed to be a matter of having a (non-propositional) ability, it claims to diagnose why Ryle’s view is intuitively appealing.

In the previous chapter, I argued that Stanley & Williamson’s specific arguments against Ryle’s understanding of know-how failed to bite. I now show the extent to which Stanley & Williamson’s positive account is not only unjustified, but is built on undermining inconsistencies and confusions. I focus primarily on their (2001) locus classicus, which is the paradigmatic articulation of post-Rylean propositional intellectualism. I also utilise material from the continued exploration of knowing-how by Jason Stanley alone, including his (2005), (2011a), (2011b) (2011c), as well as a variety of additional satellite suggestions from Yuri Cath and other intellectualists. Stanley & Williamson are henceforth referred to as S&W.

In Section 1, I provide an exposition of S&W’s three-stage positive account of the nature of know-how, in order to make available the detail on which my challenges rest. I follow their explanatory order from the initial consideration of the syntax of so-called ‘know how’ sentences; through the relevant semantics; to the practical mode of presentation of true propositional knowledge ascriptions. In each associated subsection, I raise a variety of my own concerns, accepting as much as possible of

\textsuperscript{34} “Propositional Intellectualism” is perhaps the most unambiguous term. Both “Intellectualism” and “Propositionalism” (see Braun, 2011) are also used as synonyms, if less often. Caution is required given the recent arrival of Non-Propositional Intellectualism (see Bengson & Moffett, (2007), (2011b) and (2011c).
S&W’s theoretical apparatus, in order to critically engage with S&W’s proposal on their own terms. In Section 2, I consider the main challenges which Stanley considers S&W’s account must address, and show that the suggested responses leave several key anti-intellectualist concerns unaddressed. Pursuing these pressures, I explore a problematic conflation together with three further issues on which S&W have, thus far, been near-silent. In the concluding remarks of Section 3, I reflect on issues exposed by this critical discussion to help identify the three different levels at which propositional intellectualism, as presented, unravels. In so doing, I also implicitly commit to a view (implicitly shared by S&W) that providing any preferred epistemology of know-how requires a simultaneous commitment to a particular metaphilosophical position. This motivates the closer look at meta-philosophical matters in Chapter 6. To begin, then:

1 Stanley & Williamson’s Positive Account

S&W’s complete proposal for their view that know-how is a species of propositional knowledge has three stages. First the syntax of know-how ascriptions is identified; secondly, the semantic interpretation of the relevant sentences is detailed, and finally the mode of presentation of the relevant propositional attitude is explained. Using as their paradigm example:

(1) Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle.

S&W argue that this sentence has the syntactic structure:

(1*) Hannah knows [how PRO to ride a bicycle t].

where the square brackets indicate the clausal complement taken by ‘knows’. This complement contains an embedded question which denotes its answer. Following the semantics of embedded questions, and in line with this syntactic structure, S&W state that the correct semantic interpretation of (1*) is:

35 Explanation of the ‘PRO’ and ‘t’ is forthcoming immediately below.
Finally, taking propositional knowledge to be a relation between a person and a proposition, S&W complete their account by proposing that the relevant propositional attitude be understood as follows:

(1***) Hannah knows that \( w \) is a way for her to ride a bicycle, under a practical mode of presentation.

I now examine these three stages in closer detail, starting with the syntax.

1.1 **The Syntax of Know-how**

S&W table two alternative approaches to the syntactic structure of sentences containing the words ‘know how’, as in:

(1) Hannah knows how to ride a bike.

One approach regards ‘knows’ as a verb which takes a complement clause introduced by the question word ‘how’. This can be indicated with complement clause brackets, thus:

(1a) Hannah knows [how to ride a bike].

The other takes ‘knows how’ to be a singular syntactical unit which takes an infinitive, thus:

(1b) Hannah knows how [to ride a bike].

S&W’s claim is that the complement clause in (1a) is an embedded interrogative, just as all other embedded clauses introduced by a question- or \( wh \)-word, such as:
(2) Hannah knows [whom to call for help in a fire].
(3) Hannah knows [why to vote for Gore].

Additionally, in virtue of their denoting propositions, these embedded complement clauses are no different to sentences containing non-interrogative complement clauses, such as:

(4) Hannah knows [that penguins waddle].

On this view, the structure of the syntax of (1) identified in (1a), is shared by (2), (3), and (4). By contrast, the structure of the syntax of (1) articulated in (1b) is not that of (2), (3), and (4). For in (1b) ‘knows’ does not take a clausal complement ‘how to ride a bike’, but rather phrase ‘knows how’, “forms a [singular] constituent, which takes as a complement the expression ‘to ride a bicycle’.” (2001, 417) The complement here is not a proposition-denoting clause but is a verb phrase; specifically an action-specifying infinitive.

These syntactic distinctions are held to support two epistemological distinctions. In the first instance, the shared syntax of (1a), and (4) is taken to confirm that whilst these sentences contain the words ‘knows how’ and ‘knows that’, respectively, they do not, however, indicate or refer to two different types of knowledge; one (somehow) non-propositional, the other propositional. Rather there is but one kind of knowledge, propositional knowledge, had by both. In the second instance, the distinct syntax found in (1b) and (4) is taken to confirm, or at least indicate, that the kind of knowledge indicated in each sentence is not the same. The ‘know how’ of (1b) being non-propositional, unlike the paradigmatic propositional knowledge of the ‘know that’ in (4).

S&W’s proposal is that the shared syntax found in the first approach, their own view, is correct, unlike the rival syntactic structure proposed by the second approach, which they take from Bechtel & Abrahamsen (1991). As such, the

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36 All sentence examples mentioning Hannah or John are directly taken from S&W (2001) or Stanley (various). Sentences with other personal names are my own.
37 Bechtel & Abrahamsen are not, however, engaged in the project of arguing from syntax to epistemology, or indeed to anything else. They start from the presumption that there are two different types of mutually irreducible knowledge. Knowing-how to ride a bicycle is, “what is required is to have certain ability to control one’s perceptual-motor system, a system that can plan, execute, and monitor motor activity”. (1991, 152) This is different, they presume without argument, from the ability
epistemological view that there is but one kind of knowledge, propositional knowledge, and which attends their approach is correct. The rival epistemological position that holds there are two distinct kinds of knowledge, a non-propositional know-how and a propositional know-that, is deemed mistaken.

Furthering the technical detail of their technical account, S&W consider the potential concern that there may be distinctions between embedded questions with how- as opposed to other wh-question word interrogatives, given that ‘how’ often takes an infinitive, i.e., an untensed verb. They insist that it matters not to the relevant syntax of the clausal complement whether a wh-question complement clause contains untensed clauses as in (1a), (2) or (3) or comparable tensed clauses, such as:

(5) Hannah knows [whom Bill called for help yesterday].
(6) Hannah knows [why Gore is the best candidate].

On this view, the tensed clause contained in the embedded question, here:

(7) Hannah knows [how Bill rides a bicycle].

is no different, syntactically, to the untensed clause contained in the embedded question, here:

(1a) Hannah knows [how to ride a bicycle].

Whilst the surface grammar of infinitive-involving sentences, such as (1a), does not include a pronoun that can be the subject of the verb “rides”, as is the case with ‘Bill’ in (7), there is, nonetheless, a pronoun, albeit a silent one, according to S&W’s preferred syntactic theory. Thus the superficial lack of propositionality in the

to remember propositions or make deductions from remembered propositions, which characterises propositional knowledge. The view they do take to be more “radical” (1991, 152) and to be in need of an argument, is not that these two kinds of knowledge are different, but that knowing how is more basic. Whilst the extended discussion about the categorial difference between knowing-how and knowing-that is radically curtained in Bechtel & Abrahamson’s 2nd edition (2002); they nonetheless continue to operate with a “major distinction” between a Rylean-inspired procedural knowledge that “involves skills rather than facts or episodic memories” (2002, 106), a distinction they insist is upheld by many cognitive scientists.
supposed complement clause is not an accurate guide to the matter. Instead, the syntax of (1a) to be fully articulated, according to S&W, as follows:

(1*) Hannah knows [how PRO to ride a bicycle t].

where PRO is “a phonologically null pronoun that occurs, according to standard syntactic theory, in the subject position of untensed clauses”, and t to the “traces of movement” of the question words, which “occur at the site from which the phrases have moved.” (2001, 419) (This might be characterised as a theoretical accommodation of pronoun-less clauses; bringing them into theoretically amenable line with embedded question clauses which contain a pronoun.)

Insofar then as (7) is uncontentiously a propositional knowledge ascription, then so too is the syntax-revealing articulation (1*). Hence, the word ‘knows’ in:

(4) Hannah knows that penguins waddle.
(7) Hannah knows how Bill rides a bicycle.
(1) Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle.

always takes a clausal complement that is proposition-involving, either overtly, as in (4), or less obviously, in the embedded questions that are to be understood as present in both (7) and (1). “The supposed difference has no basis in structure” (2001, 419)

No argument is offered to justify these syntactic descriptions. Rather S&W present the various claims as the deliverances of the (best of the) science of linguistics. There is however, an argument as to why the syntax offered by S&W’s view is to be preferred to the syntax of a Bechtel & Abrahamsen-style approach. This is that the syntax of the former is inline with that of the “standardly accepted syntax” (2001, 420) whereas, the syntactic theory behind that of the Distinctness Hypothesis is, by contrast, “inconsistent with what is said about such structure in recent syntactic theory.” (2001, 417) S&W claim that the standard syntax of embedded questions, which they use, is that proposed by Lauri Karttunen (1977), and their own articulation of the syntax of (1), in terms of (1*) is consistent with his theory. Furthermore, they justify Karttunen’s account as the standard theoretical view, by offering Groenendijk and Stokhof’s 1991 evaluative claim that Karttunen’s approach “is probably the
most influential analysis in the semantics literature to date” (2011, 1111). These testimonials taken together, suffice to warrant S&W’s dismissal of the rival theory of syntax, and with it, any putative syntactical evidence for a possible distinct epistemological notion of ‘know how’. 

This conclusion requires, however, that S&W explain why the supposed sub-sentential structural syntax of sentences should, in principle, be epistemologically revealing in this way. It also requires it to be the case that Kartunnen’s theoretical approach is indeed the standard view of embedded questions. Furthermore it requires that ‘how’ always operate like the other of the embedded wh-question words, rather than merely some of the time. I now argue that none of these requirements can be met by S&W’s account.

On the first requirement, there is no attempt to provide any argument for the methodological merit of S&W’s general strategy that one might from argue from syntax to epistemology, in any fruitfully philosophical way. Nor is there any indication that any such justification is either forthcoming, or indeed even needed. Instead, the nearest S&W get to any methodological justification is their claim that “most obvious benefit” of their account is that it is “entailed by current theories about the syntax and semantics of the relevant constructions.” (2001: 440). One might be concerned, however, that this suggests a worrisome circularity, rather than a chief benefit. Any rejection of their account’s epistemological conclusions, they insist, “would involve revising many well-entrenched beliefs about them in linguistics”. (2001: 440)

This points to the possibility that informing S&W’s approach is set of unannounced commitments to a deeply naturalized epistemology, that expects, invites and supports an intimate connection between the deliverances of scientific enquiry and the considerations of philosophical investigation. I will be returning to the relevance of these meta-philosophical issues. At this stage it suffices to point out

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39 See Brogaard (2009) for an intellectualist view which takes the wh-complement clause to be a predicate rather than a proposition, but nonetheless takes the relevant knowledge-how (like all knowledge-wh) to be propositional. In her case, “a special kind of de re knowledge” (2009, 439).

40 I would agree with Bengson & Moffett’s diagnosis that S&W strategy conforms to a “uniformity thesis” derived from Chomsky, and which can be generalized as suggesting, “if two surface forms A and B pattern in similar ways with respect to their syntactic and semantic behavior, then ceteris paribus both are generated from some underlying form C.” (2011c, 179) As will be explored in Chapter 6, this is also indicative of a naturalized philosophical understanding of the supposed philosophical task to
the operative notion of truth-conditional propositional content which is now, “entrenched in our intuitions and serves as a benchmark” across the science of linguistics (G&S 2011: 1082): perhaps the Archimedean point around which all else must move. The epistemology must fit the propositional syntax. It is not clear which is the explanatory direction of fit here.

On the second issue, that of the pre-eminent status of Karttunen’s account, Groenendijk & Stokhof were, and still are, referring to the status of Karttunen’s theory of embedded questions as one amongst like theories: like theories that are merely one of just several actual approaches to interrogatives. Ten years on from the original presentation of Groenendijk & Stokhof’s overview of the field, the concerns, priorities and theories of the syntax of questions have, inevitably, not remained static. Nonetheless, their own description of the area looks to be in marked contrast to that claimed by S&W:

The semantics of interrogatives […] is an underdeveloped part of natural language semantics. Part of the reason for that, it seems, is that there is no standard framework that is generally acknowledged as providing a common starting point for semantic analysis of various phenomena in the field. No set of concepts exists that can be used to formulate and compare rival analyses.

(2011, 1060 emphasis added)

Not only is it inappropriate for S&W to justify their Karttunen-orientated view as the standard theory, the very idea that there is any such single standard theory looks unsupportable. According to Groenendijk & Stokhof’s latest overview, the spectrum of current theories of embedded questions can be split loosely into “two main streams”. One is more pragmatically orientated, taking speech acts as its starting point (an approach never even alluded to by S&W). The other stream, which includes logical and computations theories, also includes a range of so-called semantic views. Additionally, there is “a third position”, that held by David Lewis.

provide theoretical hypotheses which explanatory postulate at ‘hidden’ levels. Not only are Bengson and Moffett right about S&W’s use of this technique, it also more than applies to their own approach, as will be seen in the next chapter.

This applies even at the level of introductory works on linguistics. With regard to, “most approaches to syntax [in general] there is no generally accepted framework […] Any textbook that ignore this fact is misrepresenting the field.” (Borsely, Robert D. 1999, ix)
It is within the semantic sub-section of the (non-pragmatic) second stream that Karttunen’s account is deemed to be a leading view, not across all the theories concerning interrogatives, as S&W would have their readers believe. But I will return to this, at the end of the next section on the semantics of ‘know how’, given that it is actually Karttunen’s semantics, much more than the syntax, that S&W actually exploit.

An appreciation of the importance of semantics rather than syntax is, perhaps, implicit in Stanley’s own, more recent presentation of S&W’s view, where he admits, “there is no one unique standard analysis of the semantics of embedded questions” (2011c, 221). S&W’s approach is now described as “combining a natural semantics for questions with one standard treatment of PRO and one standard analysis of the meaning of infinitives.” (2011c, 221)\(^\text{42}\). This looks, potentially, like Stanley is downgrading the ‘standard theory justification’ previous used to justify their preferred syntactic views as opposed to the alternative Bechtel & Abrahamsen version. That said, no alternative justification has been offered since, as to why one version is better than the other.

Nor indeed is there any justification attempted to support the claim that it is all occurrences of ‘knows how’, rather than just some, that are to be understood syntactically as embedded questions. One might accept the view that ‘know how’ sentences do, indeed, sometimes contain embedded questions, without being committed to the view, required by S&W’s epistemological account, that all sentences do so. After all, the embedded question reading looks to be a plausible way of considering sentences\(^\text{43}\) such as:

\[
\begin{align*}
(8) & \text{ Ruth knows how to get to Leeds on public transport.} \\
(9) & \text{ Brian knows how many rose bushes have flowered this year.} \\
(10) & \text{ Sherre knows how best to prepare the soil in the vegetable beds.}
\end{align*}
\]

I now consider the next stage of S&W’s view, the proposed semantics of embedded questions, which is consequent on S&W’s proposed syntactic discrimination.

\(^{42}\) For an alternative view, see Culicover & Jackendoff (2006) for whom, “PRO does not exist as a syntactic object” and that the required thesis of control “is best characterized in semantic [not syntactic] terms” (2006, 133). So-called ‘Answer Theorists’ like Braun (2011) are themselves, “agnostic about whether ‘PRO’ exists and introduces ambiguity,” (2011 fn.8), though Braun nonetheless shares much of S&W’s intellectualist view about the propositional nature of know-how.

\(^{43}\) The generalization-resisting diversity apparent here will be pursued further in Chapter 7.
1.2 The Semantics of Know-how

As S&W acknowledge, the work of Lauri Kartunnen (1977) on the semantics of embedded questions follows in a tradition inaugurated by Montague (1974), and includes the work of Hamblin (1958 and 1973), and more recently Groenendijk and Stokhof (1982). Unlike more pragmatically-orientated theoretical approaches to interrogatives, this theoretical orientation does not start with any consideration of the speech acts of questioning, but the syntax of sentences. It takes the clausal complement of the embedded question to denote a set of propositions, i.e., the set of answers to the relevant embedded question. In the case of Hamblin this is the set of all possible answers to the embedded question. Kartunnen’s modifies this by narrowing the scope down to the set of true answers. S&W’s articulate this approach through considering the example:

(11) Hannah knows whom Bill likes.

The embedded question, here, “whom Bill likes”, is a clausal complement. According to S&W, “On Kartunnen’s analysis, the embedded question ‘whom Bill likes’ denotes the set of true propositions expressed by sentences of the form ‘Bill likes x’.” (2001, 420). S&W embrace this approach, but narrow the scope even further, from the set of all true propositions that answer the embedded question, ‘Bill likes x’ to those true propositions that are relevant in a particular context. By making, “the denotation of
the embedded question relative to that context of use” (2001, 421 original emphasis), the set of propositions that constitute the true answers need only “contain very few members.” (2001, 421) Indeed, as it turns out, for S&W, the set need contain only one answer. Hence, S&W shift from identifying the denotation of the embedded question from being the set of propositions, to the propositions (or proposition, singular) themselves. I will follow their cue, (before discussing why this scope alteration takes their account into problematic territory).

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44 “The conclusion of our consideration will be that there are good reasons to assume wh-complements to [sic] denote the same kind of semantic object as that-complements: propositions.” (Groenendijk & Stokhof 1982, 176)

45 “[M]odifying a suggestion by C.L. Hamblin, I propose that indirect questions denote sets of propositions.” Karttunen (1977, 39)
The challenge then is to specify the relevant semantic interpretation to the answer(s) denoted by the embedded questions in ‘knows how’ sentences. Just what is denoted? In the case of (11), with its embedded question ‘whom Bill likes’, the sentence “is true, if and only if, for each proposition \( p \) in that set, Hannah knows that \( p \).” (2001, 420) If the context of use of the sentence is, say, their shared maths class, and Bill likes only Susan, then the denotation of the embedded question is the proposition ‘Bill likes Susan’. If Hannah knows that Bill likes Susan, then (11) is true: Hannah does indeed know whom Bill likes. An alternative way of articulating this would be:

\[(12) \text{ Hannah knows that } x \text{ is a person in their maths class, and Bill likes } x.\]

Similarly with other embedded wh-questions:

\[(13) \text{ John knows who has a light.}\]

The propositional content can be indicated, thus:

\[(13) \text{ John knows, of some person } x, \text{ that } x \text{ has a light.}\]

The task of providing a semantic interpretation, along these lines, for sentences such as:

\[(1) \text{ Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle.}\]

utilises the PRO pronoun revealed as part of the syntactic structure. Here again, S&W use supposedly standard semantics to legislate that ‘PRO’ ‘can be interpreted either as expressions anaphoric on the subject of the main clause, or albeit less naturally, as ‘one’. Put simply this means that may we read:

\[(1*) \text{ Hannah knows [how PRO to ride a bicycle]}\]

as either:
(1*b) Hannah knows how PRO_{she} to ride a bike.
(1*c) Hannah knows how PRO_{one} to ride a bike.

With regard to the (currently awkward) infinitive, there are two potential readings, which can be illuminated by comparing:

(14) Hannah is the person to call in case of danger.
(15) John asked where to board the plane.

S&W presume that (14) invites a deontic reading, that one *ought* to call Hannah in case of danger, whereas in (15) the embedded question does not invite information about where John *ought* to board, but rather where he *could* board the plane. Given these four alternatives readings of both the PRO pronoun and the infinitive, S&W propose four possible interpretations for:

(1) Hannah knows how to ride a bike.

These being:

(1d) Hannah knows how she ought to ride a bike.
(1e) Hannah knows how one ought to ride a bike.
(1f) Hannah knows how she could ride a bike.
(1g) Hannah knows how one could ride a bike.

Of these four options, S&W hold that it is uncontentious that (1d) and (1e) ascribe propositional knowledge. By contrast, (1f) and (1g) are possible interpretations which might reasonably be taken to provide potential support for the view that there are two types rather than one type of knowledge. They take (1f) to be the “paradigm reading” with its “nonnormative modal force” (2001, 425) and put (1g) aside.\(^{46}\) These

\(^{46}\) What is meant here by ‘non-normative’ modal force is obscure. Given however the highly naturalized and reductive commitment of Stanley’s account one wonders if the judicious use of a negating prefix is a swift side-stepping manoeuvre to avoid the need for a discussion about the normativity of know-how. And indeed, one could raise a host of questions about the various modal issues at play here. But in seeking to grant S&W as much apparatus of their account as they wish, before showing how it is compromised, I will let accept this characterisation as offered.
preliminaries set-out, S&W propose that Hannah’s bike-riding knowledge be construed along exactly the same lines as her knowledge of whom Bill likes, i.e., along standard semantic interpretation lines for embedded questions. In this particular case, that means interpreting (1f) and thus (1), as:

(1h) Hannah knows that \( w \) is a way she could ride a bicycle.

This sentence is then deemed synonymous with:

(1j) Hannah knows that \( w \) is a way for her to ride a bicycle.

Accordingly, the propositionality of the complement clause ‘how to ride a bicycle’ is revealed and detailed. By using the syntax and semantics of embedded questions, S&W take their positive account of know-how to show how and why the apparently non-propositional know-how of Hannah’s knowledge of (1) is the propositional knowledge ascribed by (1j). Furthermore, this is deemed to hold for all sentences of the form:

(16) \( S \) knows how to \( V \).

All such sentences are syntactically structured in this way, and permit of the same semantic interpretation:

(17) \( S \) knows that \( w \) is a way to \( V \).

As S&W, conclude, “Thus, to say that someone knows how to \( F \) is always to ascribe them knowledge-that.” (2001, 426)

It is indeed, then with the semantics, more than the syntax of embedded questions, that S&W utilise the work of Karttunen. It is by no means agreed that Karttunen’s theory is the leading theory, or to what extent it might serve to justify the results S&W present. Nor is it clear that the scope restrictions S&W impose are not in tension with the conclusions S&W go on to draw.

As already indicated, Karttunen’s work on embedded questions is just one of a variety of different approaches to the semantics of interrogatives. Even within the
sub-section of semantic theories (in the second, non-pragmatic stream, mentioned above), there is no consensus that the relevant semantic objects are propositions, rather there is a, “confusing multitude of semantic objects”. (G&S 2011, 1122) Groenendijk & Stokhof’s own evaluation of this raft of competing semantic theories with their mutually exclusive semantic objects, is that, “for each of these theories some empirical and methodological motivation can be given.” (G&S 2011, 1122). Indeed, they conclude their own survey of the current status of the semantic theories for interrogatives by suggesting that “perhaps the search for one single type of object which is to function as the semantic interpretation is misguided by [sic] an unwarranted urge for uniformity.” (G&S 2011, 1122) Instead of, “the rigid ‘one-category – one type’ attitude that has dominated semantics for quite some time”, Groenendijk and Stokhof invite theoreticians to continue with their ever-widening liberalism and its growing “polymorphic stance”. (G&S 2011, 1122)

This indicates that S&W not only need to justify the possibility of moving from semantics to epistemology, in principle (as already noted), but further need to justify using Karttunen-style semantics in particular. For S&W to state that, “we shall, with only minimal commentary use Lauri Karttunen’s classic 1997 account in presenting our account of embedded questions” and claim it to be the, “standard accepted semantics” (2001, 420), looks a little presumptuous. Furthermore, whilst it is the case that Karttunen does include ‘how’ in his list of wh-question words (along with ‘where’, ‘why’, ‘who’, etc.) not a single one of the 91 examples he uses in setting out his theory of embedded questions, involves the word ‘how’.\footnote{It is perhaps also important to note that in the Higginbotham & May approach to embedded questions which S&W claim is compatible, there is not one single ‘how’ example in the 39 pages of their 1981 key text. Instead their focus is on sentences such as, ‘Which people brought which books?’} Nor does Karttunen acknowledge let alone explore, at all, the tension ear-marked in the four potential interpretations offered by (1d), (1e), (1f), and (1g). Indeed, all Karttunen’s examples of embedded questions are of the unambiguous form of embedded questions, such as (2), (3), (5), and (6). There is no discussion in his work of untensed clauses of the kind that concern S&W here. Rather all examples of embedded interrogatives used by Karttunen’s are tensed. Typical examples of embedded questions, on which he focusses, include:

(18) John wonders whether it is raining. (1977, 8)
This is in the context of Karttunen’s own task to provide a, “model-theoretic interpretation for indirect questions.” (1977, 3) He does so by providing a range of “new syntactic categories”, “new syntactic rules.”, (1977, 3) each of the rules being further “accompanied by a translation rule which assigns to each resulting English construction an appropriate expression of intensional logic as a representation of its meaning.” (1977, 41) Thus, S&W’s reliance on Karttunen semantics is the reliance on a theory that is itself attempting to ensure the reduction of natural language to logic, courtesy of stipulative translation rules. So not only is Karttunen’s rationale not seeking to draw epistemological conclusions, it requires that he operate with a propositional currency, ab initio.

Whilst S&W take the same theoretical orientation to unproblematically license harnessing this technique to the provision of epistemological conclusions, Karttunen himself remains alert to the strangeness of some of some of the theoretical features it involves and entails. He readily concedes that “If direct questions are semantically equivalent to declarative sentences of a certain kind, then direct questions, too will have a truth value”, a consequence that he admits seems “pointless, even nonsensical.” (1977, 4)

Not only are these points camouflaged in S&W’s account, they go unanswered. But even leaving aside these bigger concerns, there are nonetheless issues internal to the proposed account that demand closer attention; the first of these pertaining to the scope restrictions which S&W impose. As indicated, the key theoreticians of embedded questions apply scope limitations to their proposed semantics. Hamblin takes the semantic interpretation of an embedded question to be all its possible answers, Karttunen all its true answers, and S&W narrow the scope to all true answers, relative to a context of use. Additionally, Karttunen acknowledges that not all embedded questions operate in the same way, though he does suggest that, “in the light of the great majority of cases of overlapping distribution, […] wh-questions and whether-questions should be assigned to the same syntactic category.” (1977, 3) There is no such admission, by S&W, that there are any cases that fall outside the proposed account presented by S&W. They insist that all ‘know how’-

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48 The ubiquity of the propositional seems to be inescapable, regardless of the consequences. One might argue that as a cornerstone of the intellectualist paradigm this is unsurprising.
involving sentences, without exception, are structured as described. S&W’s final conclusion is presented without caveats, without scope limitations and with no suggestion that there are awkward cases, exceptions to the rule, or additional interpretations. S&W present their conclusion not as an inference to the best explanation, the result of some inductive scientific investigation, but with the authority of a deductive conclusion. A methodology which is itself suspect.

A further example of what one might describe as the amenable scope elasticity of S&W’s account, is to be seen in cases where the embedded question has no true answer. This, though is an example S&W do acknowledge (see 2001: fn 19), when considering the situation in which there is no-one that Bill likes. In this situation, the embedded question in (11):

(11) Hannah knows whom Bill likes.

will, according to S&W be, “trivially true relative to such a context” (2001, 421). The triviality of the truth is a matter, presumably, of S&W treating (11) as a conditional whose antecedent is false (i.e., If there is someone who Bill likes, then Hannah knows who that person/those people are). But if (11) is trivially true in the case (and relative to the context of use) where there is no-one that Bill likes, then what about:

(21) Hannah knows how to catch the Loch Ness Monster.

Given that there is no w such that w is a way to catch the Loch Ness Monster (because it doesn’t exist), then, by the same token (21) would also be trivially true. This suggests that the semantic interpretation of embedded questions sentences is correct, only in cases where there is at least one answer. S&W’s response is limited to the proposal that sentences such as (11) do indeed presuppose the truth of at least one answer. “If this presupposition is not satisfied, no proposition is expressed.” (2001, fn. 19) This gestures to further scope restrictions operative in the S&W account; scope restrictions not embraced in their acknowledgement that they operate with a mention-some, rather than mention-all approach. Note also that they justify this mention-some reading on grounds of it being more ‘natural’. “Mention-some readings are

49 In Chapter 6, I explore the extent to which such ‘theoretical’ hypotheses would seem (unlike their natural scientific counterparts) to be immune to experimental confirmation or refutation.
somewhat more natural for embedded questions constructions containing infinitives” (Stanley 2011c, 224), however if taking something to be ‘more natural’ is the criterion for a stronger justification, then why is the entirely natural reading of a know-how sentence (that of ascribing the ability, capacity or skill to do something) not more warranted?

Consider too, so called ‘open questions’, where it is unclear whether or not there is an answer. As Groenendijk & Stokhof confirm, such questions are, “not requests for a particular piece of information”, rather, “[a]nswering an open question is a creative process, one might say, where we make up the answers as we go along, and do not simply choose from a pre-established set.” (G&S 2011, 1115). It remains unclear what S&W would say in response to such questions. In later writing, Stanley does admit that, “some idealizations are in order.” (2011c, 221) Notwithstanding this, there continues to be unadvertised scope restrictions in play, regardless of their insistence that without exception, “All knowing-how is knowing-that” (2001, 444 emphasis added). 50

Perhaps the tensions surrounding this scope elasticity 51 might be resolved in the light of the final piece in the jig-saw of S&W’s three-stage account. I now conclude this exposition of their intellectualist theory of know-how, by turning to the notion of the practical mode of presentation of the propositional knowledge.

1.3 The Mode of Presentation of Know-how

In line with to the supposed standard theoretic accounts of the syntactic structure and the semantics of embedded questions, S&W hold that the sentence:

(1) Hannah knows how to ride a bike.

50 Though given that S&W’s view is more about the metaphysics of mind than epistemology, exceptions are not feasible.

51 Perhaps S&W are embracing, if not announcing, Chomsky’s (1980) suggestion that, “linguistics would perhaps profit by taken to heart a familiar lesson of the natural sciences. Apparent counterexamples and unexplained phenomena should be carefully noted, but it is often rational to put them aside pending further study when principles of a certain degree of explanatory power are at stake.” This is from Chomsky’s On Binding (1980b, 2), which is a paper identified in the footnotes of S&W’s (2001). It also begs the question why S&W can use their Domino Strategy on Ryle, but slip its clutches when its challenge might be applied to their own views.
does not ascribe some form of non-propositional know-how to Hannah, but is an ascription of propositional knowledge. This is exposed, on S&W’s account, by the fully analysed and interpreted sentence:

(1j) Hannah knows that \( w \) is a way for her to ride a bicycle.

Not only is \( w \) a way for Hannah to ride a bicycle, but there are different ways (modes) in which this particular way, \( w \), can be entertained. “The same way can be entertained under distinct modes of presentation” (2001, 428) S&W suggest that to know how to ride a bicycle, i.e., to know that \( w \) is a way to ride a bicycle, can be entertained in either (at least) a demonstrative mode of a presentation, or a practical mode of presentation.

This notion of entertaining propositions under different modes of presentation is deemed applicable to any of the “three standard theories of the semantics of propositional-attitudes ascriptions” (2001, 426), whichever one prefers. 52 The distinction between entertaining the proposition that \( w \) is way to \( V \), under a demonstrative mode of presentation, as opposed to a practical mode of presentation, is given by the analogy between entertaining a proposition under a demonstrative mode of presentation, as opposed to a first-personal mode of presentation. 53 Consider the sentence:

(22) John has burning pants.

Now consider the scenario in which John believes himself to be looking through a window at another person, (though in fact he is looking at himself in a mirror). In the

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52 According to S&W’s own taxonomy, these are (a) “the Fregean theory” whereby “propositions contain modes of presentation of properties and objects”, (b) “the contemporary Russellian theory” in which “propositions are ordered sequences of properties and objects” or (c) “a third standard theory” in which “‘believes’ and ‘knows’ express three-place relations between persons, Russellian propositions and ways of thinking of Russellian propositions”. (2001, 427) N.B. Given that Russell, of course, takes propositional knowledge to be ultimately based on acquaintance (with actual properties and objects), this may explain why S&W assume, along with Hamblin et al, that there is always at least one true answer to an embedded question.

53 Note also that Stanley identifies two further modes of presentation: “a discursive mode of presentation of a way of doing something” and “a descriptive mode of presentation of a way, rather than a practical one” (2011c, 230) which seem to be the same thing, though it’s not clear if they are also identical to a (the?) third-personal mode of presentation of a way of doing something.
first instance, he notice flames on what he takes to be someone else’s trousers. In this situation:

(23)  John believes that that man has burning pants.

He is, thus, entertaining (22) under a demonstrative mode of presentation. When John realises he has mistaken a mirror for a window, and that he is actually looking at himself, then:

(24)  John believes that he himself has burning pants.

The “very same proposition” (2001, 428) (22) is now entertained, in (24), under a first-personal mode of presentation.

By analogy, S&W propose that propositions whose contents include, “ways of engaging in actions” (2001, 427 original emphasis) have the option to be known under both a similar demonstrative mode of presentation, and a comparable practical mode of presentation. (Though S&W remain silent on whether a practical mode is one and the same as a type of first-personal mode of presentation.)

Consider Hannah’s friend Susan, pointing and saying, as they watch John cycle past:

(25)  That way is a way for you to ride a bicycle.

Susan is here identifying a way (that way, John’s way) in which Hannah could ride a bicycle, under a demonstrative mode of presentation. But just as truth of the propositions entertained under demonstrative modes of presentation don’t entail those entertained under first-personal modes of presentation (as shown above in the failure of (23) to guarantee the truth of (24)), so S&W propose that the analogous propositions entertained under demonstrative modes of presentation do not entail those entertained under practical modes of demonstration. Hence, Hannah might stand in the knowledge-that relation to the proposition that w is a way for her to ride a bicycle, under a demonstrative mode of presentation (when Susan comments on John

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54 Stanley (2011a) suggests that a first-personal mode of presentation is both personal and practical.

55 Just what way is this? Against a prevailing wind? Wearing one’s pyjamas? Whilst drunk?
cycling past), this need not entail that she entertains it under a practical mode of presentation.

S&W concede that providing any further, non-trivial characterization of this practical mode of presentation is, as with the first-person mode of presentation “a substantial philosophical task”, though they do claim there is an existence proof available for both. (2001, 429) These tasks are announced, then put aside. Further detail about such ways, what it is to ‘entertain’ a way, or any consideration about the extent to which a practical mode of presentation of ways might be ability-involving, is confined to a selection of tantalizingly brief comments, none of which are pursued further. These include, “thinking of ways under a practical mode of presentation undoubtedly entails the possession of certain complex dispositions”, where dispositions are “dispositional states”. (2001, 429) Indeed these modes of presentation are taken to illuminate the view that: “It is simply a feature of certain kinds of propositional knowledge that possession of it is related in complex ways to dispositional states.” (2001, 430) Furthermore, “any successful account of natural language must postulate entities such as ways”. (2001, 427) That said, S&W refuse to be drawn into revealing anything more about the “metaphysics of ways”, except to say that they are “properties of token events”. (2001, 427) It is to be noted, however, in entertaining ways of Ving under a practical mode of presentation, one is (on Stanley’s more recent exposition of this account) thinking. “To think of (say) a way of swimming under a practical mode of presentation is to have a multi-track disposition towards that way of swimming”. (Stanley: 2011b, 42 emphasis added)

With the articulation of the practical mode of presentation, S&W conclude their positive account of knowing how. Their paradigm sentence:

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56 In his (2011a) Stanley now calls these dispositional states which supposedly cause and guide our person-level intelligent activity, and which it is the task of the epistemology of know-how to theorise about, “standing epistemic states” (2011a, 26, 31, 182, 184, 185). In finally revealing his metaphysical hand with the characterisation of these states not only does he expose his commitment to a Representational Theory of Mind (which fits in with his much of his Chomsky/Fodorian orientation to the philosophy of mind) he reveals his fundamental misunderstanding of Ryle’s project. For he suggests Ryle is arguing for a non-propositional view of these (supposed mind/brain) ‘standing epistemic states’. “[I]t is undeniable that knowledge of how to do something is a standing epistemic state of an agent; both those who deny and those who accept its propositional natural agree with this truism.” (2011a, 185) Yet far from being a truism, this not only misses the point that Ryle is not arguing about the nature of these ‘standing epistemic states’, but about their very (metaphysical) existence. Therefore, Stanley’s account is not just intellectualist in its conclusion, but in the very paradigm by which it operates, and (mistakenly) imposes as part of the very framework for all other viable proposals, including that of Ryle. In Chapter 6, I look more closely at the marriage between the intellectualist paradigm and the methodology of naturalized philosophy.
Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle.

is revealed to be not an ascription of some kind of particular non-propositional know-how, but propositional knowledge, thought of, or entertained, in a particular way:

(1***) Hannah knows that \( w \) is a way for her to ride a bicycle under a practical mode of presentation.

S&W take their conclusion to legitimize a generalization to all knowledge ascriptions. So any sentence of the form:

(16) \( S \) knows how to \( V \).

ascribes the following propositional knowledge:

(25) \( S \) knows that \( w \) is a way to \( V \) under a practical mode of presentation.

“All knowing-how is knowing-that”. (2001, 444) To think otherwise is to “embrace a false dichotomy.” (2001, 444)

Given that S&W concede that their notion of a practical mode of presentation is not essential\(^{57}\) to their positive account of know-how, what, then, is the purpose of including it in their “complete account”? (2001, 43) Could it be that the practical mode of presentation offers a way of introducing an intentional, action-like element into what is otherwise an overtly highly intellectual account, in order to attempt to make it less immediately counter-intuitive? Although S&W insist that, “It is simply false, however, that ascriptions of knowledge-how ascribe abilities,” (2001, 416)

\(^{57}\) See S&W (2001, fn.38), “[P]ractical modes of presentation are not essential to our analysis, in the sense that a philosopher who rejects modes of presentation simpliciter may easily accept the rest of our analysis of knowing-how.” In one sense this is right if one is operating with a cognitive scientific inherited picture of the mind, on which intelligence just is a matter of a information-processing over propositional/representational content, which has no addition need for modes of representation. But this bigger picture (of the mind) is one of the paradigms that anti- and non-intellectualist approaches (like Ryle, and indeed, like Wittgenstein (as will be seen in Chapters 5 and 6) question. Plus one may wish to consider those high-ranking apostates of the cognitive science world (like Rodney Brooks (1991a), (1991b), (2001) and (2012) and John Haugeland (1978) (2004) who have come to reject the Cognitivism that this ‘easy analysis’ of know-how or intelligence enshrines. And of course, there are those like Descombes (2001), Bennett & Hacker (2003), Kenny (1989) (2009) for whom this view of our mindedness has always been flawed.
nonetheless they appreciate that such ability-orientated views are much more intuitively appealing than their own position. Indeed, when considering Gilbert Ryle’s ability account of know-how, they acknowledge, “The thesis that intentional actions are employments\(^{38}\) of knowledge-how is precisely what accounts for the initial plausibility of Ryle’s original argument against the claim that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that.” (2001, 443) S&W’s own appeal to this suggested practical mode of presentation might be regarded as an unabashed attempt to reduce the implausibility of their intellectualist position, by including a practical aspect that alludes more directly to the ability-involving accounts of know-how. Of course, this prompts concern that S&W might well be shooing the ability requirement out of the front door only to facilitate its return through the back: a point S&W deny, insisting, “We are not engaged in the reductive project of reducing talk of knowledge-how to talk of knowledge-that. Our view is rather than knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. To establish that one concept is a subspecies of another, it is not necessary to provide a reductive analysis of that concept”. (2001, 433-434) In Chapter 6, I consider the extent to which claims to be providing non-reductive analyses are what they seem, but S&W’s defensive manoeuvre is somewhat awkward.

Perhaps though the claim that the practical mode of presentation is not essential is simply a way of introducing a device which provides S&W with a richer reservoir of resources from which to draw when articulating, elucidating and justifying their intellectualist account, but without having to tie themselves to it. If this is the case, then any viable notion of a practical mode of presentation will need to be, at least, free from obvious ambiguity, and be capable of providing more illumination than it needs. There are a variety of potential difficulties which suggest these criteria are not met. There is the unexplained notion of entertaining a proposition under a practical mode of presentation, offered in order to side-step recourse to having to know a mode of presentation. Plus entertaining’s awkward partner, thinking about a proposition under a practical mode of presentation. When Hannah rides her bike, is she really thinking? Even when she was learning, was she...

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\(^{38}\) I would also point out the extent to which the intellectualist paradigm is operative in the choice of phrase ‘employment’ of know-how, as opposed to the anti- or non-intellectualist or connotations involved in ‘exemplification’ of know-how. The former sets up the expectation of a metaphysical causal state, the latter has none of these metaphysical consequences. So whilst Stanley says of S&W’s account that, “They intend their analysis to be entirely neutral on how propositional knowledge is realized in the brain,” (2011b, 45) Stanley (and S&W) are not neutral in having a view that propositional knowledge is somehow realized in the brain.
thinking? Concentrating, focusing, trying to balance, perhaps; but thinking? Secondly, certain features of the practical mode of presentation, indeed its very existence, are supposedly justified by analogy to the first-personal mode or presentation, yet in other respects S&W’s account exploits the disanalogies between these modes. The result is that the arguments from analogy seem to be brought to bear in ways that are conveniently ad hoc. Thirdly, with regard to the supposed opacity of know-how, S&W’s intuitions may actually run counter to the very point that the practical mode of presentation is introduced to capture, as will be seen. Fourthly, having the option of a practical mode of presentation for know-how, runs the risk of collapsing the distinction between what it is to know how to do something, and what it is not to know how to do something. I will take a closer look at each of these worries.

Firstly, then, what is entertaining a proposition? Though S&W give no details, it clearly cannot be the same as knowing a proposition, as it is deemed capable of to illuminating and explaining what it is to know. Plus, of course, one might entertain a false proposition. Yet it is not a matter of believing or asserting. It would seem to be plausible to suggest that what S&W mean is something like considering or contemplating a proposition. But just what is the proposition that one is considering or contemplating, when doing so under a practical mode of presentation? Is doing something the same as considering or contemplating doing something under a practical mode of presentation?

S&W are clear that on their account knowing a way to do something does not require being able to describe in any detail how it is that one does that thing, or what it is happening when one is doing that thing, only that one acknowledge that one is doing that thing. Indeed, they insist that propositional knowledge known under a practical mode of presentation need not be expressable, articulable or recognisable in any non-indexical way:

Even if Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle, there need be no informative sentence of the form ‘I ride a bicycle by Fing’ which she would recognise as true. That is for [Hannah, knows PRO]
how to ride a bicycle\textsuperscript{59} to be true, there need be no sentence she understands and accepts containing a purely non-indexical description of riding a bicycle. \textit{(S&W 2001: 432)}

This suggests that the only proposition that Hannah need be entertaining or thinking (ie. considering or contemplating) when she knows how to ride a bike, is something like:

\begin{equation}
\text{(26) I'm doing this in this way.}
\end{equation}

So whilst Hannah knows how to ride a bike, the propositional knowledge in which that actually consists need consist of nothing more than (26). Presumably, then when Hannah skis or tells jokes, she need only entertain or think the following items of propositional knowledge:

\begin{equation}
\text{(26a) I'm doing this (skiing), in this (ski-ly) way.}
\end{equation}
\begin{equation}
\text{(26b) I'm doing this (telling jokes) in this (telling jokes-ly) way.}
\end{equation}

It is not clear that this amounts to any kind of illuminating way to consider what it might be to \textit{entertain} not just a proposition, but the different propositions presumably entertained when engaged in various different activities. It simply looks like a potential propositional \textit{accompaniment} to any such activities, or a sentence whose utterance one would accept, as true, \textit{whatever} one were Ving, \textit{whenever} one were Ving. But is a sentence that \textit{accompanies} an activity, or that might be acceptable when suggested as an indexical \textit{description} of an activity, the very same thing as \textit{entertaining} the proposition (the propositional knowledge)? Is it \textit{constitutive} of that knowledge?\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{59} Here the shared subscript \textit{i} is a conventional linguistic indication that PRO \textit{qua} pronoun refers back to Hannah, ie. that Hannah knows how (she) could ride a bike.

\textsuperscript{60} See Cath’s “Seeming Analysis” (2011) for an intellectualist account in the spirit of S&W that embraces, without comment, this same notion of ‘entertaining’, whilst replacing their “knowledge-that” relation between person and proposition be replaced by a “seeming relation”. The result being that “if knowledge-how is not a knowledge-that it could still be the case that knowledge-how is proposition in nature,” (2011, 135) a conclusion that looks to deepen the confusion, rather than alleviate it. Whilst remaining true to the intellectualist paradigm inherited from cognitive science.
The only suggestion S&W offer here is that entertaining a proposition under practical mode of presentation is a case of being in some kind of mental state. “Some still believe that all mental states can be characterized in nonindexical terms. We are not sympathetic to this view.” (2001, 433) But are they implying some kind of isomorphism here? And how is this supposed to work? This issue takes us back to the cul-de-sac of dispositions, where the explanatory trail initiated by S&W, goes abruptly cold. Given this minimalist indexical content of the relevant propositional knowledge entertained or thought under the practical mode of presentation, it is hard not to conclude that the relevant propositional knowledge, on S&W’s account is anything other than entirely trivial. It is unclear why S&W go to great lengths to bring in a raft of linguistic apparatus if this is the result.

Secondly, an analogy is drawn between the non-entailment of the truth of propositions entertained under the demonstrative mode of presentation, to the truth of propositions entertained under the first-person mode of presentation, and the non-entailment of the truth of propositions entertained under the demonstrative mode of presentation, to the truth of propositions entertained under the practical mode of demonstration. This analogy supposedly provides further justification for the argument for a practical mode of presentation. But when considering the first-personal knowledge had by John when, for example, he knows that he is tired, S&W admit “There may very well be no way to analyze away John’s first-personal mode of presentation of himself in third-personal terms.” (2001, 434) By analogy, then, one would expect the practical mode of presentation to be similarly unanalysable in third-personal terms. Indeed, it perhaps offers the potential for a snug fit with the non-indexical point just made. In which case, however, on the terms of S&W’s own view, there must be a distinction between (putative) third-personal ascriptions of know-how to a person and the first-personal nature of a person’s own know-how. But this is an unacknowledged distinction. What it is to ascribe of Hannah the knowledge how to ride a bike (under a practical mode of presentation) is not, therefore, the same as her own first-personal knowledge. That this mistake can be made is, I suggest, that in the cases of standard (third-personal modes of presentation) there is no difference between the ascriptions of a particular item of knowledge, say about penguins:

(2) Hannah knows that penguins waddle.
and the knowledge Hannah has about penguins. Both the ascription of Hannah’s knowledge and the knowledge Hannah has are propositional. So having exploited a disanalogy between first- and third-personal modes of presentation, the further disanalogy is now ignored, at precisely the juncture where it might be utilised to capture the distinction under consideration.

Further, if one holds the view that know-how is not propositional knowledge, one might also hold the view that whilst ascribing know-how is propositional, the know-how had by the ascribee is not, itself, propositional. Thus there is a entirely reasonable explanation for the first- and third-person disanalogy. Of course S&W, who hold that there is only one kind of knowledge, have no reason to hold that there is a distinction between propositional knowledge and ascriptions of propositional knowledge. The consequences of this are evident throughout their article, as they move seamlessly, and repeatedly, between claims about knowledge and claims about ascriptions of knowledge. At times S&W state, “We contest the thesis that there is a fundamental distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that. Knowledge-how is simply a species of knowledge-that” (2001, 411), but then presume no change of meaning occurs when shifting to, “We take our view of ascriptions of knowledge-how to be the default position” (2001, 431 emphasis added). The point I emphasise here is that the proposal of a practical mode of presentation is supported by arguments from analogy with the first-personal mode of presentation. Yet, when those parallels are either surplus to, or counter to, requirements, they are ignored. This suggests that the use of the arguments from analogy is sufficiently and strategically ad hoc to fuel increasing concerns over the general viability of the notion of a practical mode of presentation.

On the third issue, of opacity, S&W draw on the familiar appreciation that the truth of:

(27) Hannah knows that Hesperus is Hesperus

“intuitively does not entail” (2001: 438) the truth of:

(28) Hannah knows that Hesperus is Phosphorus
Their suggestion is that given propositional knowledge is know-how, it too should be similarly opaque. Their example, features dancer Hannah who performs a dance routine she has christened *Headbanger*, such that:

(29)  Hannah knows how to perform *Headbanger*.

The movements of *Headbanger* are, however, exactly the same movements as *Harvey*, which just so happens to be a semaphore rendition of *Gray’s Elegy*.

It “does not seem to follow” (2001, 438) S&W suggest, that (29) entails:

(30)  Hannah knows how to perform *Harvey*.

This conformity to the general opacity of propositional knowledge is offered as further justification of S&W’s general account.

But is there not a way to use the very apparatus S&W offer, and remain with the constraints of their account, yet arrive at a different view about (30)? Remembering that the relevant propositional knowledge need only be indexical, it would seem feasible to suggest that in knowing how to perform *Headbanger*, all that Hannah needs to do is to entertain the relevant proposition under a practical mode of presentation, whilst stating:

(31)  I’m doing this (*performing* *Headbanger*), in this (*Headbanger-ly*) way.

Presumably this indexical proposition does not require Hannah to have yet named her dance *Headbanger*, (or had it so named by a cruel critic). She need only be dancing and entertaining the proposition:

(32)  I’m doing this (*performing*), in this (*performing-ly*) way.

under a practical mode of presentation. Now, were Hannah to be performing *Harvey* she would be doing exactly the same movements, in exactly the way. Insofar as knowing-how is but a species of propositional knowledge, that need only be such

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61 See Carr (1979, 407) for the original presentation of this example.
indexical knowledge, as long as it is known under practical mode of presentation, then it is not clear that it makes any sense to claim that Hannah knows how to perform Headbanger but not how to perform Harvey.

What is actually pertinent to S&W’s example, but they fail to appreciate, or acknowledge its relevance, is that, according to their scenario description, not only does Hannah know how to perform Headbanger, but also:

(33) Hannah knows that the dance she performs is Headbanger.

and indeed (if this makes sense):

(34) Hannah knows that Headbanger is Headbanger.

whereas:

(35) Hannah does not know that Headbanger is identical to Gray’s Elegy in semaphore.

But these are not ascriptions of the supposed propositional knowledge entertained under a practical mode of presentation that is Hannah’s knowledge-how. They are associated claims one might make about Hannah’s knowledge of the names, features and further descriptions of her, and others’ activities. Knowledge that is, itself, unambiguously propositional. S&W’s use of opacity to justify their account piggybacks on the genuine propositional knowledge available in comparable situations.

The fourth reason I suggest that modes of presentation are more problematic than S&W require, is offered by the distinction between knowing how to V and not knowing how to V. Consider Ruth who both enjoys listening to pianists and clarinetists, but although she knows how to play the piano, she doesn’t know how to play the clarinet. On S&W’s account, then:

(36) Ruth knows that w is a way to play the piano, under practical mode of presentation.
(37) Ruth knows that \( w \) is a way to play the piano, under a demonstrative mode of presentation.

What, though is the relevant semantics of the sentence:

(38) Ruth does not know how to play the clarinet.

Whilst this looks likely:

(38a) Ruth does not know that \( w \) is a way to play the clarinet, under a practical mode of presentation.

It is also the case that, as a fan of Mozart’s Clarinet Quintet:

(38b) Ruth knows that \( w \) is a way to play the clarinet, under a demonstrative mode of presentation.

So it looks like Ruth both knows, yet doesn’t know that \( w \) is a way to play the clarinet, depending on which mode of presentation is being considered. If this is the case then it would appear that the mode of presentation is a necessary and not optional, element of S&W’s account, as claimed. Furthermore, their claim to, “remain neutral on the question of whether these modes of presentation have semantic import” seems premature.

In addition to the concerns I raise, circularity worries are pressed by many commentators. John Koethe takes the practical mode of presentation to require knowledge of how “to instantiate a way”, thus S&W’s account “appeals to the very notion it seeks to explicate” (2002: 326). Alva Noe also points out that S&W’s proof for the existence of a practical modes of presentation is nothing other than the claim “If there were no practical modes of presentation of propositions, then it couldn’t be true that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. But it is. Therefore, there must be such modes of presentation.” (2005: 287) In seeking responses to this range of worries about the practical modes of presentation, S&W’s cupboard does look bare.
2 Propositional Intellectualism: Responding to the Challenge

In Section 1, I presented an exposition of S&W’s positive account of know-how and articulated a variety of pressures I take to be invited by the commitments and conclusions of each of its interim stages. These particular worries are not, however, amongst the eight objections considered, preemptively, by S&W (2001). Recently, Stanley has re-entered the dialogue initiated by S&W’s (2001) paper, and superceded those particular objections by identifying “three of the most pressing issues in the debate, [in order to] show that their resolution weighs in on the side of the Intellectualist.” (2011c, 208) I will name these three issues, for ease of reference, the Objection from Explanation, the Objection from non-Gettierization, and the Objection from Other Languages. I now show, in Section 2.1, that whilst Stanley’s responses to these three objections are acceptable, on the terms of S&W positive account, they nonetheless fail to add up to a genuine defence of Propositional Intellectualism. For not only are they silent in response to the specific, stage-related concerns explored above, but there four key additional challenges remain unacknowledged, and outstanding. I take a closer look at these in Section 2.2.

2.1 Three Objections

The Objection from Explanation, that one should be able to explain what one knows how to do, has various critical manifestations. “The premise behind these arguments against the Intellectualist position is that if knowing how to do something is propositional knowledge, then knowing how to do something entails being able to explain how to do it.” (2011c, 213) But as detailed in Section 1.3, this is not a claim S&W make. By acknowledging that the propositional knowledge in question need be limited to a modest indexical claim, this objection has no purchase on the detail of S&W’s actual account. Knowing how to V need not entail being knowing how to explain how to do something. “The 8 year old Mozart can assert the proposition that constitutes his knowledge how to compose a symphony; he can just say, while

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63 Knowing how to do something and knowing how to explain how to do that thing are distinct. “On Stanley & Williamson’s theory, x knows how to explain how to ride a bicycle if and only if for some way w, which is a way in which x could explain how to ride a bicycle, x knows that w is a way in which x could explain how to ride a bicycle.” Stanley (2011c, 214)
composing it, the German translation of “this is how I can do it”. (2011c, 212 emphasis added) Indeed, this is no different to the case Stanley makes for other kinds of knowledge: “I know that the table I write on is this shade of brown, and the cupboards are that (different) shade of brown. But the only way I have of expressing my propositional knowledge about the shades of brown is in demonstrative involving terms.” (2011c, 215) Thus pressing Intellectualism by requiring the person who knows how to do something explain their supposed propositional knowledge is merely creating a straw man to attack. Actually, S&W’s intellectualist account shares the typical anti-intellectualist presumption that there need be no demand that know-how be explicable in specific propositional detail. So whilst Stanley’s successful rejection of this objection, does deflect an objection to propositional intellectualism, it no more tells in favour of a propositional account of know-how, than it might serve a non-propositional, or anti-intellectualist view.

The Objection from Gettierization exploits S&W’s thesis that know-how is a species of propositional knowledge and thereby should be open or amenable to Gettierization. As such, then their propositional account of know-how should be similarly vulnerable. And indeed S&W do offer an example of Gettierized know-how. Consider trainee pilot, Bob, who wishes to learn to fly on a simulator. Unbeknownst to Bob, Henry his instructor has inserted a randomizing device that jumbles the information supplied by the simulator’s controls. Whenever Bob uses the simulator, however, the randomized information just happens to be correct, a feature that Henry is too incompetent to realise. After the appropriate number of flight training hours, “Bob passes the course with flying colours. He has still not flown a real plane. Bob has a justified true belief about how to fly. But there is a good sense in which he does not know how to fly.” (2001, 435)

Ted Poston (2009) does not draw the same conclusion for S&W’s scenario. He considers that Bob does indeed know how to fly, offering an argument that turns on equating the justified belief condition of propositional knowledge with intelligently doing an intentional action, and the truth condition of propositional knowledge with a

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64 See Sgaravatti & Zardini (2008) for further criticisms which focus on the nature of closure and inferential isolation, and which mis-describe S&W’s commitments by ignoring their modest indexicality constraint.

65 See Snowdon for agreement on this point. “We might call the assumption that knowledge that involves being able to express completely and linguistically what is now, ‘the Myth of the Proposition’. (2003, 27-28) Having identified this myth, Snowdon manages to judiciously stay on the fence on his own view about know-how.
comparable success condition. His idea is that whereas Gettier cases are vulnerable to intervening luck which can separate the relevant justified belief from the truth of the matter; by contrast, when Bob performs an act intelligently, on the basis of the kind of correct intelligence base Bob does have, then no comparable luck can deliver a similar wedge between acting intelligently and acting successfully. “If the intelligence base is known and is accurate, he will be successful.” (2009, 744) Poston’s challenge is easily dismissed by Stanley, though not I suggest for the right reason. Stanley responds by finessing the issue as to whether or not acting intelligently need be acting intentionally. His approach is to say that whilst acting intelligently and successfully might suffice for being able to do a particular action, it does not suffice for (an ascription of) the relevant know-how.66

Such Poston-style objections and Stanley-style responses (to the effect that any Gettier intuitions need only be “weak or non-existent” (2001, 15)) are, however, both misguided. For there are uncontroversial examples of intentional action done both intelligently and successfully, which, would appear to be Gettierizable. Consider, Ernest Sosa’s adept archer. He identifies a target, takes appropriate aim and fires. Unfortunately, a gust of wind sweeps his arrow off course; then, whilst still airborne, a second gust sweeps the arrow back on course, and it hits its mark. In this situation, the requisite intentionality is present, the archer is adroit, and the shot is accurate. Nonetheless it is not accurate because its adept. Luck has played a part. Now though Sosa uses this proposal for other purposes67, it seems reasonable that such a series of events, as in the archer example, might well serve to illustrate the possibility that what appears to be a case of know-how may succumb to something plausibly Gettier-like.

The problem with the entrenched debate over this issue, is that Stanley conducts it on the basis that evidence of Gettierization is evidence for an intellectualist account of know how. But as with the Objection from Explanation, this feature does not tell for intellectualism, or against anti-intellectualism. It is a red herring. For the anti-intellectualist who rejects the suggestion that know-how is but a kind of propositional knowledge, is entirely comfortable with the hole-in-one and the lucky shot. Which is

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66 This point will be re-approached from a different angle, in Chapter 4, as part of the consideration of Bengson, Moffett & Wright’s case of Irina, who is deemed not to know-how to do a particular skating jump, even though she is able.

67 Sosa argues (in 2007) that without accuracy because of adroitness the shot is not apt. By analogy, an apt belief (which is required for knowledge) requires that the belief’s accuracy be because of the adroitness of the relevant belief-forming process. Though, of course, the relevant belief-forming process is (often) a sub-personal matter over which the person cannot exercise control.
why the criteria for know-how on such anti-intellectualist views as ability accounts, often includes the requirement that a putative knower be able to *repeat* successful actions, in order to establish that he or she does indeed know how to do something. And repetition is not a feature that can be captured by the discreteness of Gettier cases. For Gettieronization only applies to single beliefs, whereas the criteria for any ascription of know-how typically involves the repeatability of the exercises of the putative knowledge.

Finally, with the Objection from Other Languages, Stanley engages with Ian Rumfitt’s challenge from divergent “cross-linguistic data” (2011c, 232), drawing particularly on French and Russian language constructions. So, in French:

(39)  Il sait comment nager.
(He knows how to swim.)

is a well-formed French sentence, conveying a problem-solving aspect, not unlike:

(40)  Pierre sait comment traverser le fleuve en nageant.
(Pierre knows how to swim across the river).

Here (40) “might be true if, for example, Pierre knows that the way to swim across the river is to swim to the red buoy and then head straight for the northern bank.” (Rumfitt 2003, 161). Thus, it does have a propositional knowledge implication. There is also, however, the (non-embedded question) construction:

(41)  Il sait nager.
(He knows how to swim.)

(42)  Il sait parler francais.
(He knows how to speak French.)

Contra S&W, *savoir faire* constructions and *savoir comment faire* constructions are distinct. In *savoir faire* constructions, “[T]he semantic function of the infinitive is surely to refer to an activity.” (2003, 162) Furthermore, in Russian, two entirely different words are used to ascribe know how уметь (‘umet’) and propositional
knowledge знать (‘znat’). The linguistic evidence supporting S&W’s positive intellectualist thesis of know-how is, according to Rumfitt, at best “equivocal” (2003, 165.)

Stanley’s response is to restate S&W’s allegiance to a theory of embedded questions which takes the wh-words to be “semantically vacuous”. The crucial issue, supposedly, is that that the embedded question refers to a property (as detailed above with reference to the Russellian propositions.) Hence, Stanley dismisses Rumfitt Objection from Other Languages by a lengthy linguistic analysis of further languages, prefaced with the reminder that, “[O]n many accounts of embedded questions, one can obtain the embedded question semantics without a question word.” (2011c, 228)

So not only are there linguistics-guided contortions made in the throws of unpacking such an account, it now appears that their theoretical account is flexible enough to be applied where there are no questions words present at all. Credulity at the legitimacy of S&W’s method seems to be stretched to the maximum with this response.

That said one might still wish to accept that Stanley’s view can cross linguistic barriers, on the terms and deliverances of his preferred linguistic theory. There is still no response, and that includes in either Stanley’s recent discussions in (2001a) or (2011b), to the two issues already identified as outstanding, i.e., (i) that the particular linguistics theory of choice S&W utilise is to be preferred to any rival, and that (ii) any of these theories of linguistics are, even in principle, capable of supporting an epistemology. In Chapter 6, I explore the explanatory power that stands behind such Chomskyan-inspired linguistics, and the epistemological parallels covertly operative there. It is only against this background that the Stanley/Rumfitt debate can be fully understood, and what serves to justify Rumfitt’s assertion that S&W’s view is ultimately a “metaphysical thesis”. (2003, 160)

Thus, two of three key objections Stanley raises in order to diffuse, are I suggest successfully, but trivially, diffused on his own terms. The third will be explored below.

2.2 Fresh Challenges

There is one problematic topic that Stanley gives only a modest amount of space to, and two other areas of concern that neither S&W nor Stanley ever consider. These are, I suggest, the gradability, the learnability and the normativity of know-how. I
articulate and evaluate these, before turning to one final issue: the conflation of the causal and the constitutive.

Firstly, then, what of gradability? Hannah may know how to ride a bicycle, but it seems plausible to suggest that that she doesn’t have the same degree of know-how as Lance Armstrong; who really does know how to ride a bike. Ruth may play the piano, but she doesn’t know how to play like Horowitz. That said, Hannah’s, and Ruth’s knowledge has improved over the time spent practicing. Their know-how is greater than it once was. Know-how seems to come in degrees. One can have more or less of it. One person’s can be better or worse than another’s. One might have a little or a lot of know-how (or expertise) about some subject or activity.

By contrast, propositional knowledge does not appear to come in degrees. Hannah either knows or doesn’t know that penguins waddle. To say that she has knows that penguins waddle, but only a little bit, is nonsensical. Yet were know-how to be propositional knowledge, as S&W propose, then that would seem to demand that either know-how not be, or propositional knowledge be, gradable. In their joint work on knowing-how, S&W are silent on this matter. Stanley, however, has discussed his own view in connection with contextualism. Here he rejects the gradability of know-how, because though one person might ‘know how’ better than another, what “is better, or more complete” (2004, 129) is the (propositional) answer a person has to the relevant embedded question, compared to the answer had by another. But this is still committed to the ungradability of propositional knowledge that, and an intellectualist account. So any support is offers is (tightly) circular. Presumably the ordinary way of speaking of know-how as gradable is, then, to be understood as a mere façon de parler: one with no impact on the reality of their metaphysical thesis of the nature of know-how. Though Stanley suggests that in all cases of knowing-how to do something, the supposed gradability applies to the what it is one knows how to do (i.e. the topic or activity itself) not one’s own know-how, this dismissal, looks a little quick. It fails to dissolve the substantial tension had by Stanley’s insistence that “If Stanley and Williamson’s proposal is correct, the folk notion of knowing how, the one we ordinarily express by sentences of the form “X knows how to F”, is the notion of knowing how that philosophers and cognitive
scientists have found of significant explanatory use.” (Stanley 2011c, 220)

Related, in certain respects, to this gradability of know-how, is the notion of learning-how to do something. Insofar as one may just have started to learn how to do something one’s know-how maybe quite limited, curtailed or modest; limited to straight-forward situations, simple demands and attainable aspects and activities. One may also become sophisticated in one’s know-how, yet continue to learn-how to do something; as people often discover when attending an advanced driving course with the police, having been driving for many years prior to that. Furthermore, there would seem to be a wide spectrum of ways in which one might learn how to V, explore ways of Ving, and thus come to deepen one’s knowledge-how to V. Practice with or without direct instruction, copying, inventing, dismantling and reassembling, investigating, using tips, pursuing trial and error investigation and exploration, exploiting luck, etc.; all these seem to methods by which learning-how occurs. Quite how a propositional account is supposed to deal with all of these characteristics of learning-how is of limited relevance to S&W’s thoroughly propositional theory. Yet, a non-trivial epistemology of know-how would, I suggest, want to look at the connective tissue between the notions of know-how and learning-how (as indicated in Chapter 7). In his monograph, Stanley confirms an account of learning-how that dovetails with (rather than expands on) their general intellectualism. “[W]hen you learned how to swim, what happened is that you learned some facts.” (2011a, vii) Stanley’s rhetorical strategy would seem to point to an argument that requires clarification about the nature of a fact, not about learning-how or knowing-how. “You learned a special kind of fact about swimming”. (2011a, vii)

There is also one other, indirect, suggestion about the nature of learning. This is Stanley’s claim that his and Williamson’s view, “predicts that one must first have facility with the concept of propositional knowledge before one masters knowledge-wh.” (Stanley 2011c, 234). Insofar as there is a minimal requirement, as indicated

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68 Though, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, it is not clear if its ‘explanatory use’ is as an explanandum or an explanans. Furthermore, trading claims as to which account best captures the ‘folk-notion’ is a tricky strategy at best, and one that sits awkwardly with Duncan Pritchard’s characterisation of the task of epistemologists to provide, “a kind of ‘cleaned-up’ version of the folk notion”, as a likely result of the “significant disparity between the folk usage” and theoretical views of (propositional) knowledge. (forthcoming a)

69 This is a different kind of Priority Thesis than previously explored with Ryle, for whom know-how was prior to know-that. Nonetheless, Stanley seems to be suggesting that we must ‘have concepts’ before we can ‘master’ certain types of propositional knowledge. It is unclear how one comes to be in possession of concepts first – unless of course, one’s picture of the mind is the Chomskyian/Fodorian
above, on the propositional knowledge required, namely that of being able to state truthfully a sentence such as, ‘I’m doing this, in this way’, a knower-how needs to be a language-user. This of course, pushes the account towards the consideration of what it is to have semantic knowledge, or knowledge of how to speak and understand one’s first language. And indeed it transpires that Stanley is no less a card-carrying propositional intellectualist when it comes to semantic knowledge as elsewhere. “So, practical knowledge, on my view, is a special of propositional knowledge. The thesis that semantic knowledge is practical is then the thesis that semantic knowledge amounts to knowledge of a way of doing something, entertained under a practical mode of presentation (2005, 135).

Thus, S&W’s account appears to require that semantic knowledge be a pre-requisite for all other knowledge-that. This suggests that Stanley’s propositional account of semantic knowledge is not just a consequence of, but perhaps a prior commitment, informing, indeed dictating Stanley’s intellectualism about know-how, in general. In Chapter 6’s discussion of Chomsky, this will be further exposed, as I explore the extent to which nativism about semantic knowledge and competence is a silent partner to such accounts. But for now, perhaps it offers a glimpse as to why the unexplained methodology of attempting to move from linguistics to epistemology, is supposed to have some legitimacy.

The other lacuna in S&W’s propositional intellectualism is any reference to the normativity of know-how. Whilst it might be awkward, inappropriate or conceptually misguided to regard, as normative, knowing-how to, say, smile, leave rooms through doors, get someone’s attention, or flee from predators, there are nonetheless many very familiar activities and practices whose normativity is constituent of those very activities and practices; from speaking our mother tongue, to being able to do basic arithmetic, to playing team games and participating in the social and political life of our communities and the wider world. And other such examples of things that we come to know how to do. One might think, however, that coming to be a participant in certain activities or practices is a matter of coming to know how to do something, where doing that thing involves engaging in normative, public, practices. As such an internal dispositionalist account that reduces know-how
to propositional knowledge and thence to some supposedly (private) direct acquaintance with a metaphysical property known under a practical mode of presentation, as per S&W, seems not just under-equipped, but radically ill-equipped to provide an illuminating appreciation of the epistemology of know-how. But then again, perhaps Stanley’s commitment to certain notions of semantic knowledge and universal grammar, free him from feeling any pressure to acknowledge the normative dimension of our language facility. After all an account that rests on the nature, indeed the autonomy, of syntax, is ultimately one that focus on intrinsic mental contents rather than situated people living in language communities. This perhaps explains why Wittgenstein is excluded, or deemed irrelevant to the discussion.

Finally, there is the question of whether or not S&W, and Stanley, are providing an account of what causes our knowledge-how, or what constitutes it. In the original 2001 presentation there is no suggestion that what is being proposed is anything other than a constitutive account: there is but a single type of knowledge constituted by standing in the (appropriate) “knowing-that” relation between a person and a proposition. And indeed this would seem to be the case also in the Preface to Stanley (2011a), where he states, “knowing how to do something is the same as knowing a fact” (2011a, vii emphasis added). However, Stanley also writes of being “guided by the belief about how to ride a bicycle” (2011c, 219 emphasis added) and already in the Preface to his monograph there is a collection of new locutions, which threaten a conflation of the constitutive and the causal. In introducing the propositional knowledge learnt by a swimmer, Stanley writes: “Knowledge of these facts is what gave you knowledge of how to swim”; “You know how to perform activities solely in virtue of your knowledge of facts about those activities”; “…knowledge of a fact can so immediately yield knowledge of how to swim” (2011a, vii: emphases added). Such expressions suggest that propositional knowledge is what causes, or enables, or provides know-how, rather than, as per the propositional intellectualist’s central thesis, is one and the same as that very know-how.

3 Concluding Remarks

Propositional Intellectualism is the view knowing-how is not a kind of alternative, non-propositional knowledge, but is merely a species of knowledge-that or propositional knowledge. Specifically the relevant propositional knowledge is the
answer to the question embedded in any and all knowledge-how ascriptions. Ascriptions of know-how are true if and only if the appropriate propositional knowledge is known under the practical mode of presentation.

Far from being the “default position” (2001, 431), and sitting comfortably with the supposed folk notion of know-how, the above challenges indicate the extent to which Stanley & Williamson’s account has neither the resources to respond to ongoing challenges, nor little evidence with which to support its own claim to be entirely in line with ordinary usage of the concept. (Though plenty of evidence that supports an alternative view that it is entirely inline with the cognitive scientific intellectualist paradigm by which it is guided.) Furthermore, their account is fatally vulnerable internally, externally, and methodologically. Internally, its preferred theoretical position on embedded questions is not, as claimed, in line with standard theory, but uses just one of many competing theories concerning the nature of the syntax and semantics of embedded questions. Indeed, the presumption that one can ascertain the propositional nature of the relevant sentential features by syntax only, is itself a matter of debate, both in detail\(^70\) and in principle. As such, S&W have no actual justification for their view; rather they have selected the account that best serves their preferred claim. This is not justification but stipulation. Nonetheless, were their ‘justification by standard theory’ claim to be correct, however, it would still fail to serve their purpose. This is because the issue at stake is whether or not knowing-how is always an embedded question. For anti-intellectualist challenges to propositional intellectualism do not seek to establish that all know-how is non-propositional, but only that some know-how is non-propositional. Perhaps it is this very point that C. L. Hamblin\(^71\), appreciates when, in his topic-inaugurating paper, he identifies the “characteristic” question words of interrogatives as being, “words such as ‘what’, ‘when’, ‘how many’ and so on.” (1958, 159); picking out ‘how many’ rather than ‘how’. For no anti-intellectualist wishes to deny that, for example:

\[
\text{(43)} \quad \text{Brian knows how many bicycles are in his shed.}
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\(^{70}\) See Culicover, Peter W & Jackendoff, Ray (2006): “The demonstration that PRO is not syntactically motivated and that control is best characterized in semantic terms leads to the conclusion that control must be semantic.” (2006: 133)

\(^{71}\) See S&W (2001: 420 and fn. 16) for the acceptability of other frameworks into which their account is “easily translatable.”
is an ascription of propositional knowledge; the content of which is the answer to the embedded question concerning the number of bicycles in the shed. Ironically, it is Hamblin himself, one of the founding fathers of the linguistics of embedded questions, preferred by S&W, who suggests that there is more to knowing-how than just knowing that:

[I]t is interesting to compare the distinction made by Ryle between ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’. One part of the distinction can be put as follows: to say that someone “knows that (such-and such is the case)” is to specify a statement and say that he knows it to be true. But to say that someone “knows how…” (or knows whether…”, or “knowing when…”, or “knows where…” etc.) is at most to specify a question and say that he knows the correct answer to it. This distinction is valid even if we recognize that “knowing how” is in many cases rather different again, involving for example the possession of a skill. (1958, 161 emphasis added)

S&W’s proposed practical mode of presentation does not help provide a way of understanding these different skill-involving cases. Indeed, they are unsurprisingly open to what, by Stanley’s own admission are, “charges of obscurantism” (2011a, viii). Unfortunately for S&W, were the fog to lift over this notion of mode of presentation, it might just as equally be a resource for rival views. Why are modes of presentation any less ‘theoretically amenable’ to those who wish to propose that all know-that is a species of know-how. Why not suggest that knowledge-that is merely a species of knowledge-how, ‘entertained under a propositional mode of presentation’? Externally there are pressures concerning (as yet) unexplored issues such as gradability, learning-how, normativity, and the twin confusions: (i) that of the knowledge and its ascription, and (ii) that of the cause of know-how and its constitution.
Methodologically, there is no attempt to justify the supposed philosophically revealing strategy of arguing from syntax to epistemology. Indeed, if it is a science one might accept that it might legitimately move from observed data to some kind of explanation of that data. But if this is the case, then why should the data of embedded questions be given an explanation in terms of epistemology? What would constitute falsification of this account? To what extent is the meta-philosophical presumption of naturalized epistemology a requisite for this view? All of these questions will be considered in the upcoming chapters. Is it the case, perhaps, that this kind of propositional intellectualism, bestriding the two stools of linguistics and philosophy is in danger of falling between both? Perhaps the argument S&W present, such as it is, is not actually one from syntax to epistemology, as claimed, but rather from syntax to metaphysics. That their method is not only legitimate, but necessary, is presumed by Stanley’s repeated calls (2011b, 2011c) for rival views to deliver their own alternative account of the syntax and semantics. But as Chapter 7 details there is more than just S&W’s way of appreciating how our language may be a resource for philosophical insight.

Yet at the heart of propositional intellectualism there is an interest and a commitment which is also shared by those who are unable to accept its detail, given that according to Stanley, “the guiding idea of this work has been that the value of knowledge lies in its connection to action.” (2011, viii) Though Stanley wishes to arrogate this commitment for the intellectualist camp, it is not a view that anti-intellectualists seek to deny; rather it is crucial to such rival proposals. And perhaps it goes some way to explain Stanley’s admission (in discussion) that modes of presentation might just have to be “ability-involving”.

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72 See Brown (1970) for an early acknowledgement to justify this ‘mixed’ methodology. “Two kinds of theory are roughly: (a) old-fashioned analysis or description of concepts, and (b) empirical linguistics… I think that the philosophical study of particular concepts must submit to the constraints of both kinds of theory at once” (1970: 214) This being part of the dawning practice of the then recently inaugurated Naturalized Philosophy.

73 See Devitt (2011) on the failure of S&W’s account to fit which the deliverances of psychology. Even “the most ‘intellectualized’ picture of procedural knowledge, distinguish this knowledge sharply form declarative” Furthermore, “S&W’s methodology of deriving a theory of knowledge-how from a linguistic theory of ascriptions, without any attention at all to the science of knowledge-how is deeply misguided.” (2011, 207) Note this is not a pressure I wish to support, but I include it to indicate the challenges to S&W’s meta-philosophical stance come from a variety of different quarters.

74 This from a personal discussion at the Knowing-How Workshop, Geneva University 15.10.2009
Philosophical debate about know-how is deeply polarised. Ryle and Rylean-inspired anti-intellectualists maintain that knowledge-how and knowledge-that are distinct kinds of knowledge, whilst Stanley & Williamson’s paradigmatic version of intellectualism claims that knowledge-how is merely a species of knowledge-that. Although the scope of knowledge-that is central to the question at issue, thanks to a set of shared views about many other aspects of propositional knowledge, the contrast between anti-intellectualism and intellectualism can be sharply drawn. Indeed, it is precisely because there is a core range of uncontentious views about propositional knowledge that the fault line between anti-intellectualism and intellectualism is often given a parallel propositional articulation. Accordingly, anti-intellectualism and intellectualism about know-how is taken to be a matter of the non-propositional or propositionality of know-how. That is, until very recently.

John Bengson and Marc Moffett’s so-called ‘Non-propositional Intellectualism’ challenges this presumed parallel. For though Bengson & Moffett share Stanley & Williamson’s commitment to a thoroughly intellectualist construal of know-how, they nonetheless reject the suggestion that know-how is a kind, or species, of propositional knowledge. Whilst agreeing that to know how to φ is a matter of knowing a way to φ, Bengson & Moffett reject Stanley & Williamson’s proposal that knowledge of a way to φ is knowledge-that w is a way to φ. Instead, they hold that knowledge of a way to φ is non-propositional knowledge, or knowledge-of, a way to φ. Key to Bengson & Moffett’s suggestion is their further characterisation of knowledge-of as a kind of non-propositional acquaintance knowledge. This particular knowledge-of is not, however, the familiar acquaintance knowledge one might have of a person or a place, rather it is a distinct kind of acquaintance knowledge they propose; namely an objectual knowledge of concepts. Using these ingredients, Bengson & Moffett (2007), (2011b) and (2011c) construct an alternative theoretical approach to knowing-how, which cuts across several of the standard demarcations. Their proposal remains, nonetheless, unabashedly intellectualist. Indeed, their own intellectualist orientation is, like that of Stanley & Williamson, unequivocally anti-Rylean:
We should not forget that Ryle’s explicit aim was to dispel the “paramechanical hypothesis” of internal mental causes, which he viewed as a product of the “myth” of “hidden” mental “phantasms” that “take place ‘in the head’” … a “doctrine that is wholly preserved in our (relation-neutral) formulations of intellectualism.

(2011c, 165, fn. 10)

Bengson & Moffett’s own non-propositional intellectualist account of know-how is, then, no hybrid proposal. Rather it is a substantial theoretical edifice which requires a not insubstantial amount of scene-setting, definition, and refining of several more familiar notions. To facilitate this, B&M develop a reservoir of terms of art including, ‘ways of φ-ing’, ‘ability-based concepts’, ‘reasonable conceptual mastery’, ‘correct and complete conceptions’ and ‘objectual understanding’. Each of these terms of art picks out a particular piece in their theoretical jigsaw. In tandem with this is a range of highly detailed individual cases which serve simultaneously as supposed counter-examples to anti-intellectualism in general, and as evidence for their own theory. In this chapter, I present Bengson & Moffett’s non-propositional intellectualist proposal, arguing that not only does it succumb to several of the challenges already brought to bear on propositional intellectualism, it is also vulnerable to a range of new concerns.

In Section 1, I detail Bengson & Moffett’s (henceforth B&M’s) arguments against what they take to be anti-intellectualism’s ability-account of know-how. Embracing their own detailed focus and reliance on individual cases, I show that all their putative counter-examples are open to alternative readings, and argue that the supposed structural flaw they suggest anti-intellectualism is prey to, fails to tell against anti-intellectualism, per se; it being merely an inevitable and entirely general aspect of their very own methodology. In Section 2, I provide an exposition of B&M’s own positive account of know-how, articulating the internal relations between their key theoretical notions. I argue that the concepts, conceptions and concept mastery which lie at the heart of B&M’s theory are based on unannounced and contentious metaphysical, even Platonistic, commitments. Furthermore, they lead B&M to the same impasse faced by Stanley & Williamson. But where S&W appeal to the practical mode of presentation in attempting to surmount this difficulty, B&M
resort to a not dissimilar solution which employs the very notion of ability they claim to eschew. Further objections reveal that the eponymous non-propositionality of B&M’s intellectualism masks an ineliminable propositional aspect. In admitting this, B&M acknowledge it makes their account potentially vulnerable to Ryle’s Regress Challenge. I consider their attempt to circumvent this problem in Section 3, and show the meta-philosophical implications of their attempted solution. In Section 4, I argue that the supposed neutral framework B&M suggest is applicable to any account of know-how imposes an unacceptably intellectualist framework on its rivals, forcing all other views into their dualistic schema. In the final section, I offer some concluding remarks to justify why the picture presented by B&M’s so-called ‘two conceptions’ framework is neither as exhaustive nor uncompromised as announced; two points which show why the whole debate is even more important than B&M are keen to announce.

I begin by considering B&M’s rejection of what they take to be at heart of all anti-intellectualist accounts, i.e. an ability view of know-how.

1 Against Ability

B&M deny that to know how to φ is to be able to φ. Like S&W, they assume that Ryle (or indeed any form of anti-intellectualism) is committed to just such an ‘ability account’ of know-how, and they seek to undermine it by offering supposed counter-examples. In contrast to S&W’s very swift dismissal (using just the Ski-Instructor and the Armless Pianist), B&M offer a much more substantial tripartite challenge, exploiting: (i) a wider range of examples aimed at demonstrating why ability is insufficient, as well as unnecessary, for know-how, (ii) empirical data taken from specifically commissioned surveys designed to expose so-called folk intuitions about the relation between know-how and ability, and (iii) an irresolvable structural flaw in ability accounts of know-how, in general. I consider these elements individually.

In their (2007), (2011c), and their (2009 with Wright), B&M exploit a variety of invented scenarios to argue for their claim that ability is neither necessary nor sufficient for know-how.
I have organised and numbered these cases (Table 1, below) in order to provide a new opportunity to discern the similarities, distinctions and connections between the examples B&M exploit.75

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(B)</th>
<th>(A)</th>
<th>(C)</th>
<th>(D)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Know-how</td>
<td>Know-how</td>
<td>No Know-how</td>
<td>No Know-how</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No ability</td>
<td>Ability</td>
<td>Ability</td>
<td>No ability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Martin the Turtle-Keeper</td>
<td>1. Irina the Adder</td>
<td>1. Sally the Avalanche Escaper aka Avalanche aka Tropics aka Swimmer</td>
<td>1. No Salchow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Irina the Champion Skater aka Jane the Olympic Skater</td>
<td>3. The Five Year Old Child Ear-Waggler</td>
<td>3. Salchow aka Irina the Novice Skater</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Pi aka Louis, the Competent Mathematician</td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Kytoon aka Chris the Kite-Builder</td>
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1.1 The necessity of ability?

According to B&M, in (A1) *Irina the Adder* not only both knows-how to add and is able to add, but her know-how entails her ability. Indeed, they suggest that our ordinary talk confirms this point. It would be unusual, if not downright mistaken, to say that, ‘Irina knows how to add, but she is unable to do so,’ or, ‘Not only does Irina know how to add, she can actually do so.’ B&M take this to indicate that, in the case of addition, “our semantic intuitions” about ascriptions of know-how are that such ascriptions of know-how are, “neither cancellable nor reinforceable”. (2007, 36) This, they claim, confirms the entailment from know-how to ability. A detailed

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75 Though B&M do provide specific titles for the majority of their examples, I have provided names (or alternative names) for those cases I number (A1), (A2), (A3) (C4) and (D2). Please note that (A) is the second, not first, column. The reason for this becomes clear in Section 1.3
explanation as to the nature of this know-how will be scrutinised in Section 2. The point to note, here, is that though B&M’s claim is that know-how and ability can come apart, they are not claiming they must come apart. Cases where they do not come apart, are (A) cases, according to my tabular presentation.

By contrast, the candidate counter-examples in the left-hand (B) column, are designed to show that know-how need not entail ability. In (B1), though Martin the Turtle-keeper knows how turtles reproduce, such know-how, does not entail that he has an ability; indeed, in this particular example, it is not clear just what such suggestion might be aiming to capture. As B&M observe, “It is implausible that Martin thereby has the corresponding ability to engage in turtle reproduction (whatever that might mean).” (2009, 389) The other three (B) cases do appear to directly, and unproblematically, implicate particular abilities. B&M state that the presumption that ability is entailed would be, however, a mistake. Indeed these (B) cases are all chosen to exemplify what B&M take to be know-how without ability.

So, in (B2), Pat the Ski-Instructor is an expert skier and instructor who has twenty years standing as a highly sought-after teacher of Olympic-standard stunt skiers, but who is personally unable to actually perform the stunts he teaches. (2009, 391, and 2011c) Thus, according to B&M, Pat knows how to perform the stunts, notwithstanding his own inability. Similarly, in (B3) Irina the Champion Skater, Irina is an Olympic skating champion who knows how to and can regularly perform a triple Salchow; a complicated jump that involves taking off and landing on various particular edges of one’s ice-skates, after three mid-air revolutions. She remains, nonetheless, unable to perform a quintuple Salchow, even though she knows which of her skate edges are required for take-off and landing and is aware the jump requires five airborne revolutions. (See 2007, 34-35, for Irina, or 2009, 393, for Jane. Both scenarios share the essential details.) Irina the Champion Skater is, however, unable to achieve this particular jump. This is not, B&M propose, because of some inadequacy in her know-how, but is, rather, the result of an inability to leap high enough for long enough in order to be able to revolve five times. Thus, according to B&M, though she knows how to do a quintuple Salchow, she is unable to. In (B4) Louis the Mathematician knows how to calculate the n\textsuperscript{th} number in the decimal expansion of \pi, but in the case of 10\textsuperscript{46} he is unable to work this out. Again, this is no lack of know-how, but is, instead, “because of principled computational limitations, Louis (like all ordinary human beings) is unable to find the 10\textsuperscript{46} numeral in the
decimal expansion of \( \pi \)” (2011c). He knows how to calculate the numeral at issue, but is unable to do so.

I take it that one might reasonably split these (B) cases into two subcategories: In the first, here exemplified by (B1), the very idea of an associated ability seems nonsensical. *Martin the Turtle-keeper*’s turtle-related know-how seems to be a matter of knowing a particular set of facts, only. In the second category, (B2), (B3) and (B4), the know-how identified does appear to be associated with a potential tandem ability. In (B2), *Pat the Ski-Instructor* fails to have what is actually a potentially achievable physical ability, whereas in (B3) *Irina the Champion Skater*, unsurprisingly, fails to have what is anyhow an unachievable, physical ability. Whilst in (B4) *Louis the Competent Mathematician* does not have (what might be described, somewhat awkwardly, as) an unachievable mental ability. Yet Pat, Irina and Louis, nonetheless all putatively know how to perform stunts, do the quintuple Salchow, and find the \(10^{46}\) numeral in the decimal expansion of \( \pi \). (B1), (B2), (B3) and (B4) are all deemed, each in their own way, to provide counter-examples to the claim that know-how must entail ability. B&M conclude that ability is not a necessary condition for know-how and thus that, “the anti-intellectualist view that knowing how to \( \psi \) requires the corresponding ability to \( \psi \)” (2007, 33) is undermined.

But does this follow from the (B) cases presented? One may think that it is part of the very question at issue as to whether or not case (B1) is the kind of case anti-intellectualism aims to account for, or that cases (B2), (B3) and (B4) are legitimately identifiable as cases of know-how. In their very construction as examples of ability-less know-how it might look that a particular view on the nature of know-how, has already been taken. These are not theory-neutral cases. If, instead, the presence of know-how and the absence of ability are merely stipulations, it remains unclear as to how they can provide justification for B&M’s view, as opposed to simply supplying a fit, that is strategically engineered. This is, undoubtedly, a question that can only fully be answered in the light of B&M’s own positive account of know-how. B&M do, however, use (B) and (C) cases, which I consider in a moment, to motivate the need for their own account. In so doing, they are taking the cases to provide pre-theoretical, licit challenges to the ability account. But, just how viable are these pressures?

In (B1), *Martin the Turtle-keeper*’s knowledge how turtles reproduce is, better described as his knowledge of the ways in which turtles reproduce. This brings out the
propositionality of his knowledge, i.e., that turtles reproduce at particular times, in a variety of habitats, etc. Martin’s supposed knowledge-how is the kind of knowledge one has of a subject or a topic, in this case, knowledge of the natural history of turtles. In suggesting that this kind of know-how ought to entail a tandem ability, which it then somehow fails to do, B&M are suggesting that their anti-intellectualist target requires that all know-how be a matter of ability. But this is to misrepresent the anti-intellectualist proposal (as discussed in the previous chapters) presuming it seeks a singular account of all know-how and ‘knows-how’ locutions. For the likes of Ryle, this is not the case. He appreciates that some knowledge-how is propositional, precisely when it is such knowledge of a subject or topic, or is a matter of knowing how it is the case that, etc. Ryle’s own anti-intellectualism focuses on that, distinct kind of knowledge-how which is manifest in our normative and intelligent performances. His anti-intellectualist approach starts, already circumscribed and limited to, people engaged in activities and practices. (B1) does not therefore work as a counter-example to the supposed anti-intellectualist ability account of know-how.

In (B2), Pat the Ski-Instructor supposedly knows to perform complex stunts, as evidenced by the achievements of his successful pupils, though he is unable to do the relevant stunts himself. As this case directly parallels that of Stanley & Williamson’s own Ski-Instructor example, I will not repeat the extensive arguments of the Chapter 2, but quickly re-emphasise, again, that it is not obvious that one would say that the Ski-Instructor does know how to perform complex stunts given he is unable to do so. To suggest that he does, is to conflate knowing how to perform stunts, with knowing how to teach someone to perform stunts, or knowing how to train someone to do so, or coach, or guide, or advise, etc.

In (B3), Irina the Champion Skater’s inability to do a quintuple Salchow, similarly echoes S&W’s Armless Pianist. In (A3), Irina can do (by implication) a single Salchow and a double Salchow, as well as the stated triple Salchow. There is no mention of her ability to do a quadruple Salchow (which has, apparently, been recently achieved by a couple of upcoming skating champions), though no one has ever managed a quintuple Salchow. Presumably this is because it is physically impossible to remain airborne long enough to spin five times, given the force of gravity. In one sense, Irina the Champion does know how to do a quintuple, yet is unable. But this sense is merely that of knowing a set of technical facts pertaining to the blade-edge requirements for take off and landing. She might know these before
she were able to do even a single Salchow. What then is the purpose, in this example, of insisting that Irina can do a triple Salchow, though not a quintuple? The only answer would seem to be that it permits B&M to trade on an ability-involving know-how that is distinct from the kind of fact-involving know-how of (B1). The force of (B3) exploits a conflation of know-how and ability, in order to argue that know-how and ability can come apart; an awkward tension, to say the least.

Consider what happens when this example is extended to more obviously impossible cases. It would seem that B&M are similarly committed to saying that Champion Irina knows how to do not only a Quintuple Salchow (though is unable to), but also she knows how to do a 10-, 50, even 100-turn Salchow. Is there not a danger of straying into nonsensical territory? Do they wish to suggest that Roger Bannister, having been the first man to break the four-minute mile knows how to break the two minute mile, or the one minute mile? If the answer is, that he does know-how to break the one minute mile, then it would appear that what it is to know how to break running records is simply to know that one needs to run faster than the current record holder has managed. But even the most sedentary couch potato, is aware of this fact. Thus (B3) fails to serve the purpose of providing a counter-examples to the supposed anti-intellectualist view of know-how.

In Pi, (B4), Louis the Competent Mathematician is faced with temporal limitations which parallel the physical limitations of Irina in (B3). Here the sheer number of computations required and the available time left in Louis’ life, make it impossible for him to calculate the designated numeral. Once again B&M suggest that a wedge can be driven between know-how and ability; a wedge that threatens any anti-intellectualist ability account of know-how. Yet, if accepted, this argument would also undermine B&M’s own paradigmatic case of know-how/ability, (A1), where Irina the Adder’s knowledge of addition entails her ability. This is because the argument B&M take to justify Louis’ inability should, by the same token, serve to show that whilst Irina knows how to add, she isn’t able to do a series of additions, starting with one and adding one, until she reached 3,153,600,000. For this number is the number of seconds in a hundred years and would require at least that amount of time to be arrived at. As such, B&M’s (B4) Pi case, unwittingly provides a template for a super-objection that would ensure no case of know-how could ever entail ability. So if (B4) is to be successful as a counter-example to anti-intellectualism it comes at
an exceptionally high price, for it is applicable to any and all (A) cases which involve any time-consuming activity.

To summarise, even if an anti-intellectualist accepts the misrepresentation of their view as an ‘ability account of know-how’, he or she has a raft of resources for responding to the supposed (B) case counter-examples which seek to show ability is not necessary for know-how. The (B) cases do not therefore tell, either for or against, anti-intellectualism. But given that Rylean anti-intellectualism does start with the notion of normative performance, is it perhaps the case, nonetheless, that ability is sufficient for know-how?

### 1.2 The sufficiency of ability?

B&M’s (C) cases are proposed counter-examples aiming to show that ability is insufficient for know-how. In (C1), *Sally the Avalanche Escaper*, Sally finds herself walking in the mountains when she believes a nearby dam has broken and that she is being engulfed in the overflowing water. She is a good swimmer, however, and manages to swim her way out of this predicament. Actually she has, in fact, been caught up in an avalanche and it just so happens that making swimming movements is a way to survive avalanches. So though her swimming ability helps her escape the avalanches, B&M claim she does not know how to escape avalanches. (2009, 395-396 and 2011c)

In (C2), *Chris the Hiker* aka *Hiker*, Chris has been out walking in a National Park for several hours. When the time comes for her to return to her car all she knows is that she needs to cross the nearby ridge, though she does not know its name or know what will be revealed as lying beyond it. When she gets to the top of this ridge, she sees the direction she then needs to take: a pattern that is repeated at subsequent ridges, until Chris arrives successfully back at her car. According to B&M, “Chris is, at the time of her decision, reliably able to get back to her car […] plainly an intentional action of Chris’s” but at the time of her decision, she does not know how to.” (2011c)

In (C3), *Irina the Novice Skater* is able to do a (single) Salchow, but this is despite the fact that her knowledge of which ice-skate edge to use for take off and

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76 Cf. Hawley (2003) for original articulation of this case.
landing, is hopelessly confused. According to B&M’s scenario description, she also has “a severe neurological abnormality that makes her act in ways that differ dramatically from how she thinks she is acting.” (2007, 48, and 2009, 397, and 2011c)

It just so happens that though confused about her skate edges she nonetheless ends up doing her Salchow correctly. Performing the jump, Irina does not, however, know-how to do it. B&M claim that (C3), together with (C1) and (C2), “demonstrate the possibility of ability without intelligence, skill, sensibleness, and cleverness,” (2011b, 32) thus confirming ability is insufficient for know-how. But are B&M’s readings the only, or even the most likely options?

In (C1), Sally’s swimming escape from the avalanche might be better described as a case of her not knowing that what she is currently up against is an avalanche. Sally does not know that making swimming movements is a way to escape avalanches; she does not know that what she is doing is escaping an avalanche by swimming. (C1) might be usefully compared to S&W’s dancer case. Just because a dancer doesn’t know that her dance is also a semaphore version of Gray’s Elegy, doesn’t mean she doesn’t know how to perform a semaphore version of Grey’s Elegy. Similarly Sally knows how to escape an avalanche even though she doesn’t know that she knows how to do so. These opacity-involving cases have already been extensively explored in Chapter 3, Section 1.3. I will not therefore rehearse those challenges again. I trust it suffices to suggest that many of those criticisms are equally applicable to (C1). As such they remain unaddressed, challenging B&M’s assumption that (C1) is an unproblematic counter-example to the sufficiency of ability for know-how.

In (C2) there are comparable issues relating to opaque contexts and mis- or other-description in play. Is Chris’s ability in question the ability to return to her car, or to navigate unfamiliar countryside? To describe what she is doing a matter of some skill-less, sensible-less, ‘mere’ ability, risks so trivialising her achievements, that they become unrecognisable. I suggest, instead, that Chris’s activity manifests a flexible, creative and dynamic response to developing circumstances and situations. Her reflective negotiation of a fresh environment in the service of a clear goal, might, itself be described as a paradigm example of know-how; of know-how in practice. Its power as a counter-example to the contrary is tenuous at best.

In (C3) Irina the Novice Skater is able to do a Salchow, but according to B&M’s scenario she is confused about which edge of her skate blades she is supposed to use, and thinks she is using; though she still manages to do the jump. Once again,
this case might be dealt with by considering opacity issues, and raising questions about the entailments between first and third person ascriptions of know-how. But a full understanding of why B&M take (C3) as an example of ability-without-know-how can only be achieved in the light of their own positive account, below. The (C) cases are, therefore, either vulnerable to anti-intellectualist challenge or rely on the architecture of their own concept-based account, as will be seen. This throws doubt on their supposed authority as counter-examples, and undermines the extent to which the cases can be taken to motivate B&M’s own account, as opposed to be exemplars of that very account, reflecting its particular requirements. This latter point will be dealt with in detail in Section 2.

The very strategy of attempting to provide counter-examples presumes that anti-intellectualism seeks, or is committed to establishing, necessary and sufficient conditions for know-how. Furthermore, the consequences of relying on what I identify as the Domino Strategy (Chapter 2, Section 2.1, i.e., the creation and use of outlying ‘hard case’ examples to undermine familiar linguistic usage) are counter-productive, given that they threaten the stability of meaning. Like S&W, B&M’s heavy reliance on the methodology of argument-by-counter-example risks sawing off the very branch on which they sit.

That said, unlike S&W, B&M do admit to the need for caution in the use and scope of putative counter-examples. They claim to be alert to a recent warning from Dan Bonevac, Josh Dever and David Sosa. Though Bonevac, Dever and Sosa’s focus is on the use of supposed counterexamples in connection with conditional analyses of dispositions, they argue that, as a methodology in general, it is flawed. Indeed, it “badly overestimates the effect of counterexamples, as if the Gettier example were sufficient to refute the possibility of conjunctive analysis of knowledge.” (BD&S 2011, 1143). They go on to point out that though there may be a role for counterexamples in refining positions, one must only use them to counter specific proposals. To do otherwise is to succumb to what Bonevac, Dever & Sosa call, ‘the counterexample fallacy’. Yet though B&M do acknowledge this risk, they simply insist that, “our argument… does not commit a ‘counterexample’ fallacy” (2011c, 174, fn. 29). Whether or not what I identify as the Domino Strategy is one and the same as this Counterexample Fallacy, the two raise similar worries about the value of claims which are based on supposed counter-example cases.
Bearing these caveats about such cases in mind, I now examine the experimental testing of intuitions done by B&M, together with Jennifer Wright: the second of their three strategies to undermine ability accounts of know-how.

1.3 Empirical Data

Stanley & Williamson’s *Ski-instructor* and B&M’s *Pat the Ski-Instructor* are both supposed by their proponents to indicate the extent to which know-how need not entail ability. In the tug-o’-war of suggesting alternative readings, one might respond that the inability in both cases serves, instead, to indicate a lack of know-how, rather than show that ability can be missing in the face of know-how had. Indeed Alva Noe (2005) claims that the strength of such competing intuitions is an empirical matter and that were they to be tested, he suggests his own, more anti-intellectualist, evaluation might prevail. At the very least, “the outcome of such a poll would depend on how well we tell the backstory.” (2005, 283)

In the wake of this comment, B&M teamed up with psychologist Jennifer Wright (henceforth BM&W) and conducted a number of surveys seeking to establish the extent to which the general public would or would not assign either know-how where ability was given, or ability where know-how was given. To do this, they presented two (B) cases and two (C) cases to 194 people. Specifically they described in rich detail, (B2) *Pat the Ski-Instructor*, (B3) *Jane the Olympic Skater*, (C2) *Sally the Avalanche Escaper* and (C3) *Irina the Novice Skater*. In the case of (B2), BM&W declare, “[b]ecause the vignette explicitly states that Pat has never been able to perform the stunts, the possibility of telling a “back-story” which could rationalize an ability-attribution… is effectively ruled out.” (2009, 391-392) And indeed, BM&W claim to apply this non-biased strategy in the presentation of all cases.

The results of their survey are as follows. Re: (B2) *Pat the Ski-Instructor*, “81% judged both that Pat knows how to perform the student and that he is unable to do them.” (2009, 392) Re: (B3) *Jane the Olympic Skater*, 76% judged Jane knows how to do the quintuple Salchow but is unable, (2009, 393). Re: (C2) *Sally the

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77The general public, (or ‘we’ as one might say) is increasingly referred to as ‘the folk’ in philosophical discussion which contrast pre-philosophical ‘ordinary talk’ and ‘ordinary intuition’ with philosophical or theoretical talk, intuition or reflection. I take this terminology to come with a set of meta-philosophical presumptions that are themselves open to question. I will therefore avoid using the term myself, except where quoting BM&W, who remain unworried about the expression, as seen in the title of this particular paper, ‘The folk on knowing how’.
Avalanche Escape, 76% judged Sally is able but doesn’t know how to escape the avalanche, (2009, 395), and re: (C3) Irina the Novice Skater, 86% judged Irina is able but doesn’t know how to do a Salchow. (2007, 397)

BM&W take these results as vindicating the status of their cases as successful counter-examples to the view that ability is necessary and sufficient for know-how. But is Noe’s backstory worry diffused? To what extent is the presentation neutral? If one is told in the scenario description that, as they say, Pat is unable to do stunts, to what extent can the participants even be described as then judging whether or not he is able to do stunts. If someone says, as part of the story, that there is no table in the room and then asks you whether or not there is a table in the room, something already seems amiss. And to what extent does the implicit separability of ability and know-how not already pre-judge one of the central beliefs at the heart of the debate? Might the separability of know-how and ability in the construction of the survey not bed in the very presumption of dualism that Ryle was seeking to question? Furthermore, how might the participants have answered questions about whether or not Pat knows how to perform the stunt or whether he knows how to teach the stunt, or both, and what might their answer(s) be? Would they say that Chris is doing something skillful, or not? How might a survey even begin to engage with the kinds of objections proposed earlier concerning alternative descriptions, opacity issues and the interchangeability of first and third person ascriptions? I will not, however, push BM&W further on these points, but focus instead on an alternative important worry which BM&W do acknowledge, which I take to be even more fundamental than all these more detailed concerns. This relates to their explanation as to why there is no complete consensus in the participants’ attributions. According to BM&W, the main reason a substantial number of participants do not share the views of the majority, or of B&M, is that, “the stereotypical individual who knows how to φ is, in addition, able to φ. This suggest that know how attributions will stereotypically implicate the corresponding ability attributions”. (2009, 394)

BM&W’s acknowledgement of the very idea that there is such a stereotypical relation between know-how and ability, is not only a late-arriving admission, but it is then one they go on to suggest need not be taken seriously. Instead, when considering the survey results, they suggest, “It seems more natural to attribute the minority anti-intellectualist responses to some form of misunderstanding.” (2009, 394) In dismissing solicited empirical responses as the products of misunderstanding,
BM&W’s treatment of anomalies raises a host questions about the legitimacy of their supposed experimental method and the philosophical value of its data. Ironically, elsewhere Bengson is alert to the need for caution when engaging with empirical studies, going as far as issuing thirteen warnings to be born in mind when testing intuitions in general, including a reminder that, “not all answers are created equal.” (2010 MSS) No comparable tentativeness is exercised here.

Having said all that, let BM&W be allowed their results, on their own terms. For even with this concession, it would still not be the case that BM&W are correct in claiming, “the present findings go decisively against anti-intellectualism.” (2009, 3998) On the contrary, there is no principled reason why the survey should not support the anti-intellectualist view that ascriptions of know-how and ability do not and need not always overlap. Anti-intellectualism is not a view that seeks to supply an account of some singular notion of know-how. It is rather (at least for Ryle)78 a matter pertaining to a specific aspect of our intelligent performances. This does not deny that there are propositional or theoretical kinds of know-how. One knows how to get from London to Leeds when one knows that you can catch a bus from Kings Cross or a coach from Victoria. I conclude that BM&W’s survey tells as much for anti-intellectualism, as against it; and that it does so is, ultimately, unsurprising. After all, according to anti-intellectualism ‘know-how’ and ‘ability’ are non-synonymous terms, usage of which is likely to be a matter of fine distinctions and discriminations depending on the context, the presentation of the context and a host of other rhetorical and narrative features and devices.

1.4 A Structural Flaw

The third of B&M’s trio of strategies to challenge the relation between ability and know-how is to identify a so-called ‘structural flaw’ at the heart of anti-intellectualism. Their suggestion is that (B) and (C) cases each pull in different directions, generating a tension, which is, in principle, irresolvable. Specifically, the ‘know-how-without-ability’ (B) cases manifest “the problem of pervasive inability”, (i.e. the assumption that no additional know-how will deliver the ability, for whatever reason) whereas the ‘ability-without-know-how’ (C) cases are subject to “the problem

78 Nor is a singular notion the pursuit of Wittgenstein (see Chapter 5), or myself (see Chapter 7).
of ignorant reliability”, (2011c, 173) whereby one (supposedly) is able to do something without knowing-how to do it. See my modified table, Table 2., below.

Table 2.

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<tr>
<th>(B)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Know-how</td>
<td>Know-how</td>
<td>No Know-How</td>
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<tr>
<td>No ability</td>
<td>Ability</td>
<td>Ability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pervasive Inability</td>
<td>Ability</td>
<td>Ignorant Reliability</td>
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Any ability-account theorist supposedly faces this predicament:

The problem of pervasive inability counsels us to *weaken* the ability condition: we must require *less* than a reliable ability to \( \phi \), since a reliable ability to \( \phi \) is not necessary for knowledge how to \( \phi \). But the problem of ignorant reliability counsels us to *strengthen* the ability condition: we must require *more* than a reliable ability to \( \phi \), since a reliable ability to \( \phi \) is not sufficient for knowledge how to \( \phi \). (2011c, 174)

This putative situation is not a problem, let alone a structural flaw, with anti-intellectualism. Rather it is a feature which is applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to any attempt to conflate two non-synonymous terms or provide necessary and sufficient conditions for two separate notions. Consider the ways in which Fs and Gs might be co-extensive, i.e. an (A) case. This need not rule out there being examples of Fs which are not Gs, i.e., (B) cases, or examples of Gs which are not Fs, i.e., (C) cases. B&M’s structural flaw would apply no less in such a situation. (See Table 3., below.) This is not a structural flaw, it is merely a general feature of the relations of any such triple sets of cases. It is not therefore a structural flaw, or even a problem for anti-intellectualism, *per se.*

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79 Indeed one can reconfigure this table, using any of B&M’s terms of art in place of F and G, and generate exactly the same “flaw” for non-propositional intellectualism.
Table 3.

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<td>Not G, F-ness</td>
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<td>Not F, G-ness</td>
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B&M go further, however, declaring this structural flaw to be the product of a more profound mistake, one which, “goes deeper, and can be traced to the project of trying to force knowledge how, which is cognitive into the mold of ability, which is behavioral-dispositional.” (2011c, 174). Now though there are difficulties in Ryle’s appeal to the notion of dispositions, his focus on the rule-involving, practice-based, normative aspect of our performances and activities is hardly behaviorist. 80 Added to which, given Ryle’s catalogue of dispositions includes, “addictions, ambitions, missions, loyalties, devotions and chronic negligences,” (1949, 128), I suggest that to identify such a list as mere abilities seems not only inaccurate, but churlish. B&M are correct in identifying the mistake, but it is of their own, not anti-intellectualism’s, making.

I suggest that the identification of this spurious structural flaw in anti-intellectualism and its tenuous association with some kind of behavioural-disposition is more of a rhetorical manoeuvre designed to distance B&M from ability, prior to the need to call upon the notion of successful performance, as a means of escaping a problem in their own positive account; a matter I consider in the next section. What is worth noting here is that for this manoeuvre to gain any purchase, B&M need to drive a deep wedge between the notions of ability and skill. This they do by (i) stipulating that “[a]bilities…are at most reliable dispositions to intentional behaviour” (2007, 46) and (ii) declaring, somewhat sotto voce, that it is, “important to recognize that intellectualists will distinguish sharply between skills and abilities or dispositions. Skill is a state of Intelligence… skills but not abilities or dispositions must be at least partially grounded in propositional attitudes.” (2011b, 9, fn. 12). This new category division between abilities and skills turns them into technical notions, making it

80 Cf., Ryle: “The general trend of this book [The Concept of Mind] will undoubtedly, and harmlessly, be stigmatized as ‘behaviourist’. (1949 308)
impossible to characterise Ryle’s philosophy, or anti-intellectualism in general, using these (now) theoretical terms. Furthermore, in stipulating such a categorial distinction between abilities and skills, B&M provide further clues as to the thinking behind the characterisation of their various cases.

What, though, of B&M’s own positive account of know-how? The next section sets out the detail of this apparently fresh new approach.

2 Understanding, Concepts and Conceptions

According to S&W’s propositional intellectualism:

(1) S knows how to φ

is not a matter of S having an ability to φ, or engaging in some kind of normative performance of, or associated with, φ-ing. Rather it is a matter of:

(2) S’s knowing w is a way to φ

On their own positive account of know-how, B&M’s share S&W’s view that knowing how is knowing a way. But whereas for S&W’s knowing a way to φ is propositional:

(3) S knows that w is a way to φ under a practical mode of presentation

for B&M knowing a way is not propositional knowledge-that, but non-propositional knowledge-of, or acquaintance knowledge. B&M distinguish (at least) two kinds of acquaintance knowledge. There is the more familiar notion of the knowledge had for people or places, e.g., my knowledge of my own, but not B&M’s neighbours, or my knowledge of Central London, but not downtown Denver. There is, they suggest, a further kind of acquaintance knowledge; one that involves understanding. This kind of acquaintance knowledge, B&M take to be objectual knowledge or objectual

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81 This ability/skill stipulative distinction, with the propositional attitude grounding of skill might be taken as yet further evidence that the ‘non-propositionality’ heralded in the name of B&M’s position, is a not insubstantial piece of mis-direction.
understanding. Specifically, it is the objectual knowledge or understanding of concepts.

Armed with this distinction, B&M propose that what it is to know-how to φ, is a matter of having (i) an objectual understanding of concepts, (ii) a guiding conception of a way of φ-ing, (iii) a correct and complete (possibly implicit) conception of that way of φ-ing, and (iv) reasonable concept mastery of the relevant ability-based concepts. All of these elements, ‘objectual understanding’, ‘a guiding conception of a way of φ-ing’, ‘a correct and complete conception of a way of φ-ing’, ‘reasonable concept mastery’ and ‘ability-based concepts’ have precisely tailored identities and roles in B&M’s theoretical edifice.

Against thinking of knowledge-how as either a propositional attitude or an ability, the paper (Non-Propositional Intellectualism) [2011c] proposes a third way: to know how to perform a given activity is to have some understanding of a way of performing that activity, where such objectual understanding (understanding of, not understanding-that) is grounded in but distinct from propositional attitudes and involves having reasonable mastery of the concepts in some (possibly implicit) conception of that way. (Bengson, 2011)

I now examine these elements individually, raising critical issues en route.

2.1 Understanding

B&M’s decision to ascribe know-how but not ability in their (B) cases, i.e., to *Martin the Turtle-keeper, Pat the Ski-Instructor, Irina the Champion Skater, and Louis the Mathematician*, is both evidence for, and consolidation of, the supposedly distinction between genuine know-how and ability. In eschewing ability as a feature of know-how, not withstanding their own admission about their natural intimacy in stereotypical cases, B&M are faced with two broad options. They could take the know-how at issue in both the (A) and (B) cases to invite further analysis or they could reject the idea that know-how has any such further analysis. In the latter case, there would be no single property, element, aspect, feature, essence, characteristic or criterion shared by *all* the cases of know-how. Instead, following a suggestion from
Ludwig Wittgenstein, know-how might be recognised to be a “family resemblance” (PI §67) notion.\textsuperscript{82}

In his associated work on the nature of intuitions, Bengson’s philosophical preference is for, “a unitary (as opposed to “family resemblance”) theory of intuition”, being more capable of offering “significant theoretical advantages” (MSS 2010). Given B&M’s substantive theoretical ambitions, it is perhaps unsurprising that they forgo the family resemblance option. “[I]t seems implausible to deny that knowing how, skill, and other states of Intelligence have something important in common; what is needed is an account of this commonality.”\textsuperscript{83} (2011b, 19, fn. 19) B&M claim to identify understanding as the desired and presumed commonality shared by all cases of know-how. This is not the conclusion of an argument based on attempts to excavate the syntax and semantics of know-how-involving sentences, (à la S&W). Indeed, it is not the conclusion of an argument at all. In sharp contrast to the methodology of their fellow intellectualists, B&M’s proposal that understanding is the shared characteristic of all examples of know-how, is the deliverance of intuition, backed up by the observation of ordinary language usage.

Using intuitions about Irina’s knowledge of addition, in (A1), B&M propose that, “she must simply possess a minimal understanding,” because, “[i]ntuitively, knowing how to perform select activities entails a minimal understanding of them.” (2007, 41) Having articulated this “intimate relation between know-how and understanding” B&M now take themselves to be equipped with “the motivation” and indeed the wherewithal, to provide “a general intellectual analysis of the former in terms of the latter.” (2007, 31 and also 46) As well as now having an available rationale for their various counter-examples.

Three preliminary objections might be raised at this juncture. First, one might claim it is a mistake to simply presume there must be a commonality to know-how; an avoidable error brought on by too narrow a diet of examples, an over-enthusiastic ambition to system-build, the urge to naturalistic reduction, and such like. All of these are symptomatic of what Wittgenstein identifies as, “[o]ur craving for generality.” (BB, 18) B&M might respond that there is insufficient evidence to suggest that know-how is a candidate family resemblance notion, or present evidence

\textsuperscript{82} I return to this in Chapter 5 to take a closer look at Wittgenstein’s insight. But here, I will continue to use Bengson’s intuitive understanding of what is meant.

\textsuperscript{83} And of course, without the assumption of just such a commonality, naturalized philosophical theory-building loses its rationale. I look more closely at this methodological demand in Chapter 6.
to warrant their claim for a commonality. They might, perhaps, go on to raise the stakes to a discussion of the merits of different meta-philosophical ambitions and approaches (as I do in Chapter 6). Whilst, however, they do discuss the important ramifications for their (or any) theory of know-how for a vast range of philosophical topics (a point which can’t be faulted) they never question the task and principles that shape naturalized philosophy.

Secondly, one might suggest that even without committing to a family resemblance approach, there might be crucial differences between (A) and (B) cases. Just because understanding might be a useful tool in considering (A1), it needn’t be applicable to any, let alone, all, (B) cases. After all why should addition be the paradigm example of knowledge-how? Why not politics, sport, dancing, looking after a child, caring for animals, creating a garden, running a country, a business or a household?

Thirdly, in seeking to analyse know-how in terms of understanding, B&M select a notion which is, itself, the subject of major controversy. According to Stephen Grimm, the majority of philosophers of science take it to be entirely uncontroversial that understanding is a matter of understanding why things are as they are; a kind of propositional knowledge about the understanding of causes. (2006, 515-516) Epistemologists Jonathan Kvanvig and Linda Zagzebski disagree, holding that though understanding may well be related to knowledge, it is not some kind of species of it, propositional or otherwise. Their arguments involve appreciating the extent to which understanding can not be Gettierized and may or may not be compatible with luck. In stark contrast to either of these two general trends in the philosophy of understanding, B&M hold that understanding is not to be regarded in terms of being (or not being) a kind of propositional knowledge, but of being a kind of acquaintance knowledge. Specifically, it is a “type of objectual knowledge, theoretically speaking […] not mere objectual knowledge or ‘knowledge-by-acquaintance’. Rather, it is a kind of understanding.” (2011c, 180)

As such, B&M propose an account of know-how which takes it to be a kind of understanding, where understanding is held to be a sub-species of acquaintance knowledge. This latter is not only a deeply contentious point, but perhaps the detail of B&M’s account provides the very resources needed to help illuminate these problems. I move on, therefore, to consider the concepts and conceptions which are relata of this objectual understanding and the relevant relation of grasping. For,
together these establish the core of B&M’s theory of know-how.

2.2 The Three Cs

Having agreed with S&W that to know-how to φ is to know a way to φ, but having disagreed with S&W that to know a way to φ is to have propositional knowledge of a way, B&M propose instead that:

(4) \( x \) knows how to φ when \( x \) minimally understands a way of φ-ing.

(cf., 2007, 41)

B&M then offer the following necessary and sufficient conditions for minimal understanding:

(5) “\( x \) minimally understands a way of φ-ing if and only if \( x \) has a correct and complete (possibly implicit) conception \( \xi \) of \( w \) and \( x \) has reasonable mastery of the concepts in \( \xi \) (and their mode of combination)” (2007, 50)

‘Concepts’, ‘concept mastery’ and ‘conceptions’ are all terms of art, as I now indicate.

2.2.1 Concepts

B&M claim concepts can be ability-based (2007, 32 & 2011c, fn. 68), demonstrative (2007, 51), proprioceptive (2009, fn. 28) and relevant. “[B]y ‘relevant concepts’ we simply mean the concepts reasonable mastery of which is necessary and sufficient for understanding the select activity in question.” (2007, fn. 20)

2.2.2 Concept mastery

According to B&M, concept mastery comes in qualitatively distinct degrees: (i) minimal mastery (i.e., mere concept possession), (ii) reasonable mastery (i.e., solid grasp of a concept) and (iii) full mastery. To understand a concept, it need only be reasonably, rather than fully, mastered. Such reasonable mastery is deemed to be a
cognitive state\textsuperscript{84} which “occupies the middle ground between mere possession and full mastery”, involving having a “sufficiently solid grasp” (2007, 42) of the relevant concepts. Furthermore, “Intuitively, $x$ has reasonable mastery of the relevant concepts only if $x$ has the ability to correctly employ those concepts in simple ways.” (2007, 43)

### 2.2.3 Conceptions

According to B&M, “one’s conception of some $\delta$ is how one conceives or thinks or is somehow inclined to think, of $\delta$.” (2011c, 190). Such conceptions can be correct or incorrect, complete or incomplete, there can be different conceptions of the same thing, and “necessarily equivalent conceptions need not be identical” (2011c, 191). Conceptions can also be wholly or partially demonstrative, implicit or explicit, publically shareable and one person can have more than one distinct conception of the same thing. B&M name these properties respectively the “non-correctness, non-exhaustiveness, diversity, fine-grainedness, unsophisticatedness, covertness, publicity and non-exclusivity” of conceptions. (2011c, 190-191).

Though these properties would seem equally applicable to beliefs, and thus suggest that conceptions are beliefs, B&M insist that conceptions are neither beliefs, nor sets of beliefs. Were they to be beliefs, this would invite, or perhaps demand, the very propositional account of know-how they seek to reject. That said, B&M do acknowledge there are deep similarities. Conceptions, they admit, “are not identical to beliefs – at least not outright beliefs – or collections thereof (though they may supervene on beliefs and their kin).” (2011c, fn. 50) Given, however, that conceptions are not, on this account, beliefs, they cannot be believed, thus (on some epistemological view) a fortiori, not known. Instead, they are (as are their constitutive concepts) grasped. Objectualist intellectualism says that, “To know how to $\phi$ is to

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\textsuperscript{84} B&M’s ‘cognitive state’ is, as might be suspected the same as Stanley’s ‘standing epistemic state’. This was confirmed in personal discussion with John Bengson at the 2011 Arche Knowing-How Conference at St Andrews University, where interestingly, the expression “epistemic standing state” swiftly became the single most important term of art, though as already pointed out, its very existence (and not its nature) is what Ryle sought to criticise. Note also that to presume that propositional knowledge is any kind of state is for some to have already made a mistaken step in the wrong direction, c.f., Hacker (2001) and (2004), and Wittgenstein.
stand in an objectual understanding relation to a way of $\phi$-ing.” (2011, 189) This is done in two steps with the introduction of the notion of a guiding conception:

(6) A conception $\xi$ of a way of $\phi$-ing is correct and complete only if it is possible for $\xi$ to be some individual guiding conception in $\phi$-ing in way $w$. (2011c, 192)\(^{85}\)

and, then:

(7) $\xi$ is a guiding conception for an action $\phi$ for an individual $x$ if $\xi$ is for $x$ a conception of a way of $\phi$-ing and, in attempting to $\phi$, $x$ tries to at least implicitly to make $x$’s behaviour conform to $\xi$. (2011c, 192)

With this, B&M complete a concept-theoretic account of know-how. This, they claim, provides an “escape” from the “false dichotomy between the identification of knowing how either with propositional knowledge or ability.” (2011c, 195) To know how to $\phi$ is to stand in the appropriate objectual understanding relation to a way to $\phi$, which requires having a (possibly) implicit correct and complete conception, that is, a guiding conception of a set of ability-related concepts of which one has solid grasp, or reasonable mastery.

Armed with the detail of B&M’s proposal, I now argue that this is not only propositional in all but name, it is also fundamentally flawed.

2.3 A Fourth C: Concerns

B&M’s view that know-how is objectual knowledge crucially requires highly specific, indeed stipulatively defined notions of concepts, concept mastery and conceptions. I consider the first, and then third of these, individually; incorporating issues pertaining to the second, concept mastery, where best applicable.

\(^{85}\) For B&M, this is the relation between a way of acting and a conception.
2.3.1 Concepts

According to Maurice Weitz, there is “an astonishing variety of theories of concepts”, which variously claim that concepts are, “supersensible entities, such as universals, meanings, abstract objects, definitions, predicates and relations”, “mental entities or states, such as composite images, ideas, thoughts, conceptions or innate ideas”, or “neural entities”, “somewhere between words, thoughts and things” or “abstractible items from families of sentences” or “human or animal skills or abilities”, etc. (1988, 260) Georges Rey’s more recent overview offers an equally diverse range of candidate suggestions for the ontology of concepts, from the “constituents of thought” to “sets of real and possible objects, and functions defined over them” to, “properties, ‘senses’, inferences rules or discrimination abilities”. (1998, original emphasis). In attempting to structure this sprawling contemporary diversity, Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence identify “two dominant frameworks” which understand concepts to be either, “mental representations or [...] abstract objects.” (2007, 561, see also 2008) Jerry Fodor’s theory is an example of the former framework; the latter stems from Frege and is the orientation that best captures the work of Christopher Peacocke.

In their own writings on know-how, B&M offer no direct view on the nature of concepts, eschewing any engagement with this maelstrom. There is a clear commitment in Bengson’s current work on perception, however, to the view that concepts are abstract senses. In their (2011), Bengson (together with Enrico Grube & Daniele Korman) states, “We shall understand concepts to be abstract senses, as opposed to abilities or mental representations (e.g. words in a language of thought).” (2011, 175) This sits comfortably with the views of those two concept theorists B&M reference most, i.e., Peacocke and George Bealer. “On Bealer’s (1998) analysis of concept possession, the relevant propositional attitudes are intuitions. On

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86 Nonetheless, in the complex theoretical environment of contemporary work on concepts, there remain a number of similarities between B&M’s views and those of Fodor (1998 and 2008). These include, (i) B&M’s apparent amenability to Fodorian-style concept atomism, as seen in Novice Irina’s vulnerability to discrete, rather than holistic, conceptual confusions; particularly concerning skate-edges, (ii) B&M’s worries over concept learnability (see 2011b, the ‘rational practice question’) and Fodor’s rejection of concept-learning, (iii) apparent resonances between B&M’s objectual knowledge and Fodor’s proposal that concept acquisition involves ‘locking onto’ properties in the world, and (iv) B&M’s externalism and Fodor’s suggestion that, “having a concept (concept possession) is constituted by being in some sort of nomic, mind-world relation.” (1998, 146)

87 In personal communication, Bengson confirmed that his own view of concepts has “differences, but also relevant similarities (in approach as well as content)” to that of “Bealer, Burge and Peacocke”. (email, 8th June, 2011)
Peacocke’s (2007) most recent analysis of concept possession, the relevant attitudes are states of tacit propositional knowledge. Either way, the basic idea expressed is that, “to fix a subject’s propositional attitudes plus the subject’s conceptual situation, is to fix their knowledge how.” (2011c, fn. 55). So whilst it is the case that B&M do not specifically identify or offer their own account of concepts, per se, I take it to be uncontroversial that their views can be situated alongside these Fregean theorists.

One might bring a range of objections to bear on the view that concepts are some kind of Fregean abstract objects, but I limit myself to focussing on the demanding metaphysical implications of the view favoured by B&M. These are apparent in Bealer’s claim that, “concepts are sui generis irreducible entities comprising the ontological categories in terms of which propositions (thoughts, in Frege’s sense) are to be analyzed”. (1998, 261) This is the “ante rem view of propositions and concepts... the view that they are mind-independent entities which would exist whether or not they apply to anything.” (1998, 261, emphasis added) As mind-independent entities, concepts do, of course, fit well into B&M’s theoretical requirements that one have objectual (acquaintance) knowledge of concepts, that concepts are graspable relata. But though this indicates the extent to which B&M are radical concept objectivists, it trades on the view that concepts not only can be, but are, and indeed need to be substantial, stand-alone metaphysical entities.

But need B&M’s view be quite so metaphysically demanding? Perhaps, B&M’s objectivism is simply a matter of relations to some social, rather than Platonic realm. After all, B&M do share Tyler Burge’s view that a patient who mistakenly believes she has arthritis in the thigh does share the same concept, arthritis, with her doctor (see 2009, 399, fn 31). And as Burge points out, “Every man is a piece of the social continent, a part of the social main.” (1979, 86). Perhaps B&M’s view that concepts are abstract objects or senses, is the more metaphysically innocuous observation that concepts are but part and parcel of our human language activities, and that concept possession and mastery comes with our inculcation into, and ongoing involvement in, public language practices.

There is no evidence, however, that B&M’s view about the nature of concepts is involved with our being, or coming to be, language-users. No connection is

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88 Cf., Margolis & Laurence (2007) for a raft of further objections.
89 B&M also refer to their own non-propositional intellectualism as ‘radical intellectualism’ (2007, fns. 1 & 24), though this nomenclature has been dropped in (2011a).
considered, let alone exploited, between language mastery and concept mastery.\textsuperscript{90} Indeed, there is indirect evidence that B&M take language abilities to be irrelevant to their proposed objectual knowledge of concepts. In briefly considering the applicability of their know-how theory to animals, B&M state, “We believe the status of animal know-how is best left to experts on animal cognition”, though they admit, “we are comfortable with the corresponding attributions of propositional knowledge, and minimal understanding.” (2007, 399)\textsuperscript{91} Leaving aside the immediate worry that this suggests B&M might be taking know-how to be the \textit{explanans} not the \textit{explanandum}, this confirms my point that B&M take any putative internal connection between language-use and concepts to be misguided.\textsuperscript{92}

The viability of B&M’s account of know-how rests on the (as yet absent) clarification and justification of this ante-rem view of concepts. But just what are concepts such that they are in the world prior to our grasp of them? How do they relate to our new and developing practices? Before there were poets and philosophers, artists and sportsmen, dancers and demolition experts, were the required ability-based concepts, ‘out there and waiting’ to be grasped? Without doubt, the required concepts that figure in B&M’s theory are far more metaphysically demanding, and obscure than their presentation acknowledges. In foregoing the connection between know-how and abilities in favour of know-how and concepts, B&M escape the difficulties of (what they claim to be) the frying pan for those (I would suggest) of the fire.

\subsection*{2.3.2 Conceptions}

Following Burge, B&M are committed to the view that two people might share the same concepts, whilst nonetheless having difference conceptions. Given that the default view of conceptions is that they are beliefs or sets of beliefs, this looks to push B&M towards a propositional approach. B&M’s non-propositional form of

\textsuperscript{90} This indicates a further Fodorian parallel, given his view that “concepts are prior to and independent of natural language” (Margolis & Laurence, 2008)

\textsuperscript{91} In this B&M are even more closely associated with Burge, for whom, “even where social practices are deeply involved in individuating mental states they are not the final arbiter.” (1986, 707)

\textsuperscript{92} When questioned specifically about whether being a language-user is a pre-requisite for having concepts, Bengson replied, “I’d prefer to remain neutral on this issue if I can. At any rate, the answer might depend on what is meant by ‘language-user’ (e.g., one who does vs. could use a language).” (e-mail 8\textsuperscript{th} June, 2011)
intellectualism requires, by contrast, that the relevant guiding conceptions are not propositional. As non-propositional entities, conceptions (and indeed concepts) are not believed, but are grasped. But just what is this grasping?

According to Jason Stanley, “Grasping what it is [to] know how to do something involves understanding what it is to know the answer to a question. As we have seen this is an ability that presupposes mastery of propositional knowledge.” (2011, 233-234) In contrast, B&M claim that, “grasping a correct and complete conception of a way of acting involves conceiving of that way in an appropriate manner – conceiving of it as such.” (2011c, 188). This ‘as such’ qualification gets a further mention, in connection with B&M’s insistence that objectual understanding “is neither propositional knowledge nor merely objectual knowledge (acquaintance, familiarity) alone: rather it is objectual-knowledge-of-a-way-of- φ-ing-as such-with reasonable-conceptual-mastery.” (2011c, 188 fn. 54)

So, just as believing or knowing is to propositions, so grasping is to be regarded as a conceiving-as-such to non-propositional conceptions, or an objectual-knowledge-as-such to a way of φ-ing, for B&M. This ‘as such’ qualification is, therefore, doing most, if not all, the work in distinguishing the desired non-propositional conception, from the presumed default propositional view of conceptions. But can it be that this ‘as such’ rider is all that stands between B&M’s non-propositional, objectual intellectualism and propositional intellectualism? Not quite. For B&M do offer one further distinction in denying the apparently propositionality of their view. This is their suggestion that the grounds of know-how are distinct from, and should not be conflated, with the nature of know-how. For though it is the case that know-how is, propositionally grounded, B&M claim that its nature is not.93

93 Although B&M use the ‘in virtue of’ locution, solely in connection with the grounding relation, and acknowledge both Kit Fine and Jonathan Schaffer as the source for their own (undetailed) views on the grounding relation, the views of Fine & Schaffer, however, pull in different directions. Fine (2001) states that, “The notion of ground should be distinguished from the strict notion of reduction” (2001, 15) thus enabling Fine (and B&M) to remain metaphysically neutral. Whereas for Schaffer, grounding is a “primitive… unanalysable but needed notion – it is the primitive structuring conception of metaphysics.” (2009, 364, original emphasis). Further evidence for B&M’s more Finean view is perhaps to be found in Fine’s commitment to the role, importance and metaphysically illuminating power of intuitions; something found Bengson’s other related work,(e.g., his (2010) & (2011 with Grube & Korman) Note Fine’s view that, “two main sources of evidence for making judgments of ground” are firstly, “our wealth of intuitions” (2001, 21) and secondly the, “simplicity, breath, coherence or non-circularity” which provide “the most metaphysically satisfying” explanation. (2001, 22) Again, this dovetails nicely with Bengson’s other work on intuitions. (2010 MSS)
This propositional *grounding relation* is, “x knows how to φ in virtue of x’s having some propositional attitudes(s) regarding φ-ing”. (2011c, 162). By contrast, “the *nature* of knowing how to φ (or, if you prefer, what it *is*: its analysis, definition, or essence”. (2011c, 163) And this is not propositional. In light of this, B&M take it to be the case that one might accept intellectualism without propositionalism. And this is, indeed, what B&M propose. Thus, as a matter of the *grounding of know-how*, B&M share with S&W a propositional view: know-how is grounded in propositional attitudes. As a matter of the *nature of know-how*, B&M take know-how to be non-propositional, a view not shared by S&W. For where S&W’s *propositional intellectualism* takes the person who knows how to be something to be in a knowledge-*that* relation to the proposition that w is way to φ, B&M’s *non-propositional intellectualism* takes the person to be in a knowledge-*of*, objectual relation to way to φ.

Of course it is important to note that S&W do not recognise the distinction between grounds and nature which B&M are suggesting. They do, though, talk about the *nature of propositions* and their account’s commitment to a “metaphysics of ways” (2001, 427). Were one to attempt to appraise S&W’s propositional intellectualism using B&M’s distinction between grounding and nature, then I suggest that S&W’s declared commitment to Russellian propositions would result in their position similarly qualifying as ‘non-propositional’. For this is non-propositional because it picks out the metaphysically robust *constituents* of propositions, rather than the propositions themselves. A further step that S&W could, but don’t actually make in their account. The distinction then turns on B&M willingness to take a final naturalizing step in their epistemology. All of which confirms the deep commitment that has been running through each stage of their theoretical proposal. Namely, that B&M’s account is, fundamentally, a *metaphysics-driven account* of know-how. I return to these issues in the next section.

A second worry concerns a tension connected to the degree of richness needed for a guiding conception. A *correct* and *complete* conception looks to be something of a substantial notion, yet a much more modest, indeed, minimalist notion is all that actually seems to be required. As with S&W’s requirement that one might know how to φ, but under a practical mode of presentation that need only be indexical, (I can do *this* like *this*, or in *this* way), so B&M accept and allow that the knower’s relevant
concepts, concept mastery, and guiding conception need only be demonstrative. As such, B&M’s required guiding conception that \( w \) is a way to \( \varphi \), need be a matter of merely having the objectual understanding that, ‘this is a way to do this’.

To illustrate this point B&M provide us with two cases: a neuro-anatomist (A2) and a five year old child (A3) both of whom know-how and are able to waggle-their ears. The neuro-anatomist’s guiding conception includes, “reasonable mastery of the concepts muscular contraction and auricular muscles”, though the child’s conception is, “more likely proprioceptive and demonstrative: by doing this to these muscle (parts of my body).” (2007, 51) To be deemed to know-how to do something merely because one knows how to do this, in this way, looks to make the need for a ‘correct and complete conception’ even more irrelevant. Furthermore, given such an acceptance of demonstrative guiding conceptions and concepts, it is unclear why the three (C) cases Avalanche, Chris the Hiker, and Irina the Novice are any different from the child in (A3) who both is able to wiggle his ears and knows how to. They can all do what they do, in the way that they do, i.e., in “this” way. Why then aren’t Sally, Chris and Novice Irina all people who both are able and know how to do what they do? Why are (C) cases not (A) cases? Or conversely why is (A3) an (A) and not a (C) case?

Not withstanding the permissibility of demonstrative concepts and conceptions, a connected worry emerges from the requirement that whilst different people may all know-how to \( \varphi \), they need not all have reasonable mastery of the same concepts, or indeed have the same correct and complete conception of a way of \( \varphi \)-ing. For if a guiding conception needs to be a correct and complete conception, in order to suffice for know-how, how is it the case that one person’s correct and complete conception could be both correct and complete, yet different to another’s? If my guiding conception is not the same as yours, yet mine is correct and complete, and yours is equally correct and complete, then either the supposed completeness is not the case, or correct and complete conceptions need not be identical. In which case the very idea of a correct and complete conception, appears to be, if not incoherent, at least surplus to requirements.

\[94\] Cf., Peacocke’s comparable view that one might be, “unable to make its [an implicit conception’s] content explicit.” (1998, 49), or that “thinkers sometimes mischaracterize the content of their implicit conceptions.” (1998, 51)
One possible response might be that there are as indefinitely many complete and correct conceptions as there are people φ-ing: each guided by what are distinctly different ways of φ-ing.\(^{95}\) B&M’s theory now looks to collapse back into an ability-involving account of some kind. But then again the final piece in their theoretical jigsaw does indeed appeal to action, to the notion of trying and to behaviour:

\[
\begin{align*}
(7) & \xi \text{ is a guiding conception for an action } \phi \text{ for an individual } x \\
& \text{if } \xi \text{ is for } x \text{ a conception of a way of } \phi \text{-ing and, in attempting } \phi, x \text{ tries to at least implicitly to make } x\text{'s behaviour conform to } \xi. \quad \text{(2011c, 192 emphasis added)}^{96}
\end{align*}
\]

Having worked so hard to reject the necessity of any ability features, it now seems that B&M need to appeal to ability, or at the very least, people doing things, in order to provide any sense to the very idea of a guiding conception.

This indicates the extent to which B&M have a gap in their intellectualist theory; a gap which ultimately requires that they, like S&W, must appeal to something beyond either static objectual acquaintance, (B&M), or inert propositional knowledge (S&W). Indeed, I would argue, that B&M account faces an impasse, and that it does so at exactly the same juncture as that faced by S&W. When S&W need to distinguish between Hannah’s knowledge of a way Bill rides a bike, and her own knowledge how to ride a bike, they appeal to propositional knowledge known under a practical mode of presentation. When B&M need to distinguish between a person who knows how others waggle their ears, and his or her own knowledge how to waggle their own ears, they resort to as such qualifications of objectual knowledge and ability-involving guiding conceptions.

I conclude that having rejected ability involving accounts of know-how, B&M’s theoretical approach is guilty of kicking our human actions, activities, abilities, and practices out the front door only to invite their return through the back.

\(^{95}\) Cf., Peacocke’s own view of implicit conceptions he considers to invite a (parallel) criticism that, “implicit conceptions… are simply projected backwards from the actual inferential and classificatory dispositions of thinkers” (1998, 54), and are “no more than a summary of truths about inferential dispositions” (1998, 57) with neither explanatory power, nor metaphysical reality.

\(^{96}\) Though this is to miss the point that is only because one knows how to do something that one can one can know how to refrain from doing it; and refraining from doing one thing one knows how to do, and refraining from doing another thing one knows how to do may thus be, as one might say, behaviourally indistinguishable.
B&M’s non-propositional intellectualism not only shares an ineliminable propositionality with S&W’s intellectualism, it similarly confronts a theoretical Rubicon that can only be crossed with resources drawn from the anti-intellectualist reservoir.

Furthermore, in grounding know-how in propositional attitudes, B&M do accept their account needs to answer Ryle’s Regress Challenge. I now evaluate their attempt to dispel the challenge this poses.

3 Responding to the Regress

Ryle’s Regress Objection challenges intellectualism by claiming that a regress is generated by the “tandem” operation of considering propositions and then “putting them into practice” in intelligent action. (1949, 46) On this model of knowing-how to \( \phi \) intelligently, the initial step of considering propositions itself would need to be done intelligently to serve as the necessary guide to intelligent action. As an action that could also be done intelligently, it requires, first of all, the consideration of (yet further) propositions. And so on. B&M attempt to avoid this regress by turning to the same Ginet example\(^\text{97}\) exploited by S&W.

According to Ginet, in his knowledge how to open a door, he claims to, “exercise (or manifest) my knowledge that one can get the door open by turning the knob and pushing it...” (1975, 7 original emphasis) As already discussed, S&W take Ginet’s point to show that one might exercise or engage with propositional knowledge, without having to contemplate or formulate it. Thus the Regress is, supposedly, avoided. I have argued already that this is simply helping oneself to the desired answer to the question at issue, rather than providing an argument for it. B&M adopt a similar tactic; slightly modified.

For B&M, “In some cases, a state of engaging propositional content (in Ginet’s example...) can be appropriately causally related to the production of (‘produce’) an Intelligent action although it is not itself an exercise of Intelligence”. (2011b, 22) The idea here is that there is a kind of non-intelligent exercise of the propositional knowledge or propositional attitudes. There are, according to B&M two

\(^{97}\) Cf., Hetherington (2009) for a contrasting view of Ginet on understanding and a priori knowledge in which he suggests Ginet can be read as offering an “ability-interpretation of full understanding”; which would challenge B&M’s reading from quite a different perspective. (2009, 34)
ways this might occur: (i) at the person level, in “applying or utilizing” a proposition or propositional attitude or, (ii) sub-personally by “an act of deploying or triggering an attitude”. (2011b, 23) With (i), I take it that B&M mean that the application or utilisation of knowledge, at a personal level, is the conscious application and utilisation of knowledge or propositional attitudes. But what might it mean to consciously apply or utilize knowledge, non-intelligently? It is unclear what this means, or if it even makes sense. For were it to mean stupidly, then B&M would be suggesting one halts the Regress by saying intelligent action requires the stupid exercise of other knowledge. That cannot be right. But if this is not the case, then why involve further exercise or engagement with any such propositional knowledge or attitude in the first place. It looks like B&M now have the possibility that intelligent action needs no prior exercises of propositions at all. But this, of course, is Ryle’s position, and is what B&M seek to avoid. This pushes the thrust of B&M’s Regress Response entirely on to (ii), the sub-personal option. And indeed as they say, in general:

[I]n Ginet’s example propositional knowledge regarding the door arguably could be simply triggered or deployed subpersonally… To the extent that these views are able to explain how the relevant attitudes can be non-Intelligently exercised, such views would play a crucial role in helping to elaborate intellectualism in a way that averts regress. (2011b, 23)

B&M are right, here, to point out it would help to avoid Ryle’s Regress were they able to explain how the subpersonal, non-intelligent, trigger or deployment of propositional knowledge might be appropriately exercised. But no such explanation is actually offered. Yet, without such an explanation, their objectual intellectualism is not just short of help or assistance in averting the Regress, it is without any resources at all, and must succumb to it.98 Yet in order for B&M to supply a viable explanation,

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98 For B&M (like S&W before them) the pursuit of sub-personal explanations brings them to the same Ginet point, in search of justification for the naturalized philosophical option of ‘going sub-personal’. Ironically, B&M (unlike S&W) acknowledge that “Ryle would presumably object to the subpersonalist views and hybrid views, which seem to violate the tenet that the locus of Intelligence is always the person or agent.” (2011b, 23). But isn’t just a tenet, it’s the very point that motivates the whole issue. Having acknowledged the problem Ryle would have with their position, they say nothing further in response to it. This is a pertinent reminder that what is fundamentally going on in these rehearsed
they now need to make sense of the very idea of “the subpersonal, non-intelligent, trigger or deployment of propositional knowledge”.

At this point, the unresolved issue moves from the philosophical to the meta-philosophical level. For an anti-intellectualist in the spirit of Ryle might well say that whatever the subpersonal, non-intelligent, trigger or deployment of propositional knowledge or attitudes is, or might be, if it is even coherent, it is embroiled in a set of metaphysical views about the nature of mind that require an understanding of the nature of a philosophy that is deeply (perhaps too deeply) naturalised. Where such characterisation identifies that broad church of meta-philosophical commitments clustered round the view that philosophy and science run not just in parallel, but share the same tasks, methodology and ambitions. 99 Any possibility that B&M might produce a successful response to Ryle’s Regress Challenge hangs in the air, alongside these larger issues.

I now bring together some of these meta-philosophical issues that have been hinted at throughout this chapter.

4 Framing the debate

In the introduction to their (2011a) edited collection of articles on knowing-how, B&M claim that both anti-intellectualism and intellectualism agree there is a relation between mind and action, though each offers a different conception 100 of that relation. B&M take this as an invitation to articulate (i) a shared framework in which the two conceptions might effectively be articulated, thus effectively revealing their similarities and differences, and (ii) a set of questions they take both conceptions to need to answer. I now consider whether (i) the shared framework, really does offer that.

philosophical encounters between different accounts of know-how is actually a meeting of two paradigms (one naturalized and intellectualist, the other neither) about what philosophy’s tasks and methods are.

99 Cf., Bengson, “[W]e might learn something about the epistemology of a given mental state or event, such as intuition, by first reflecting on its metaphysics.” (2010 MSS)

100 Cf., The title of the introduction is, “Two Conceptions of Mind and Action”. I take it the term ‘conception’ here is the more familiar usage of the term ‘conception’, rather than B&M’s newly reconfigured term of art considered in Section 2 above.
The framework is presented through a collection of paired definitions. All these pairings exploit, on the one hand, the notion of a “state of intellect and character” and on the other, its exercise. B&M offer four intellectualist definitions:

(8) \[\text{[I}_{\text{MIND}}]\] A state \(\sigma\) is a state of Intelligence\(^{101}\) if and only if \(\sigma\) is or involves a certain type of internal states of engaging with propositional content.\(^{102}\)

(9) \[\text{[I}_{\text{ACTION}}]\] An individual \(x\) exercises a state of Intelligence in performing an action \(\varphi\) (i.e. \(x\ varphi\)-s Intelligently) if and only if \(x\ varphi\)-s and \(x\) has some state \(\sigma\) such that (i) \(\sigma\) is or involves a certain type of internal state of engaging propositional content and (ii) \(\sigma\) is appropriately causally (or otherwise explanatorily) related to the production of \(\varphi\).

(10) \[\text{[I}_{\text{KNOW-HOW}}]\] A state \(\sigma\) of an individual \(x\) is a state of knowing how to \(\varphi\) if and only if \(\sigma\) is or involves \(x\)’s having some relevant propositional attitude(s) regarding \(\varphi\)-ing.

(11) \[\text{[I}_{\text{KH-ACTION}}]\] \(x\) exercises knowledge how to \(\varphi\) in performing \(\varphi\) if and only if \(x\ varphi\)-s and \(x\) has some state \(\sigma\) such that (i) \(\sigma\) is or involves having some relevant propositional attitude(s) regarding \(\varphi\)-ing and (ii) \(\sigma\) is appropriately causally or otherwise related to the production of \(\varphi\).

The more general contrast between mind in (8), and action in (9), is consolidated into the more specific know-how-related pairing of (10) and (11). But the contrast between a state and its exercise in (8) and (9), which becomes the contrast between a state of knowing-how and its exercise in (10) or (11) is not as innocuous as it might first appear. For the distinction between (10) and (11) is not the standard distinction between one’s know-how (in general) and one’s specific exercise of that know-how,\(^{102}\)

\(^{101}\) B&M take “Intelligence” with a capital ‘I’ to refer to “all states of intellect and character, including (intelligence in the narrow sense), stupidity, and idiocy.” (2011b, 5-6)

\(^{102}\) It might be worth noting that B&M nowhere offer a ‘theory of content’, though this is clearly required by their strategy.
at a particular time or on a particular occasion. Rather it is an in principle separation between the having of know-how and its exercise, such that one might have know-how, yet be unable to exercise it at all. As such the separation of (10) and (11) enshrines the intellectualist possibility, seen in (and now explanatory of) B&M’s (B) cases. The exercise of know-how is not a necessary condition for the having of it.\footnote{\textsuperscript{103}}

That [I\textsubscript{KNOW-\textsc{how}}] is autonomous, and in no way constituted by [I\textsubscript{KH-action}], that [I\textsubscript{KNOW-\textsc{how}}] and [I\textsubscript{KH-action}] are distinct, and that [I\textsubscript{KNOW-\textsc{how}}] is causally efficacious in [I\textsubscript{KH-action}] fits well with B&M’s announced committed to the very picture of mind which Ryle wishes to challenge.\footnote{\textsuperscript{104}} Indeed, the dualism it articulates dovetails with their preference for a, “paramechanical” picture of mind, which involves “hidden” and “occult” mental “phantasms” that ‘take place ‘in the head.’”\footnote{\textsuperscript{2011c, 165, fn. 10}} It also fits well with B&M’s claim that there are causally efficacious states of intellect, which, in (8) and (10) “have the profile Producer of Intelligence.”\footnote{\textsuperscript{2011b, 24}}

But might such a framework be suitably reconfigured to enable it to host the alternative anti-intellectualist conception? B&M offer the following anti-intellectualist definitions which supposedly parallel those of (8), (9), (10) and (11):

\begin{enumerate}
\item [(12)] [A\textsubscript{M\textsc{ind}}] A state $\sigma$ is a state of Intelligence if and only if $\sigma$ is or involves a certain type of ability or disposition (e.g., a trained, trainable, multitrack disposition) to perform some action (or set of actions), rather than propositional attitudes. \footnote{\textsuperscript{2011b, 15}}

\item [(13)] [A\textsubscript{A\textsc{ction}}] An individual $x$ exercises a state of Intelligence in performing an action $\phi$ if and only if $x$ $\phi$-s and $x$ has some state $\sigma$ such that (i) $\sigma$ is a certain type of ability or disposition (e.g., a trained, trainable, multitrack disposition) to perform some action (or set of actions), rather than propositional attitudes, and (ii) $x$’s $\phi$-ing is the actualization of $\sigma$. \footnote{\textsuperscript{2011b, 15}}
\end{enumerate}

\cite{2011c, 167 fn. 17} It also hints at a reason why B&M “regard past ability as a red herring.”\footnote{\textsuperscript{2011c, 167 fn. 17}} Once again, this picture is comparable to Stanley’s ‘standing epistemic state’ but the very thing Ryle challenges.
(14) \([\text{AI}_{\text{KNOW-HOW}}]\) A state \(\sigma\) of an individual \(x\) is a state of knowing how to \(\varphi\) if and only if \(s\) is or involves \(x\)’s having a particular type of ability or disposition (e.g., a trained, trainable, multi-track disposition) to \(\varphi\), rather than propositional attitudes. (2011b, 15)

(15) \([\text{AI}_{\text{KH-ACTION}}]\) \(x\) exercises knowledge how to \(\varphi\) in performing an action \(\varphi\) if and only if \(x\) \(\varphi\)-s and \(x\) has some state \(\sigma\) such that \(\sigma\) is a certain type of ability or disposition (e.g., a trained, trainable, multi-track disposition) to \(\varphi\), rather than propositional attitudes, and (ii) \(x\)’s \(\varphi\)-ing is the actualization of \(\sigma\). (2011b, 15)

Here, B&M reveal as much in the titles of their definitions as they do in their definitions, for the titles presume that this rival conception is equally at home with the view that mind stands in some sort of relation to action. But for Ryle, and other anti-intellectualists, to suggest that the mind and action are relata of any sort, is to already indicate confusions are afoot.

Putting that aside, though, what of the parallel between \([I_{\text{KNOW-HOW}}]\) and \([I_{\text{KH-ACTION}}]\) and their new anti-intellectualist equivalents in (14) and (15)? If this framework is transferrable, as B&M propose, then presumably there is a distinction between (14) and (15) comparable to that between (10) and (11). But if this is the case, then it would entail that one might have \([\text{AI}_{\text{KNOW-HOW}}]\) without ever, in principle, ever needing to have \([\text{AI}_{\text{KH-ACTION}}]\). Which is to say that one might have an ability, but that ability might never be exercised, and indeed need never have been exercised; but one would still have the ability, notwithstanding. Such is the consequence of a putative anti-intellectual parallel which holds \([\text{AI}_{\text{KNOW-HOW}}]\) autonomous from \([\text{AI}_{\text{KH-ACTION}}]\), just as \([I_{\text{KNOW-HOW}}]\) is autonomous from \([I_{\text{KH-ACTION}}]\). But to say that one has an ability that is always and entirely in principle unexercised, but that nevertheless one still has that ability, is to sail very close to the winds of nonsense.

B&M’s attempt to articulate a shared framework for anti-intellectualism and intellectualism not only fails, but it reveals the meta-philosophical commitments at work in their view. Not only is there a deep dualism running through their account, it is supported by a range of naturalistic presumptions, which B&M struggle to see might be optional. This, from Bengson:
The question of the nature of a given mental state or event, such as intuition, need not be regarded as merely (or even primarily) epistemological, for at bottom it concerns the metaphysics or ontology of mind. In fact, it is generally possible to engage such a question without taking a firm stand on associated epistemological issues.

(2010 MSS)

B&M’s intellectualist account of know-how is not merely a highly naturalized form of epistemology, but it is an unrivalled example of what, I suggest, ought to be called *metaphysics-first epistemology*.

5 Concluding Remarks

B&M’s non-propositional, radical, or objectual intellectualism offers a metaphysically substantial, highly elaborate, concept-theoretic account of know-how. It stipulates more than describes, requires more illumination than it sheds, and is surrounded by a moat of engineered examples in which its own views are enshrined. Its apparently non-denominational freshness is not quite as new as supposed, for it remains substantially propositional; in line with S&W, if not for the same reasons. Much of its apparatus is a marriage between the metaphysics of mind-independent concepts and a naturalised picture of the relevant neurological correlates in the mind/brain. Half-Platonic, half-naturalistic, B&M’s account offers a new dualism rooted in the causal efficacy of so-called ‘producer of Intelligence states of Intellect and character.’

That this is even a *candidate* epistemological account of know-how shows the extent to which naturalism and its theory-constructing methods hold sway over much of contemporary analytic philosophy. A point to which I return in Chapter 6. B&M are right to suggest that know-how is no marginal topic. They claim that philosophical consideration of know-how is, “a hinge upon which our general understanding of mind and action turns”. (2011b, 4) Know-how is, however, even more important than this. For it not only brings in a range of first-level philosophical topics, it crucially highlights key issues in meta-philosophy. The value, status and implications of not just naturalized epistemology but naturalism in general, and are all

105 In personal discussion about this suggestion (July 2011) Bengson responded to my characterisation with the response that he’d be entirely happy were his views to be regarded as “completely Platonistic”.
implicated in this debate. In the next chapter, I explore an alternative way of conceiving of those hinges which constitute our conceptual world, and around which our activities and our human life turns. One which also reveals the interdependency of the philosophical and meta-philosophical, albeit quite differently.

I will also argue that though B&M misappropriate the notions of concept mastery and understanding, they are entirely right in wanting to bring them into an investigation of know-how. For these notions are not merely crucial aspects of our skills, activities and practices, they are constitutive of them. As Wittgenstein observes, “But if a person has not yet got the concepts, I shall teach him to use the words by means of examples and by practice. And when I do this I do not communicate less to him than I know myself.” (PI §208)
The anti-intellectualist and the intellectualist accounts of know-how explored in last three chapters are standardly taken to capture the key contributions to the modern discussion. There is, however, a potentially substantial contribution to this philosophical topic, that has yet to be considered by any of the participants in the foregoing debate. It is to be found in the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. For according to one particular reading of Wittgenstein’s *On Certainty*, there is a kind of *certainty* that is actually a kind of *know-how*. Furthermore, this is a foundational know-how which *enables* our empirical, propositional knowledge, whilst remaining categorically distinct from it. *Prima facie*, this suggests that there is at least one type of knowledge-how which is not reducible to propositional knowledge. If this were to be the case, not only would it provide a new Wittgensteinian perspective on the subject of know-how, but Wittgenstein’s insights would themselves be a substantial new contribution to it. In this chapter, I argue that Danièle Moyal-Sharrock’s understanding of *On Certainty* offers a springboard to just such a development.

Key to this conclusion is an appreciation of Moyal-Sharrock’s understanding of what she calls ‘hinge certainty’, which she characterises as a kind of know-how. In illuminating Wittgenstein’s insights into this foundational kind of know-how, Moyal-Sharrock takes us to the brink of a Wittgensteinian breakthrough in understanding the relation between (at least some aspects of) knowing-how and propositional knowledge. Having correctly identified this non-intellectualist insight, however, she adds a qualification to Wittgenstein’s point, which may risk undermining the higher grounds she is, otherwise, correctly staking out. For in going on to distinguish *two* different types of know-how, she suggests that the kind of know-how which provides the enabling foundation for our empirical knowledge, whilst non-propositional, is not a kind of non-propositional *knowledge*. She argues for this on the basis that, for Wittgenstein, only propositional knowledge is knowledge, hence any non-propositional know-how cannot, by definition, be knowledge. By imposing on Wittgenstein what I call the ‘propositional presumption’ (that knowledge *just is* propositional knowledge and nothing else), Moyal-Sharrock makes, I believe, an
unnecessary faux pas; one that the rest of her account does not demand.

There are a number of reasons why Moyal-Sharrock’s reading adds this qualifying caveat to the substantial contribution it offers. Firstly, there is perhaps a seeming circumspection in connecting the insights of On Certainty with those of the Philosophical Investigations; and secondly an associated resistance to fully integrating and involving the insights pertaining to rule-following in her understanding On Certainty. A third reason is to be sourced in the epistemological surroundings in which Moyal-Sharrock situates her reading. It is the demands and expectations of this environment which, I will argue, may well be contributing to the imposition of the propositional presumption on her reading of Wittgenstein. It is the intellectualist paradigm, within which contemporary epistemology operates, which helps to misdirect this crucial aspect of Moyal-Sharrock’s understanding. For in seeking to build an epistemological bridgehead from On Certainty to the more mainstream epistemological arenas, and in using their technical terminology, she has, I suggest, unwittingly welcomed in their intellectualist Trojan Horse. In this chapter, I argue for the need to re-visit Moyal-Sharrock’s understanding of On Certainty, alert to these issues, as a preliminary to accessing the resources that Wittgenstein’s philosophy has to contribute to the philosophy of know-how; a contribution illuminated by the otherwise unrivalled perspicacity and fecundity of Moyal-Sharrock’s appreciation.

To argue for these points, I begin with a scene-setting introduction to Wittgenstein’s engagement with G.E. Moore’s views, and what I take to be common exegetical ground shared by the majority of commentators on On Certainty. In Section 2, I articulate how hinge certainty (following Moyal-Sharrock) can be understood as a kind of know-how, but question her rationale for denying this know-how the status of knowledge. In Section 3, I turn to the wider environment in which all readings of On Certainty find themselves situated; exploring the extent to which epistemology is currently dominated by an exclusive focus on propositional knowledge. In the light of this ‘propositional presumption’, what emerges is a limited and often distorting philosophical space for any consideration of know-how which is not intellectualist. In Sections 4 and 5, I return, forewarned, to consider Moyal-Sharrock’s non-propositional know-how by the light of the propositional presumption arguing that in seeking to connect with a wider philosophical audience, she falls prey to difficulties involved in any non-intellectualist usage of the increasingly ubiquitous
term of art: the so-called ‘epistemic’. In Section 6, I consider challenges, particularly from Duncan Pritchard, which question the non-propositional reading at the heart of Moyal-Sharrock’s understanding of *On Certainty*, and reveal that the threat they pose is not one that gets delivered. What emerges throughout this critical engagement is that Wittgenstein is unquestionably presenting a brand new opportunity for the philosophy of know-how; an opportunity which, now identified, cannot be ignored.

I begin with the prompt to Wittgenstein’s work in *On Certainty*, namely those truisms which G. E. Moore’s claims to know with certainty.

1 **Moorean Beginnings**

In his 1939 paper, ‘Proof of an External World’, the first stage of G. E. Moore’s proof takes the form of a supposed argument that there exists “external things”:

> I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, “Here is one hand” and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, “and here is another.” (1959, 144)

Moore insists that the premises of this part of his argument are true. Furthermore, he claims to know with certainty that, “Here is one hand and here is another.” (1959, 145) To suggest otherwise, he claims, would be absurd. “You might as well suggest that I do not know I am now standing up and talking… that it’s not quite certain that I am!” (1959, 145)

In considering what it is to, “know that here is one hand” (OC 1) Wittgenstein identifies, then pursues the following discrimination:

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106 Wittgenstein considers a variety of other truisms which Moore also claims to “know with certainty to be true.” (1959, 32 original emphasis) These are to be found in his 1925 paper, ‘A Defence of Common Sense’, and include but are by no means limited to, “There exists at present a living human body, which is my body. This body was born at a certain time in the past, and has existed continuously ever since, thought not without undergoing changes…. Ever since it was born, it has been either in contact with or not far form the surface of the earth; and, at every moment since it was born, there have also existed many other things, having shape and size in three dimensions,” (1959, 33) and, “The earth has existed for many years past.” (1959, 36)
I should like to say: Moore does not know what he asserts he knows, but it stands fast for him, as also for me; regarding it as absolutely solid is part of our method of doubt and enquiry. (OC 151)

By contrasting ‘standing fast’ with being ‘known’, Wittgenstein drives a previously unnoticed and unanticipated wedge between certainty and knowledge; specifically empirical propositional knowledge. Standing fast turns out to be unwavering, although not in the way that Moore thinks. As Wittgenstein’s next remark sketches:

I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility. 

(OC 152)

The possibility that particular propositions might provide axes which enable, license or facilitate the doubting of other propositions leads Wittgenstein, in On Certainty, to the recognition that there is a categorial divide between empirical knowledge and certainty. “‘Knowledge’ and ‘certainty’ belong to different categories.” (OC 308)

Though Moore’s truisms are indeed indubitable, the certainty he claims for them does not get its purchase from their being maximally secure examples of our empirical knowledge; rather their indubitability reveals something about, and is a feature of, that which enables such empirical knowledge, in the first place. The indubitable certainty which Moore alerts us to with his (literal) hand-waving announcement, ‘This is a hand’, is categorially distinct from the empirical knowledge that, ‘This is a hand’, gained when one identifies, say, dismembered body-parts at the scene of a terrible accident. The truth (or falsity) of the latter is, however, made possible by the certainty of the former. Wittgenstein identifies Moorean certainty as located not in the category of empirical propositional knowledge itself, but as situated in, as part of, the enabling framework of that empirical knowledge. When Moore asserts his common sense beliefs, he is offering exemplifications, or what Moyal-Sharrock illuminatingly characterises as “monstrations” (2007, 66), of a part of the very framework which makes possible those most firmly held empirical beliefs. Moore is showing us what facilitates and enables his truisms, not identifying some feature of those truisms.
Wittgenstein articulates this categorial distinction using a variety of metaphors and imagery. He contrasts the facilitating axes around which empirical propositions rotate (OC 152), the riverbeds and the flowing water they channel (OC 96, 97, 99), and the static door hinges and movement of the doors themselves (OC 341, 343, 655). As he writes, “[T]he questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions [Sätze] are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn. (OC 341) And again, “If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.” (OC 343)

In one sense, of course, a hinge is uncontroversially something to be contrasted with its associated door (when the notion of a door is taken to refer not to the whole functioning item but to the flat moveable panel which swings open and shut). Equally, the hinge is part-constitutive of the door, for the moveable panel part of the door is but an inert flat piece of material which stands in need of a hinge, in order to be a door at all. So, too, with the fixed certainty around which our investigations turn, and which enables our empirical inquiries to be pursued. What makes those empirical investigations possible is to be contrasted with those inquiries, (i.e., categorically distinct from them, as hinge to door panel); yet at the same time what makes empirical investigations possible is part-constitutive of the whole process of inquiry and its products. After all, a hinge-less door is no door. Thus empirical knowledge with no way of, or framework for, ascertaining empirical knowledge is no knowledge at all.

The categorial division between door (panel) and hinge is analogous to the categorial division between the certainty of empirical knowledge (established through evidence and empirical observation) and the certainty of that which enables empirical knowledge. Consider again the body-part example. In the aftermath of, say, a train crash and fire, there might well be doubt as to which particular body-part one had recovered; perhaps a hand, a foot, or a dismembered shoulder? The possibility of doubt here goes hand-in-hand with the possibility that one might come to know, for in coming to know the possible doubts are eliminated. “One says “I know…” where one can find out,” (LW 1, 883), i.e., where there is information that will confirm, and/or a process, a procedure, a practice for ascertaining what is, or was, the case. One might, for example retrieve the rest of the body-parts and through a process of bodily reconstruction establish which particular body-parts are which. One might use X-ray photography, and other forensic methods, to establish the underlying bone structure
and thus confirm the identity of the specific part. On the basis of such evidence, one might then come to (be in a position to) know that the item in question is indeed a hand. One might successfully remove all reasonable doubt, and thus (empirically) know with certainty that ‘This [body-part] is a hand.’

In situations like Moore’s hand-waving declaration that ‘This is a hand’, however, the very possibility of doubt fails to make any sense. What might it be to doubt ‘This is a hand’, as it is being waved? One struggles to see just what is being brought into question. Or, indeed what is being attempted or what might be ‘confirmed.’ The possibility of doubt in the body-part scenario cannot be transferred to Moore’s hand-waving situation, and retain either the same, or indeed any, sense. “I know how to ascertain that I have two coins in my pocket. But I cannot ascertain that I have two hands, because I cannot doubt it.” (LW 1, 832) What could Moore bring as evidence for his hand-waving claim that what he is waving is a hand? The certainty Moore claims in his hand-waving example is not the same as the certainty achieved through the elimination of genuine doubts as a result of evidence-gathering and evaluation en route to empirical knowledge. Furthermore the certainty involved in the Moorean hand-waving situation is a pre-requisite for the certainty involved in the body-part situation. For it is because the body-part investigator has the same certainty as Moore (and as we all do) that ‘This [waving] is a hand’, that he or she can then come to know that ‘This [body-part] is a hand’. The ‘hinge certainty’ (as one might express it) of the first is required for, and categorially distinct from, the empirical knowledge of the second. What then is this hinge certainty that is exemplified, shown or monstrated in ‘Here [waving] is a hand’?

2 Hinge Certainty as Know-How

According to Moyal-Sharrock, the hinge certainty that is exemplified in ‘Here [waving] is a hand’ is a kind of know-how. In coming to know how to speak, understand and master language we achieve a certainty that is, “a flawless way of acting… an expert and unhesitating grasp”; such certainty “takes the shape of a flawless know-how” (2007, 63). Not only is this certainty, this know-how, something on which we are, “unwaveringly and yet thoughtlessly hinged”, and which provides an enabling framework for our empirical propositional knowledge, it also is that which, “enables us to think, speak or act meaningfully.” (2007, 174)
Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence … is not certainty propositions’ striking us immediately as true, ie. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game. (OC 204)

Moyal-Sharrock identifies such non-propositional acting with our hinge certainty; our ways of acting, our know-how. Moreover, the non-propositionality of this know-how is required for, and enables it to play its foundational role. “To be sure there is justification, but justification comes to an end.” (OC 192) And the justification comes to an end in our certain way of acting, our know-how, where, “If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false.” (OC 205) As such, when Moore declares ‘Here [waving] is a hand’, he is not making an empirical knowledge claim; he is displaying the certain ways of acting, the know-how on which his empirical knowledge stands. This indubitable certainty is, as Wittgenstein reminds us, none other than, “our manner of judging and therefore of acting.” (OC 232)

There are readings of On Certainty which do not recognise the non-propositional know-how that is our certain ways acting. Instead they interpret Moore’s ‘This [waving] is a hand’ to be an example of a hinge proposition. I will consider the challenges these readings may pose below.

‘This [waving] is a hand’ together with ‘This [indicating] is green’, ‘This [indicating] is a tree’, ‘This [indicating] is a chair’ are examples of what Moyal-Sharrock categorises as ‘linguistic hinges.’107 Just as we must learn the correct use of our body-part vocabulary before being able to inquire about the identity of an item rescued from a crash site, so too with our colour vocabulary. “A child must learn the use of colour words before it can ask for the name of a colour.” (OC 648). On Moyal-Sharrock’s understanding of Wittgenstein, coming to know how to master the use of ‘hand’, ‘green’, chair’ and ‘tree’ etc., is a matter of being exposed to and inculcated into the language-games in which they feature. Coming to learn the language-games in which they feature is a matter of learning how to do something; mastery of which results in knowing how to do something. Doubt is senseless in the face of such

107 Linguistic hinges are one of four types of hinges Moyal-Sharrock (2007) identifies; the others being universal hinges (eg. ‘There are physical objects), local hinges (eg. ‘The earth is round’), and personal hinges (eg. ‘I am sitting in a chair).
mastery, for as Moyal-Sharrock argues, “I cannot be mistaken or uncertain about the use of some\textsuperscript{108} words.” (2007, 119). According to Wittgenstein, “doubt about existence only works in a language-game” (OC 24) and we need to know how to play the various language-games to begin to doubt (within those games.) Therefore mastery of one’s first language is not the product of remembering previously ascertained propositional knowledge, or having first ensured one is not ‘mistaken’ about what one’s words mean, or empirically confirming whether one’s foundational ways of acting, judging, knowing are correct. Rather language-mastery is a matter of knowing how to do something. “In the case of linguistic hinges this know-how, this mastery is \textit{flawless}.” (2007, 120 original emphasis)

Through her understanding of Wittgenstein, Moyal-Sharrock therefore identifies a relationship between non-propositional know-how and propositional know-that, where non-propositional know-how is not reducible to empirical knowledge. In one respect this sounds entirely amenable to, and indeed perhaps an important way of understanding the categorial divide Ryle articulates in his own anti-intellectualist know-how/know-that distinction. But Moyal-Sharrock rejects the Rylean view that knowing how to do something and propositional knowledge are both kinds of knowledge, albeit different. For the know-how of our hinge certainty is not, she goes on to insist, any kind of knowledge, at all.

Instead, Moyal-Sharrock characterises the “objective know-how”, the “thoughtless \textit{savoir-faire}” that is our hinge certainty as being \textit{so} flawlessness and thoughtlessness, \textit{so} “expert and smooth” (2007, 64) that it requires no attention, no maintenance, and thus is a certainty \textit{as opposed to} any kind of knowledge. On Moyal-Sharrock’s reading of Wittgenstein, this very thoughtlessness and the associated characteristics entail that this ‘objective’ know-how is not knowledge (for only propositional knowledge is knowledge.) Always successful and “unerring”, the hinge certainty that is know-how is “so natural” that is has neither the opportunity or need for improvement. (2007, 65) Again, this serves, she concludes, to ensure that it can be no kind of knowledge. But why should the very expertise with which one’s know-how is exercised exclude it from being knowledge, where knowledge might be more broadly conceived? Moyal-Sharrock cites a number of Rylean observations as

\textsuperscript{108} Our use of the words such as ‘funambulist’ or ‘phyloxera’ does not, according to Moyal-Sharrock, have the hinge certainty that is characteristic of our more familiar vocabulary. They might well be, I would suggest, for anyone who has grown up in an erudite circus family or is a vineyard-owning biologist with substantial pest-control problems.
part of her discussion of this matter, (such as Ryle’s point that know-how is a success
verb (2007, 64)), but given that her own conclusion about know-how is directly at
odds with Ryle, it remains unclear why she brings Ryle in to serve a point on which
she and he fundamentally disagree. For Ryle never questions the idea that know-how
might not be any kind of knowledge. Rather his view, as seen in Chapter 2, is that
know-how is an irreducible *sui generis* kind of knowledge. Why does Moyal-
Sharrock introduce the notion of know-how in the first place, only to then deny that it
is a kind of knowledge (especially when every other aspect of her view is compatible
with Ryle’s?) One could avoid this detour and simply characterising hinge certainty
as a kind of animal ability, and avoid expressing it in know-how terms at all.

Several reasons might be diagnosed for this move. I focus on three. Firstly, at
the heart of Moyal-Sharrock’s reading is a deep commitment to the *animality* of our
hinge certainty. As Wittgenstein writes, “I want to conceive it [our hinge certainty or
know-how] as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were as
something animal.” (OC 359) For Moyal-Sharrock, it seems that, the animality of our
know-how is at odds with the its status as a kind of knowledge. Perhaps having
accurately appreciated the non-propositionality of our foundational ways of acting,
she is concerned that any subsequent suggestion this know-how is a kind of
knowledge risks handing back to the intellectualists the very victory which
Wittgenstein snatches from their jaws. On this picture, Moyal-Sharrock would seem
to be working from the assumption that the only way one might protect the animality,
the confidence, the thoughtless, the immediacy of our know-how is by insisting it is
no kind of knowledge. But expert drivers, wine connoisseurs, cartoonists, musicians,
knitters, mathematicians, multi-lingual people, snooker players etc., exercise their
know-how with a comparable animal facility. Might not an appreciation of their
animal immediacy happily co-exist with the realisation that they are also extremely

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109 Cf., Coliva’s alternative criticism: “[T]here would be little of philosophical significance in W’s last
work if he were just trying to bring into focus animal certainty.” (2010, 171) Coliva seems to think that
what is missing in Moyal-Sharrock’s understanding is a rapprochement between *animalistic* certainty
or know-how, and a more *human* certainty or know-how; which she takes to require “being guided by
propositional attitudes.” (2010, 171) This indicates that Coliva (possibly like Moyal-Sharrock) seems
to worry that either one emphasises the animal or one is forced into something *propositional*. But the
kind of non-propositional know-how that is knowledge need not be so intellectually construed.
According to my own Know-How Reading of *On Certainty* (MSS), by considering ourselves not just
as *animals*, with a *nature*; but *language-animals* with a *human nature*, we step firmly into the
normative realm. In language, we are not just animals engaged in *sure-footed action* but human animals
participating in *normative activities and practices*. In language, we don’t just get *around* the world
*successfully*, but we get *on* in the world, *correctly*. As Wittgenstein reminds us, “The rule-governed
nature of our language permeates our life.” (RC III-303 and LW II, 72)
knowledgeable? Might not this very animal ease with which such know-how is exercised also be the product of extensive training and learning, which has perhaps gone through less confident, less successful, more self-conscious stages?\footnote{Cf., Dreyfus & Dreyfus’s five-stage theory of the acquisition of skill, (1980) and (1986) according to which it is only at the fifth (expert) stage that one achieves a full-blown, non-inferential expertise, which resists formalisation. This “unrationalised know-how” (1986, 41) might reasonably be characterised along the lines of the animal surety Moyal-Sharrock wishes to stress. “When things are proceeding normally, experts don’t solve problems and don’t make decisions; they do what normally works. (1986, 30-31 original emphasis) That is to say, they (we) often exercise our know-how ‘without thinking’. Elsewhere (MSS) I pursue a number of crucial distinctions between Wittgensteinian and Dreyfusian understandings of know-how.}

Moyal-Sharrock might respond by agreeing with this point and bringing in the only other reference to the animality of hinge certainty/know-how in *On Certainty*. “I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination... Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination.” (OC 475) But if this were to justify the claim that know-how is no kind of knowledge, then it would require a dramatic (and unWittgensteinian) polarising of the available options. Either know-how is animalistic and thus not knowledge, or it is ratiocinative (thereby propositional) and thus knowledge. But as Ryle points out, “Ratiocination is not the general condition of rational behaviour but only one species of it.” (1946, 219) To think otherwise is to succumb to intellectualism. As such Moyal-Sharrock’s concern to protect the animal aspect of hinge certainty risks being a back-handed confirmation of, or capitulation to, intellectualist tenets; something that would be at odds with the very spirit of her understanding. So although, Moyal-Sharrock, reminds us that, “Animals need no ghostly propositions to prompt their actions,” (2007, 204) I would add that (often) neither do knowledgeable human beings. Again, Moyal-Sharrock might accept this, but still deny that the know-how she has identified is any kind of knowledge. Nonetheless, the ‘middle ground’ of know-how as a non-propositional kind of knowledge seems to be a no-go area.

A second reason why Moyal-Sharrock may wish to deny the status of know-how as knowledge is, as I suggested in my opening remarks, the exegetical focus she gives to *On Certainty*. It may be that in seeking not just to identify the unique aspects of *On Certainty* but to argue afresh for the fecundity of Wittgenstein’s particular insights, found in these last writings, Moyal-Sharrock is concerned to avoid undercutting her point by highlighting comparable insights in his earlier work.
Although she acknowledges that there is no “second recantation” (2004, 1) by Wittgenstein of his preceding work, in developing her ‘Third Wittgenstein’ reading of *On Certainty* Moyal-Sharrock does argue for the merits of replacing the more familiar ‘Early’ and ‘Late’ categories with a triple-phase ‘First’ ‘Second’ and ‘Third’ discrimination. The burgeoning interest in *On Certainty* in the wake of Moyal-Sharrock’s book points to the undeniable benefits of this approach. The price to be paid for this, however, seems to be a reduced exploitation of the genuine connections between *On Certainty*’s insights and those to be found in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Keen to show the extent to which Wittgenstein “breaks new ground” in his third “masterpiece”, *On Certainty* (2004, 1), important comparisons between what Wittgenstein says about language mastery in *On Certainty* and the *Investigations* are not pursued. Although Moyal-Sharrock does draw some connections between her observations about linguistic hinge know-how and Wittgenstein’s previous discussion about language mastery (2007, 117-121) her emphasis is on the ability (in contrast to know-how) that is our language mastery, and her textual focus remains on *On Certainty* and only briefly hints at the resources in the *Investigations*. Resources indicated by such tips of the icebergs as, “To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to have mastered a technique,” (PI §199) are not mined as a justificatory source for Moyal-Sharrock’s *On Certainty* reading. Though, of course, one might add that to understand a technique (be it linguistic, mathematical or artistic…) means to know how to do something, to know how to go on, to know how to act in certain ways.

One reason for this strategy (or perhaps a consequence of it?) is the extent to which Moyal-Sharrock’s arguments in *Understanding On Certainty* do not particularly focus on exploring issues pertinent to the heart of our normative practices, or to what it is to follow a rule or engage in a rule-following practice. Whilst the extensive index of her (2007) accurately reflects the balance of the book’s contents, providing 30 page references under the entry for ‘animal’ and 38 page references for ‘instinct’ (and its cognates), both ‘normative’ or ‘rule’ (or anything related to the notion of a rule) are noticeable by their total absence in the index (and their very

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111 Moyal-Sharrock identifies the corpus of the ‘Third Wittgenstein’ as including what was *Part II of the Investigations* and is now called *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*, together with all other writings from 1946 on, i.e., what are now published as the two volumes of *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology* and the two volumes of *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, as well as *Remarks on Colour, Zeitel* and, of course, *On Certainty*.

112 See Moyal-Sharrock (2010).
modest presence in the book.) Yet OC (204), one of the cornerstone key passages for Moyal-Sharrock’s understanding is intimately connected with this quote from the *Investigations*:

“How am I able to follow a rule? – if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my acting in this way in complying with the rule. Once I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say, “This is simply what I do.” (PI § 217)

Here Wittgenstein is reminding us that our normative, i.e., our rule- and standard-constituted practices, are themselves unjustified. They ground, without themselves being grounded, and the ground they provide is our ways of acting. Our linguistic ways of acting being themselves normative. As Wittgenstein goes on to say, “When I follow the rule, I do not choose. I follow the rule blindly.” (PI §219) Why does Moyal-Sharrock not use the insights of *Investigations* to help articulate the kind of hinge certainty that she identifies in *On Certainty*, given that the blindness with which we participate in our normative practices readily dovetails with the animality that she takes to best characterise our linguistic hinge certainty or know-how?

One possible answer is that Moyal-Sharrock may have too intellectualist an understanding of rules; though prima facie this looks to be at odds with her emphasis on the animal. Is she perhaps succumbing to that tempting picture which (the Second/Later) Wittgenstein attempts to dislodge, i.e. that, “there is an inclination to say: every action according to a rule is an interpretation”, from which it is a short hop to a mistaken intellectualist assumption that ways of acting are themselves founded upon consciously considered and propositional interpretations. Whereas, for Wittgenstein, once rid of this misguided picture, one appreciates, “There is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of

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113 This point is even more obvious in the original manuscript source for this passage, “When justifications run out one hits the bedrock of a normative regularity – this is what I do, this is what I call ‘...’” MS 179 quoted in Baker & Hacker (2009, 194 original emphasis)

application, is exhibited in what we call “following the rule” and “going against it.” (PI §201)

Is not Moore’s ‘This [waving] is a hand’ just such an exemplification of the grasping (and expressing) of a rule which is not some kind of pre-considered interpretation, but is nonetheless a display of normative linguistic know-how? Not only is it the case that, “To use a word without a justification does not mean to use it wrongfully,” (PI 289) in Moore’s case, though there is no further, more foundational justification in virtue of which what he does in ‘This [waving] is a hand’ is correct; it is nonetheless correct. Correct, because that is what correct is, at the level of the normative bedrock of regularities understood as regularities. In On Certainty, Wittgenstein is not denying that our linguistic know-how is a normative practice, nor is he committed to an intellectualist construal of the rules that constitute our linguistic practices. For, “Not only rules, but also examples are needed for establishing a practice. Our rules leave loop-holes open, and the practice has to speak for itself.” (OC 139) When one looks to the Investigations for help in further understanding such linguistic hinge certainty or know-how, one reads:

One has already to know (or to be able to do) something before one can ask what something is called. But what does one have to know? ….. We may say: it only makes sense to ask what something is called if he already knows how to make use of the name. (PI §30-31)

Is Moyal-Sharrock really suggesting that know-how is not a kind of knowledge (contra Ryle) and indeed, as it might seem contra Wittgenstein? If she is, and the source of this conclusion is exclusively a matter of how she reads On Certainty, then I suggest that the one possible rationale for this conclusion is that she is concerned to ensure that no backdoor is left open to any intellectualist construal of rules, and may be swinging a strategic pendulum in the opposite direction. But this suggestion gets

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115 Wittgenstein repeatedly warns, “The danger here, I believe, is one of giving a justification of our procedure when there is no such thing as a justification and we ought simply to have said: that’s how we do it.” (RFM III-74) But, for the avoidance of doubt, we still do it this way, and not that way.

116 Space prohibits any detailed exploration of intellectualist construals of rules, but I hope the following serves as a useful reminder of the distinction between those autonomous rules of our grammar which are part-constitutive of our language-use, and those rules that are merely prescriptions for practical reasoning. Here is Wittgenstein. “Why don’t I call cookery rules arbitrary, and why am I
purchase only through the substantial distortion of the spirit of Moyal-Sharrock’s understanding of *On Certainty*. Especially, as I have already pointed out, almost the entirety of Moyal-Sharrock’s view is consistent with (and indeed the platform for) the view I argue for, namely that hinge certainty is a kind of know-how that is both non-propositional and (yet still) a kind of knowledge.

At the very least, however, she has illustrated that that if certainty is a matter of know-how, and this kind of know-how is not a kind of knowledge, then the anti-intellectualist/intellectualist debate in epistemology about the nature of know-how is not (as previously thought) a simple bifurcation between know-how being a *sui generis* kind of knowledge (à la Ryle) or being *reducible to another kind of knowledge* (propositional, à la S&W, or objectual à la B&M). Moyal-Sharrock now raises issues about a further kind of know-how, one that is neither *sui generis*, nor reducible to another kind of knowledge, because it is not a kind of knowledge at all; yet it is *required* for our empirical propositional knowledge. This is a fresh Wittgensteinian alternative that cannot be dismissed; whether one agrees or disagrees with Moyal-Sharrock as to whether this know-how is knowledge at all.

A third possible reason for Moyal-Sharrock’s rejection of the view that know-how is a kind of knowledge, is to be sourced in the wider (non-Wittgensteinian) epistemological environment in which she finds herself working. For contemporary epistemologists are, I will now demonstrate, committed to the all-pervasive propositional presumption that knowledge just is propositional knowledge. Amid this landscape, know-how is only knowledge insofar as it reduces to propositional knowledge. Yet according to Wittgenstein, the kinds of things we know include not only, “how many metres high Mont Blanc is” but, “how the word “game” is used” and, “how a clarinet sounds.” (PI §78) For Moyal-Sharrock to appear to take no succour from so much in the *Investigations* and *On Certainty* which chimes with (PI §78) there must be powerful intellectualist paradigm at work. And there is.

It is now necessary to take a side-step into the epistemological neighbourhood in which Moyal-Sharrock is operating, before returning to explore this point further.

tempted to call the rules of grammar arbitrary? Because ‘cookery’ is defined by its end, whereas ‘speaking’ is not. That is why the use of language is in a certain sense autonomous, as cooking and washing are not. You cook badly if you are guided in your cooking by rules other than the right ones; but if you follow other rules than those of chess you are *playing another game*; and if you follow grammatical rules other than such-and-such ones, that does not mean you say something wrong, no you are speaking of something else.” (Z 320)
There is a *prima facie* tension in the contemporary practice of epistemology. This tension is between what contemporary epistemologists *declare* their topic to be and where their philosophical focus *is, in actual practice*. This is perhaps most apparent in the introductions and textbooks to the subject. In presenting the philosophical study of knowledge to undergraduates and other interested readers, such general books characterise epistemology, roughly, as the examination of, and investigation into, the nature, sources, possibility, extent, types and value of our human knowledge. In the prefaces and/or opening pages of such books, authors typically initiate discussion of the subject by highlighting the fact that there are three types of knowledge: propositional knowledge, acquaintance knowledge and know-how (sometimes referred to as ability knowledge). Coming to the subject completely fresh, one might reasonably anticipate that what follows would be divided equally between this trio, with time spent considering the individual features of each kind of knowledge, together with similarities, differences and inter-relations between them. This is not, however, what occurs. For once textbook authors have announced the existence of this knowledge trio, it is then standard procedure to set aside both acquaintance knowledge and know-how. Typically, an announcement is usually made that the focus of the remainder of the book will be entirely on propositional knowledge; which is what then transpires.

This is both a consequence of, and further fuel to the intellectualist paradigm which informs naturalized philosophy in general. But paradigms are not only powerful, they are often so when at their most invisible. In what follows I lay out the evidence for these claims, in an attempt to make the day-to-day practices of epistemology momentarily visible. I take this to be a task, which though potentially laborious to do (and, with apologies, to read) is nonetheless a necessary prerequisite for appreciating the constraints that any discussion of know-how (not just Moyal-Sharrock’s) is under. If, as I will conclude there is a propositional presumption in place despite (occasional) claims to the contrary, it can only be shown by taking a look at actual epistemologically practice. I begin with a look at some of the leading (and best) textbooks.
In Duncan Pritchard’s *What is this thing called Knowledge* (2006)\(^\text{117}\) he writes, “Ability knowledge is clearly different from propositional knowledge. I know how to swim, for example, but I do not thereby know a set of propositions about how to swim.” (2006, 4) Pritchard continues with the suggestion that an ant, “might plausibly said to know how to navigate its terrain,” but we would not want to say, therefore, that it has propositional knowledge. This, he immediately concludes, “marks out the importance of propositional knowledge over other types of knowledge, over ability knowledge.” (2006, 4) This argument is deemed sufficient to warrant the setting aside of ability knowledge for the rest of the book. And indeed on the following page, Pritchard announces, “Henceforth, when we talk about knowledge, we will have propositional knowledge in mind, unless explicitly stated otherwise.” (2006, 5) Out of a total of 188 pages, the time spent on considering ability knowledge or know-how, totals roughly one-third of a page. The rest of the book is devoted to propositional knowledge.

Nicholas Everitt & Alec Fisher’s *Modern Epistemology* (1995) is another rare example of a textbook which, after the initial introduction of know-how, does offer some modest argument for its swift dismissal. “There are clearly some complex interconnections between these three types [the aforementioned trio] of knowledge,” but because propositional knowledge, “has attracted most attention from philosophers, probably because it connects with such philosophically interesting concepts as rationality and truth… We shall follow this tradition and focus on propositional knowledge.” (1995, 12) The time spent on know-how is less than a single page out of 252. Note also the assumption that rationality is, and perhaps is only, related to propositional knowledge and not to know-how. Again, this links back to the (intellectualist) collapse of rationality into ratiocination, already touched on.

In Keith Lehrer’s *Theory of Knowledge* (part textbook, part an expression of his own views), he readily gives examples of the, “many sorts of knowledge” (1990, 3) there are. These include his own knowledge of how to play the guitar. On the same page, Lehrer declares, “In our study we shall be concerned with knowledge in the information sense. It is precisely this sense that is fundamental to human

\(^{117}\) Pritchard’s textbook is already in its second (2009) edition. The general policy of this section is to quote from first editions, so as to give some sense of the evolution of historical attitudes; albeit a modest one.
cognition…” (1990, 3) The time spent on know-how: less than half a page out of 212. In Noah Lemos’ *An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*, Lemos acknowledges that, “‘how to’ knowledge” is one of the “three most significant … senses of knowledge.” (2007, 2) Know-how’s significance only manages to earn it, however, one eighth of a page, out of 232; the remainder of Lemos’ book being dedicated to the exploration of propositional knowledge.

Several classic textbooks and introductions to the epistemology make no mention of know-how or ability knowledge at all. They simply characterise the subject matter of epistemology *solely* in terms of propositional knowledge. John Pollock embraces this approach in his *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*. “In asking how a person knows something we are typically asking for his grounds for believing it… *Epistemology might better be called ‘doxastology.’*” (1986, 7 emphasis added) Jonathan Dancy’s *Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology* makes no mention of either acquaintance knowledge or know-how at any point. Its opening paragraph announces, “Epistemology is the study of knowledge and the justification of belief.” (1985, 1) Michael Williams’ *Problems of Knowledge* similarly offers no acknowledgement that knowledge is or could be anything other than propositional knowledge. On the opening page he introduces, “The analytic problem. What is knowledge?” and fleshes out the question by asking, “[H]ow is (or should) knowledge be distinguished from mere belief or opinion?” (2001, 1)

Whether philosophers introduce know-how (albeit momentarily) as a *sui generis* kind of knowledge or it goes entirely unmentioned, the focus of introductory, overview and general textbooks (and indeed encyclopedia entries119) is entirely on propositional knowledge. In all of these books, either the synonymity of ‘knowledge’ and ‘propositional knowledge’ is immediately announced or just assumed.

The *prima facie* tension in epistemology is then this: on the one hand the majority of textbooks and introductions to the subject readily acknowledge that there are at least three types or kinds of knowledge: propositional, know-how (or ability knowledge) and acquaintance knowledge. Yet, on the other hand, epistemology’s preoccupations and practice is so dominated by the focus on propositional knowledge

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118 I pursue this intellectualist construal of ‘the cognitive’ in Section 3.1 in the next chapter.
119 Encyclopedia entries standardly follow this textbook pattern. After the briefest of opening admissions concerning the knowledge trio of propositional, acquaintance and know-how (or ability knowledge) all attention turns to propositional knowledge. Matthias Steup spends one sentence out of 17,500 words on know-how in his Stanford Entry for *Epistemology*. Peter Klein manages half a sentence out of over 2,000 words in the Routledge Encyclopedia entry on *Epistemology*. 
that the regular dismissal of non-propositional knowledge (both know-how and acquaintance) is not only acceptable, it is expected. Perhaps, though, textbooks are not the appropriate place to establish the extent of the propositional orientation of contemporary epistemology. What of collections of classic readings in the subject, or anthologies of important articles: are they comparably intellectualist?

In *Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology* Sven Bernecker & Fred Dretske write, “[O]ur goal was to provide a full review to date of contemporary epistemology, including frequently neglected topics.” (2000, Preface, emphasis added) Know-how does not feature, however, in the 41 selected articles chosen, nor in an additional list of 16 candidate topics which the authors declare they would have liked to include but space would not permit. In the 2nd edition (2008) of Ernst Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath’s *Epistemology: An Anthology*, there is nothing in 917 pages on know-how, and no mention of know-how in the index; not even given the post 2001 resurgence of interest in Ryle’s distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that. In the recent 911 page, state-of-the-art, *Routledge Companion to Epistemology* (2011) edited by Pritchard & Bernecker, there are 78 especially commissioned articles. The cover heralds the book as, “a comprehensive and up-to-date survey of epistemology, charting its history, providing a thorough account of its key thinkers and movements, addressing enduring questions and contemporary research in the field.” Gilbert Ryle’s unique work on knowing-how does not merit a chapter. There is no article on knowing-how, and I can find only five mentions of know-how, all *en passant*. The challenge, and of course the achievement, of such books is almost inevitably doomed to leave certain enthusiasts disappointed at not finding a window for their own preferred, possibly more obscure, area of interest. But why should the subject of the nature, status, scope and value of knowing how to do something, as opposed to knowing that such-and-such is the case, be deemed a *niche* topic? Especially given the not uncommon standard textbook opening announcement that it is one of three types of knowledge.

In moving from textbooks to edited collections and anthologies what is quickly apparent is that know-how is no longer noticeable by its absence, rather its absence now goes completely unnoticed. That *knowledge just is propositional knowledge* I call, ‘the propositional presumption’. This propositional presumption has two powerful (and powerfully intellectualist) consequences. The first of these is that the *study* of knowledge is assumed to be the study of *propositional* knowledge and
propositional knowledge only; thus epistemology itself just is the study of propositional knowledge.

Some monographs in epistemology are, of course, specifically about propositional knowledge\textsuperscript{120}, e.g., Jennifer Lackey’s \textit{Learning from Words} (2008). One doesn’t expect philosophers working in areas particularly related to propositional knowledge to introduce references to, or offer caveats about, their non-engagement with non-propositional knowledge.\textsuperscript{121} There are epistemologists, however, whose monographs set out to explore knowledge, more richly conceived. One might reasonably anticipate that these monographs would perhaps acknowledge know-how and acquaintance knowledge, alongside propositional knowledge, before pursuing their own particular lines of exploration. The \textit{realpractik} is that monographs, however broadly conceived, follow the pattern of anthologies and collections, i.e., it is assumed that any contemporary book-length inquiry into knowledge, however, broadly envisioned, is to be explored through the singular lens of propositional knowledge; a point taken to need no justification nor any prefacing caveats. Monographic evidence that the propositional presumption prevails is available at any and every turn.

Laurence Bonjour confirms that, “the central question of epistemology… concerns the rational status of our beliefs about the world in relation to the independent world that they purport to describe.” (Bonjour & Sosa 2003, 5) Ernest Sosa and Bonjour together write, “Epistemology is the theory of episteme, of knowledge. Ever since Plato it has been thought that one knows only if one’s belief hits the mark of truth and does so with adequate justification.”\textsuperscript{122} (2003, Introduction: opening sentence). Jonathan Kvanvig insists, “[K]nowledge requires truth... and always will”. (2003, xi) Pritchard, Millar & Haddocks’ recent investigation into the

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\textsuperscript{120} I move interchangeably between ‘knowing that something is the case’, and ‘propositional knowledge’, with the following caveat: ‘Propositional knowledge’ is not the knowledge of a proposition, it is knowledge of what a proposition states to be the case. Just as one is not frightened of the \textit{proposition} that the tiger is running towards you, one is frightened of the \textit{tiger} which is running towards one or that one believes is running towards one; so too, what one knows is not a \textit{proposition} that the tiger is running towards you, what one knows is \textit{that the tiger is running towards you}.

\textsuperscript{121} As will be seen, however, in the final chapter, we can describe some exemplifications of know-how with sufficient accuracy that one come to learn how and thus know how to do things by being in receipt of good descriptions. So the radical separation of know-how and know-that in matters relating to the \textit{transmission of knowledge}, is by no means as simple as this dichotomy suggests.

\textsuperscript{122} In Aristotle’s distinction between \textit{episteme}, \textit{techne}, \textit{nous}, \textit{sophia} and \textit{phronesis} (\textit{Nichomachean Ethics} Bk. 6) which echoes Plato’s usage, the object of \textit{episteme} is knowledge \textit{only} of the unchanging. It’s not clear how Sosa & Bonjour’s Greek reference serves their desired purpose, as opposed to flagging up unanswered questions about the status of (particularly) \textit{techne} and \textit{nous}, given that \textit{episteme}, (as originally conceived) does not extend to contingent truths.
\end{footnotes}
value of knowledge, declares that its, “core issue about value” is, “of course, not whether knowledge is better than ignorance, but whether knowledge is better than true belief.” The propositional presumption is embraced without explanation or qualm.

One might anticipate that the propositional presumption would be less at home in so-called ‘Virtue Epistemology’, with its emphasis on the agent and agency. After all, it looks like ability knowledge or know-how might be central for John Greco, given his summary claim that for that, “The central thesis of this book [Achieving Knowledge] is that knowledge is a kind of success from ability.” (2010, 3). It transpires that the ability in question, here, is sub-personal tacit propositional knowledge and outside the agent’s voluntary control. (A view that is sourced in a wholly intellectualist Chomskyan picture of the mind; as will be explored in the next chapter.) This is a quintessentially intellectualist view about know-how. Even Linda Zagzebski’s distinct kind of virtue epistemology is, however, similarly propositional. The opening line of her own On Epistemology announces, “Epistemology is the philosophical study of knowledge and other desirable ways of believing and attempting to find the truth.” (2009, 1 original emphasis) And in his Epistemic Luck, Pritchard paraphrases what it is, “to engage in an epistemological enterprise at all” as an, “attempt to track the truth.” (2005a, 243) Thus even for the supposedly agent-centred, excellence-encompassing virtue epistemologists, knowledge still just is propositional knowledge. In its contemporary practice, there seems to be no other conclusion to draw: the propositional presumption is entrenched. Epistemology is intellectualist through and through.

It is unsurprising therefore that having suggested that hinge certainty is a kind of non-propositional know-how, Moyal-Sharrock (or any know-how reader of On Certainty) might be under some (typically unacknowledged) environmental pressure to resist the idea that as non-propositional it might nonetheless be a kind of knowledge.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{123} Pritchard suggests (in discussion, 16\textsuperscript{th} January 2013) that the prevailing view of contemporary epistemology is not actually intellectualist. Whilst this may be the case in informal philosophical discussion and/or may indeed inform philosophers’ unarticulated assumptions, it remains camouflaged by the focus, priorities and volume of epistemological writings which are thoroughly intellectualist and propositional. This prompts the question (not pursued here) as to whether or not future generations of epistemologists, with access only to the written record of our contemporary philosophical activities, will have much evidence for such a supposed ‘prevailing view’.
4 Know-how Meets the Propositional Presumption

Having appreciated that Wittgenstein recognises Moorean certainty to be a kind of non-propositional know-how, Moyal-Sharrock is under two identifiable pressures to conclude that this know-how is not knowledge. The first is from Wittgenstein, the second from the propositional presumption constitutive of contemporary epistemological practice.

In the first case, as already noted, Wittgenstein understands that that knowledge and Moorean certainty are not of the same categories. As this kind of certainty turns out to be know-how, then Moyal-Sharrock’s position looks to be a presentation of the following argument:

(1) Knowledge and certainty are categorially distinct. (cf. OC 308)
(2) Certainty is a kind of non-propositional know-how.
(3) Therefore, non-propositional know-how is no kind of knowledge.

What this requires, however, is that Wittgenstein be using the term ‘knowledge’ in (1) as not merely elliptical for ‘empirical propositional knowledge’, or ‘empirical knowledge’ but for anything that might be regarded as knowledge, or that humans might know. But is he? One might reasonably think that an ellipsis here is to be expected, given that the motivation for Wittgenstein’s investigations in the On Certainty passages, are all examples of apparent empirical propositional knowledge, such as ‘This is a hand’, ‘That is a tree’ ‘This is green’. etc. The limitation in scope of ‘knowledge’ starts from the passages’ already circumscribed focus on Moore’s empirical knowledge claims. Were any philosopher’s focus to be on religious or aesthetic knowledge (for example) one would not expect his or her unpublished indeed un-reworked notes to keep using the relevant adjectival qualification, when the focus of attention is clear, and there is no reading audience to bear in mind. Instead of this conclusion, however, Moyal-Sharrock declares:

It must first be noted that Wittgenstein adheres to the standard view of knowledge as justified true belief, and therefore sees not only the claim to knowledge, but also the possession of knowledge as conceptually linked to justification. (2007, 15)
At this point she might qualify her point, for the avoidance of doubt, by writing, “Wittgenstein adheres to the standard view of propositional knowledge as justified true belief…”, but this option is not taken, and the possibility of a reasonable ellipsis is not explored.124 Were this option to be taken, however, then the argument above would then proceed:

(1*) Empirical propositional knowledge and certainty are categorially distinct.
(2*) Certainty is a kind of non-propositional know-how.
(3*) Therefore, empirical propositional knowledge and a kind of non-propositional know-how are categorially distinct.

In this version of the argument, (3*) does not entail that non-propositional know-how either is a kind of knowledge, or that it is not a kind of knowledge. In taking her reading of Wittgenstein to rule out restricting (1) to (1*) Moyal-Sharrock cannot (indeed does not wish to) access the opportunity that (3*) offers and thereby take know-how to be a kind of knowledge. And she is right to argue that there are reasons in On Certainty which point in this direction. For Wittgenstein does write, “‘I know it’ I say to someone else; and here there is a justification. But there is none for my belief.” (OC 175) As already pointed out, however, he is already focussing on the kind of knowledge Moore takes his truisms to be, i.e., empirical propositional knowledge (supposedly but mistakenly thought to be) known with certainty.125 That he wants to distinguish certainty from clearly propositional conceptions of knowledge, does need not mean that he need limit knowledge tout court to just to propositional knowledge. So although Wittgenstein does observe that, “One says 'I know' when one is ready to give compelling grounds. 'I know' relates to a possibility of demonstrating the truth.” (OC 243) This is not the same as saying ‘I know’ only relates to the possibility of demonstrating the truth.

124 See Coliva (2010) for a reading of On Certainty which is at odds with Moyal-Sharrock on the non-propositionality of our hinge certainty, as a result of the view (which Moyal-Sharrock shares) that Wittgenstein’s notion of knowledge is limited to justified true belief. “Wittgenstein adhered to a classical internalist and tripartite conception of knowledge.” (2010, 221 fn. 26)

125 Other pro (1) citations might include (OC 181, 406, 407, 245, 438) but all of these show the extent to which Moore and his claims to specifically propositional knowledge are being obviously used to provide a robust interlocutor and interlocutory content.
As noted in Section 2, in the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein specifically reminds us that amongst the kind of things we know are not merely empirical facts (such as the heights of mountains), but things we are acquainted with and are able to recognise (like the sound of a clarinet), and things we can do (explain how words are used). Indeed, in the *Investigations*, there is plenty of evidence that he regards ‘knowledge’ as a family resemblance term.\footnote{According to Wittgenstein, the same nose, the same eye-colour, and other such characteristics, are often shared amongst members of a particular family, though not each characteristic is had by every member. Thus, not all family members have the same set of essential traits in virtue of which they are members of the same family. Analogously, Wittgenstein reminds us that in the case, for example, of games, there is no essential property in virtue of which each and every game is a game. Instead, there is, “a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing,” between all games. (PI §66) When explaining what a game is, descriptions are offered, examples are indicated, and, according to Wittgenstein, “we might add to the description: ‘This and similar things are called ‘games’,” (PI §69 emphasis added). Just as all games need not involve winners (ring-a-ring-a-roses), or boards (hide-and-seek) or more than one player (solitaire), so in the case of family resemblance concepts there need be no set of necessary or sufficient conditions which constitute our knowledge; just examples, together with what Hacker calls ‘a similarity rider’.

When philosophers use a word – “knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, “propositions/sentence”, “name” – and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home? –

What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical use to their everyday use. (PI §116)

In restricting Wittgenstein’s notion of knowledge to justified true belief, Moyal-Sharrock appears to simultaneously announce her straightforward denial that knowledge is a family resemblance notion; or at least she seems to reject the possibility that the knowledge family is elastic enough to encompass non-propositional know-how. Furthermore, one might reasonably think that this goes against her own advice. “As a rule of thumb in reading *On Certainty*, I suggest systematically regarded the word ‘know’ as under scrutiny, even where it is neither underlined, nor otherwise emphasized by Wittgenstein.” (2007, 25) This scrutiny does not, for Moyal-Sharrock, extend to the possibility that non-propositional know-how (that is our hinge certainty) might be a kind of knowledge.
Yet the family resemblance notion of knowledge is not just limited to the *Investigations*, it makes its way into other writings which Moyal-Sharrock identifies as belonging to the work done by the Third Wittgenstein. When considering the interrelations between knowledge, understanding and experience, Wittgenstein reminds us that in music when it comes to, “The knowledge of metre. One who knows the metre, hears it differently.” (RPP I, 740 original emphasis) Is not Wittgenstein here picking out a kind of non-propositional knowledge; one which has nothing to do with justified true belief? And again, Wittgenstein reminds us that, “In one sense knowing is to have learned and not forgotten. In this way it hangs together with memory.” (RPP II, 300) This view also fits comfortably with the idea that (non-propositional) knowing how to do something is a kind of knowledge.\(^{127}\)

For Moyal-Sharrock to reject the possibility that non-propositional know-how is knowledge, on the grounds that for Wittgenstein knowledge is just justified true belief requires not only some rather circumscribed readings of key passages from *On Certainty*,\(^{128}\) it needs a reading quarantined from much of the rest of his work. For in rejecting the idea that knowledge can be a family resemblance notion, generous enough to include non-propositional know-how, Moyal-Sharrock (or other any Moyal-Sharrock-inspired views) will need to advance views as to how best to appreciate such evidence, apparently to the contrary, as:

“To know” can mean something like “to be able”
(to know by heart, eg.) or it can mean something like
“to be sure” (RPP II, 736)\(^{129}\)

\(^{127}\)Moyal-Sharrock has expressed concern (personal communication September 2012) that unless one restricts Wittgenstein’s idea of knowledge to justified true belief then in *On Certainty*, he would he’d “be saying in the selfsame work, hinge certainty is not a knowing, but it is a knowing.” But on my own view, there is a case to be made to say that what he’s saying is hinge certainty is a know-how and that’s not a propositional knowing, but it is a kind of knowing, nonetheless. Once again, though, I point out that either way, the philosophy of know-how, as a debate conducted in the terms of the three preceding chapters, needs to engage with these issues.

\(^{128}\)“I would like to reserve the expression “I know” for the cases in which it is used in normal linguistic exchange.” (OC 260) Presumably this includes, “Do you know Johnny?... Yes, I know him,” and “Do you know how best to prepare a roast chicken?... Yes, I know what the best way is, here let me show you.” Here again, is Wittgenstein, “I know all that”. And that will come out in the way I act and in the way I speak about the things in question.” (OC 395) “But is it wrong to say: “A child that has mastered a language-game must know certain things? If instead of that one said “Must be able to do certain things”, that would be a pleonasm.” (OC 534)

\(^{129}\)In reference to this passage, Moyal-Sharrock writes (personal communication, September 2012) “Yes, here again, as always before OC, he is using the word [know] broadly. But he comes to the decision in OC not to because doing so leads to the kind of confusion Moore was in...” I do not see that this is a counter-argument, but as a reading of *On Certainty* which takes Wittgenstein to be doing a
Yet, at the same time, Moyal-Sharrock’s reading is eager to embrace the family resemblance option for the notion of belief. Indeed, she suggests that the know-how that is our hinge certainty, be understood as a kind of non-propositional belief-*in*, rather than a propositional belief-*that*. Were she to be consistent here, she should have to then go on to say that this non-propositional belief-*in*, though a basic belief, is not *doxastic*, but some other kind of non-*doxastic* belief. But this does not happen. Instead she tells us that “objective certainty’ (ie. hinge certainty or know-how) is both “a doxastic category” and “a doxastic attitude” (2007, 53). So why resist the substantial evidence in Wittgenstein (and the standard Rylean assumption) and deny that non-propositional know-how is another kind of knowledge?

Perhaps these concerns about some features of Moyal-Sharrock’s reading are if not a direct consequence of then *facilitated by* the propositional presumption of the contemporary epistemological climate. For when Moyal-Sharrock refers to, “the standard view of knowledge as justified true belief”, she is undoubtedly correctly identifying the views of today’s epistemologists and their colleagues of the last several decades. (Though note the caveat identified in footnote 123, p. 139) And there is an obvious tension between the “plethora of riches” (2004, 3) *On Certainty* offers for epistemology, according to Moyal-Sharrock’s view, and Coliva’s claims that, “Wittgenstein’s work both in philosophy of language and epistemology is often considered of interest only to Wittgensteinians nowadays.” (2010, 5) Furthermore, Coliva acknowledges that, “the current debate on scepticism in contemporary epistemology […] generally rejects Wittgenstein’s concepts of meaning and philosophical discourse.” (2010, 104)

I now argue that contributing to the difficulties in unpicking these issues is a shift in the philosophical notion of the term ‘epistemic’. For its meaning has been increasingly restricted in scope to the point where it now precludes the possibility that any non-propositional know-how might be a kind of knowledge. So any attempt to characterise a Wittgensteinian (or any other) notion of know-how as knowledge, becomes deeply problematic, if one uses the vocabulary of today’s professional epistemologists. But if our propositional knowledge is enabled by non-propositional know-how and that non-propositional know-how *is* a kind of knowledge, then the

‘Philosophy may in no way infringe upon what is really said; in the end it can only describe it. Neither can it justify it… It leaves everything as it is.” (BT 417)
whole intellectualist project of epistemology (not to mention intellectualism about know-how itself) is potentially brought into question.

5 Intellectualising the Epistemic

Moyal-Sharrock correctly discerns in Wittgenstein the appreciation that there is a non-propositional know-how that enables our propositional knowledge. She then goes on to rule out classifying this non-propositional know-how as a kind of knowledge, on the grounds that, for Wittgenstein (and herself) knowledge is limited to the propositional; only justified true beliefs can be knowledge. As such, the hinge certainty that is this non-propositional know-how is to be characterised, Moyal-Sharrock claims, as a “nonepistemic certainty.” (2007, 27)

I now take a more detailed look at what is meant, in general, by this notion of ‘the epistemic’. Not only is this crucial to understanding Moyal-Sharrock’s characterisation of Wittgenstein’s notion of know-how, it serves (simultaneously) as a necessarily prequel for the engagement with the criticisms of the non-propositional view of hinge certainty to which I will shortly be turning.

As indicated in the discussion of the propositional presumption, the operative notion of knowledge (in the practice of contemporary epistemologists) is interchangeable with that of propositional knowledge. One consequence (or reflection) of this is that epistemology has subtly shifted from being the study of knowledge to being the study of propositional knowledge. A second consequence of this is a shift in the meaning of the associated adjective ‘epistemic’. Here is the opening of Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath’s ‘Pragmatic Encroachment’, “According to the received tradition in analytic epistemology, whether a true belief qualifies as knowledge depends only on purely epistemic factors – factors that are appropriately “truth-related”.” (2007, 558 emphasis added) To characterise something as epistemic is not, as one might have thought, a matter of highlighting its knowledge-relevant, or knowledge-pertinent features: features potentially shareable by acquaintance knowledge and/or non-propositional know-how. Rather, to characterise something as epistemic is to characterise something as having a particular propositional knowledge-relevant or propositional knowledge-pertinent feature: i.e., something truth-related or truth-apt. That Fantl & McGrath are able to describe this as being part of the “received tradition” shows the extent to which this shift has
become embedded and accepted. And whilst the phrase ‘received tradition’ suggests a substantial use beyond that of the last few decades, but there is little evidence that it extends beyond the era (and the activity) of naturalized philosophy ushered in by Quine. As Jonathan Kvanvig confirms, “[T]he epistemic goal standardly taken in epistemology over the past fifty years or so to be that of getting to the truth and avoiding error.” (2005, 295 emphasis added). This burgeoning use of the term ‘epistemic’ not only confirms the propositional presumption in play, it consolidates, extends and crucially, appears to require the propositional presumption.

Haddock, Millar & Pritchard’s recent Epistemic Value (2009) echoes this point; adding a further nuance. In the opening paragraph of their introduction they confirm the propositional orientation and parameters of their task, identifying their starting point as the question, ‘How can knowledge be more valuable than merely true belief?’ (2009, 1) They immediately gesture to a further “theme” they wish to explore; one which “concerns epistemic value in a broad sense.” (2009, 1 emphasis added) Haddock, Millar & Pritchard’s use of the term ‘epistemic’, in their declared broader sense remains, however, firmly within the boundaries circumscribed by propositional knowledge and its associates. “Epistemic appraisal conceived broadly” expands only as far as, “evaluation of beliefs not just with respect to whether they amount to knowledge, but also with respect to whether they are, for instance, justified, or reliably formed, that is formed through methods or processes that reliably yield true beliefs.” (2009, 1) Even though ‘the epistemic’ might, then, be understood as having both a broader scope, and (I will call it) a narrow scope standard usage, both remain firmly anchored to the propositional. The former retains its connections (albeit at one step removed, rather than immediately) to that which is either truth-related or truth-apt. On neither of these conceptions, does the remit of ‘the epistemic’ extend as far as being able to characterise features had by acquaintance knowledge or non-propositional know-how.

Contrast such uses of the narrow and broader scope ‘epistemic’, with one from just a few decades ago. Paul Ziff’s Epistemic Analysis (begun in 1962 and published in 1984) begins, “Epistemic analysis, as I conceive of it, is concerned with the analysis of knowledge.” (1984, 5) Immediately, Ziff assumes that knowledge is a broad church including acquaintance knowledge and know-how and weaves examples of all three types of knowledge throughout the book; also devoting a whole chapter to know-how. Ziff’s understanding of what he calls, “epistemic terms ‘know’ and
‘knowledge,’” (1984, 109) goes unqualified, assuming the widest possible scope. This more liberal understanding of the notion of epistemology and ‘the epistemic’ found in Ziff’s work is also found, I suggest, in the philosophical inauguration of this area of philosophical interest: Plato’s *Theatetus*. When Socrates asks Theatetus “What do you think knowledge is?” (146c) his focus is by no means limited to propositional knowledge. In preparation for tackling the ‘what is knowledge question’, Theatetus gives examples of the kinds of things we know. These, he declares are, “geometry and the subjects you enumerate just now”, being “astronomy and music and arithmetic” together with, “the crafts such as cobbbling.” (145d and 146c-d) Socrates immediately adds, “the knowledge of the making of wooden furniture.” (146e) Socrates, Theatetus and Theodorus all appear to assume that knowledge encompasses not only what we know to be the case, but what we know how to do. Knowledge includes the mastery of methods and techniques of our artistic activities and crafts.  

From this brief, and I trust non-contentious descriptive overview, it appears that the adjectival characterisation ‘epistemic’ has three distinct degrees of scope: narrow, broad(er) and wide. Narrow scope readings of the epistemic are limited to those factors which are directly truth-related; broader scope readings incorporate indirectly truth-related factors, such as the justification and reliability of propositional-knowledge candidates, and wide-scope readings are open to any knowledge-related factors, including but not limited to truth-related factors. This disambiguation also reveals that both the narrow and broader scope readings are thoroughly propositional and intellectualist, whilst the wide scope reading has no intellectualist nor anti- or non-intellectualist implications or allegiances. Furthermore, for active epistemologists wide scope usage now no longer seems to be appropriate (perhaps because of the all-dominant propositional presumption.) Yet, for philosophers further afield, the (more regularly used and assumed) wide-scope meaning of ‘epistemic’ does not have the narrow-scope links to truth and truth-related factors. Instead, like ‘artistic’ (meaning pertaining to art) or ‘political’ (meaning pertaining to politics), ‘epistemic’ is not used with any technical overtones, or an ear

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130 It is perhaps ironic that at the end of the *Theatetus* when the answer that knowledge is true belief plus an account is rejected, the standard view of modern epistemologists is to think that what needs philosophical attention is the account that might best supplement true belief; not the possibility that there might be something problematic about understanding knowledge in purely propositional terms. The *Theatetus* can be read, however, as a challenge to this very point.
for the restrictions it has as a term of art for contemporary epistemologists. It has no connotations that restrict its meaning to propositional knowledge; it simply means ‘pertaining to knowledge.’

Given these variants, how is one to answer the question: Is know-how ‘epistemic’? At the very least, the answer to this question depends on two separate considerations: (a) whether one is an intellectualist about the nature of know-how and (b) what one takes to be the scope of the meaning of the term ‘epistemic’. Four options would seem to be available:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.</th>
<th>(a)</th>
<th>(a*)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is know-how ‘epistemic’?</td>
<td>Intellectualist about know-how (ie., know-how reduces to or is just a version of propositional knowledge)</td>
<td>Anti-intellectualist about know-how (ie., it is a sui generis kind of knowledge) that is non-propositional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Narrow-or broader-scope usage of ‘epistemic’ meaning pertaining to propositional knowledge or truth-related factors only</td>
<td>Know-how is ‘epistemic’.</td>
<td>Know-how is not (or non-) ‘epistemic’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b*) Wide scope usage of ‘epistemic’ meaning pertaining to knowledge, in general</td>
<td>Know-how is ‘epistemic’.</td>
<td>Know-how is ‘epistemic’.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What emerges from this is:

(4) Claims that know-how is ‘epistemic’ may be justified in three different ways; based on three different reasons:
(i) because know-how can be reduced to propositional knowledge and ‘epistemic’ is the pertinent adjective for propositional knowledge or knowledge involving truth or truth-related factors. [a + b]

(ii) because know-how can be reduced to propositional knowledge and ‘epistemic’ is the pertinent adjective for knowledge in general. [a + b*]

(iii) because know-how is a (sui generis and non-propositional) kind of knowledge and ‘epistemic’ is the pertinent adjective for knowledge in general. [a* + b*]

Reasons (i) and (ii) are intellectualist, whereas reason (iii) is not. Therefore, characterising know-how as epistemic need not entail that it is intellectualist (or propositional).

(5) Claims that know-how is non-epistemic are based on one reason:

(iv) because know-how is a (sui generis and non-propositional) kind of knowledge and ‘epistemic’ is the pertinent adjective only for propositional knowledge. [a* + b]

Yet Moyal-Sharrock’s claim that non-propositional know-how is not knowledge and non-epistemic is not based on reason 5(iv). This is, I suggest, because Moyal-Sharrock is using as her guide to the meaning of the term ‘epistemic’, the thoroughly intellectualist usage which is according to Fantl & McGrath is that currently used by contemporary epistemologists. She writes, “Is this concept of certainty epistemic, or does Wittgenstein’s dissociation of it from knowledge exclude our foundational certainty from the realm of epistemology?” (2007, 13) But this usage of ‘epistemic’ no longer acknowledges any other square of the above table, other than the top left hand one [a + b]. Thus if one wishes to engage in philosophical discussion about know-how, and use the terms of art familiar to and expected of today’s epistemologists, one has no choice other than to perpetuate the view that limits
knowledge to the confines of square \( [a + b] \), and, on these terms one must declare know-how to be non-epistemic. This is what, I conclude, Moyal-Sharrock is doing.

In today’s epistemological environment one cannot, therefore, use the term ‘epistemic’ without reinforcing intellectualist views about knowledge. For the option that existed only a few years ago, i.e., \([a^* + b^*]\) falls on deaf ears; notwithstanding that \([a^* + b^*]\) is non-other than Ryle’s view.\(^{131}\) If one attempted to use the option \([a + b^*]\) in order to state that non-propositional know-how was a kind of knowledge,\(^{132}\) one would find oneself having to declare that non-propositional know-how was ‘non-epistemic’, which would not only be not what one might which to claim, but whilst appearing to be making the same point as that made by Moyal-Sharrock, would actually be its contrary. These entanglements go by unnoticed for intellectualists, for whom there is no contretemps consequent upon using the term, for they no longer acknowledge the four options available. The problem is only brought to light if one wishes to pursue Wittgensteinian, anti- or non-intellectualist views about know-how. I suggest this why the problem has (thus far) slipped under the radar.

There seems no way to avoid the conclusion that one might use the term ‘epistemic’ and be understood by contemporary epistemologists without simultaneously perpetuating the propositional presumption and the intellectualist paradigm.\(^{133}\) This can be seen in the work of self-professed anti-intellectualist Kieran Setiya. In his July 2012 Aristotelian Society talk on ‘Know-how’, he worries that unless know-how can be shown to be directly related to (propositional) belief there is no justification for know-how to be regarded as any kind of knowledge at all. He uses an Ascombean picture of propositional belief about one’s intention (the details of which are irrelevant to this point) in order to articulate his own worry that, “Unless we accept his Anscombean conception [i.e. something which has the required propositional], we cannot explain what is epistemological about knowing how; why

\(^{131}\) A set of parallel quandaries would be faced when considering the question of the epistemic status of acquaintance knowledge.

\(^{132}\) In ‘The Know-How Reading of On Certainty’ (MSS), I take our linguistic hinge certainty to be just such a non-propositional know-how, which (contra Moyal-Sharrock) is an example of knowledge.

\(^{133}\) Nowhere are the entanglements prompted by the seemingly innocent term ‘epistemic’ revealed more starkly than in Coliva’s account. On her reading, ‘hinge propositions’, although propositions, do not have a truth value at all, thereby ensuring that, “we bear no epistemic relation to them” (2010, 11), and they cannot be “epistemically assessed.” (2010, 133 original emphasis) Nonetheless, she suggests, they do have an, “epistemically normative role” because they “contribute to the …possibility of acquiring evidence for or against genuinely empirical – that is verifiable propositions.” (2010, 86), and, “our acceptance of hinges… is itself constitutive of epistemic rationality.” (2010, 174)
knowing how to φ is an authentic form of knowledge.”134 This is an example of the extent to which an anti-intellectualist has succumbed to the propositional presumption that knowledge is (limited to) propositional knowledge. In his talk, Setiya presumes that the burden of proof is on him to argue that know-how is any kind of knowledge all; rather than starting from this assumption. The result is an (entirely un-Rylean) anti-intellectualist about knowledge who agrees with the intellectualist paradigm. Such are the levels of confusion generated by the unacknowledged scope ambiguities of the term ‘epistemic’. If anti- and non-intellectualists, in general, were to share the principle at work in Setiya’s view then they would be condemned to accept that in having something to say about know-how, they are not thereby saying anything yet about knowledge, nor making a contribution to epistemology. This is not merely to marginalize know-how, it is to ensure its exile.

Might one conclude that the dominance of the intellectualist paradigm and the commitment to a reading of Wittgenstein that holds knowledge to be limited to propositional knowledge that is justified true belief, explains Moyal-Sharrock’s rejection of the idea that the know-how (which is our linguistic hinge certainty) is knowledge? I can see no other option. Before concluding, however, I return to the strategy employed by Moyal-Sharrock in setting up two types of know-how in her original reading. Having stipulated there are two types of know-how (i) ‘ordinary’ and (ii) ‘objective’ or hinge certainty know-how, the latter being the non-propositional certainty that is no kind of knowledge, because of its animal surety, Moyal-Sharrock never returns to this distinction. The status of the ‘ordinary’ know-how is not given. Yet it is hard to see what further clarification Moyal-Sharrock would be able to offer about this kind of know-how. For should she concede it is knowledge or not?

If Moyal-Sharrock concedes that ordinary non-propositional know-how is both non-propositional and yet knowledge, then she opens up the option that being know-how need not per se rule out the possibility of being knowledge; thus a backdoor to the possibility that hinge certainty know-how (qua knowledge) becomes available. Yet if she denies ordinary know-how is knowledge, then what is it? On this second option, Moyal-Sharrock now appears to have identified two types of non-propositional know-how, neither of which are any kind of knowledge. So why make

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134 The citation is from the pre-publication draft of Setiya’s talk, with permission.
the discrimination between them in the first place? The distinction, once made, would seem to fall by the wayside. Again, this issue is unproblematic for a non-propositional know-how reading that takes know-how to be a kind of knowledge (albeit not in any propositional, Moorean sense.)

On these grounds, I conclude that in order to reject our linguistic hinge certainty being a kind of know-how that is non-propositional knowledge, Moyal-Sharrock must deny Wittgenstein’s acknowledgement that knowledge is a family resemblance notion capable of embracing non-propositional know-how. This risks undermining the very opportunity she has identified of bringing Wittgenstein’s insights to bear on the (misguided) hegemony of the propositional presumption. That said, she has opened up a vast new philosophical territorial landscape, previously unexplored by the participants in today’s philosophy of know-how debate.

There are, however, critics for whom Moyal-Sharrock’s reading of *On Certainty* makes a *faux pas* not in failing to appreciate that know-how is a kind of knowledge, but by suggesting, in the first place, that for Wittgenstein hinge certainty is any kind of know-how. I now turn to consider just how deep these challenges might bite.

5 Hinge Propositionality

According to Duncan Pritchard’s latest taxonomy of *On Certainty* readings, only one of the six types of interpretations (thus far offered and characterised) is non-propositional. This is the reading which he takes Moyal-Sharrock’s understanding to exemplify. So far removed is it from Pritchard’s own view of Moorean certainty and what he calls ‘hinge propositions’, that he entitles the position, ‘Radical Non-Epistemicism’.

Here is my own summary overview of Pritchard’s taxonomy:\(^{135}\)

(See over the page)

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\(^{135}\) See Pritchard (2005a, p 249 end note 1) for his now-superseded non-epistemic/epistemic taxonomy.
Table 5:

Readings of Wittgenstein’s *On Certainty*: Pritchard’s Taxonomy
(extracted & collated from his 2011a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Hinges” including Moorean Truisms</th>
<th>Non-Epistemic</th>
<th>Non-Epistemic</th>
<th>Non-Epistemic</th>
<th>Epistemicist</th>
<th>Epistemicist</th>
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<td>DM-S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Knowable?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>Propositional?</td>
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<td>Factual / Fact-stating?</td>
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According to Pritchard, non-epistemic (unlike epistemicist) views take at “face-value” Wittgenstein’s appreciation that, “hinges are unknown.” (2011a, 533) The strongest of these readings is the “radical” non-propositional reading, which Pritchard suggests captures the interpretations offers by Avrum Stroll\(^ {136} \) and D. Z. Phillips, as well as Moyal-Sharrock. There is a less strong account on which hinges are propositional, but “non-factual,” (2011a, 535) and which Pritchard takes to characterise the views of Crispin Wright (particularly his work in the 1980s), McGinn, Stroll (again, but under a different light), Conant and Minar. The weakest of the non-epistemicist readings is the, “simple non-epistemic” (2011, 536) view that hinges are both facts and propositions, though still not knowable.\(^ {137} \)

All Epistemicist readings regard so-called ‘hinge propositions’ as knowable; (where that term is deemed to pertain to propositional knowledge) and thereby fly in the face of what Wittgenstein would seem to be saying. Pritchard suggests these come in three varieties: Contextualist, Neo-Moorean and Pritchard’s own version of Neo-Mooreanism. Contextualism supposedly holds hinges are supposedly knowable,

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\(^{136}\) I would agree with Pritchard’s assignation of Stroll to this category. He is perhaps the first (indeed the breakthrough) non-propositional reader of *On Certainty*. “Wittgenstein is steadily moving away from thinking of certainty in propositional terms at all.” (1994, 7) I also think that that Norman Malcolm may be added to this list; though I take Phillips’ views to be too metaphysical to sit comfortably alongside those of Malcolm, Stroll or Moyal-Sharrock.

\(^{137}\) The simple non-epistemicist view appears to be a ‘place-holder’ view; its purpose to carve out a possible (thus far untaken) option in a schema of options. It is not a view Pritchard ascribes to anyone; though, as he points out, it might be understood as a way of sketching out scepticism.
“just so long as one does not enter a context where such hinges are brought into question,” (2011, 538) a view Pritchard takes to be held by Michael Williams. On Neo-Moorean readings, particularly those of Wright (from 1991 on), hinges have unearned but nonetheless, “positive epistemic support,” (2011a, 542) and on Pritchard’s own contrasting externalist version of Neo-Mooreanism, whilst hinges, “lack direct epistemic support in the form of reflectively accessible grounds” they still, “count as instances of knowledge.” (2011a, 546).138

In what follows, I consider the critical pressure Pritchard’s propositional reading of hinge certainty brings to a non-propositional (and thus non-propositional know-how) understanding of our hinge certainty. As such, I concentrate my attention on the two outer columns of Table 4. This not only allows an engagement with the account most diametrically opposed to that offered by Moyal-Sharrock, but it also brings to the table what I take to be the strongest available challenge to any non-propositional understanding. In considering the challenges posed by Pritchard’s propositional conception of Moorean certainty, I draw mainly on his (2005a), (2005b), (2011a) (2011b) and (forthcoming b).

On Pritchard’s reading of On Certainty, Moore’s truisms such as ‘Here [waving] is a hand,’ is a hinge proposition. As such it is knowable, it states a fact, and it is propositional. ‘Here [waving] is a hand’ is, however, different to ‘Here [body-part] is a hand’ because whilst it is possible to provide suitable justification for the belief ‘Here [body-part] is a hand’, no justification can be provided for ‘Here [waving] is a hand’, for any putative justification would be less warranted than ‘Here [waving] is a hand’ is itself. So whilst Pritchard’s reading agrees that Wittgenstein

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138 Pritchard’s own selection of references for the various interpreters can be found throughout 532-547, but specifically on pp 539, 542 and fns. 5, 6 and 22. Note that Pritchard’s taxonomy uses different discriminatory criteria to one previously offered by Moyal-Sharrock & William Brenner. According to Moyal-Sharrock & Brenner, the contributors to 2005 edited collection Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, can each be assigned to one of four possible readings (though this does not preclude a degree of overlap.) The framework reading examines the, “foundational and grammatical views” (2005, 3) and is pursued by Moyal-Sharrock herself together with Stroll, Williams and Schulte. The transcendental reading found in Mounce, Brenner and Rudd, “offers neo-Kantian and neo-Realist interpretations.” (2005, 3) The epistemic reading focusses on the epistemic status (or otherwise) of the so-called ‘hinge propositions’ and is favoured by Morawetz, Pritchard, Kober; whilst the therapeutic reading is, “less theoretical, more dialectic and open-textured” as in the writings of Minar, Cracy, Read. (2005, 3) By these criteria, I suggest Marie McGinn be regarded as another framework reader, not least because of her continued emphasis on, “judgements that form the frame of our practice,” (1989, 101) though her use of the term ‘judgement’ is at odds with other framework readers. Coliva (2011) and Wright’s work (in general) are perhaps best regarded as epistemic readers. In the wake of Section 4 conclusions, the very decision to characterise readings as ‘epistemic’ or otherwise, is, I think, itself a problematic move.
identifies a categorial distinction, in *On Certainty*, between propositional knowledge and certainty, this is to be understood as a difference between *types* of propositional knowledge, and not between propositional knowledge and something that is not propositional knowledge. I suggest this might reasonably be regarded as a *modest* construal of Wittgenstein’s notion of a ‘categorial difference’. Indeed, Pritchard frequently describes the content of *On Certainty* as being a new proposal, from Wittgenstein, about “the structure of reasons.” (2011a throughout; 2011b, 273; 2005a, Sec 9.2; forthcoming b)

Adherence to such a propositional reading, requires that a number of commitments are maintained and a number of challenges are rejected. I now take a look at just four of these. In the first place, one needs to ignore the argument presented by Moyal-Sharrock (2007, 33-34) that ‘Satz’ in German is too often translated as proposition and not sentence; the former being the ubiquitous choice in the Paul/Anscombe translation. Pritchard is silent on this matter. That said, the philosophical thrust of these issues will not turn, I suggest, merely on questions of translation.

Secondly, any fact-stating propositional reading needs to either explain or ignore Wittgenstein’s numerous observations that whilst sentences may have the form of empirical propositions they are nonetheless not empirical propositions. As seen already in (OC 308) the worry is raised, and in (OC 494) Wittgenstein writes:

“I cannot doubt this proposition [Satz] without giving up all judgement.” But what sort of proposition is that? … It is certainly no empirical proposition…It has the character of a rule.

According to Moyal-Sharrock, “hinges are grammatical rules”; rules which retain their non-propositionality precisely because they are “rules in action: logic in action.” (2007, 99)139 Pritchard’s reading does not proffer a propositional understanding of rules, or indeed wrestle with what rules are. He does briefly engage with what he describes as the non-radical, non-epistemicist view that hinges might be propositional

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139 Hence Moyal-Sharrock’s characterisation of Wittgenstein’s overall position in *On Certainty* as “logical pragmatism” (2007, 173) In my own Know-How Reading I avoid characterising Wittgenstein’s position as any kind of pragmatism, because of the familiar practice of contrasting ‘the pragmatic’ with ‘the epistemic’. (More about which below). Also given the extent to which the latter is now a technical term, any contrastive use of the former with it, fuels a comparable technical shift in the usage of ‘pragmatic’ to which I do not wish to contribute.
but non-fact-stating, suggesting that this finds, “strong support” in the “river bed passages” (2011, 535). Yet he does not offer an alternative way of understanding the river bed passages, or open up any potential Pandora’s Box pertaining to rules. Instead Pritchard claims that any non-propositional reading is left, “to contend with the problem of explaining how a proposition like ‘I have two hands can be non-fact-stating and this is no easy task.” (2011, 535) This is not an argument against the non-propositionality of hinges, it is an acknowledgement that he has does not intend to pursue one.

Were he to attempt to counter Moyal-Sharrock’s particular non-propositional view, Pritchard might turn to Peter Hacker’s propositional reading of grammatical rules. According to Hacker (contra Moyal-Sharrock) rules are grammatical propositions. But where Moyal-Sharrock reads Wittgenstein as holding that a proposition must be bipolar (i.e., capable of being both true and false), Hacker has a looser notion of proposition, according to which bivalence (i.e., being either true or false) is acceptable. On Hacker’s view grammatical propositions are (bivalent) necessary truths whose negations are not false, but nonsense. Were Pritchard to pursue this more overtly propositional approach, it would require him to articulate some view about the nature and status of rules which, as noted, he does not. That said, having identified his own position as ‘epistemicist’¹⁴⁰, it would appear that Pritchard, like Moyal-Sharrock (and unlike Hacker) is committed to the bi-polarity of propositions.

On my Know-How Reading of On Certainty, I take the Moyal-Sharrock/Hacker non-propositional/propositional clash to be less divisive than it might first appear. This is because, for Hacker, the point that our rules of grammar are propositional does not entail that they are fact-stating empirical propositions. Rather, it is simply the point that what are actually our rules, which are themselves non-propositional, can be formulated or expressed in language. Here is Hacker:

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¹⁴⁰ Epistemicism is a metaphysical position (originally articulated in considerations relating to vagueness, and then logic) that the world is constituted by facts, and that all propositions are either true or false, because of the way the world is or isn’t. So, for example, it just is either true or false that a particular is bald, and this has nothing to do with the norms of description we use and have developed to describe the world. Although one might hold that such a view could comfortably fit with Pritchard’s (or any) externalist views (in epistemology), according to discussion with Pritchard (16th January 2013) no such association is entailed or sought, indeed the selection of the term ‘epistemicist’ seeks to bring nothing further into play than the term ‘epistemic’.
The truth of ‘The chess king moves one square at a time’
does not consist in its corresponding to the fact that this chess
piece moves thus (since it is not a fact that it does, but a norm)
or things in reality being as the sentence describes them as being
(for the sentence is not a description), but rather in it correctly
articulating a rule of our game of chess.

(2009, 263 emphases added)

Pritchard’s defence of his own propositional views does not, as already identified,
find him delving into any rule- or norm-involving territory. Perhaps this is because he
reads On Certainty not only with an eye on sceptical issues, but from an externalist
perspective. Given that epistemological externalism is a more naturalized approach to
philosophy; it is an orientation that might be expected to resist, in general, the idea
that there are irreducible norms.

Pritchard is not, however, unaware that his, “discussion of non-epistemicism is
inevitably glib,” readily acknowledging that he, “leaves out a number of important
considerations that are relevant to this topic (such as how best to understand the very
notion of a proposition.)” (2005a, 538, fn. 13 emphasis added) Yet one might suggest
that how to understand those assertoric sentences which appear to have the form of
fact-stating propositions (but which are not) is not simply the motivation for, and the
substance of, the On Certainty passages, but one possible description of
Wittgenstein’s life’s work. Even if one wishes to promote a steadfastly propositional
reading, then Wittgenstein’s point that, “the concept ‘proposition’ itself is not a sharp
one.” (OC 320) would seem to demand a more substantial response.141

In taking for granted the unproblematic and univocal nature of the proposition
Pritchard is conforming to the standard practice of all contemporary epistemologists.
That is to say, that in pursuing a theory of the knowledge or a theoretical explanation
of the ‘knows that’ relation expressed in the schematic ‘Skp’ (Subject S knows that
proposition p), the nature of p itself may be taken for granted.142 That Pritchard

141 See Moyal-Sharrock (2007, 79-80 and 147-8) for her importantly critical engagement with Quine’s
thoroughly propositional picture of beliefs which are held to different degrees of strength; a picture
which could apply equally well to Pritchard.
142 Cf., Harrison (2011) in which I identify and challenge the questionable Singularity and
Metaphysical Presumptions built into this schema.
appreciates there is such a lacuna at the heart of his engagement with the readings of *On Certainty* is already an unusual concession.

The third commitment that is required in order to maintain a propositional reading of hinges is a number of quite idiosyncratic interpretations of some of Wittgenstein’s key passages. Consider, for example, Wittgenstein’s realization that, “If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false” (OC 205) Here Pritchard ignores the obvious relevance of this for any appreciation of the categorial distinction under discussion. Moreover, he describes this passage (along with paragraphs OC 199-200) as being “ambiguous since neither of them explicitly states that hinge propositions are neither true nor false.” (2005a, 250 end note 1.) If (OC 205) is ambiguous on this point then the rigours of disambiguation Pritchard seeks are not just extraordinarily high, but, I am afraid, opaque. It is unclear how this passage could fail to mean that our empirical knowledge is grounded in something which does not itself have truth values. Especially when one considers that, “the ground is not true, nor yet false” follows straight on from the following key paragraph:

> Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end is not certain propositions’ [Sätze] striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game. (OC 204)

Undaunted, Pritchard offers a unusual reading\(^{143}\) of this associated passage which denies our justifying comes to an end in our practices or ways of acting. Rather, he claims that Wittgenstein is pointing out that our justifying bottoms out in a “visceral conviction.” (2011a, 534) I admit to struggling to see how this captures what Wittgenstein is articulating. It looks, instead, to be a strategy for diffusing the central thrust of Wittgenstein’s insights; drawing attention away from the foundational dynamism that is our acting, to some more static conviction, presumably to help promote a characterisation more amenable to capture in propositional terms. Our ways of acting, are on this reading, not different in kind to the empirical knowledge

\(^{143}\) For the avoidance of doubt, I am not suggesting that Pritchard (or indeed Williams or Wright) are offering interpretations (comprehensive or otherwise) of *On Certainty*, rather their readings of particular passages are perhaps best appreciated as articulations of views inspired by Wittgenstein’s writings.
they enable, but rather they are, and thereby offer, “a backdrop of claims which are of their nature ungroundedly held.” (2005a, 226 emphasis added)

This is not so much a challenge to the non-propositional view so much as the articulation of an alternative incompatible intellectualist orientation. The assumption that our intelligence and our mindedness (and thus our knowledge) must be propositional all the way down (as it were) is a cornerstone of the intellectualism paradigm. Again, this is perhaps to be expected from any epistemologist focused on sceptical concerns; especially someone like Pritchard, who in seeking ways to combat sceptical “angst,” (2005a, Sec 9.4) takes this to require, by definition, a propositional ‘solution’. The irrelevance of the non-propositional is built into any such perspective from the start. This perhaps also explains why Pritchard’s characterisation of Moyal-Sharrock’s position acknowledges its non-propositionality, but (to my knowledge) remains silent on her suggestion that foundational hinge certainty is a kind of know-how.

The fourth commitment to which a propositional reading is likely to adhere, is a degree of separatism between any pragmatic and (supposedly) ‘epistemic’ aspects or features. In resisting Wittgenstein’s realisation that our ways of acting ground our empirical knowledge, it is unsurprising therefore to note that Pritchard rigorously polices what he takes to be the discreteness and lack of interdependency between ‘epistemic’, pragmatic (and in addition, semantic) features or characteristics. Indeed he regularly argues that such-and-such a feature cannot be ‘epistemic’ because it is pragmatic, (or because it is semantic):

[I]f one is looking for a primarily epistemic response to scepticism from Wittgenstein’s remarks in this text then one is likely to be disappointed. At best, it seems, all that Wittgenstein offers in this regard is the kind of pragmatic defence of our belief in hinges that Wright was trying to pass off as being a genuinely epistemic approach to the problem.” (2005b, 217)

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144 This is further pursed in my ‘The Intellectualist Paradigm’ (MSS) where I identify propositionality, computationalism and what Hutto has called, “semantic thesis of intentionality” (2012, 41-42) as the three cornerstones of the intellectualist paradigm which, having been imported into naturalized philosophy of mind and epistemology from cognitive science, have been thoroughly embraced.

145 I deliberately use the term ‘epistemic’ in scare quotes, henceforth, as a reminder that in light of its now-dominant narrow-scope usage, it is unclear how one might use the term whilst attempting to pursue an anti- or non-intellectualist approach to knowledge.
And again, instead of supplying, “the desired epistemic answer to scepticism” what Wittgenstein offers in *On Certainty* is, according to Pritchard, certain resources which may, “help us to identify a possible pragmatic response to the problem.” (2005a, 242). If one starts with, *and expects to maintain*, a separatism between the epistemic and the pragmatic, how might one engage with Wittgenstein’s resources, given that the substance of these pertain to the *interdependency* of our propositional knowledge and our non-propositional know-how? One is left wondering if the description of Wittgenstein’s knowledge-related investigations in *On Certainty* as “Wittgensteinian Epistemology” (Pritchard 2011a, Sec 3) is anything more than an honorific gesture.

One moral to be drawn from the four requirements to which a propositional account is committed, as sketched above, is that propositional and non-propositional readings of hinges do not share the same starting point. From Pritchard’s point of view, a ‘hinge proposition’ is something whose categorial difference is not a matter of its putative propositionality, but it is, rather, a consequence of it being a proposition which, “performs a peculiar epistemic role.” (2005b, 194, and 2001/2, 97) The challenge of engaging with *On Certainty* is thereby taken to be the task of understanding just what this specific ‘epistemic’ role is; a role that *by definition* is a role played by some kind of proposition. On any such propositional view, the ‘epistemic role’ is therefore the *explanandum* in need of an *explanans*. By contrast, the non-propositional know-how understanding of *On Certainty* (both Moyal-Sharrock’s and my own) does not recognise this supposed ‘epistemic role of hinge proposition’ as an *explanandum* of any sort; rather to characterise it as such, is already to be engaged in offering an *explanans*. This exposes the extent to which propositional and non-propositional views are not simply contrasting *explanans* of the same (mutually agreed) *explanandum*, but two approaches which fundamentally disagree on where to begin their philosophical pursuits.

That said, as an externalist, there is, of course, no need for Pritchard to deny the intellectualist paradigm which informs his reading. Indeed, any position that suggests that, “the grounds that we have for our beliefs” are “encoded in the hinge propositions.” (2005a, 227 emphasis added), or that, “certain propositions are codifying the hinge conviction,” (2011b, 283) is operating comfortably with the

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146 Furthermore, if pragmatism and the ‘epistemic’ are to be kept apart is there any putative way of characterising non-propositional know-how as knowledge? Yet again, the nomenclature employed by the propositional presumption thwarts the discussion.
tradition of with a deeply naturalized perspective informed by intellectualist philosophy of mind and (its partner) epistemological externalism. But Pritchard, in a move rare amongst contemporary epistemologists, does appear to appreciate the tension this provokes, admitting, “There is hardly any textual support in On Certainty for externalism.” (2005b, 208) Having said this, however, more recently he suggests that one might, “plausibly argue that recognizing and incorporating the insights provided by Wittgenstein’s treatment of scepticism in On Certainty is essential to the proper development of any externalist anti-sceptical epistemology.” (2011, 547)

My interim conclusion is that Moyal-Sharrock’s and Pritchard’s two very different readings of Wittgenstein cannot be evaluated by the same criteria. Pritchard’s Neo-Mooreanism operates within the parameters (and under the authority) of an intellectualist naturalized philosophy, Moyal-Sharrock attempts to free her views from this, only to find them ensnared in the tendrils of those terms of art with which contemporary epistemology operates (and protects) itself. In a final attempt to try and find some shared ground on which to consider the propositional and the non-propositional know-how readings, I will return to Wittgenstein’s passages and offer a fresh argument against the propositional reading; one that aims to simultaneously deepen the exposition, the accuracy and the fecundity of non-propositional know-how reading. To do this, I focus on two of the passages which Pritchard regular uses as anchors for his own propositional reading, beginning with:

The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.” (OC 166)

If I understand Pritchard correctly, on his view the power of this passage turns on the idea that certain propositions, i.e., hinge propositions, are not just held without

147 Cf., Pritchard’s observation, that, “[E]pistemological externalists have long made play with such a notion [i.e. a “respectable notion of entitlement”], arguing that agents can legitimately believe all manner of propositions in the absence of supporting reasons just so long as the agent’s belief is formed in the right kind of way, where this is defined externally in terms of, for example, the reliability of the belief-forming mechanism involved. (2005b, 207)

148 On this I would agree with Pritchard, but for entirely different reasons. For I take the development of externalist anti-sceptical epistemology to be best served by the realization (i) that what is ‘external’ (as it were) is best understood in non-naturalized, non-intellectualist terms, i.e., as a matter of the public nature of our normative practices; (ii) that in coming to master normative practices we are trained in public normative practices and in so doing become minded, intelligent, human beings; and (iii) that therefore there is no epistemological gap between mind and world for scepticism to find purchase. But this is not the place for this argument, and the New Epistemology of Know-How is just one of the first steps to that particular philosophical destination. For illuminating discussions of this normative training see Meredith Williams (1991) and (2011).
grounds, but they are held without grounds because there is no grounding they could have. This contrasts with the non-propositional reading, in which hinges are not propositions, but are themselves grounds for empirical propositions. On the former account what is being presented is indeed, what Pritchard characterises as a new picture of the structure of (propositional) reasons. On this picture there are (non-hinge) propositions that are grounded or supported by other propositions, and there are (hinge) propositions that are not grounded or supported by other propositions. There is nothing, it would seem, which provides any non-propositional grounding. “The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing,” is taken to support this, because it takes ‘our believing’, or our beliefs, to be ungrounded, and ungroundable. Away from the context of the many of the other key passages of On Certainty, there is no question but that this looks like a viable construal.

On the latter (non-propositional) understanding, (empirical) propositions are grounded by other propositions but ultimately this justificatory support comes to an end in something non-propositional: our hinge or foundational or bedrock ways of acting. Our non-propositional know-how. “The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing,” is taken to articulate this point in two ways. Firstly empirical beliefs are ultimately ungrounded -- propositionally. Secondly, that there is a way in which our empirical propositions are grounded, i.e., by our non-propositional ways of acting, our know-how, but these ways of acting are not themselves grounded in anything further. What we do is just what we do. And what we do correctly is just what we do correctly. Our normative linguistic know-how is a matter of engaging in rule- and standard-involving normative practices which are not played correctly because of some further justificatory grounding. Our linguistic know-how, our language-games just are what they are. As Wittgenstein reminds us:

149 On this propositional reading (i) “The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.” (OC 166) and (ii) “If the true is what is grounded then the ground is not yet true, nor yet false” (OC 205) are taken to be incommensurable. The propositional view is then required to select which view best articulates Wittgenstein’s central ‘thesis’. It then selects (i), rejecting (ii). By contrast, the non-propositional view does not regard them as being incommensurable, and so is not obliged to choose between them.

150 When considering why a particular number is the right one in a series, Wittgenstein reminds us, “He must go on like this without a reason. Not, however, because he cannot yet grasp the reason but because – in this system – there is no reason. (“The chain of reasons comes to an end.”) And the like this (in “go on like this”) is signified by a number, a value. For at this level the expression of the rule is explained by the value, not the value by the rule.” (RPP II, 404) In other words that such-and-such a number is correct is just the way we act; what we do, when we do this – correctly.
You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something unpredictable. I mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable).

It is there like our life. (OC 559)

So whilst Pritchard is right to claim (OC 166) in support of his views, this is only possible if one takes the passage out of context. Once re-situated in the body of *On Certainty*, the alternative reading, which supports the non-propositional view is more consistent with the rest of Wittgenstein’s insights both here, and elsewhere.

What determines our judgement, our concepts and reactions, is not what one man is doing now, an individual action, but the whole hurly-burly of human actions, the background against which we see any action. (Z 567)

One of Pritchard’s other favoured passages is, “It is always by favour of Nature that one knows something.” (OC 505) There is no denying that this is a canny choice for any externalist or naturalized philosopher seeking to expand the support base for their views by raiding Wittgenstein’s coffers. But a non-propositional reading could readily understand this as a reminder that our ways of acting (including our normative ways) are a kind of second nature:

We’re used to a particular classification of things. With language, or languages, it has become second nature to us. (RPP II, 678)

As Moyal-Sharrock puts it, “Our potential to develop these abilities [for language and other intelligent behaviour] is an endowment of nature; the actualization of that potential is ensured by nurture, and furthered by culture.” (2007, 6) I would extend Moyal-Sharrock’s point that these abilities which we have and develop through training are not just non-propositional know-how, they are a know-how that is a kind of knowledge. For, as Wittgenstein reminds us not only is, “The kind of certainty is
the kind of language-game,” (LW I, 892) but, “the concept of knowing is coupled with that of the language-game.” (OC 560)\textsuperscript{151}

The fact that I use the word “hand” and all the other words in my sentence without a second thought, indeed that I should stand before the abyss if I wanted so much as to try doubting their meanings – shews that absence of doubt belongs to the essence of the language-game. (OC 370)

I conclude that Pritchard’s Neo-Mooreanism acknowledges but does not repudiate the non-propositional reading. Furthermore, the non-propositional view can more readily accommodate the breath and variation of the On Certainty passages, whereas the propositional view is inevitably limited to cherry-picking from a small selection of potentially serviceable quotes. On Pritchard’s own admission, however, much of his attention is at the service of his own focus and interest in propositional scepticism, and so his reading is perhaps inevitably circumscribed.\textsuperscript{152}

6 Concluding Remarks

Moyal-Sharrock’s non-propositional understanding of hinge certainty articulates a foundational kind of know-how which is implicated in all our empirical knowledge. Although I take this know-how to be a kind of knowledge and Moyal-Sharrock resists this point, her understanding of Wittgenstein nonetheless illuminates the extent to which his philosophy can no longer be side-lined by any serious philosophical attempt to engage with know-how. Even if my arguments above have failed to show that our foundational linguistic certainty or know-how is a kind of knowledge, there is still a kind of ‘objective know-how’ (of some sort) that, according to Moyal-Sharrock is constitutive of the enabling framework of empirical knowledge, and it is a non-propositional know-how. This, alone, is sufficient reason for the involvement of

\textsuperscript{151} Pritchard has not yet offered any externalist reading of Wittgenstein’s “Not until there is a language-game are their reasons.” (RPP II, 689) And it remains unclear what any such reading might be.

\textsuperscript{152} That said, there are yet more resources in On Certainty and the later writings on psychology, for Pritchard’s (and other epistemologists’) further interests; particularly in relation to such currently popular topics as the value question and the relation between knowledge and understanding. After all, “Understanding is like knowing how to go on, and so it is an ability.” (RPP I, 875)
Wittgenstein’s work in any future consideration of the philosophy of know-how which seeks to be comprehensive.

Furthermore, the critical engagement between the non-propositional know-how readings and the propositional orientation raises an entirely new set of issues. For if the non-propositional know-how views of our grounding certainty are right, then not only is intellectualism about know-how wrong, but the intellectualist paradigm with which naturalized epistemology operates is itself threatened. Engaging with Wittgenstein on the subject of know-how thus reveals the extent to which know-how can no longer be a peripheral topic; one whose consequences are ring-fenced from wider implications. In bringing Wittgenstein into the debate about know-how, know-how stands ready to be repatriated from its epistemological exile.

In the next chapter, I expand on these conclusions to expose on a number of highly specific meta-philosophical considerations, which show that the expanding consequences of engaging with Wittgenstein on matters pertaining to know-how. I explore ways of disempowering a number of critical attempts to undermine Wittgenstein’s own, and Wittgensteinian-inspired contributions to, epistemology. This is a final preliminary step en route to the creation of a viable and legitimate philosophical space for the New Epistemology of Know-How. And it takes us into questions about the nature of philosophy itself.

Some will say that my talk about the concept of knowledge is irrelevant, since this concept as understood by philosophers, while indeed it does not agree with the concept as it is used in everyday speech, still is an important and interesting one, created by a kind of sublimation from the ordinary, rather uninteresting one. But the philosophical concept was derived from the ordinary one through all sorts of misunderstandings, and it strengthens these misunderstandings. It is in no way interesting, except as a warning.

(RPP II, 289)

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Wittgenstein’s insights offer a number of as yet unexplored, reinvigorating and potentially revolutionary contributions to the ongoing philosophical investigations into know-how. Although this realisation is facilitated by non-propositional know-how understandings of On Certainty, the resources it identifies are by no means limited to Wittgenstein’s final writings. They are to be found in the Investigations, and elsewhere; wherever his explorations of our form(s) of life and our normative practices are explored. Given that Wittgenstein’s work cuts across the familiar lines of debate rehearsed by the intellectualist/anti-intellectualist confrontation, any engagement with his insights offers not merely the possibility of a fresh approach to know-how but, as I will argue in this chapter, the opportunity for what might now be called ‘The New Epistemology of Know-How’.

The momentum for this New Epistemology of Know-How comes from three realisations. Firstly, as a proper understanding of know-how may well involve radically reconsidering what helps ground our empirical propositional knowledge, the epistemological investigation of know-how can no longer be a discrete philosophical topic, on the sidelines of mainstream of epistemology. Know-how is no longer irrelevant to epistemology’s preoccupation with, and sole focus on, propositional knowledge. The possibility that (some of our) know-how and (some of our) propositional knowledge are part of an interdependent set of relations, which may be part-constitutive of one-another,\(^\text{153}\) point to the central importance of the epistemology of know-how for epistemology in general. Secondly, a Wittgensteinian appreciation of know-how inevitably challenges some of the assumptions and principles which are taken for granted by the intellectualist paradigm with which naturalized philosophy operates. In pursuing any Wittgensteinian appreciation of

\(^{153}\) I am currently exploring the possibility that the interdependency between (some) know-how and (some) know-that is best appreciated in terms of Wittgenstein’s notion of an internal relation. As Hacker explains, “[I]f one severs the internal relations between concepts of As and concepts of Bs and abandons the use of concepts of Bs, one is not left with concepts of As, but with something else, which may be mere nonsense or may be given a fresh sense.” (1986, 203) Though Moyal-Sharrock denies the internal relation between hinge certainty and empirical knowledge, I believe this is in tension with her observation that, “Language and form of life are internally related: to imagine a human language is necessarily to imagine a human form of life, a human way of being and acting, which essentially involves both our biological make-up and our social behaviour.” (2007, 6 original emphasis)
know-how, one is therefore led to engage with a range of issues wider than the epistemology of know-how has so far recognised as pertinent. One example of this, already identified, is the extent to which there are intellectualist commitments built into contemporary usage of the term ‘epistemic’. In this chapter I will also identify comparable problems pertaining to the notion of the ‘cognitive’. Thirdly, engaging with the potential contributions of Wittgenstein’s insights for the philosophy of know-how requires some degree of acceptance of the merits of his methods and an appreciation of the philosophical worth of descriptive rather than theoretical goals. This prompts the opening up of the philosophical debate to various meta-philosophical questions. Given that Wittgenstein’s approach is taken to be at odds with the methodology of naturalized philosophy, there is a risk that the legitimacy of one approach precludes the legitimacy of the other. Unlike other potential contributors to the philosophy of know-how, the entrée of Wittgenstein into this particular debate therefore comes with a requirement to engage in meta-philosophical reflection. That said, there is no obvious reason why pause for reflective thought on these matters should not be welcome and timely. The arrival of Wittgenstein into the know-how debate thereby not only raises matters pertaining to epistemology in general, as well as to the philosophy of know-how, but its potential impact might not stop short of our understanding of what philosophy itself is.

In this chapter, I argue that not only are Wittgenstein’s potential contributions to the epistemology of know-how illuminatingly considered in tandem with the potential challenges he makes to the tenets of naturalized philosophy, but that the particular philosophical understanding he offers about know-how brings into question central features of what Pritchard claims is the, “actual methodology employed by analytic epistemologists” (forthcoming a), i.e., reflective equilibrium. For, as I will show, the insights of On Certainty go to the very heart of this reflective equilibrium, revealing why it cannot deliver on its own methodological promises, because it mistakenly assumes that all our ‘intuitions’ are fact-stating propositions. But, as Wittgenstein appreciates, not everything that looks like a empirical proposition is one; sometimes it is the expression of our non-propositional know-how. If this is the case, then the modus operandi of reflective equilibrium may well be inadequate to its own task.

In what follows, I argue that from the marginalised topic of know-how comes a Wittgensteinian contribution that has the potential to be a non-naturalized David to
naturalized epistemology’s Goliath. Specifically, I start by articulating a metaphilosophical comparison between (some of) the key methods and principles of Wittgensteinian & Naturalized Philosophy. In Section 1, I use criticisms of Wittgenstein’s methods from John Searle to argue that the latter’s preoccupation with philosophical theory (supposedly exemplary of the ambitions of Naturalized Philosophy) ultimately struggles to articulate the very notion of theory it claims to champion. It is therefore unable to successfully challenge Wittgenstein’s contrasting descriptive priorities. Indeed, it is not clear that philosophical theorising isn’t just an alternative style of description. In Section 2, I use criticisms of Wittgenstein’s methods offered by Peter Strawson, to show that the commitment to theory is not a commitment to a methodology at all, but to the fact that there is a metaphysical reality which underpins and thereby validates the practice of philosophical theorising. Thus the apparent methodological criticism is but a disguised philosophical conflict. In Section 3, I look at the practice of reflective equilibrium which Pritchard characterises as the methodology of contemporary epistemology. I show that some of the intuitions it supposedly uses as its ‘input data’ are already heavily biased intellectualist claims, some of which are susceptible to the same kind of re-appraisal that Wittgenstein applies to Moore’s truisms. In Section 4, I suggest that the real merit of reflective equilibrium, as a methodology, may be better captured by using Gertrude Conway’s notion of reflective awareness, thereby offering a way to a modest rapprochement between naturalized and Wittgensteinian philosophical approaches. In the final remarks, I bring together the conclusions of this chapter with those of the last chapter, concluding that the move forward to the New Epistemology of Know-How is now motivated and available.

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1 Naturalized Philosophy I: In Search of a Theory

“I see philosophy not as an a priori propadeutic or groundwork for science, but as continuous with it.” (1969, 126) This is Quine’s unqualified announcement of the
guiding principle which informs naturalized philosophy. In the last fifty years or so the mainstream Anglo-American philosophical tradition has not just embraced this move but in the words of Hans-Johann Glock, naturalized philosophy has, “achieved the status of orthodoxy, especially in the USA.” (2008, 46) Yet Wittgenstein has quite a different idea of what philosophers do and why. “We are not pursuing a natural science” he confirms, “our aim is not to predict anything.” (RPP I, 46)

Indeed, Wittgenstein’s goals lie elsewhere. “I am aiming at something different than are the scientists & my thoughts move differently than do theirs.” (CV, 9) In describing his own, “much more homespun way” of reflecting (BT 420), Wittgenstein warns that, “there is a “constant danger” of using words like ‘explanation’, “in a sense that is derived from physics.” (BT 418) Instead, “All explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place.” (PI §109) What Wittgenstein seeks are not theses but, “new comparisons” (CV 16), to help lay out, “an overview”, a “surveyable representation” [or “perspicuous presentation”155] with which to gain, “that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’.” (PI §122, cf. BT 417) This kind of philosophical approach does not develop hypotheses aimed at new supposed philosophical truths, rather it seeks a clarifying overview of what we struggle to understand. It strives to articulate the way things hang together, to map the, “landscape of conceptual relations,” (CV, 90) and thereby help us find our way around. “Philosophy unties knots in our thinking; hence its results must be simple, but philosophising has to be as complicated as the knots it unties.” (Z 452, cf., LWP I, 750)

The goals, methods and strategies that shape Wittgenstein’s philosophical investigations are at odds with the theory-generating and hypotheses-involving practices which drive the naturalized philosophical agenda. Is there any common ground on which a philosophical encounter between putative Wittgensteinian contributions might engage with contrasting philosophical ‘theses’? Are there any shared set of benchmarks on which contrasting philosophical approaches might agree? By the end of this chapter, I hope to have teased out a positive answer to this, but in order to get there the journey needs to expose the deep chasms which divide these

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154 I date the start of the Naturalized Philosophical movement to 1959, with Chomsky’s attack on B.F. Skinner’s (1957) Verbal Behaviourism, for reasons identified in Section 3.1 below.
very different understandings of the nature and methods of philosophy. Even those naturalized philosophers who readily acknowledge a respect for Wittgenstein, such as John Searle, are at times at a loss to recognise the value in his methods. Indeed, for Searle, “the single most disappointing feature of Wittgenstein’s later work,” (1987, 342) is his, “aversion to theory.” (1987, 344) In spurning theory-construction for description, Searle charges Wittgenstein with, “waffling in certain crucial areas.” (1987, 344) Searle’s warning is unambiguous: eschew theorizing at your philosophical peril. But is this charge warranted? I now take a closer look at Searle’s own diagnosis as to where and why Wittgenstein has ‘gone wrong’.

Searle suggests that Wittgenstein’s spurning of theory-construction is the product of, “a series of massive mistakes,” (1987, 343); one group in the philosophy of language, the other in the philosophy of mind. In language, Wittgenstein’s supposed error is to reject a particular, theoretically amenable, picture of language. This is the view (to which Searle himself adheres\textsuperscript{156}) that in every single one of our language-games and individual speech acts there is an ever-present, albeit sometimes ‘transformed’ truth-functional propositional content. In contrast, Wittgenstein’s understands language to be an ability, a normative technique which we language users come to master. Wittgenstein’s own appreciation of language rejects the very thing which Searle takes to be impervious to challenge, i.e., the central intellectualist assumption that, “Representation is of the essence of language.” (1987, 344) Furthermore, for Searle, Wittgenstein’s ability view blocks any viable theorising about the nature of our language. For, according to Searle, it is the representational propositionality itself which is what makes possible the provision of, “a general theoretical account of how the various modes of representations in different sorts of speech acts actually function.” (1987, 344)

According to Searle, Wittgenstein is therefore guilty of a double mistake: (i) denying the essential representationalism of language and, thereby (ii) ruling out the very possibility of theorizing about it. That propositionality or representational semantic content (of some sort) is required for theorising is further evident in Searle’s notion of the ‘Background’(1983, 141-159) This is postulated as the necessary condition for the possibility of having intentional states, and therefore cannot itself be

\textsuperscript{156} Other adherents include truth-conditional theorists of meaning, Chomskyan-orientated linguists and those philosophers who believe that all philosophically relevant aspects of natural language can be captured by some form of predicate calculus or logic, eg. Timothy Williamson.
theorised about, for the very reason that it is non-propositional and constituted by abilities. With this criticism, Searle reveals the extent to which the method of investigation dictates the nature of what is being investigated.

This representation-hungry notion of ‘theory’ requires a representational conception of the *explanandum*. In other words, a representation-hungry notion of theory requires an (already) *intellectualised picture* of what one is trying to understand. This is, for Searle, *married to the task of providing a theory* for it. Intellectualism and theory-provision are thus two sides of the same naturalized coin. And of course, if Searle is right about this, then he is also right that Wittgenstein’s philosophical views about language preclude him from theorising about it.

The reason Searle gives for Wittgenstein’s supposed antagonism to theoretical pursuits is not, of course, the reason Wittgenstein himself eschews theory-generation. For Wittgenstein regards scientific theories as typically (i) involving the power to make predictions and (ii) confirmable (or discomfirmable) by experimental methods. On the first point, it is not clear that the philosophical theories pursued by Searle are capable of offering successful predictions. Indeed, it is not clear just what it is they might actually predict. Wittgenstein does not hide the fact that any potential prediction would be of little interest anyway, given that that he takes philosophy’s goals to be understanding, conceptual clarification and perspicuous presentations, not *advance warnings*.\(^{158}\)

On the second point, Wittgenstein queries whether the practice of philosophical ‘theorising’ is in fact open to experimental confirmation or refutation. Announcing that an investigation is theoretical, or labeling it as such, is not yet engaging in the various appropriate experimental activities embedded in the quotidian methodology of the natural sciences. Both these issues are highlighted in Wittgenstein’s reflection on Goethe’s attempts to provide a supposed *theory* of colour:

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\(^{157}\) One might think of Searle’s Background as a kind of naturalized philosopher of mind’s noumenal realm.

\(^{158}\) Although almost of Wittgenstein’s characterisations of philosophy in this chapter are taken from the post-*Tractarian* writings, (see particularly BT Sections 86-93), his insistence that the tasks of philosophy and the sciences are radically different is evident already in the *Tractatus*: “[P]hilosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word ‘philosophy’ must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them.) Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations.” (TLP 4.111-4.112)
Goethe’s theory of the constitution of the colours of the spectrum has not proved to be an unsatisfactory theory, rather it really isn’t a theory at all. Nothing can be predicted with it. It is, rather, a vague schematic outline of the sort we find in James’s psychology. Nor is there any experimentum crucis which could decide for or against the theory. (RC I-70, see also RC III-125)

Although Searle berates Wittgenstein for eschewing theory, is it the case that Searle himself is engaged in theory-production? What experimentum crucis will confirm or refute Searle’s view (his ‘hypothesis’) that, “representation lies at the heart of nearly every single language game”? (1987, 343) One might imagine Searle responding by saying that he is laying the groundwork for some future, as yet unarticulated, experimental possibility, but this does not solve the problem as to how an empirical experiment is supposed to confirm or refute a conceptual claim.159 These worries chime with those expressed by Herman Philipse, who throws down the following gauntlet to Searle:

Is he [Searle] engaging in proto-empirical theory building, as present-day string theorists, are, hoping that his theories will become empirically testable in the near future? If so, what are the empirical tests he is dimly envisaging for this theories, and what are the predictions he derives from them? Or is he just proposing a somewhat simplified and systematized picture of how we are using segments of ordinary language, such as words expressing intentional and mental characteristics of human beings? (2009, 171)

And if Searle is doing just doing that, how different is it to (Wittgensteinian) description? Just when is a theory a theory? Searle needs to get more specific about what he charges Wittgenstein with failing to deliver, if Wittgenstein’s methods are to be found wanting. One possible answer to what Searle may regard as crucial, can

159 Cf., Williamson’s claim that philosophy, like mathematics, is a science with its own particular kind of ‘experiment’. “Much of the philosophical community allows that a judicious act of the imagination can refute a previously well-support theory.” (2007, 117) But is this a flexible notion of science or experimentation, a redefinition of both, or a transgression of the bounds of sense? As Hacker points out, “[A] thought-experiment is no more an experiment than monopoly money is money.” (2009a, 140, fn. 15)
perhaps be found in the second ‘mistake’ which Searle accuses Wittgenstein of making.

In connection with the philosophy of mind, Searle charges Wittgenstein with, “the failure to see the importance of the brain for understanding mental phenomena”, due to his supposed, “neglect of the fact that causal processes in the brain are sufficient for any of our mental phenomena.” (1987, 344 emphasis added) Here (for all his rejection of computationalism in the Chinese Room thought experiment\textsuperscript{160}) Searle assumes a picture of the mind which nonetheless embraces several of the inviolable tent-poles of the intellectualist paradigm, i.e., the semantic thesis of intentionality (the there can be sub-personal representational states with discrete semantic content), the collapse of any distinction between co-variance and causality, and vehicle reductionism.\textsuperscript{161} These are not agreed starting points from which to reflect on the nature of human mindedness and intelligence, they are already highly developed positions \textit{about} our mindedness and intelligence. Wittgenstein rejects all of these reductionist claims and in so doing, according to Searle, commits his second mistake. For Wittgenstein, however, the consideration of our ‘mental phenomena’ concerns those particular capacities, abilities, and skills which we have. Being minded is not some \textit{thing} we have, but it is a \textit{capacity} we \textit{possess}. Understanding this requires attention to our psychological concepts and not the physical nature of our brain states.\textsuperscript{162} Searle is mixing up causal and conceptual connections, again on the similar grounds that (only) the former enable the possibility of theorizing. The take-home message of Searle’s two criticisms is the same: given that philosophy’s subject-matter is conceived of in intellectualist terms, it therefore requires intellectualist philosophical engagement, and intellectualist philosophical engagement is theoretical. Put otherwise: no theory, no philosophical legitimacy.\textsuperscript{163}

\textsuperscript{160} See Searle 1980 (417-419) for Searle’s argument that the mind, albeit representational is not computational, on the grounds that “[S]ymbolic manipulations could never be constitutive of mental states, because the formal or the syntactical structure of the symbol manipulations could never be by itself sufficient to guaranteed the presence of intentional or semantic content.” (2001, 176). Ironically, this very argument might also be exploited against the representationalist picture of the mind which he insists is a given.
\textsuperscript{161} See Kenny (1989, Chapter 5), Bennett & Hacker (2003)
\textsuperscript{162} The task of defeating this position is not the task at hand, though it is a quarry I pursue elsewhere (in ‘The Intellectualist Paradigm’ MSS). The task here is to identify the extent to which theory-provision is facilitated by, and only works within an intellectualist approach to the mind, language and knowledge. It is therefore unsurprising that a theoretical ‘bringing to heel’ is sought by those eager to maintain the intellectualist paradigm.
\textsuperscript{163} This point is reminiscent of Rorty’s observation, “From a Wittgensteinian perspective, the approach taken by Chomsky and his fellow cognitive scientists look like that taken by the man who searches for
Wittgenstein is not unsympathetic, however, to the powerful ‘call’ of theory-generation. Indeed he is alert to the extent to which, “One has to regard what appears so obviously incomplete, as something complete” when, “renouncing all theory.” (RPP 1, 723) But this acknowledgement throws the ball back into Searle’s court. For if philosophical theory-generation is supposed to complete that which description supposedly leaves ‘unfinished’, and this is not a matter of providing predictions or experimental confirmation or refutation, then just what is it that remains outstanding? As Searle is not forthcoming with an answer to these questions, one might respond on his behalf that philosophical theorizing is not so much philosophical theory-generation, itself, but is rather a matter of exploiting the findings of cognitive scientific theories. But as Moyal-Sharrock points out, “If attention is to be paid by philosophy to science, shouldn’t it be to scientific results rather than to scientific hypotheses that seem nourished by a preconception of how things must be.” (forthcoming a, original emphasis) Those (limited) attempts by naturalized philosophers to justify the theoretical status or credentials of their own candidate ‘theories’ risk reducing the notion of a philosophical theory to some ersatz version of its scientific namesake. At which point, the gulf between philosophical theory and description fails to look particularly substantial.

Furthermore, Wittgenstein may set aside hypothesis generation and theory production, but he is nonetheless eager to pursue what he thinks such faux theories may, in part, be aiming at. Indeed he suggests that what is often wanted from a theory would be better achieved by alternative methods. What is wanted in the case of colour, is not a theory, but rather “the logic of our colour concepts” (RC I-22, RC III-188) What is actually sought is not an explanation that will enable prediction, but an answer to the kind of ‘why’ question which provides a suitable, “analogy” in virtue of which, “the phenomenon no longer stands alone, it is connected with others and we feel reassured.” (LW II, 86) There is no principled reason why theory-eschewing description should not be illuminating, and substantial. Moreover, in science itself, these ‘alternative’ results are often extraordinarily powerful. “The real achievement of a Copernicus or a Darwin was not the discovery of a true theory but of a fertile new

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164 I follow Thagard’s definition, “Cognitive science involves at least six integral disciplines: psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, philosophy, anthropology and artificial intelligence.” (2009, 242)
point of view.” (CV 26) Indeed, the fecundity of the latter seems inexhaustible. The meta-philosophical point here is that fresh perspectives and perspicuous presentations of the conceptual landscape are themselves substantial philosophical achievements.

It is not only in the philosophical arenas of mind and language that the *cri de coeur* of ‘theory’ can be heard. Epistemology is now standardly regarded not as a particular subject area of *study*, but a *theory*. Pritchard & Blaaw’s mini-encyclopedia entry on epistemology immediately announces that epistemology is, “Also referred to as ‘theory of knowledge’,” (1997, 197) and Pritchard’s article *The Methodology of Epistemology* refers repeatedly to both the “specific epistemological task” and the “contemporary epistemology project” of “offering a theory of knowledge.” (forthcoming, a)\(^\text{165}\) These examples may, however, be using the notion of theory in a more deflationary sense. As Ray Monk points out, there is a not unfamiliar non-philosophical usage of the term ‘theory’ which is roughly interchangeable with, and “means nothing more than ‘view’ or ‘opinion’.” (2009, 136) Indeed, in contemporary epistemology, the term ‘theory’ seems to oscillate between this modest usage, i.e., as a loose synonym for opinion, and the full-throttled Searleian scientifc-naturalistic exploitation; though it is not often clear which one is in play.\(^\text{166}\) But Searle’s charge looks to demand more than just a notion of theory which holds it to be synonymous with *opinion*, so this option is not helpful.

Although Searle’s charge seeks to contrast two radically opposing approaches, Searle’s preference for theory comes with a name-tag and a set of particular philosophical commitments but just what it is as a *method* remains surprisingly unclear. At the same time, despite Wittgenstein’s rejection of the pursuit of what he understands as theorising, he does clarify what he takes a theory to consist in, and suggests its ambitions are perhaps better pursued by alternative routes. So whilst a number of comparable goals may have been identified, the force of Searle’s ‘theory or

\(^{165}\) Cf. Paul Moser’s overview of the 20\(^{th}\) century epistemology which opens, “Epistemology is the *theory* of knowledge, the philosophical study of the nature, origin and scope of knowledge.” (1997, 197) This is just one a dozens of examples.

\(^{166}\) Cf. Hacker (2006) for a reconstruction of the Quineian notion of ‘theory’, which is conceived as an alternative to human (general) knowledge, and involves construing all our knowledge (from ‘the cat is on the mat’ to the theses of the natural sciences) as the theoretical ‘output’ of our sensory ‘input.’ In this sense all claims to knowledge are theoretical. This is not Monk’s suggestion, but it does point to the difficulties inherent in the naturalized philosophical method and its theoretical approach to all our familiar notions; a view that, inevitably, creates an epistemological gap between our knowledge and what it is of. See Ayer (1973) for the recent empirical origins of this view, and an example of a reading *On Certainty* from such a perspective. “Our judgements about what there is are always embedded in some *theory*.” (1973, 245 emphasis added)
waffle’ criticism would seem to come from rhetoric alone.\footnote{Cf., Cottingham (2009) who argues that contemporary academia not only encourages the rhetoric of natural scientific methodology but demands it. He insists that is now no longer possible to be honest about one’s philosophical methods as a philosopher (i.e. reading books and thinking about ideas) if one hopes to get ‘research’ (sic) funding.} Perhaps the gulf between them is not that big after all? Or perhaps there is a fundamental commitment that cannot be bridged, but has yet to be identified? Might it be that this clash, supposedly over methodology, is actually about metaphysics?

2 Naturalized Philosophy II: Safe-guarding the Metaphysics

One possible explanation as to why Searle regards theory as philosophically preferable to description is that the former offers the kind of account which operates on two levels, whereas the latter does (or need) not. Re-considering the supposed ‘mistakes’ Searle discerns in Wittgenstein’s approaches to language and mind, one realises that the latter are not driven by the ambition to provide some kind of dual-level account; unlike those of Searle. Of course, pointing out that a theory is a dual-level account looks to be nothing more than an innocuous way of saying an explanans is sought for an explanandum. But a closer look at the specific characterisations which Searle offers, in both language and mind, reveals that there is more to it than that. For what appears to guarantee that an explanans is suitably theoretical is that it accounts for the observable phenomenon, the explanandum, by the postulation of unobservables. (In the philosophy of language this is the supposed ever-present propositional content, and in mind, the supposed sub-personal, brain-encoded representational postulates which are deemed sufficient for our intelligent practices.) On Searle’s understanding of the notion of theory, then, a theory is not just a dual-level account, but one which explains the observable by the unobservable, the open-to-view by the underlying and/or the public by the private or inaccessible. Its theoretical legitimacy comes from the twin presence of (i) a dual-level structure, and (ii) an unobservable postulate at the ‘lower’ level. It is not, therefore, any putative predictive power or the possibility of its being justified (or refuted) by some experimentum crucis, which makes a theory a theory but this involvement of a dual-level account part-constituted by second-level unobservable explanatory postulates.

This invites the question: what is the nature and status of the unobservable, hidden, underlying, private, or inaccessible postulates? If the answer is something
which cannot be established (or ruled out) by standard scientific experiment, and
which does not serve to generate predictions, then the unobservable second level and
its putative contents are metaphysical. Thus, like science, philosophical theories offer
a dual-level explanations, but unlike science, their explanans are metaphysical.
Naturalized philosophy, understood in this way, gets to keep (some of) its scientific
credentials whilst maintaining its own philosophical raison d’être. Of course, Searle
might object that my diagnosis is merely a Just-So Story, but in the absence of
clarification of what Searle means by a philosophical theory, it is hard to see where it
might be faulted as a description of what is actually going on in naturalized
philosophy’s ‘theory-provision’. 168

With Strawson’s help, I now argue that the primary task of so-called
naturalized philosophical ‘theorizing’ is to protect a metaphysical ontology, without
which naturalized philosophy would lose its rationale. I exploit the work of Peter
Strawson to help with this task for a number of interconnected reasons: (i) like Searle
he has a great deal of respect for Wittgenstein, and so criticisms from him are more
thoughtful and targeted than the more obvious dismissive barbs one might select
from, say, Fodor; (ii) Strawson’s methods and principles are acknowledged
(Pritchard, forthcoming a) to be operative in those of contemporary epistemology; (iii)
my own reading of Pritchard’s work, in general, detects a Strawsonian ancestry, and I
think that the issues raised below also pertain to any general understanding of
epistemological externalism; and (iv) given (i)-(iii), Strawson’s work provides a
uniquely pertinent historical thread with which to weave together the past and the
present, the Wittgensteinian and the naturalized. In so doing it offers the opportunity

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168 I take this characterisation of naturalized theory-provision to apply to the work of Stanley and
Bengson & Moffett. Its original entry into the specific realm of epistemology can be seen in a variety
of papers in the wake of Quine (1969), such as Stephen Stich’s classic Belief and Sub-Doxastic States.
(1978) In this paper, Stich claims there is a, “heterogeneous collection of psychological states that play
a role in the proximate causal history of beliefs, though they are not beliefs themselves.” (1978, 499).
Instead such states are supposedly, “sub-doxastic states representing the information that...” (1978,
509) In these earlier days of naturalized epistemology, there were momentary qualms about the very
possibility of a presumed sub-personal theoretical postulate but these were soon overcome by the rising
tide of enthusiasm for A.I. and cognitive science in general. As Stich confirms, “Though talk of
[sub-personal] states representing facts is difficult to explicate in a philosophically tolerable way, it is
surprisingly easy to master intuitively. Even the barest introduction to work in artificial intelligence
and cognitive simulation quickly leaves one comfortable with attributions of content or
representational status to the states of an information processing theory. (1978, 510 emphasis added)
This is further evidence of the intellectualism that is constitutive of naturalized philosophy of language,
mind and knowledge and intelligence. And its inescapable propositionality.
to reveal not merely what separates these two very different philosophical approaches, but what might connect them.

In *Individuals*, Strawson characterises his descriptive metaphysics as a method that uses language to understand human phenomenon; a strategy that does not look that far removed from Wittgenstein’s own methods. There comes a point, however, where considering language can go no further. The reason being, Strawson claims, is that there are, “general elements of structure [of the world] which the *metaphysician* wants revealed. The structure he seeks does not readily display itself on the surface of language, but lies *submerged.*” (1959, 10 emphasis added) So not only does the metaphysician start with the tenet that there is something beneath the surface (some explanatory powerful unobservable hidden); what this is, is metaphysical rather than physical. Furthermore, it is the task of *philosophical theory* to unearth and expose it. To reject theory is, for Strawson, tantamount to rejecting the starting supposition that there are metaphysical facts and truths which it is the task of theory to uncover.

When characterising Wittgenstein’s more descriptive pursuits, Strawson suggests that Wittgenstein is (mistakenly) urging philosophers, “[D]on’t look for anything *underlying*… Don’t try for a *general theory.*” (1992, 27 emphasis added). This reveals the extent to which for Strawson, as for Searle, a theory *just is* that which appeals to the ‘underlying’. Unlike Searle, however, Strawson makes it very clear that for him the underlying (or submerged) is metaphysical, and that it is in refusing to engage with this supposed second *theoretical and metaphysical level* that leaves one failing to philosophise. No metaphysics, no philosophy. I suggest that this is not just Strawson’s view, but it also plausibly characterises the motivation behind Searle’s dictum: no theory, no philosophy.\(^\text{169}\)

For Wittgenstein, however, the very assumption that there is a hidden metaphysical level which the right kind of philosophico-scientific theory will access, and thereby be able to solve our philosophical problems, is actual the *source* of those problems, not their *solution*. “Since everything lies open to view there is *nothing* to explain… For anything that might be hidden is of no interest go us.” (BT 418 emphasis added) This is not, of course, to suggest that the natural sciences are to be made redundant, but the observation that what they do is not what philosophy does do or should do. Conceptual clarification, philosophy’s proper task is not a matter of

\(^{169}\) One might be tempted to add on behalf of Wittgenstein, no metaphysics: no *need* for philosophy.
postulating some unseen metaphysical something or other. It is about understanding what is in front of us, but struggle to get a comprehensive and illuminating overview of. For Wittgenstein, what one might be tempted to think of as the metaphysical features of the world are confusions born of the misguided mixing of empirical and conceptual matters.  

Thus, what appears to be a meta-philosophical discussion about the merits, or otherwise, of theory over description is actually a disguised philosophical argument about the status of metaphysics. The seeming meta-philosophical debate camouflages the conflicting positions of those who seek to discover metaphysical truths (like Strawson and Searle) and those (Wittgenstein and Hacker) who not only think this is chasing a mirage, but that the mirage is of their own making. Furthermore, as the operative notion of a theory is taken for granted, so too is the supposed fact of metaphysics. What I am arguing here is not that there is no metaphysical level (though I agree with Wittgenstein that there isn’t), but rather than there is a symbiotic relation between the provision of a philosophical theory and the presumption of a metaphysical underpinning. A dual-level structured account not only permits metaphysics, it engenders it. It is therefore unsurprising that the pursuit of philosophical theories are deemed a necessary requirement for any philosophical agenda which shares Strawson’s confessed ambition to, “keep our metaphysics warm.” (1985, 62)

2.1 Connective Analysis

What is surprising and what may be a possible objection to this line of attack is to be found in Strawson’s own preferred method of analysis which, at first glance, looks thoroughly Wittgensteinian in spirit and detail. Here is Strawson’s characterisation of what he terms ‘connective analysis’:

> Let us imagine, instead, a model of an elaborate network, a system, of connected items, concepts, such that the function of each item,

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171 Cf., Hacker’s characterisation of metaphysics as, “a non-subject that rests on a confusion and conflation of empirical and conception questions.” (2010, 285 emphasis added) “Philosophy… cannot discover metaphysical truths about the world – for there are none to discover.” (2009, 147)
each concept, could from the philosophical point of view, be properly understood only by grasping its connections with the others, its place in the system – perhaps better still, the picture of a set of interlocking systems of such a kind.” (1992, 19)

This looks to capture much of Wittgenstein’s own approach to mapping the logical or grammatical terrain of our conceptual landscape. Indeed, as Hacker acknowledges, “the felicitous term, ‘connective analysis’… is wholly appropriate for the later Wittgenstein’s style of analysis.” (Baker & Hacker, 2009, 49 fn. 7). Yet though Strawson declares that he is engaged in just such conceptual analysis, he worries (in the first instance about Ryle’s approach) that conceptual geography remains “uncomfortably metaphorical.” (1992, 3) What is the difference between Ryle and Wittgenstein’s notion of connective analysis and Strawson’s own method? The answer is that whereas Ryle and Wittgenstein resist the siren call of metaphysics, for Strawson, it is not until connective analysis, or its associate methods elucidation and mapping, are engaged in the supposedly proper theoretical business of pursuing dual-level metaphysical explanations, that they are properly philosophical methods. Connective analysis and elucidation are, for Strawson, techniques for gaining access to the underlying core of “natural metaphysics” (1985, 29) The kind of mapping he favours, is not Ryle’s or Wittgenstein’s single-level cartography, but the, “mapping of a personal story on to the corresponding physical story.” (1985, 57) The entirely un-Wittgensteinian spirit of this can be seen in Strawson’s claim that it is, “reasonable to draw a conclusion that is commonly drawn... namely, that each particular mental event or state belonging to a personal history has a particular physical basis or is physically realized (as the phrase goes) in a particular physical event or state belonging to the corresponding physical history.” (1985, 57) Here Strawson’s view connects back with the Searle’s view of what understanding mind ‘should’ be engaged with. But again, this is not a physical (natural scientific) method which is open to refutation, it is a picture of our mindedness (and our intelligence) which keeps the metaphysics bubbling away.

172 Ryle christens “a favourite procedure” of Wittgenstein’s, “the tea-tasting method.” For, “Tea-tasters do not lump their samples into two or three comprehensive types. Rather they savour each sample and try to place it next door to its closest neighbours, and this not in respect of just one discriminable quality, but along the lengths of various lines of qualities.” (1951, 7)
Furthermore, it is not obvious how Strawson’s insistence that his philosophy exemplifies connective *as opposed to* reductive analysis might be supported. At best, it risks being disingenuous, at worst, it is a matter of substantial misdirection. But given that Strawson characterises this kind of (at least partially, reductive) elucidation as both the method and the goal of the “connective metaphysical task” (1985, 27) there seems no other conclusion to draw. Inevitably, this approach is in obvious tension with Goethe’s maxim which Wittgenstein approvingly cites, “Don’t look for anything behind the phenomena; they themselves are the theory.” (RPP I, 889) Once again, the apparently *meta-philosophical* debate over methodology is camouflaging a *philosophical* antagonism over the possibility of metaphysical truths.

In his original review of the *Philosophical Investigations*, however, Strawson unhesitatingly concludes that Wittgenstein’s views are, “of the greatest interest and importance. But the value of the book as a model of philosophical method is greater still.” (1954, 99 emphasis added) Yet when it comes to translating these methods into the reality of his own philosophical practices, Strawson still wonders, if it might be possible to, “make room for a purged kind of metaphysics with modest and less disputable claims than the old.” (1954, 78) Yet again, it would seem that it is not the *methods* that meta-philosophy is disputing; it is the results that they produce, and the commitments they protect. There appears to be no Archimedean point from which to provide a *meta-philosophical* argument for the merits of doing naturalized philosophy as opposed to pursuing a more Wittgensteinian activity (or vice versa). What there is, however, is the possibility that it is *the philosophy itself* which provides the sought-for *meta-philosophical* justification or authority. As such, legitimising the value of any method *is not a prequel* to selecting or valuing a philosophical method, rather it is a *consequence* of it.

I complete this section by considering one philosophical example from Strawson to highlight the contrast between naturalized and Wittgensteinian approaches. It provides a concrete example of the foregoing discussion, as well as bringing to bear some of the Wittgensteinian insights from the last chapter on a key

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173 Indeed, Pritchard similarly equivocates around the notion of reductionism. On the one hand “elucidation” is sometimes “more informative than a reductive analysis”, yet it is one of the chief tools of contemporary epistemology, which is “focused on offering a completely reductive analysis of knowledge.” (forthcoming a)

174 Elizabeth Stopp’s (1998) Penguin edition translation of Goethe’s *Maxims & Reflections* offers the even more apposite: “Don’t go looking for anything beyond phenomena: they are themselves what they teach, the doctrine.” (Maxim 575)
Strawsonian presumption; thereby also playing a important role in setting the scene for upcoming discussion on reflective equilibrium.

In *Analysis and Metaphysics*, Strawson regards it as self-evident that, “It is true that p if and only if p,” is a, “fact that calls for explanation.” (1992, 90) Strawson offers us no reasons, however, (i) why this sentence is a fact, when it appears quite different from an empirical fact which might be established by *observation*; (ii) what an ‘explanation’ of it might be aiming to explain or clarify; and (iii) what makes this a quintessentially a philosophical issue, problem, or task.

Whereas thanks to Wittgenstein’s investigations into ‘Here [waving] is a hand’ in *On Certainty*, ‘It is true that p if and only if p’ need not be assumed to be a empirical fact-stating proposition. For not everything that looks like a proposition is one.175 Although Strawson’s example is not one of the sentences Wittgenstein discusses, I would suggest that like ‘Here [waving] is a hand’, it is nonetheless, part-constitutive of the framework, the methods of inquiry which make possible the ascertaining of our empirical knowledge. ‘It is true that p if and only if p’ is the expression of a grammatical rule, or standard. It licenses the move from, say, ‘It is true that the London hosted the 2012 Summer Olympics’ to ‘London hosted the 2012 Summer Olympics’, or from ‘Rio di Janeiro is already preparing for the 2016 Summer Olympics’ to ‘It is true that Rio di Janeiro is already preparing for the 2016 Summer Olympics.’ Our knowledge of ‘It is true that p if and only if p’ is not the propositional knowledge-that of some fact, it is the know-how that is correctly exemplified in our linguistic move from ‘It is true that this body-part is a hand’, to ‘This body-part is a hand.’

Strawson’s view that ‘It is true that p if and only if p’ is a fact, is a proposition and can be known, is, of course, the very *epistemicist*176 position Pritchard holds about so called ‘hinge propositions’. So the philosophical positions of both Strawson and Pritchard are reflections of their meta-philosophical commitments (for the former)

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175 To be clear, on Pritchard’s reading of the relevant passages in *On Certainty* he does not argue for, nor is he committed to the view that, “everything that looks like a proposition is one”. (Cf., 2011a, §2) Indeed, in the specific case of “There are physical objects” he is willing to grant this apparent proposition is nonsense. That said, the argument of this thesis does not turn on the features of such so-called ‘universal hinges’, (Moyal-Sharrock, 2007, Chapter 5), but is limited to such ‘linguistic hinges’ as ‘This is a hand’. (See my section 5.2 above.) And Pritchard does not doubt that such sentences as ‘This is a hand’ have sense; indeed his own Neo-Moorean Epistemicist Reading of *On Certainty* requires that they not be nonsense. (This point also serves also as a reminder that Pritchard is not seeking to offer a full interpretation or exposition of *On Certainty*, as already noted in footnote 143.)

176 Bearing in mind the qualification regarding epistemicism, introduced in footnote 140.
about philosophy in general, and (for the latter) about epistemology in particular. To what extent, then, might reflective equilibrium help or hinder any engagement with a Wittgensteinian method (in general) and a Wittgensteinian appreciation of know-how (in particular.) A closer look at reflective equilibrium is now required.

3 Reflective Equilibrium by the Light of Naturalized Philosophy

Reflective equilibrium is, very briefly, both a methodology and a methodological ambition. It is the task (and result aimed at) of bringing our judgements, intuitions, individual beliefs and guiding principles, into a coherent and thereby warranted whole. It is a discriminatory activity of dynamic evaluation; which John Rawls describes as a, “going back and forth.” (1971, 20) “Equilibrium” is reached, Rawls declares, “because at last our principles and judgements coincide,” and the process is, “reflective… since we know to what principles our judgements conform and the premises of their derivation.” (1971, 20)

According to Duncan Pritchard, reflective equilibrium is not only a generally applicable philosophical method, it is the method of contemporary analytic epistemology. In pursuing reflective equilibrium, today’s epistemologist goes back and forth reflecting, refining, and sometimes rejecting, his or her intuitions in the pursuit of a “stable theory” of knowledge. But where Rawls makes it plain that part of the ‘raw material’ under consideration are principles, and thus some kind of rules, standards or norms, Pritchard’s characterisation of reflective equilibrium has no place for principles qua rules, standards or norms. In the context of his own self-

177 All unspecified citations from Pritchard in this section are from his (forthcoming, a); The Methodology of Epistemology.

178 Pritchard’s paper mentions no exceptions to this generalization other than the target group of contrasting ‘experimental’ philosophers that motivates his paper. Epistemologist Timothy Williamson does not, however, share Pritchard’s views on the merits of reflective equilibrium, regarding it as lacking in the desired rigour. He argues that whilst superficially analogous to the, “mutual adjustment of theory and observation in natural science” (2007, 244), given that he regards philosophy as an “evidence-based discipline,” (2007, 246) too little has been clarified about the nature of ‘evidence’ supposedly offered by intuitions. Pritchard’s paper might usefully be regarded as a response to the gauntlet Williamson throws down.

179 This is not to be confused with an alternative notion of ‘norm’ which is operative in contemporary epistemology and is not a grammatical rule or norm of description (such as ‘This [waving] is hand’ or ‘This is red’) but is hypothetical prescriptive generalization, usually taking the form, ‘You ought to do A if B.’ One example is the so-called ‘knowledge norm of assertion’, i.e., “You ought only to assert that p if you know that p”. But this isn’t a rule or norm that is constitutive of any of our normative practices (which is the way in which I, following Wittgenstein, understand and am using the
professed epistemicism, and the view that (following Strawson) everything that looks like a fact-stating, knowable proposition is one, there is no distinction to be had between descriptions and norms of description. In reflective equilibrium the raw material, i.e., the “input data” or “intuitions” on which an epistemologist goes to work, are thus entirely constituted by a collection of fact-stating, propositional knowledge-candidates, which are all either true or false (in virtue of the way the world actually is.) There are no rules used in order to refine and reject beliefs as either true or false. The epistemologist is supposed to use his or her, “critical and logical acumen” together with, “a healthy dose of ingenuity” in order to “square” the “data”. But yet, a closer look at the intuitions which Pritchard identifies, and helpfully taxonomises, reveals a number of intuitions which many which ‘non-epistemicist’ readings would argue are neither fact-stating, nor (ultimately) propositional. The insights of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty are now potentially applicable at a meta-philosophical level.

In characterising the ‘input’ on which epistemology’s process of reflective equilibrium works, Pritchard discriminates four different kinds of intuitions: the extensional, intensional, general and linguistic. Specifically, they are (i) “extensional intuitions”, i.e., judgements as to whether or not particular examples are actually knowledge, e.g., Gettier-style cases; (ii) “intensional intuitions”, e.g. “Knowledge that \( p \) entails \( p \)” or “S’s knowledge that \( p \) entails S believes that \( p \)”; (iii) “general intuitions” e.g. “that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief”; and (iv) “linguistic intuitions” i.e., “intuitions about the correct linguistic usage of the target term.”

Alert to the non-propositional readings of On Certainty (and other Wittgensteinian insights) one is now in a position to offer the following alternative observations. Regarding (i) extensional intuitions, that is intuitions about whether or not a, say, Gettier-style case is a case of knowledge, there need be no fact of the matter. With extreme, unexpected, or unanticipated cases, there need be, as yet, no rule that yet determines whether any particular example is to be correctly characterised as knowledge. If knowledge is a family resemblance concept then determining whether a particular case if a member of the conceptual family may

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term). There is also an entirely different notion of normative in the work of John Greco, which I fail to understand. See Greco (2005) for the suggestion that ‘normative’ is a synonym for ‘pertaining to value’, or which may mean “intellectually better” (2005, 257)
change depending on the situation and purpose to hand, and the general evolution of our normative linguistic practices. Our conceptual scheme is flexible. Although Pritchard does not announce in this particular paper whether he construes extensional intuitions as epistemicist (or not), there is no reason to think that this is not the case. In which case, extensional intuitions are to be regarded as capturing the facts of the world (unmediated by any norms of representation or conceptual schemes). Thus in the very act of identifying extensional intuitions it looks like there is already a metaphysical underpinning built into epistemological reflective equilibrium. Not only is this a move away from Rawls’ original conception, it suggests that reflective equilibrium is not a neutral but an intellectualist, methodology.

Regarding (ii) *intensional intuitions*, such as ‘Knowledge that p entails p’. I would refer to the point made above, in connection with Strawson’s consideration of ‘It is true that p if and only if p’. For in characterising the examples of intensional intuitions Pritchard follows Strawson’s view that they are fact-stating propositions. This ignores any reflection on the possibility or potential relevance of *grammatical* propositions or rules, etc. Again it appears epistemicist, and as such suggests the further embedding of a metaphysical underpinning.\(^{180}\) So too with (iv) *linguistic intuitions*. Yet, as explored in the previous chapter, *linguistic hinges*, such as ‘Here [waving] is a hand’, (which might reasonably be regarded as an example of one of Pritchard’s *linguistic intuitions*) might be understood as expressions of non-propositional rules of grammar, or norms of description. From a Wittgensteinian perspective, these are not metaphysical facts in the world (for there are none), nor are they descriptions of the way the world is. They are the norms of descriptions that provide the conceptual scheme which make it possible, through our language mastery, to describe the way the world is. What though of (iii) the *general intuitions*?

Rather than focus on the example Pritchard gives (that knowledge is more valuable than true belief) I will instead consider his so-called ‘ability intuition’ which he has elsewhere (2009) and (2010) identified as one of the master intuitions about (propositional) knowledge. As a supposed master intuition, I presume it might be

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\(^{180}\) Pritchard also refers to “deep-seated” intensional attitudes or intuitions as “intensional platitudes”, but again one may think that (some of these) overlap with Moorean truisms, which on a non-propositional understanding of Wittgenstein, are a kind of non-propositional know-how. I anticipate Pritchard will be pursuing the connection between intensional platitudes and his own account of hinge ‘propositions’ in future, though it should be noticed that he follows Quine in accepting the possibility that, “any particular intensional platitude is not immune to revision” (forthcoming a), whereas for Moyal-Sharrock ‘universal hinges’ are not giveupable.
uncontentiously taken to be an example of the kind of *general* intuition which reflective equilibrium seeks to ‘square’ as part of its method of epistemological theory generation.

According to Prichard, the ability intuition is the intuition that knowledge (and by that Pritchard always refers to *propositional* knowledge), “is true belief that is due to cognitive ability in some way.” (2009, 414) This is sometimes articulated as the view that (propositional) “knowledge is the product of cognitive ability” (2010, 134) or that (propositional) “knowledge involves cognitive ability” (2010, 133). It is, Pritchard announces, “an adequacy condition on any theory of [propositional] knowledge” that “the ability intuition” be accommodated. (2010, 135) But what are we to understand by a ‘cognitive ability’? And, crucially, for the philosophy of know-how, might it be comparable to, or even in some sense, the same as, a kind of know-how? Given that one of Wittgenstein’s potential contributions to epistemology is his insight that all empirical propositional knowledge is enabled by a kind of non-propositional know-how, might it be that Pritchard is arriving at exactly the same appreciation with his intuition concerning the importance of ‘cognitive ability’. Might, with this particular example, we have found a point of contact between the naturalized approach and the Wittgensteinian approach that will usher new possibilities for mutual understanding? All roads now point to the question: *Is know-how cognitive? Is know-how a cognitive ability?*

To answer this question, and thereby to expose the similarities and differences between the ability intuition and know-how requires an understanding of the term ‘cognitive’. But as I will now argue, the term ‘cognitive’ (like the ‘epistemic’) is not as innocuous as it might appear. Until the prohibitions that it entrenches are exposed, the constraints on answering the above questions cannot be fully appreciated. To reveal just these difficulties (as a precursor to a full appreciation of the limitations of reflective equilibrium) I turn to the instigator of this intellectualist shift: Noam Chomsky.

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181 For Pritchard a cognitive ability is, “a belief-forming process which is reliable” and which is “integrated within, and therefore part of, the cognitive character of the agent, where the agent’s cognitive character is her integrated web of stable belief-forming processes.” (2010, 136)
3.1 Chomsky’s Shuffle

In reviewing B. F. Skinner’s *Verbal Behaviour*, Chomsky simultaneously attacks Skinner’s behaviorist methodology, introduces his own radically different approach to language, and re-characterises our language use and understanding, and our intelligent behaviour in general, in terms of information processing over sub-personal representations. “One would naturally expect that the prediction of the behavior of a complex organism (or machine) would require in addition to information about external stimulation, knowledge of the internal structures of the organism, the way in which it processes input information and organizes its own behaviour. (1959, 27 emphasis added). Knowing how to speak and understand our native tongue is thus introduced as an *explanandum*, but one already characterised in a fully intellectualist way. And like Searle and Strawson above, it demands an unobservable set of hidden explanatory postulates which whilst providing no predictions and being invulnerable to confirmation or refutation by experiment, do offer a dual-level metaphysically amenable ‘theory’.

Our human language use and understanding is, for Chomsky, to be understood as the information-processing of a machine. “[K]nowing a language” is a matter of, “the “computational” aspects of language – that is, the rules that form syntactic construction of phonological or semantic patterns” which are “represented in the mind and brain.” (1980, 54 emphasis added). Crucial to this picture is a stipulative redefinition of the term ‘cognitive’, in which the word is turned into a technical term. One consequence of this is that (as with ‘epistemic’) it has become unclear how to engage with the question: *Is know-how cognitive? A fortiori* attempts

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182 I take this characterisation from Ryle who uses the term ‘shuffle’ to describe a general manoeuvre of his intellectualist opponents. When writing *The Concept of Mind* Ryle’s opponents obviously did not include Chomsky, but his criticisms are entirely applicable to Chomsky’s own strategy (and indeed to much in epistemological externalism and naturalized philosophy in general.) “There is a not unfashionable shuffle which tries to circumvent these considerations by saying that the intelligent reasoner who has not been taught logic knows the logicians' formulae "implicitly" but not "explicitly"; or that the ordinary virtuous person has "implicit" but not "explicit" knowledge of the rules of right conduct, the skillful but untheoretical chess-player " implicitly" acknowledges a lot of strategic and tactical maxims, though he never formulates them and might not recognise them if they were imparted to him by some Clausewitz of the game. This shuffle assumes that knowledge-how must be reducible to knowledge-that, while conceding that no operations of acknowledging-that need be actually found occurring. It fails to explain how, even if such acknowledgements did occur, their maker might still be a fool in his performance”. (1946, 7-8 emphasis added) Ryle’s characterisation of an intellectualist shuffle which embraces the implicit and sub-personal, is a prescient characterisation of the move Chomsky was to make within a few years. (And that Quine, Goldman, Stich *et al* continued.)
to grapple with the question: *Is Pritchard’s cognitive ability one and the same as know-how?* are even more problematic.

I now explain how this move was made, and introduce some of the constraints and commitments that are consequent on it. Very briefly, Chomsky’s original theory of language acquisition and ability turns on the idea that humans are born with a ‘Universal Grammar’. This ‘initial state’, which incorporates the fundamental structure of *all* languages, is to be regarded as a brain-located language ‘faculty’ which grows into its mature ‘steady state’. The mature steady state is constituted by our specific language’s ‘generative grammar’, which is represented in the ‘mind/brain’ and which provides the information-bearing representations that we process, or compute, and the rules ¹⁸³ for so doing. All this happens at the sub-personal level, “far beyond the level of actual or even potential consciousness.” (1965, 8). It not only explains what it is to know a language, it *is* what we know when we know a language. We human beings sub-personally ‘know’ the rules and representations that are the ‘mental states’ that comprise the ‘steady state’ of our ‘generative grammar’.

This sketch of Chomsky’s view uses a variety of familiar terms, typically used as non-technical characterisations of features or activities of people, at a personal level. Chomsky however uses them to characterise features or activities at a sub-personal level. Alert to the awkwardness of using the term ‘know’ about something going on at a subpersonal level, inaccessible to reflective awareness, he deliberately introduces the term ‘cognize’ as a way round the potential terminological problems:

I have been speaking of “knowing English” as a mental state (or a stable component of mental states), or a property of a person in a certain mental state, but … What is it that is known? Ordinary usage would say: a language – and I have so far been keeping to this usage, speaking of knowledge and learning a language, eg. English. But… this way of talk can be misleading… To avoid terminological confusion, *let me introduce a technical term devised for the purpose, namely “cognize”* with the following properties… The particular things we know, we also “cognize”… Furthermore, *we cognize the*

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¹⁸³ Chomsky’s ‘rules’ are not to be confused with Wittgensteinian rules, standards or norms; all of which can be cited as standards by which the correctness of our normative actions and activities can be judged, and as such they cannot be sub-personally inaccessible.
system of mentally-represented rules from which the facts follow. That is we cognize the grammar that constitutes the current state of our language faculty and the rules of this system as well as the principles that govern their operation. And finally, we cognize the innate schematism, along with its rules, principles and conditions.

In fact, I don’t think that “cognize” is very far from “know”….

If the person who cognized the grammar and its rules could miraculously become conscious of them, we would not hesitate to say that he knows the grammar and its rules, and this conscious knowledge is what constitutes his knowledge of language. Thus cognizing is tacit or implicit knowledge, a concept that seem to me unobjectionable… cognizing has the structure and character of knowledge… but may be and is in the interesting cases inaccessible to consciousness. I will return to the terms “know” and “knowledge”, but now using them in the sense of “cognize”… The fundamental cognitive relation is knowing a grammar.”

(1980, 69-70 emphases added)

According to Chomsky’s reinvention of the notion of cognition, we know how to speak our native tongue because we sub-personally cognize the tacit propositional knowledge that is the steady state of our generative grammar. But, note here, sub-personal cognition is of and is only of subpersonal propositional knowledge.

What this move does is, therefore, to remove know-how from the picture by reducing it to know-that. Cognition is now of the propositional, and only of the propositional. Therefore, non-propositional cognition is now a contradiction in terms. How then might one discuss the extent to which know-how is cognitive? The answer is: with great difficulty. The propositionality that is constitutive of the intellectualist paradigm is now built in to the meaning of the verb ‘to cognise’ and the noun ‘cognition.’

Furthermore, as the final lines of the quote reveal, having switched from ‘know’ to ‘cognize’ for the stipulative redefinition, Chomsky immediately announces he intends to ‘return’ to using ‘know’, as if nothing of importance has actually transpired. Whereas in fact, ‘know’ has had any all of its

184 Ryle earlier characterises, “the Three Estates of Cognition, Volition, and Emotion” as “a feudal allegory;” suggesting, “‘Cognition’ belongs to the vocabulary of examination papers.” (1949, 244)
non-propositionality excised. Chomsky’s shuffle ensures the removal of everything except propositional knowledge, resulting in the reduction of all other knowledge to propositional knowledge.  

This forecloses on the philosophical possibility and value of our ordinary talk of knowing how to speak and understand a language, in the sense of a non-propositional ability to speak and understand a language. Not only does this encourage a turn away from our language use and understanding as being examples of a kind of know-how or ability, it requires a tandem re-conception of the notion of competence. Unsurprisingly (and entirely necessary according to the demands of his own account) Chomsky simultaneously redefines our ordinary notions of ‘competence’ and ‘performance’ turning them into technical terms. To be competent in a language is now, as a matter of stipulation, to (sub-personally) cognize one’s (sub-personal) generative grammar. Chomsky deliberately contrasts this with the notion of performance, which now identifies a speaker/hearer’s actual language use. Crucially for Chomsky competence is not an ability. “We thus make a fundamental distinction between competence (the speaker-hearer’s knowledge of his language and performance (the actual use of language in concrete situations).” (1965, 4) This is because, for Chomsky, one can have the competence without actually being able to speak or understand language.

This point is made throughout Chomsky’s work, and together with the priority of competence over performance it is repeatedly acknowledged. “[O]ne might have the cognitive structure that we call “knowledge of English” fully developed, with no capacity to use this structure.” (1975, 23 emphasis added) Again, “I assume that it is possible in principle for a person to have a full grammatical competence and no pragmatic competence, hence no ability to use a language appropriately, though its syntax and semantics are intact.” (1980, 59 emphasis added) What this picture

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185 It is unsurprising that Stanley’s linguistic-prompted view of know-how, which comes from a Chomskyan tradition (furthered by Fodor), finds it unproblematic to reduce any and all know-how to propositional knowledge. For Stanley is just doing for the rest of our intelligent activities what Chomsky does for language, and indeed Chomsky himself regards the metaphysics of mind he proposes for language to offer a viable interdisciplinary template for the scientific or philosophically naturalized study of other ‘mental faculties’ or knowledge. “It may turn out that in the domains where we speak of, “knowledge of X”, (knowledge of language, of music, of mathematics, of the behavior of objects, of social structures, of human characteristics, etc)... there is a mentally represented system of this nature which can take to be an object of knowledge.” (1980, 180) Given that our relation to this proposed sub-personal mentally represented system is a matter of ‘cognizing’ the system; then by natural extension our ‘cognitive abilities’ are the sub-personal abilities we have in ‘cognizing’ any and all such knowledge. And upon this rock was cognitive science (and subsequently naturalized philosophy of mind and epistemology) built.
confirms is that for Chomsky you can be linguistically competent (because you supposedly sub-personally cognize your tacit propositional linguistic knowledge) but this need not entail you can actually speak or understand a language. Unperturbed by the implausibility (not to mention the dubious coherence of this) Chomsky readily insists that, “[I]nvestigation of performance will proceed only as far as understanding of competence permits.”186 (1965, 6)

Chomsky’s final move, in locking down this entirely intellectualist theory of our language understanding, is to marry the new theoretical meanings of ‘cognitive’ and ‘competence’ together.

By “grammatical competence” I mean the cognitive state that encompasses all those aspects of form and meaning and their relation, including underlying structures that enter into that relation, which are properly assigned to the specific subsystem of the human mind that relates representations of form and meaning.

(1980, 59 emphasis added)

Thus the theoretical framework of Chomsky’s work turns on the radical bifurcation of our ability to speak our first language into (i) a sub-personal (non-ability-like) competence that consists in the state which is the sub-personal cognizing of the propositional knowledge which are the propositional representations of the steady state of our generative grammar, and (ii) a person-level performance that is an ability, but an ability one might not actually have, even though one were competent. It is incontrovertible that Chomsky was aware of the extent to which his re-definitions inaugurated radical, and radically intellectualist, conceptual shifts:

[M]y concept ‘knowledge of a language’ is directly related to the concept ‘internalization’ of the rules of grammar”…[ and I have] tried to avoid, or perhaps evade the problem of explication of the notion ‘knowledge of language’ by using an invented technical term, namely the term ‘competence’ in place of ‘knowledge’. However, the term ‘competence’ suggests ‘ability’, ‘skill’ and so on, through a chain

186 This competence/performance distinction finds its contemporary resonance in the ‘epistemic’/pragmatic contrast.
of associations that leads directly to much new confusion. *I do not think the concepts of ordinary language sufficient for the purpose at hand; they must either be sharpened, perhaps somewhat arbitrarily, or replaced by a new technical terminology.*

(1975, 315 emphasis added)

And indeed this is exactly what Chomsky has done with both ‘cognition’ and ‘competence’. To regard either of these notions as invoking abilities or non-propositional knowledge of any kind is, on Chomsky’s account, not just inappropriate, but mistaken. It is a misuse of the terms ‘cognition’ and ‘competence’; terms now specifically re-designed to ensure the *avoidance* of any implications of ability or know-how.\(^ {187}\) When contemporary philosophers of mind talk of cognition, they help themselves to this Chomskyan picture and its associated intellectualist terminology.\(^ {188}\) Furthermore, this is exactly the kind of picture with which Stanley operates, as he now makes clear in his monograph when referring to the sub-personal propositional that are “cognized” (2011, 26) and which (with their facilitating mechanisms) are “realized in the brain.” (2011, 45) Indeed, Stanley now announces, “that just as the brain has specific mechanisms governing place and person names, the brain has

\(^{187}\) Cf., Harman (1967) for one of the first critics of this approach, responding to Chomsky (1965), “Competence is knowledge in the sense of knowing how to do something: it is an ability. It is not the sort of knowledge that can properly be described as ‘tacit.’” (1967, 81) This view was quickly swept aside, however, by the all-conquering progress of Chomsky’s theory, facilitated through its uptake by the cognitive science it helped to create. Its marginalization has since been perpetuated by the now-familiar naturalized philosophical strategy of dividing our vocabulary into two conceptual schemes; one philosophico-theoretic one, the other had by the so-called ‘folk’. This is another example of a methodological divide between naturalized philosophy and a more Wittgensteinian approach. Ironically, contributions from philosophers *not au fait* with Chomsky’s shuffle, (as well as those working in a more Wittgensteinian tradition) continue to use ‘competence’ in the non-technical way, even though their points are thereby unwittingly falling on ears (like Stanley’s) who now understand ‘competence’ in Chomsky’s technical sense. See for example, the interesting (and I think often overlooked views) on know-how offered by such philosophers as Kjell S. Johannessen. “To document that one does in fact master a given concept one has to be accepted as a competent performer of the series of established activities or practices which incorporates the concept.” (Johannessen, 1990, 112) The coherence of Chomsky’s separation of competence and performance makes no sense on these non-technical usages.

\(^{188}\) This can be seen in the recent debates about the nature of the so-called ‘extended mind’. For even those extended mind theorists like Clark & Chalmers who argue that, “Cognitive processes ain’t (all) in the head,” (1998, 8) are still using the Chomskyan intellectualist assumption that cognitive processes are matter of sub-personal information-processing over propositional representations. The propositionality and computational processing over representations is part of the orthodoxy of the ‘cognitive’ science picture that sprung from this Chomskyan soil. Even self-described ‘cognitive integrationist’ Richard Menary admits, “Cognition is simply defined as the processing of representations.” (2007, 10)
specific mechanisms governing indexical propositional and non-indexical propositional contents.” (2011, 156)

Earlier, I explored the difficulties faced by any putative anti- or non-intellectualist accounts if faced with the question: Is know-how ‘epistemic’? The anti- or non-intellectualist, or Wittgensteinian, has exactly the same difficulties with the question: Is know-how cognitive? How might he or she exploit the term ‘cognitive’ without (i) falsely suggesting an intellectualist commitment to the reducibility of know-how to sub-personal tacit propositional knowledge that is sub-personally cognized and/or (ii) consolidating the dominant intellectualist/theoretical meaning of the term ‘cognitive’, thereby contributing to the intellectualism which nourishes it and whence it comes, and/or (iii) having to engage in the kind of historical reconstruction and disambiguations seen above, for an audience who are (often) unaware that one of their most important terms of art has a highly strict and restrictive meaning.

With this historical shift now established, I return to the ‘intuitions’ that are the ‘input data’ of reflective equilibrium, particularly the ‘cognitive’ ability intuition which Pritchard champions.

3.2 Reflective Equilibrium Revisited

According to Pritchard, “the methodology of analytical epistemology” is “essentially the application of a process of reflective equilibrium to the inputs just described” [i.e., the four types of intuitions] in pursuit of a reflectively stable theory of knowledge which can accommodate all these inputs. One of these master intuitions, he takes to be crucial to any epistemological theory is that our knowledge is true belief that is due to cognitive ability. One might now ask what it is that is actually providing the ability intuition with its plausibility? The suggestion that our ‘cognitive ability’ is a matter

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189 The intimacy between the Chomskyian picture of the mind and Stanley’s views can be seen in the following sentence, which could be taken from either linguist: “It is in virtue of our competence with individual words and understanding of modes of syntactic combination that we have whatever abilities we do with sentences.” This is, in fact, Stanley (2005, 138) and presumes just the point at issue, which is that a person can become ‘competent’ whilst still not having the relevant person-level ability. But as Normal Malcolm warns, “Our understanding of human cognitive powers is not advanced by replacing the stimulus-response mythology with a mythology of inner guidance systems.” (1971, 392)

190 Chomsky’s stipulative theoretical reinvention of ‘cognition’ and ‘competence’ finds itself in increasingly historically-insensitive environments, further contributing to its invisibility. Recently, Ronald Giere suggested that he and his fellow cognitive scientists should regard themselves as, “free to develop it [the word ‘cognition] as a technical term in cognitive science.” (2007, 318) As if it weren’t one, already.
of sub-personally cognizing tacit propositional knowledge in such a way that one might be competent though not be able to understand or speak a language, looks to be neither intuitive nor plausible, nor anything that one might pre-theoretically regard as an obvious suggestion which demands accommodating. Instead, I would suggest that the plausibility that our propositional knowledge requires some kind of ‘cognitive’ ability comes from our entirely un-technical (but no less philosophically important) appreciation that there is an intimacy (in many cases) between knowing how to do something and knowing that something is the case. Knowing how to multiply $25 \times 25$ is a matter of knowing that $25 \times 25 = 625$. Knowing how to read a thermometer and knowing that it is 18 degrees centigrade in the room. By contrast, on a Chomskyan construal of the notions of the ‘cognitive’ a cognitive ability is the sub-personal information processing (by and of tacitly cognized propositional knowledge). It is propositional ‘all the way down’. Any abilities or know-how which might be thought to be involved turn out to be reducible to sub-personal propositional knowledge.\footnote{So too with ‘cognitive character’ which is also a sub-personal (not personal) level matter.}

Might the ability intuition be seen as an expression of a genuine need for new strategies, tools and options with which to expand, or even circumvent, the ubiquitous propositionality demanded by intellectualist naturalized philosophy? What is now emerging is the extent to which any appeal to know-how has a number of both visible and invisible obstacles to surmount. Not to mention more ramifications than previously anticipated. Furthermore there is now an unsuspected potential rapprochement between naturalized philosophy’s ‘cognitive ability’ and Wittgensteinian ‘foundational know-how’, if a method can be found through which to bring these two appreciations into philosophical contact.

Whilst it is the case that the ‘raw material’ of epistemological reflective equilibrium is almost entirely intellectualist, there are nonetheless viable Wittgensteinian alternatives to each of the four kinds of intuitions. As such, it is not clear how epistemologists engaging in reflective equilibrium who fail to consider these Wittgensteinian options might be able to claim they are attempting to square all the data. There is therefore no other choice than to engage with Wittgenstein’s contributions and these alternative conceptions of our supposed intuitions. At the very minimum, then, the non-propositional know-how readings of \textit{On Certainty} (and other Wittgensteinian insights) add to the ‘input data’ reflective equilibrium seeks to
embrace. For as seen, the assumption that extensional intuitions always state facts can be challenged by, or viewed instead from, an appreciation of the flexibility of family resemblance notions. The presumption that intensional intuitions, such as ‘It is true that p if and only if p’, have to be fact-stating might be challenged by the view that they might be non-fact stating expressions of a grammatical norm or rule. The view that a linguistic intuition such as ‘Here [waving] is a hand’ is fact-stating may again, be considered as the expression of a norm of description. And regarding the matter of a general intuitions such as the ability intuition, it is quite possible that the intuitive power this intuition has actually comes from the appeal of the involvement of non-propositional know-how.

Not only has substantial doubt has been cast on the neutrality of the ‘input data’ used by reflective equilibrium, but until it incorporates Wittgensteinian contributions its comprehensivity must remain in doubt and the value of its ‘stable theories’ compromised. As such, I conclude that the epistemological playing field on which reflective equilibrium takes place, will not be level until Wittgenstein’s own, and other Wittgensteinian orientated insights, participate in the process. And that until such time, epistemological reflective equilibrium is better characterised as Chomskyan rather than Rawlsian.

The problematic nature of reflective equilibrium may be further compounded by the fact that the skills one supposedly needs to engage in it are to be provided by the right kind of “philosophical training” in Strawsonian “elucidation” which as already noted is a “connective metaphysical task.” (Strawson 185, 27 emphasis added) Thus in order to do epistemology ‘properly’ one has to be trained into the acceptance of the intellectualist paradigm. Yet reflective equilibrium fails to acknowledge that the kind of much-needed know-how and skills it requires are developed through engagement in normative practices. Normative practices are constituted by standards of correctness and skillful practitioners are those who recognise standards of correctness as standards of correctness and are capable of modifying their behaviour in light of them. To be skilled in a normative practice requires, as Pritchard acknowledges, being training into that practice. But what justifies the practice? What justifies our ways of acting?

\[192\] Cf. Cottingham (2009) for further worries about what he calls the “flawed methodology” (2009, 244) of reflective equilibrium, which in seeking to, “subsume…under a simple and elegant generative principle or set of principles,” (2009, 243) pursue reductive analytic “theorising”, when what is needed for philosophical understanding is process of synthesis, or “linking” things together.
Once again Wittgenstein’s potential contributions to the philosophy of know-how are not only targeted on a topic *within* epistemology, but are potentially illuminating of the very methodology with which epistemology operates. But just as there are unanticipated connections between what Searle (overtly) demands from a ‘theory’ and what Wittgenstein seeks from description, there is a philosophical method close to reflective equilibrium which offers a number of echoes of the best of Pritchard’s conception of epistemology’s methodology.

4 Reflective Awareness: A Non-Naturalized Methodology

One might seek to address some of the above concerns about reflective equilibrium by appreciating that epistemological reflective equilibrium is more Chomskyan than Rawlsian, and that a reconsideration of the role played by principles in Rawls methodology would be useful. Perhaps this, in tandem with an alertness to the constraints imposed by certain intellectualist-only terms of art, would be a route to a greater pluralism in contemporary epistemology.

Another option may be to consider what Gertrude Conway refers to as ‘reflective awareness’. Conway characterises our reflective awareness as the practice of the critical distancing and reflecting upon our judgements amid the, “matrix of activities which fundamentally structure our account of the world” (2007, 75) Here there is a matrix of activities which is acknowledged to shape, frame and *enable* our propositional knowledge, and which is not itself some further type of propositional knowledge (or reducible to propositional knowledge.) This matrix is constituted by our ways of acting; many of which are normative. Whilst, of course, *total* disengagement from our normative practices is impossible, one can come to distinguish between the rules, standards and conceptual schemes that shape them and the judgements they enable. One can come to appreciate the categorial distinction between ‘Here [body-part] is a hand’ and ‘Here [waving] is a hand.’

On Conway’s understanding, a philosopher is someone, who is not only critically engaged with the substance of many of Pritchard’s ‘intuitions’ but who also has the crucial and, “uncanny *inability* to take the inherited background, the entrenched propositions for granted.” (2007, 75 emphasis added.) Like Pritchard’s reflective equilibrium, this stresses the importance of reflecting on our ‘intuitions’, but in such a way as to be prepared to acknowledge the grip of those operative
paradigms within which our practices proceed. Such reflective awareness is, however, unambiguously non-reductive. It generates no theories; it aims at no new ‘informative’ truths. Rather, “The philosopher strains to see more clearly the world in which we live everyday and provides a perspicuous reading of the language games which tacitly define our daily living.” (2009, 76) It is in this spirit that Conway reads Wittgenstein’s remark that, “the philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas. That is what makes him into a philosopher.” (Z 455)

The value of such ‘cosmopolitanism’, as Conway conceives of it, is touched on, tangentially, in a worry expressed by Pritchard. Having acknowledged that one’s epistemological intuitions and intellectual virtues are inculcated and honed by the supposed expert views of one’s epistemological community; what happens if one’s ‘experts’ are in thrall to a misguided picture? Unfortunately, having admitted this possibility of Pritchard says nothing about what one might do, or need to do, about such a situation. This is because reflective equilibrium does not provide him with the necessary resources, given that it fails to identify that possibility that some of the supposed ‘intuitions’ are actually (ungrounded but grounding) rules and standards by which the correctness of other ‘intuitions’ can be judged. By contrast, Conway argues not just for this Wittgensteinian categorial difference, but for the importance of deliberately seeking encounters with outsiders, those engaged in different practices which reveal apparently incommensurable views, view-points and frame-works. This provides the kind of challenges that prompt both self- and other- critical scrutiny. In our thoughtful engagements with ‘the Other’, “such contrasting brings us to live more reflectively within our own culture by forcing us back on ourselves in critical scrutiny in response to rival claims.” (2007, 99) Reflective awareness, unlike reflective equilibrium needs, indeed, thrives on the de-stabilising and distancing encounters with alternative ways of making sense. (And is exemplified in such fecund encounters as Wittgenstein has with Moore’s truisms.) The move to homogeneity or subsumption under generalization, which haunts the corridors of reflective equilibrium, runs counter to such reflective awareness.

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193 For the avoidance of doubt, Conway’s notion of ‘tacit definition’ has nothing to do with the kind of Chomskyan sub-personal ‘tacit knowledge’ realized in the brain. Conway’s usage has the standard non-technical connotations.

194 Cf., Ryle on Wittgenstein and the nature of philosophy itself in his (1951) “In philosophy, generalisation are unclarifications.” (1951, 7)
Reflective awareness is, therefore, more naturally at home with any method which appreciates that philosophy seeks understanding rather than some kind of new philosophical truths or empirical knowledge (of the kind sought after by naturalized philosophers for whom philosophy is just another science). This distinction has been made by a number of Wittgensteinian philosophers. Anthony Kenny contrasts science’s appropriate concern for “information and explanation” with philosophy’s contrasting method and ambition of “description and understanding.” (2009, 252)

This distinction also helps to provide the rationale for Hacker’s own characterisation of philosophy’s quest, “to attain an overview of a conceptual field, to arrange the grammatical data so that the manifold relationships become perspicuous”; an activity which enables one, “to disentangle conceptual confusions, to destroy metaphysical illusion, to undermine mythologies of symbolism and psychology.” (2005, 285)

Or as Wittgenstein himself writes, “Philosophy simply sets everything out, and neither explains nor deduces anything.” (BT 418) On this view, although philosophy is not continuous with science as Quine suggests, it is neither in competition with science nor dismissive of it. Rather it acknowledges the distinct, and distinctly valuable, purpose of sciences, as well as being a potential resource for it.

That there is a substantial contrast between the methods and goals of the more naturalized philosophy and Wittgensteinian methods seems introvertible. The relation with science and the pursuit of metaphysically-underpinned theories are gulfs that do appear unbridgeable. The announcements of overlapping practices such as mapping, connective analysis and elucidation, mask similarly radical differences.

Yet in the contrast between reflective equilibrium and reflective awareness there is a shared commitment to the practice of critical reflection, which is held to be central to both methodologies. Is it perhaps here that a meeting point might be found between two

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195 See Hacker (2009a) for more on why, “Philosophy is not a contribution to human knowledge but to human understanding.” (2009a, 135)

196 Cf., Nachev & Hacker (2010) as an example of philosophical conceptual clarification working with science (on the neuroscience of persistent vegetative states), as opposed to Bach & Dolan (2012), an example of science, in need of philosophy’s conceptual contribution. The latter’s paper misguidedly presumes that it is coherent to talk about the possibility of the, “distinct neural encoding of uncertainty” (2012, 572), on the assumption that the brain can be the subject of properties that are only applicable to the person. The paper also repeatedly ‘exploits’ the intellectualist paradigm’s misconception that there can be semantic content at a sub-personal level, in reference to semantically-sensitive “neural computations.” (2012, 584) Yet, as Bennett & Hacker clarify, “A neural representation in the non-semantic, non-iconic sense – that is a causal correlate – is not a form of storing information and does not involve encoding.” (2003, 164)

197 For Pritchard the “mere elucidation of a term can in fact give us just what we seek in terms of being a theory of that term.” (forthcoming a)
apparently very different ways of philosophising. Might there yet be a positive answer to Strawson’s hopeful speculation, “[C]ould not the activities we call ‘doing philosophy’ also form a family?” (1954, 78) And if so might a Wittgensteinian entry in the philosophy of know-how be just the springboard needed to confirm this?

5 Wittgenstein’s Epistemology & The Possibility of Wittgensteinian Epistemology

Quine’s re-conception of epistemology as a subject, “contained in natural science, as a chapter of psychology” (1969, 83) whose purpose is to provide “the technology of truth-seeking,” (1986, 665) brought naturalized philosophy to epistemology, where it has since become the orthodoxy. Furthermore, if John Turri’s definition of epistemology is now indicative of the subject, then the intellectualism which is the hallmark of naturalized epistemology would appear to be the only game in town:

Epistemology is the philosophical subdiscipline that studies the evaluative dimensions of cognition, their metaphysical bases, and increasingly nowadays, the language we use to ascribe cognitive achievements. The nature and scope of knowledge is the central focus of epistemology. (forthcoming)

In this chapter I have presented just a few of the possible reasons why Epistemology thus Naturalized is nothing but Epistemology inevitably Intellectualised. As such, the opportunity for contributions from Wittgenstein, and Wittgensteinian approaches in general, have little, indeed possibly no room for manoeuvre. They are shut out by a discipline whose propositional presumption is anchored to the cornerstones of cognitive science and philosophy of mind and which has turned ‘epistemic’.

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198 Alvin Goldman’s similar trajectory further contributed to this. He not only embraced cognitive sciences self-professed aim to “delineate the architecture of the human mind-brain” but regarded it as “essential for primarily epistemology.” (1986, 1)

199 This goes some way to explain Michael Williams’ claim that, “Wittgenstein’s position is not epistemological scepticism but scepticism about epistemology,” (2004, 269) and Rorty’s suggestion that Wittgenstein “set aside epistemology” altogether. (1979, 6)

200 Coliva reminds us “Philosophy constantly runs the risk of producing myths – viz. false pictures – of our conceptual and epistemic systems.” (2010, 206-7). Nowhere, though, is this more evident than in the very suggestion that we have epistemic systems and that, as per Turri, epistemology has a metaphysical base.
‘cognitive’, and ‘competence’ not only into intellectualist technical terms but synonyms.\textsuperscript{201}

Given the lengthening list of possible contributions which Wittgenstein’s insights into the philosophy of know-how offer, his exclusion from the philosophical debate can no longer warranted. That this must inevitably, as indicated, come with a requirement for reflection on the very methodology of epistemology itself, cannot be helped. But as all parties involved are eager to reflect on our most deeply held ‘intuitions’ and those pictures which can and do hold us captive, then this is not a challenge that any would or should wish to avoid.

According to Glock, \textit{On Certainty}’s "most important achievement was to provide the cue for an epistemology socialized." (1996, 81) This is a powerful point, but unfortunately Glock undercuts this reminder of the main challenge to the intellectualist picture, by going on to talk about our ‘epistemic activities’. I would like to take Glock’s cue and suggest instead that we move beyond Epistemology Naturalized to Epistemology Socialized, (or perhaps even to Epistemology Elucidated) but I think perhaps that the most fruitful way forward would be to return to the pursuit of Epistemology Unqualified. This ‘new’ kind of epistemology might perhaps be helpfully understood as the study of knowledge, a study open to a variety of possible approaches, some, but not necessarily all of which, are theoretical. Some Wittgensteinian, some Naturalized. It would acknowledge the commitment to critical reflection and a belief that it is the quality of the philosophy which confirms the worth of the meta-philosophy, and not \textit{vice versa}.

In the final chapter, I attempt to untangle some of the knots about know-how, using Wittgensteinian methods. There will, therefore, be no theorising. Nor will I use any theoretical terms, introduce any new terminology, or suggest any acronyms. I pursue no necessary and sufficient conditions, and offer no hypotheses. Rather, I present some features of the landscape pertaining to know-how. If, of what comes next, the reader thinks, “But yes, of course, that is how it is,” then I will have started, albeit modestly, what I take to be one possible example of Wittgensteinian

\textsuperscript{201} John Greco \& John Turri’s Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Virtue Epistemology opens with the announcement of a “helpful” note about their terminology, stating, “[W]e use ‘cognitive’ epistemic’ and ‘intellectual’ synonymously.” (2011) Given the above arguments, this is, of course, exactly right. What is less clear, however, is the extent to which the authors are wittingly exploiting and deliberately committed to the intellectualist paradigm or they are unwittingly in the grip of it and unaware to what they are committed, and are thus implicitly ruling out. But such is the nature of the power of any operative paradigm.
epistemology, in this case the New Epistemology of Know-How. This is not to be regarded as either quietism or therapy; but something that seeks to be a substantive contribution to our human understanding.

For those who read the final chapter and think that philosophising ought to be something more, or something else, they may perhaps add what follows to their cache of ‘data’, and honour it, perhaps, in their own accounts. Although what follows is by no means complete, it is not the prequel for something different, rather it is the start of an attempt to make visible what is in front of us, but which we struggle to see. The signpost which points the way, is Wittgenstein’s:

I can characterise my standpoint no better than saying that it is the antithetical standpoint to the one occupied by Socrates in the Platonic dialogues. For if were asked what knowledge is, I would enumerate instances of knowledge and add the words ‘and similar things’. There is no shared constituent to be discovered in them since none exists.

(Wittgenstein & Waismann 2003, 33)

*
I now step away from the current debate, and the terms under which it is conducted, in order to present a variety of observations about our know-how, together with some of its conceptual connections to our abilities, actions, activities and practices.

In the sections below the comments and reminders which are in tabular form are meant to be uncontroversial. After each table I reflect further on some of the points that emerge and articulate some of the reflections that are prompted. This commentary does not purport to be offering theories, but rather teases out further points and questions of interest.

In the first section, I consider a variety of different abilities, actions and activities and practices from the point of view of their normative or non-normative status. This is very much by way of a preliminary overview. The last line of Table 6 ends with the introduction of know-how. Three further tables then go on to articulate different aspects of, and perspectives on the reticulations at play.

1 Abilities, Actions, Activities and Practices: Introducing know-how

As human beings we do a variety of different things, some of which we are not only able to do, but we know how to do. One possible articulation of the territory which this covers is laid out in Table 6. This identifies a number of features and characteristics of our abilities, actions, activities and practices around which discriminations may be orientated.

(See over page)
Table 6. 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Normative Abilities, Actions and Activities</th>
<th>Normative Abilities, Actions, Activities and Practices</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>One-Way Powers</strong></td>
<td><strong>Two-Way Powers</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Examples</strong></td>
<td><strong>Examples</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- digesting food</td>
<td>- crying, smiling, laughing</td>
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<tr>
<td>- breathing</td>
<td>- making noises</td>
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<td>- seeing, hearing, tasting, touching, feeling</td>
<td>- moving around under one’s own steam</td>
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<td>- urinating, vomiting</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Voluntary Control</strong></td>
<td><strong>Voluntary Control</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>These abilities and their exercises cannot be brought under voluntary control.</td>
<td>These abilities and their exercises can be brought under varying degrees of voluntary control, though they begin as outside voluntary control.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Intentional Action</strong></td>
<td><strong>Intentional Action</strong></td>
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<td>These abilities are not exercised as intentional actions.</td>
<td>The exercise (and deliberate non-exercise) of these abilities are possible intentional actions.</td>
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<td>One cannot not decide to do them, though one can predict that one will be</td>
<td>An actor can cry on cue in play. One may resist</td>
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<td>Preventability</td>
<td>Preventability</td>
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<td>These possibility of exercising these abilities can be prevented by deliberate or accidental interference with our normal bodily workings through the imposition of physical barriers (eg. blindfolds), environmental changes (eg. darkness), drug or medical intervention.</td>
<td>The possibility of exercising these abilities can be prevented by deliberate or accidental interference with our normal bodily workings, though drug or medical intervention (eg. the removal of tear ducts).</td>
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<tr>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
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<tr>
<td>These abilities and their exercises may be evaluated in terms of whole (or partial) success (or failure) and efficiency.</td>
<td>These abilities and their exercises, the exercise of voluntary restraint (of the abilities) may be evaluated in terms of whole (or partial) success (or failure).</td>
<td>The exercise of these abilities, the doing of these actions and the participation in these activities and practices may be evaluated in terms of whole or partial success (or failure), and/or correctness (or incorrectness), and/or accuracy (or inaccuracy) and/or appropriateness (or inappropriateness) and/or skillfulness (or lack of skill) and/or merit (or lack of merit*).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>These abilities and their exercises are not subject to evaluation in terms of their correctness (or incorrectness).</td>
<td>These abilities, their exercises (and restraints) are not evaluated in terms of correctness (or incorrectness) but may be evaluated in terms of appropriateness (or inappropriateness) and/or some but not all types of merit (eg. financial)</td>
<td>*Such as musical, financial, strategic etc., merit.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Learnability/Teachability</strong></td>
<td><strong>Learnability/Teachability</strong></td>
<td><strong>Learnability/Teachability</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>These abilities are neither learnt or learnable.</td>
<td>These abilities are not learnt or learnable but one may be trained by others to bring them under voluntary control (e.g. potty-training) or learn how, oneself, to bring them under voluntary control, and so refrain from their exercise, (eg. not laughing, not crying).</td>
<td>The exercise of these abilities, the doing of these actions and the participation in these activities and practices are all learnable, though not all are teachable.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>One may learn wittingly (or unwittingly) by being taught or trained wittingly (or unwittingly) by others.</td>
<td>One may learn wittingly and unwittingly by self-direction, observation and practice.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One may learn by a mixture of all of these methods.</td>
<td>One may learn something but may or may not be able to teach it.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One may have the ability to teach something but may not be able to do it oneself.</td>
<td>(I will return to this in Table 7.)</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Improvability</strong></th>
<th><strong>Improvability</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>These abilities and their exercises may be potentially directly improvable through drug or medical intervention or technological supplementation (e.g. spectacles, hearing aids).</td>
<td>These abilities and their exercises are potentially directly improvable through drug or medical intervention or technological supplementation.</td>
<td>The exercise of these abilities, the doing of these actions and the participation in these activities and practices can be improved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>These abilities and their exercises may be indirectly potentially improvable through diet and/or exercise regime (e.g. the improvement of one’s ability to breath and smell through stopping smoking.)</td>
<td>These abilities and their exercises are not (obviously) improvable through diet and/or exercise.</td>
<td>Improvement may be identified in terms of increased frequency of, or likeliness of success and/or correctness and/or accuracy and/or appropriateness, and/or skill, and/or merit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Improvements may be further identified and characterised in adverbial terms relating to the manner, styles and modes in which the activity is done, or the ability exercised, eg, tidiness, speed, delicacy, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Deterioration</strong></td>
<td><strong>Deterioration</strong></td>
<td><strong>Deterioration</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>These abilities may but may not deteriorate and will inevitably cease altogether (in death).</td>
<td>These abilities may but may not deteriorate and will inevitably cease altogether (in death).</td>
<td>These abilities may but may not deteriorate in terms of decreased frequency of, or likeliness of success and/or correctness and/or accuracy and/or appropriateness, and/or skill, and/or merit, and will inevitably cease altogether (in death).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Creditable</strong></th>
<th><strong>Creditable</strong></th>
<th><strong>Creditable</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>These abilities and their exercises, are not typically creditable to the person.</td>
<td>These abilities and their exercises are not typically creditable to the person, but the ability to bring them under voluntary control and thereby restrain from exercising them (wholly or partially) is normally creditable to the person.</td>
<td>The exercise of these abilities, the doing of these actions and the participation in these activities or practices is creditable to the person, the participant or the practitioner.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Forgettable</strong></th>
<th><strong>Forgettable</strong></th>
<th><strong>Forgettable</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>These abilities are not characterisable as either forgettable or unforgettable.</td>
<td>These abilities are not characterisable as either forgettable or unforgettable. But the deliberate ability to restrain from doing something (e.g. not smiling, not crying) can be forgotten or perhaps lost, either temporally or entirely. Similarly the ability to cry at will (in the case of an actor) can be forgotten or lost.</td>
<td>The exercise of these abilities, the doing of these actions and the participation in these activities or practices can be forgotten.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above abilities, actions, activities and practices may also be things we know how to do.

Knowable
These abilities and their exercises are, and are regarded as things we do, as opposed to things we know, or know how to do.

A does digest food but A doesn’t know how to digest food.

Knowable
These abilities and their exercises are regarded as things we do, not things we know.

But the learnt ability to exercise some of these abilities at will (crying on demand) and to restrain from their exercise (eg. not laughing when amused) is something one does, one is able to do, and also knows how to do.

A does cry (but A doesn’t know how to cry), but A does know how not to cry.

Knowable
These abilities and their exercises, the doing of these actions and the participation in these activities or practices are thing we both do, are able to do know, and know how to do.

A does speak English and Spanish; A knows how to speak English and Spanish; A doesn’t know how to speak Turkish, he/she is unable to speak Turkish.

A is able to land an airplane, A knows how to land an air-plane.

A knows how to render a good likeness in clay. A know how to multiply imaginary numbers, A knows how to officiate at weddings, how to run a Presidential campaign, how to train for the high-jump, lobby for environmental issues, make a patient feel comfortable after a long spell in bed, not take ‘no’ for an answer, etc..

From this preliminary introduction of the topic of abilities and know-how a number of points emerge, which look to bear on any fuller appreciation of know-how.

(i) The borders between our normative and non-normative abilities are porous. In certain situations crying is a non-normative activity, typically provoked by physical or emotional distress. Were one to learn that a friend had unexpectedly died, one might be unable to prevent oneself from crying but it would make little sense to say that one cried correctly or incorrectly. Were one to be acting in a play, however, the failure to cry on cue, or the intentional crying at the wrong moment might be reasonably taken to be an example of failing to do something correctly. Matters can be further complicated, as in Camus’ novel L’Etranger (1942). Here the main character Mersault is deemed to be morally reprehensible for failing to cry at his mother’s funeral. Whilst it appears that our normative abilities, actions, activities, and practices
are things we also know how to do, the same action may sometimes be a normative activity, sometimes not.

(ii) It is not obvious whether certain activities are standardly to be characterised as normative or non-normative. Consider the activity of comforting a grieving person. Would we say that this is a normative activity? What would it be to comfort someone correctly as opposed to incorrectly?²⁰²

Evaluating an action or activity in terms of correctness looks to be distinct from evaluating it in terms of success. Playing chess correctly, is a matter of playing by the rules, but playing chess successfully is normally a matter of winning a particular game, or regularly (though not necessarily always) winning a number of games. Yet in the case of some actions and activities, evaluation in terms of success and correctness conditions would seem to be the same thing. Think of multiplying 25 \times 25. If one gets the answer 625 one has done the multiplication both successfully and correctly. Yet have the same criteria been applied, in judging the activity as both successful and correct? Or is it that we regard the procedure to be correct (in contrast to successful) because multiplication is a practice obviously constituted by specific rules and clear repeatable techniques? Yet comforting a grieving person does not look like something that is constituted by rules. Is this why it seems awkward to suggest that comforting a grieving person can be done correctly? If there are no correct or incorrect ways of comforting someone, only successful ways, then it looks like this action may be better identified as a two-way non-normative activity. But do we really want to say that what may be a highly sophisticated, complex and subtle activity is non-normative?

It would seem that we have less trouble distinguishing between people who know-how to comfort others and people who don’t, than we do distinguishing between those actions and activities that are normative and those that are not. This suggests that there are cases where regarding the exercise of an ability or an activity as matter of know-how is not a consequence of, or does not entail that that ability or activity is normative.

²⁰² This is not to be confused to with comforting someone inappropriately.
(iii) Language, itself a normative practice, is extensively implicated in our normative activities. This raises questions as to whether the normativity of practices is a product of this very language-involvement. This is an enormous philosophical topic in its own right, but it is perhaps worth considering, in light of the articulation in the above table, that the “same” ability might be regarded as normative when exercised by a human being, and non-normative when exercised by another kind of animal who does not have our normative linguistic practices with which to understand what they are doing. One might think, say of, the ability to delay the eating of food when hungry. We humans might delay eating when hungry because, say, an honoured guest has yet to arrive and join the table. This would be part of the correct behaviour at, say, an official banquet. So, too, an ant might delay eating a leaf until it has returned it to its nest, even though it may not have eaten for a very long time. It is not clear, however, whether it makes any sense to regard the ant as appreciating that it was applying some kind of standard to its own behaviour. There might be standards, but without a language with which to articulate and recognise standards qua standards, it is unclear that the ant’s action is to be regarded as normative. Yet both the person and the ant have delayed eating when hungry. We might want to say that the person knows how to behave appropriately at a state dinner, but do we want to say that the ant knows how to do something, in the same way?

(iv) Intentional actions can be things one refrains from doing, when one has the ability to do them. As such, when exercising an ability nothing observable, as it were, needs to occur. But this is not because something unobservable is occurring. By not doing something, such as not laughing at a comedy routine which one finds very funny, one is exercising an ability. One can also exercise the sophisticated parenting skills by deliberately not intervening in a particular situation. As such, whilst it appears that our normative abilities, actions, activities, and practices are things we do and know how to do, in the act of doing them and in so exemplifying our know-how, no actual action need occur.

2 Know-how: Characterisations and Contrasts

There are numerous ways one might go about attempting to lay-out some of the features, characteristics and aspects of our know-how. In Table 7 below, I offer just
of the many possible approaches, limiting myself to those particularly normative abilities, actions, activities and practices, the like of which have been introduced in Table 6’s right hand column. I leave to one side, for the purposes of the current presentation, those two-way but non-normative abilities, on the grounds that they are perhaps more borderline candidates, and space is limited. Of course, any full epistemology of know-how is likely to want revisit our non-normative two way powers, perhaps by the light of the topics which unfold below. In Table 7, I have chosen one particular ordering of the issues, reminders and observations concerning our know-how, but a range of alternative orderings would undoubtedly reveal yet further interdependencies and contrasts.

Table 7:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Normative Abilities, Actions, Activities and Practices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Know-how</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In being able to do, engage in, and participate in normative abilities, actions, activities and practices, people are knowledgeable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In knowing how to do, engage in, and participate in those normative abilities, actions, activities, and practices, people are knowing agents, practitioners and participants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A does speak English, A is able to speak English, and so A knows how to speak English. A does not speak Polish, is not able to speak Polish, and so A does not know how to speak Polish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B is able to land an airplane; B knows how to land an air-plane.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C is able to officiate at a wedding; B knows how to officiate at a wedding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D knows how to drill for oil, E knows how to multiply imaginary numbers, F knows how to run a Presidential campaign, G how to train for the high-jump, H how to lobby for environmental issues, J to make a patient feel comfortable after an operation, K knows how to build up a successful business from scratch, etc..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J, K are all knowledgeable, in different ways and about different things.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Know-how: Situation-and Occasion-Dependency

Not all the things that one knows how to do, one knows how to do, or is able to do in any and/or all situations or occasions.

Situation- and/or occasion-dependency may be a matter of a variation in contexts of purpose, of geography, or of importance, etc. A may know how to run a political campaign at local but not national level, in England but not in Italy, or when the candidate’s priorities are his or her own, but not when they diverge.

Situation- and/or occasion dependency may be a matter of the availability or quality of the required equipment or tangible resources. B may know how to mend car engines but not without certain tools. C may know how to stamp out water poverty world-wide but not without enough money and the will to see it fully spent where it will solve the problem.

Situation- and/or occasion dependency may be a matter of one’s own physical condition. Arthritis may hamper or curtail the exemplification of the ballerina’s know-how.

### Know-how: Other-Dependency (1)

Not all the things one knows how to do, one can come to know how to do alone. Some things require the involvement of other people to gain know-how.

Knowing how (and learning how) to play football involves playing in a team. It involves match-play skills, learning to give and receive passes, and collectively develop attacking and defensive positions.

Knowing how (and learning how) to play music with other musicians is a separate skill to playing one’s instrument alone. It involves listening to others and responding to musical choices and developments that are outside one’s direct control.

### Know-how: Other-Dependency (2)

Not all the things that one knows how to do, one still knows how to do if the people with whom one does them change.

A may know how to play with one group of musicians, but not another.

B may know how to teach one student how to multiply (using a particular method), but not another (using the same method).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Know-how:</strong></th>
<th>Some things that people know-how to do are part contributions to things that only groups of people know-how to do.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Of groups</td>
<td>The team members of NASA (together) know-how to put a man on the moon, but each person in the team does not know how to do what all the other team members know how to do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The whole crew of a whaling ship knows how to catch a whale, though not each crew member knows how to do the jobs of all the others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Know-how:</strong></td>
<td>The exercise or exemplification of one’s know-how may be different on each occasion. This may be because of situation-, occasion- or other-dependency or because of one’s own mood, health or degree of concentration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercises &amp;</td>
<td>The exercise or exemplification of A’s surgical know-how is different on each operation. A may know how to perform a triple-heart bypass, but no two triple heart-bypasses are alike.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exemplifications</td>
<td>Singer B knows how to perform the role of Tosca, although she never gives the same performance twice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Know-how:</strong></td>
<td>One person can have the same know-how as another if both people know how to do the same thing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>A and B both know how to fly a helicopter. They have the same know-how, though the exercises of their know-how may be quite different.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Know-how:</strong></td>
<td>Any particular or individual exercise of one’s know-how need not be successful, correct, accurate, appropriate, skillful or of any merit. Failures occur, mistakes are made, but one’s know-how need not be undermined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallibilism</td>
<td>There is no one single percentage by which an exercise of know-how is evaluated as successful, or correct etc.,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A need never win a game of chess, but may still know-how to play it, if his opponents are always of a higher standard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All of Dr. B’s patients might die, but if he or she works in a hospice then Dr. B may have an extraordinary amount of know-how about the nature of the human body and the welfare of patients.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Whereas if the majority of C’s plants died, gardener C would not have much, if any, gardening know-how.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Know-how:</strong></th>
<th>Under a description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Know-how:</strong></td>
<td>The exercise of know-how and know-how itself may be identified under a variety of different descriptions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Know-how:</strong></td>
<td>Sculptor A is an expert in rendering good likenesses and knowing how to capture the personality of his sitters. If A’s model is King Gustaf of Sweden, and A renders him well, then A knows how to render a good likeness of King Gustaf of Sweden. But if A doesn’t know the identify of his model, then A still knows how to render a good likeness of King Gustaf of Sweden. He also knows that he knows how to render a good likeness of his current sitter. A does not know, however, that he knows how to render a good likeness of King Gustaf of Sweden. But he does know that he would know how to render a good likeness of King Gustaf of Sweden were he to attempt to do so.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Know-how:</strong></th>
<th>Decompositionality &amp; Countability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Know-how:</strong></td>
<td>Knowing-how to do one thing is often a matter of knowing how to do a lot of things.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Know-how:</strong></td>
<td>When one knows how to make a Shepherd’s Pie, one knows how to shop for the ingredients, handle money, make arithmetical calculations, cut and fry onions, peel and boil potatoes, select and prepare meat, use a weighing machine, assemble the ingredients, season appropriately, use a variety of kitchen implements, use a cooker and a stove, make creative choices about how to decorate the top, tell the time, manage one’s time, read numerals, possibly read a recipe, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Know-how:</strong></td>
<td>How many things does one know how to do when one knows how to bullfight, to rear a child, to defend one’s country, to speak a language? The answer to this would seem to relate to the purpose of question.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Know-how:</strong></td>
<td>The noun ‘know-how’ is a cognate of the verb ‘to know’ and the verbal phrase ‘to know how to do something’; but it is not a count noun.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Know-how:</strong></th>
<th>Degree of Grain</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Know-how:</strong></td>
<td>Knowing how to do something can be characterised to different degrees of grain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Know-how:</strong></td>
<td>A knows how to write. A knows how to write his name. A knows how to write his name with his right hand (but not the left). A knows how to write his name with the right hand (but not the left) whilst blind-fold, etc..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know-how:</td>
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<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Differentiation</td>
<td>Knowing-how to do one thing can be differentiated from knowing how to do (the apparently) same thing by contrasting both with a third thing one knows how to do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Knowing how to repair something that you have made is different to knowing how to repair something that you haven’t made.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrability &amp; Definability</td>
<td>What it is to know how to do some particular thing can be demonstrated through the exercise or exemplification of that know-how.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exercise or exemplification can be used to ostensively define a particular kind of know-how.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>This [exemplification] is how you serve in tennis.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>That [exemplification] is knowing how to quit while you’re ahead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st/3rd Personal Know-how</td>
<td>The ostensive definition of know-how provides third-personal know-how, but not necessarily first-personal know-how.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ostensive definition of know-how results in knowing how one who knows how to do some particular thing does it, i.e., what the ability, action, activity or practice of knowing how to do that thing is, in general. One knows that knowing how to do that thing is a matter of being able to do that [exemplification].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ostensive definition of know-how does not automatically result in oneself knowing how to do that thing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Watching somebody do a Fosbury Flop high jump exemplifies what knowing how to do a Fosbury Flop is (third-personally) and provides an ostensive definition of a Fosbury Flop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Knowing how to do a Fosbury Flop oneself (first-personal knowledge) is a matter of successfully learning how to do a Fosbury Flop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imitation (1)</td>
<td>Some kinds of (first personal) know-how may be gained through imitating exemplifications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A comes to know how to pick grapes by watching B exemplify his knowledge of</td>
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</table>
picking grapes and successfully imitating A.

Successful imitation may involve no or some practice, using abilities one already has. Both C, D and E already know how to speak. But C knows how to imitate any accent on hearing it once, D takes more time, needs more examples to imitate and has to practice more, whilst E is ‘tone deaf’ and does not know how to distinguish between accents and does not know how to imitate them, although he has the physical ability to speak and to hear no less than C and D.

A first-time banquet guest F imitates neighbouring etiquette-expert guest G in selecting the right items of cutlery with which to eat the banquet. F comes to know how to eat correctly according to the rules etiquette when using a 16-piece cutlery set. Anyone who follows G comes to know how to eat correctly with a 16-piece cutlery. No new physical abilities are required.

A visitor to Paris, H overhears a local L saying he’s en route to the Eiffel Tower via public transport. H follows L and in so doing learns the bus and metro route from his hotel to the Eiffel Tower. H knows how to get from his hotel to the Eiffel Tower. No new physical abilities are required.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Know-how:</th>
<th>Some kinds of (first personal) know-how may be gained through following descriptions (or visual, diagrammatic presentations) of exemplifications of know-how.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imitation (2)</td>
<td>First-time banquet guest F* learns how to handle a 16-piece cutlery set prior to the banquet by reading the relevant section of etiquette expert G’s ‘how-to’ book. F* displays his know-how at the banquet by successfully handling the cutlery throughout the meal. No new physical abilities or techniques are required or need to be mastered. But F*, unlike F, needs also to know how to read.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Visitor to Paris, H* reads directions in his guide-book of how to get to the Eiffel Tower from his hotel. H* follows the directions, learns how, and comes to know how to get to the Eiffel Tower. No new physical abilities or practical techniques need to be mastered, though H* needs to know-how to read, and may need to know-how to read another language (if he finds he has only picked up a French-language guide.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-assembling a wardrobe, J follows the international (wordless) instructions which explain how to put the wardrobe together using only pictures of nails, pieces of wood, dotted lines and arrows. Three hours later J knows how to...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
construct the wardrobe. No new physical abilities are required, but one needs to know how to follow schematic visual instructions, which may include knowing how to match objects to their images, count and read numerals.

**Know-how: Imitation (3)**

Some kinds of (first-personal) know-how may be gained through following descriptions, instructions, diagrammatic presentations etc., of exemplifications of know-how, but the successful implementation of these instructions also involves the mastery of new physical abilities or practical techniques. This involves further imitation of exemplifications of those additional abilities and techniques, which will involve further exemplification which may or may not be conveyed through description.

In coming to know-how to perform various key-hole operations, surgeon A come to know how to develop abilities using remotely extended surgical procedures aided by cameras, which are of no use outside of the operating theatre.

In coming to know-how to perform dressage non-rider B first has to know-how ride a horse.

**Know-how: Imitation (4)**

Some kinds of (first-personal) know-how involve the same physical actions but are exemplifications of very different know-how.

In typing, novelist A engages in the same physical activity as poet B, secretary C or accountant D. To know-how to write a novel, to compose a poem, to organise a diary and to prepare documents, or to do double-entry book-keeping are not the same things as knowing how to type, yet their physical manifestation need only be typing.

(A further variation on knowledge-under-a-description.)

**Know-how: Informed Imitation**

Some kinds of (first-personal) know-how require both the imitation of physical action or technique (which may or may not be describable) together with the making of decisions as to which physical action, move or technique is required.

Decision-making may require understanding the different options of and reasons for each, which itself may involve an amount of empirical, mathematical or theoretical knowledge. Selecting the appropriate propositional knowledge is itself a matter of developing the appropriate know-how.

A knows how to sail when he or she knows not just how to rig the sails and
navigate but when he or she knows how to do these appropriately, i.e., knows when and why to do these things.

B knows how to treat certain kinds of illness when B knows how to decide when surgery and further interventions are no longer appropriate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Know-how: Non-imitation Inauguration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some kinds of know-how are not the result of any imitation, but when exemplified the possibility of new know-how by imitation is inaugurated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The inventor of a new machine knows how to use it. In demonstrating it to others so that they might come to know how to use it, he is not engaged in imitation, but those who learn how and come to know how will use imitation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loom operators came to know how to use John Kay’s flying shuttle through following his (first) and others’ (subsequent) exemplifications.</td>
</tr>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Know-how: Hermeneutic Learning (1)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reflecting on particular exercises or exemplifications of one’s (and others’) know-how may provide additional information, insight or understanding, which then becomes part of the reservoir of resources which is part-constitutive of one’s know-how.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A’s skill at diagnosing motorbike engine problems and repairing them improves with each engine encountered; enhancing the know-how brought to the next job.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picasso and Matisse’s artistic know-how evolved and expanded as they watched and learnt from each other’s work.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Know-how: Hermeneutic Learning (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unsuccessful or failed attempts to exemplify know-how may provide additional information, insight or understanding, which becomes part of the resources constitutive of one’s know-who.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writer A’s serial failed attempts to articulate her thoughts in a letter finally resulted in her knowing how to communicate her point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squash-player B’s serial failed attempts to hit the ball in the middle of the racquet are useful contrasts through which the successful hitting the ball in the middle of the racquet comes to be recognised and appreciated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Know-how:** Kinships

The reservoir of resources that is constitutive of one’s knowledge how to do one thing may become a reservoir of resources that is constitutive of one’s learning-how (and subsequently knowing how) to do something else.

A’s knowledge of how to play the clarinet is transferable to the playing of the saxophone. Much of B’s knowledge of how to grow vegetables is transferable to growing fruit.

**Know-how:** Teaching

Know-how can be taught by exemplification and demonstration where imitation, or imitation and self-reflection alone, suffices to come to know-how to do something.

A can teach B how to play noughts and crosses by demonstration.

Know-how can be taught by description or verbal instruction where imitation guided by description (or description plus self-reflection) suffices for someone to come to know-how to do something.

C can teach D how to open E’s safe by description. “You turn the dial to the left until no. 78. OK. Now turn it to the right to 23, etc…”

**Know-how:** Training

One can come to know-how to do things by being trained and/or acculturated into practices. The trainee need not appreciate that he or she is being trained, and it is by no means clear whether the training is successful because of the trainer’s witting or unwitting methods, or a combination of both.

In knowing how to speak a language we are trained into/acculturated into a normative practice that requires immersion in a community of speakers with full mastery of their language.

**Know-how:** Rules (1)

Knowing how to engage in normative abilities, actions, activities and practices is a matter of engaging correctly in rule- and standard-involving practices.

Some rule- and standard-involving practices are learnt by first learning some (or all) of the rules and standards by which those practices are constituted.

A learns how and comes to knows how to play checkers by learning the way the counters move, how they interact and what constitutes victory in the game.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Know-how</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
</table>
| **Rules (2)** | Some rule- and standard-involving practices are not learnt by first learning what the rules and standards are, or even that there are constitutive rules and standards.  
B learns his or her first language, perhaps in this way.  
Full mastery requires appreciating that there are constitutive rules and standards and being able to change what one does in order to bring one’s activity and practice into conformity with them.  |
| **Rules (3)** | Different kinds of know-how, whilst being part-constituted by rules and standards, do not all share the same degree of latitude as to what it is to correctly follow the rules.  
A and B both know how to multiply and as such they will get the same answer when they multiply 25 x 25. If they do not get 625, then they will have made a mistake. It is part of knowing how to multiply that one appreciates there is only one possible answer.  
C and D both know how to compose for the piano in the key of B Flat. Exemplifications of their know-how will be quite different.  
E and F both know how to speak Mandarin but if given the task of describing the same object they may do in quite different ways.  |
| **1st/3rd Person Claims to Know-how** | Knowing that someone knows how (or doesn’t know how) to do something is made on empirical evidence.  
A knows that B knows how to speak German (having heard B talking with the locals on holiday in Berlin); that C knows how to make jewelry (having been on a guided tour of C’s workshop); that D knows how to make a limited budget stretch (having lived with D for a week). A knows that E doesn’t know how to cook having eaten numerous unpalatable meals provided by E.  
Knowing of oneself that one knows how to do something (or does not know how to do something) is not a matter of having empirical evidence.  
I know how to crochet, and I know that I know how to crochet, but not because I have gathered evidence for this in the same way as I know that A knows how to crochet, but not B.  |
I do not know how to speak Russian, but not because I have evidentially disconfirmed my putative know-how. I do know that I don’t know how to speak Russian, Mandarin, juggle with 4 balls, build a suspension bridge, or play bridge. I know that I have not learnt these abilities, but not from empirical observation of myself.

From these uncontentious reminders of some of the similarities and differences at play in our know-how, a number of innocuous conclusions would seem to follow.

(i) The above table suggests that any comprehensive understanding of our know-how is likely to require a complimentary and concomitant understanding of what it is to act in accordance with a rule, to be guided by a rule, to follow a rule; generally to engage in rule-following practices. This points to the importance of engaging with, and discriminating between two quite distinct and mutually exclusive ways of understanding our rule-governed practices; particularly what it is to know how to speak a language.

On the one hand, there is the Chomskyan approach which pervades and informs not only linguistics but cognitive science and a not insubstantial amount of (naturalized) philosophy of mind and externalist epistemology. On this view, the rules which supposedly constitute our normative linguistic practices are a kind of sub-personal tacit propositional knowledge. We have such knowledge, but we are unaware of it, and it is inaccessible to reflection. On the other hand, there is Wittgenstein’s understanding, which takes rules to be not explanatory hypotheses (possibly encoded in the mind/brain), but as guides to, and standards for, our actions; against which what we do may be evaluated as correct or incorrect. In order to fulfill this latter role, rules are not in the head (as it were) but are constituted by and incarnate in our public normative linguistic practices, into which we are trained or inculcated. On this view, we need not first learn that such-and-such is a rule, nor need we have an overview of our rules, nor is there the need for rules to be considered prior to their successful employment, once we are masters of our first language. It would be reasonable to suggest that silence about what it is to engage in rule- and standard-constituted activities and practices is not an option for any epistemology of know-how which seeks to be comprehensive or valuable.
(ii) The extent to which knowing and learning are interconnected also emerges from the above table. In some instances, there is no clear demarcation between learning how to do something and coming to know how to do it. At what point can one be said to know how to read, or to play the piano? Furthermore as one’s know-how can continue to evolve, there is an important sense in which learning is not just a preliminary to, but remains part of knowing how to do something. This suggests that any comprehensive epistemology of know-how might look at the conceptual interdependencies between learning and knowing. Also implicated in this nexus of connections are the notions of doing, practicing and experience; in light of the extent to which we may to know how to do something by learning through doing and reflecting on our experiences.

(iii) The sheer diversity of examples of know-how looks to be a prima facie challenge to any assumption that a single example of know-how might provide a paradigm case on which a philosophically viable epistemology of know-how may be built. The “contemptuous attitude towards the particular case” as Wittgenstein puts it (BB, 18) looks more than ever out of place in the area of know-how. The importance of considering a substantial range of cases and looking at the particulars of each would appear to be unquestionable. Similarly, the idea that there may be one way which is ‘the way’ of knowing or knowing-how to do something, looks similarly incautious. I return to some of the previously considered points now from a slightly different angle, to approach to know-how via this idea of ‘ways’ of knowing.

3 Know-how: Ways of Knowing

The ways in which we know how to do things appear to pick out a variety of different things: methods, procedures, manners, modes and styles. Some of these cut across the previously articulated first and third personal conceptions of know-how.

(See over page)
Table 8.

### Knowledge: Ways of Knowing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ways of Knowing: Methods &amp; Procedures</th>
<th>Describability &amp; Commandability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowing how to do something can be a matter of knowing a way of doing something, where the way is a describable method or procedure.</td>
<td>Method and procedures may be described in declarative sentences or turned into a set of commands or recipe-style instructions for following. Such descriptions or instructions, when followed correctly help the agent, participant or practitioner to produce an exemplification of know-how.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A may follow a set of instructions for getting to the Olympic Stadium: Get on such-and-such a bus, get off at such-and-such a stop, cross over the bridge, turn left and carrying on walking for 100 yards. If these instructions are carried out correctly, A will know how to get to the Stadium from where A begins.</td>
<td>One may come to know how to get from one place to another by doing it successfully only once. However, some types of know how cannot be achieved by a single successful exemplification. One may read a set of instructions as to the method of shooting a bow and arrow at a target and in the first attempt to do it, hit the target. But one successful shot is not a case of knowing how to be an archer. One knows the way, one has read the way, one has been successful in executing the way to fire an arrow, but one does not yet know how to be an archer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different descriptions or set of instructions can state a way of knowing how to do the same thing.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ways of Knowing: Methods &amp; Procedures</th>
<th>Teaching-how using Commentary-as-Instruction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A person who knows how to teach someone to do something may do so using a set of instructions or ‘tips’ that resist translation into assertoric sentences, but work in tandem with exemplification or attempts at exemplification.</td>
<td>A is teaching B how to do a particular exercise in the proper way. “Up a bit”, “Over, yes”, “Left hand in,” “Now lean.” “Feel that?” “OK” “And breathe…”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The same words could be in a variety of instances to help someone comes</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
to know how to do something. A might be teaching B how to grip and swing a golf club, or how to walk on a cat-walk, or how to diagnose peritonitis.

**Ways of Knowing:**

**Methods & Procedures**

Knowing how to do something can be a matter of knowing a way of doing something that is indescribable, even though there is a specific procedure that is being followed or pursued.

A is a virtuoso violinist and knows how to identify any other of the world’s leading violinists within a few notes of their playing. A does not know how to describe the way in which this is done.

Knowing how to do something can be a matter of doing something that one recognises as a paradigm example of what it would be to know how to do something, even though neither the person doing it nor those witnessing it know how it is being done.

An example of this is the single occasion on which Laurence Olivier gave his finest performance of Othello. To all present, including Olivier, his performance was in a different league to anything ever achieved prior to that. When he came off-stage Olivier was deeply distressed because, so the story goes, he knew that he’d just given one of the finest performances of his life, but he also knew that he didn’t know how he’d done it, or how to do it again.

**Ways of Knowing:**

**Manners, Styles, Modes**

The ways in which one knows how to do something need not refer to either methods or procedures by which it is done, but to the manner, style or mode in which those methods or procedures are pursued or practiced.

- intelligently/stupidly,
- creatively/derivatively
- slowly/quickly
- stylishly/awkwardly
- tidily/messily
- with/without fuss
- with/without substantial expense
- with/without panache
- with/without respect
- with/without hope
- with others/alone
In attempting to distinguish describable from indescribable ways of knowing, several difficulties are encountered: (i) identifying what might count as a full description is unclear, and varies on a case by case basis, (ii) the describable and indescribable aspects are often interwoven and (iii) ostensive definition sometimes picks out a method and sometimes a manner of engaging in a method. The assumption that there is “a” way of knowing looks somewhat premature.

4 Know-how: Conceptual connections

The final table of this chapter offers further reminders of the common ways in which we talk about know-how and the kinds of conceptual connections, implicatures and sub-text at play in our grammar and our conversations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Know-how:</strong> Something one has</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Know-how is a possession. Like a book it is something that one has, though, unlike a book, it is not something one owns. Like a book it is something one can sell to someone else, though in so doing, one retains it. One can buy someone’s know-how but in so doing one does not gain the know-how oneself, only the products of that know-how.

Unlike with a book one can’t give one’s know-how away though one might pass it on or share it. Like a book it is something one might lose, but not because it had been physically misplaced.

Unlike possessing a book, possessing know-how is having a power or a potentiality.
**Know-how:**
**Being knowledgeable**

To know how to do something is to be knowledgeable.

To be knowledgeable is to have the power to do something.

A knows how to build a chess-playing computer; A is very knowledgeable about chess-playing computers.

The construction team for the Olympic venues know how to create world-class facilities. They are very knowledgeable.

**Know-how:**
**Conversational Implicatures (1)**

In discussing, asking and enquiring about know-how a variety of different things can be implied by the use of the verbal phrase ‘to know how to…’ or its cognates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A1: Do you know how to get to the Olympic Stadium?</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B1: Yes. You catch the number B Bus. Get off at the S Stop opposite the park. Then cross over the Br Bridge and take a left.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here A1 is simultaneously (i) asking if B1 has certain information, (ii) telling B1 that he/she doesn’t have the information, (iii) asking if B1 is prepared to share the information and (iv) requesting that B1 do share the information. B’s ‘Yes’ is simultaneously an answer to the questions (i) and (iii). B’s supply of directions is simultaneously an acknowledgement of (ii) and a response to (iv).

After this exchange A1 now has the relevant information about the way to get to the Olympic Stadium from where he/she is now. A1 knows how to get to the Stadium.

**Know-how:**
**Conversational Implicatures (2)**

A2: Do you know how to get to the Olympic Stadium?

| B2: Yes. (B2 walks off.) |

Here A2 might be a tour guide checking amongst his party that everybody knows how to get where they are going, in the wake of instructions issued by A2 earlier.

Here A2 is simultaneously, (i) asking if B2 remembers the already issued information, (ii) reminding B2 that the information can be repeated if it has been forgotten, (iii) letting B2 know that he is prepared to repeat the information if required, (iv) providing an
opportunity for B2 to request the information.

Both before and after this exchange A2 and B2 know how to get to the Stadium.

**Know-how:**

*Conversational Implicatures (3)*

A3: Do you know how to get to the Olympic Stadium?
B3: Yes. (B walks off.)

Here A3 is simultaneously (i) asking if B3 has certain information, (ii) telling B3 that he/she doesn’t have the information, (iii) asking if B3 is prepared to share the information and (iv) requesting that B3 do share the information.

B3 misunderstands, however, thinking A3 does have the information and is offering to help. As B3 does know how to get there, B3’s yes, is simultaneously a way of declining A3’s (mistakenly assumed) offer of help.

The situation ends with A3 still not knowing how to get to the Stadium, B3 still knowing how to get there.

**Know-how:**

*Conversational Implicatures (4)*

A4: Do you know how to get to the Olympic Stadium?
B4: Yes. (B walks off.)

Here A4 might be asking (i) asking if B4 has certain information, (ii) telling B4 that he/she doesn’t have the information, (iii) asking if B4 is prepared to share the information and (iv) requesting that B4 do share the information.

B4 finds it amusing, however, to pretend that he has misunderstood (as in the A3/B3 situation). Or perhaps B4 is simply rude.

This, and similar things, are know-how.

*
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.

(from T. S. Eliot *Four Quartets, Little Gidding*)
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