Identity in the Anglo-Indian Novel: “The Passing Figure” and Performance

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Abstract

In the following thesis, two interrelated arguments are offered: firstly, a re-appropriation of the passing figure from an African-American context to the Anglo-Indian context is suggested, which it is argued, will allow new methods for the study of the hybrid figure in British literature to develop. Secondly, the thesis works to critique the relationship between poststructuralism and postcolonialism, suggesting a move away from a discourse concerned with anti-reality and its linguistic-theoretical focus to a framework with stronger roots in the study of postcoloniality as a real, lived condition experienced by a large number of people.

The above arguments are realized through a reading of Anglo-Indian literature which closely aligns both the displaced postcolonial figure and the passing figure through a shared ability to perform multiple identities. In adopting the passing figure, Anglo-Indian literature illustrates the rejection of in culture forms of rigid and constraining essentialisms and the commitment to modernist and contemporary cultural discourses of identity construction in the hybrid figure of postcolonial works. Such cultural discourses of identity presuppose the intervention of performativity in the negotiation of multiple selves. Both the hybrid postcolonial figure and the passing figure display an adoption of performance in identity construction.

In a theoretical reflection of the multiplicity offered by the passing figure, a number of diverse critical approaches to these Anglo-Indian texts are introduced. Specifically, the aim is to suggest alternative theoretical approaches to the hegemonic poststructuralist critical view. I will argue that the reliance upon poststructuralist theory can be detrimental to the full exploration of the postcolonial identity, due largely to the tendency to privilege textual fee-play over experiential analysis. I am proposing a modification to the relationship between deconstruction and postcolonialism, whereby certain selected deconstructive techniques are appropriated alongside more existentialist concerns that reflect the real, lived conditions of postcolonial environments. In relocating textual critique within an approach more concerned with the real-life experience of multiplicity, this study advocates a continuing relevance of a more existentialist mode of postcolonialism, as exemplified by Sartre and Fanon, and other adjacent theorists. An example of this is that popular and contemporary authors such as Naipaul, Rushdie, Kureishi and Malkani are read in light of “dialogical self theory”, R.D. Laing’s “false-self system”, Fish’s “interpretive communities” thesis and Goffman’s concept of “front”. Dialogical self theory and the false-self system ensure a firm underpinning of the
internal psychological structure of the passing figure’s psyche, establishing a discourse of postcolonialism that is centred on the real experience of multiplicity. The following work on interpretive communities and front allow for the connection of the internal construction of self to the wider social environment through the relocation of the passing figure’s identity in relation to the interpretations of the audience.
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Introduction: The Passing Figure in Anglo-Indian Literature

The study of contemporary Anglo-Indian literature indicates a transformation in the concept of identity from a rigid and permanent structure to one characterized by fluidity and adaptation. Significant in this transformation is the displaced postcolonial migrant figure, usually a racial or cultural hybrid who illustrates the ability to adopt or reject sometimes opposing identities, seemingly at will. In the postcolonial migrant’s transcending or transgressing of the boundaries that serve to distinguish one identity from another (including such barriers as race, class, nation, and religion among others), the effectiveness of these divisions are called into question by the porosity they exhibit. I argue that both the ability and conscious decision to transcend such boundaries lead to the postcolonial figure engaging in an act of “passing”. “Passing” in its purest form is the intentional deception of identity; the process of passing involves the disguise and concealment of a pre-existing identity and the adoption and performance of another identity. The representation of the person engaged in the act of passing within literature has developed from the narratives of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century African-American fiction. These narratives included texts such as Nella Larsen’s *Passing* (1929) and James Weldon Johnson’s *Autobiography of an Ex-Coloured Man* (1912), which have seen a resurgence of critical interest since the 1990s. I argue in this thesis that it is productive to consider the postcolonial figure as a “passing figure” due to the postcolonial hybrid’s ability to demonstrate opposing or different personas and the intentional choice to do so in interactive events with others.

The displaced postcolonial migrant and the person engaged in the act of passing share a symbolic disunity which binds them to two or more notions of self or identity at any one given time. Both figures are located in the peripheral positions between established cultural centres, which allows them to appropriate the characteristics of the individual cultures or construct a synthesis of those (sometimes opposing) identities. Consequently, they displace the notion of identity as a stable and permanent social structure capable of adequate personal identity construction. At the same time, the otherness that both the postcolonial and passing figure demonstrates ensure that they remain firmly rejected from those cultural centres, whilst at the same time allowing for the identification with them. Throughout this dissertation I will use the passing figure to demonstrate the process of identity construction which the figure of the hybrid so engaged exemplifies. Through the continuous process of defining and re-defining identity in the adoption and rejection of multiple cultural centres, the passing figure
makes use of the mechanism of performance in the construction of self. My argument is that the demonstrable use of performance by the hybrid figure belies an engagement with forms of passing. It is through the recognition that the hybrid identity operates as a consciously performed self that we can then apply discourses of passing as a framework for the exploration of what it means to be a hybrid identity or a postcolonial migrant who can display different identities. I argue that this is significant as it suggests a move away from the discourse of hybridity and the connotations involved with a terminological basis in genetics, to a framework that works to consolidate identity construction as a cultural engagement through performance behaviours and the less deterministic acceptance of personal agency in the identity construction process.

My conception of the performed identity is taken from Erving Goffman’s *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959). Within this text, Goffman examines the construction of identity through the analogy of the stage performance. His preface dictates his concern to illustrate how the individual in everyday situations ‘presents himself and his activity to others, the ways in which he guides and controls the impression they form of him, and the kinds of things he may and may not do while sustaining his performance before them.’. Although he notes in using the dramaturgical perspective, whereas the performer, other performers and the audience constitute three separate but linked parties, in real life the other performers and the audience become one other party. When writing of the individual and their interactions with other people, Goffman notes they may wish to ‘defraud, get rid of, confuse, mislead, antagonize, or insult them.’ but regardless of their intention, it will be in their interests to attempt to control the conduct of others and especially, the responsive treatment directed towards the individual. Such control can be achieved by influencing the definition of the situation formulated by the other interactants. The definition is, in turn, controlled by acting in such a way as to provide them with a particular impression that will lead them into acting in the way that is desired by the individual voluntarily.

Sometimes this is intentional, at others the individual influencing of the definition can be unaware that he is doing so. Of course, ‘The individual’s initial projection commits him to what he is proposing to be and requires him to drop all pretences of being other things.’ Goffman defines performance as ‘the activity of a given participant on a given occasion which serves to influence in any way any of the other participants.’

For this to work, Goffman argues that society is predicated on the principle that when an individual demonstrates certain characteristics, they have the right to demand that they are treated in a manner appropriate to the characteristics they command. On the other hand,
connected to this is the principle that when an individual indicates the presence of certain characteristics, he should be what those characteristics would suggest he is and not something other. Essentially, a ‘moral demand’ is exerted upon other interactants that when a definition of a situation is projected, and a claim is made as to the kind of person the individual wishes to be perceived as, he should accordingly be treated as that person. The individual will, however, forgo the right to be anything other than the person he has claimed to be. In essence, ‘The others find, then, that the individual has informed them as to what is and as to what they ought to see as the ‘is’.’

Accordingly, Goffman can introduce a performative framework into his study of the construction of identity. In the passage quoted above, no identity is a fixed entity but instead it is always relative to the definitions given by the performer and received by the audience. Significantly, Goffman briefly extended his study to India, quoting M.N. Srinivas on the caste system. Srinivas notes how movement between seemingly rigid religious identities has always been a possibility, particularly so in the middle regions of the system. It is perfectly possible for a low caste individual to adopt vegetarianism, teetotalism, Sanskritize ritual and pantheon and ultimately perform the Brahmanic lifestyle in order to rise up a position or two within a couple of generations. Theoretically, this is forbidden, but it seems to have been a common occurrence. The caste system is particularly revealing of the unique British-Indian context as it plainly relies upon a performative view of the self as opposed to an essentialist racial theory. Movement between different identities (low caste to Brahmin and vice versa) is perfectly possible and is predicated upon the displayed behaviour of an individual. The Anglo-Indian has the benefit of cultural ties to both a modern Britain embracing cultural theory and an India whose dominant societal structure of religion also exhibits the qualities of the new modernist view of identity construction. By re-appropriating the passing figure into the British-Indian context, I am highlighting the predisposition of the Anglo-Indian for a modernist identity politics. Whether affiliated more to a British or an Indian cultural centre, the Anglo-Indian is intrinsically connected to an ideology of postcolonial multiplicity and performativity.

Contemporary Anglo-Indian literature adopts the passing figure in order to displace the notion of a rigid identity as defined by philosophies propounding an essentialist notion of both identity and ethnicity, which was itself partly a result of genetic developments and the eugenics movement of the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In utilizing the act of passing it is necessary to recognize that although still engaged in the division of boundaries such as race, nation, culture and class, the tactic of passing has undergone some dramatic
revisions from the original concept as found in African-American practices and reflected in associated fictive and non-fictive works. The British-Indian context, in opposition to the American context, supported a much more flexible attitude to race and the divisions between different groups of people. The essentialism common to the American South was much less prevalent and subsequently relationships between Britons and Indians came to be (at least in part) influenced by a cultural discourse of identity informed by the intellectual developments of later modernism and the growing popularity of relativism.

For Elaine Ginsberg, the genealogy of ‘passing’ in American history is associated with racial difference and specifically with the adoption of a “white” identity by someone who would be defined as possessing a “black” or “Negro” identity in a legal or cultural sense. Passing is very much associated with the African-American slave population “passing for white” and so gaining their freedom. She notes that the term indicates an individual who has ‘crossed or passed through a racial line or boundary—indeed trespassed—to assume a new identity, escaping the subordination and oppression accompanying one identity and accessing the privileges and status of the other.’. ¹⁰ Passing has also been extended to the disguise of other elements of the self, including for example gender, sexuality, class and ethnicity. It is not necessary for the passing figure, to misrepresent their race, although this is probably the most common aspect of passing, especially given the strong connection to the concept of a racial hierarchy and the slave culture of America in which it has largely evolved. The majority of blacks who managed to pass for white were hybrids who usually had a black mother and white father (often the father was a slave owner who had sexual relations with or raped his female slaves), thus endowing them with lighter skin and a “white” look. Culturally they could identify with either whites or blacks and were well placed to be able to pass between the two groups.

For the purposes of this study I am defining passing in its most simplistic form, that is the misrepresentation of an identity in order to reject certain characteristic aspects of a particular persona (which would evoke presuppositions, very often negative in others) and subsequently assume or adopt other, perhaps more desired characteristics in their place. This definition does not necessitate “passing for white” or indeed “passing for black” but implies the manipulation of the perception of the passing figure’s identity. The ability to pass usually depends on the use of disguise and masquerade to suggest that the passing figure’s identity is a genuine representation of what one wishes to be perceived as. By engaging in a masquerade, the passing figure indicates the ability to perform an alternative identity which serves to link him/her to the postcolonial discourse of hybridity. In the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries, the role of performance has become more critical to the act of passing with the disintegration of the authority previously invested in skin colour. When compared to the nineteenth century, contemporary accounts of identity place relatively little emphasis upon skin colour as a sign of racial belonging which in turn was taken to represent the totalized identity construct. Instead, the ability to perform a role carries more authority in the construction of self. Both the cultural/racial hybrid and the person engaged in passing illustrate the identification with two or more different identities; which one they assume at any given time is informed by a performative process of adoption and projection. As I argue throughout, however, any person can employ a performative approach to the construction of identity, opening up the rejection of essentialism and the adoption of a postcolonial multiplicity to everyone who constructs a persona. As such, I offer a framework for the understanding of all identity construction which is localized here in the study of Anglo-Indian writers.

In making the connection between the passing figure and the hybrid figure explicit in the works of contemporary Anglo-Indians, I will demonstrate that the notion of passing, although more usually deployed within an African-American context, can be applied to the British-Indian context of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Theoretically, I am also proposing that recent postcolonial attempts to investigate the hybrid figure have stalled due to a radical disconnection between certain branches of theory and the ground state of lived reality. As an alternative, I suggest in this dissertation a variety of methodological approaches to the postcolonial figure that although still referencing and deploying aspects of poststructuralist theory, offer a framework that adequately reflects the real and lived experiential content that I argue is a significant part of the human condition of postcoloniality. I am advocating a return to the earlier postcolonial work of Frantz Fanon which is typified by an overt concern for the development of self and its relationship to wider societal forces, influenced in turn by the existentialist work of philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre’s concept of existentialism was predicated upon the freedom that beings exhibit in the construction and development of selves, culminating in the dictum ‘existence precedes essence’. Sartre’s dictum illustrated how the self or persona was independent of any aspect of pure existence but rather developed after existence had commenced within the given life world. As such, it rejected deterministic philosophies marked by essentialisms due to the complicity of existence and essence with each other. The application of theorists such as Erving Goffman and R.D. Laing illustrate the return to a postcolonial methodology that privileges postcoloniality as the lived condition of colonized peoples rather than an intellectual exercise in contemporary Western discourses.
which simultaneously exists within and creates an object of study somewhat removed from a more fundamental sense of an objective reality. One of the thesis’s main objectives is to deploy other theorists in a manner that may suggest that Sartre’s existentialism is demonstrably active in postcolonial fictions, evidenced in the ability to construct and reconstruct identities through the adoption of passing and the autonomy this provides over deterministic philosophies like racial essentialism.

The vast majority of research conducted into passing so far is located in the historical context of the American South and the continuing troubled relationship that America experiences with race theory. As a result of the British-Indian location of my research, the methods and approaches adopted in this thesis stand apart from other perspectives on the passing figure. The British context provides a limited amount of research. However, one academic, John McBratney, has written an article titled “Passing and the Modern Persona in Kipling’s Ethnographer Fiction” (1996), within which he discusses the contribution to passing literature made by Rudyard Kipling. He is primarily interested in the contribution that Kipling made to modern forms of identity construction and holds passing as representative of new methods for negotiating cultural difference in the modern period. McBratney focusses upon developments in anthropology, made primarily by Boas and Malinowski, determining that Kipling wrote at a time when ‘pre-modernist notions of race were gradually giving way to modernist conceptions of culture that, in a spirit of relativism, challenged received ideas about racial essence and hierarchy.’ Passing was a typical method for exploring this thematic change as the rigid binaries of the pre-modernist period were being displaced by fluid and ever-adapting modes of identity construction. He concludes that several of Kipling’s characters are motivated to construct themselves without the traditional ideology of race. In essence, McBratney argues that ‘Cultural identity came to be thought of as a dynamic entity continually reconstructed by the individual actor on a stage governed by multiple, relative, non-privileged cultural scripts.’

This new notion of identity was explored in Kipling’s works through the adoption of passing in his ethnographic fiction and consisted of the use of disguise which became a method for understanding and decoding other cultures. Ethnographic fiction, as a genre, was concerned with the gathering of anthropological information about other cultures in a bid to unlock these seemingly new modes of identity. Significantly, McBratney uses the terminology of a performance: ‘scripts’, ‘individual actor’ and ‘stage’, which illustrate the performative nature of all identity construction.
McBratney offers a unique starting point for the study of passing in contemporary British-Indian postcolonial literature. I will build upon his conception of passing as a result of anthropological developments but alternatively suggest new directions from which we can approach the act of passing and begin to detail the process of passing as a social phenomenon. I will illustrate the re-appropriation of the passing figure into contemporary Anglo-Indian postcolonial literature and possible alternative postcolonial methodologies by taking four popular significant and yet authors and offering a chapter-length case study of how each of these writers engages differently with the passing figure and offers a unique perspective on the construction of identity. The selected writers are V.S. Naipaul, Salman Rushdie, Hanif Kureishi and Gautam Malkani.

Each has either a direct or hereditary connection to both India/Pakistan and Britain through either genetic history which connects them to another culture or they have spent a considerable period domiciled in the two countries country, imbued with the cultural dynamics of both. In this understanding, each of these writers also possesses the qualities of hybridity, either in a racial or cultural fashion. Significantly still, each of them also therefore possesses the ability to pass as either British or Indian due to the performative mechanism available to them and an intimate knowledge of both cultures. My decision to include those who have Indian heritage but have been domiciled overseas is justifiable with regard to the long-term effects of colonialism. Despite the removal of colonial settlers, the ideology of imperialism has perhaps not been as quickly dismantled. Similarly, in relocating from the geographic spaces of colonial contact, the ideologies have remained imprinted on the colonized/colonizers who then pass these ideologies down through their subsequent generations. For example, V.S. Naipaul has Indian heritage but can identify with British culture due to his significant period of domicile in Britain. His Trinidadian upbringing was largely influenced by his Indian heritage and the global reach of British/Western culture. Essentially, he grew up under the twin shadows of an Indian heritage and the British Empire. Although it is arguable that the writers I have included identify with Britain more than India, they do all have some form of connection to India/Pakistan which is sufficiently strong to allow them to at least partly identify with that other heritage. It is not, therefore, untenable that the writers identified within this research can themselves occupy the role of the passing figure in displaying an Indian/Pakistani identity, should they choose to do so. Alternatively, the ability to identify with either Britain or India is a concern apparent in any reading of their fiction, if not in their personal lives.
Chapter One will open our discussion of the passing figure with a reading of V.S. Naipaul’s *The Mimic Men* (1967) and *The Enigma of Arrival* (1987) within which I argue that the protagonists of both texts are best understood as passing figures through the application of Hubert Hermans’ dialogical self theory. Dialogical self theory is a psychological theory influenced heavily by Bakhtin’s work on the polyphonic novel and dialogism. I argue that in applying dialogical self theory to Naipaul’s writing, the multiple selves of the split postcolonial/passing figure are identified with specific roles and enabled to interact with each other in the creation of a dialogic persona. The second section of this chapter introduces the passing figure as a performer, able to adopt and reject roles based on the provision of a good performance as a particular character. The significance of performance, an issue I will return to throughout every chapter, is that it allows the passing figure to negotiate around the ideology of essentialist race theory. Instead, the passing figure illustrates the capacities for self-reform, rendering identity a fluid and malleable concept with a closer connection to culture over race as the totalizer of identity construction.

Chapter Two continues from Chapter One in adopting an individual approach to the passing figure through an in-depth analysis of the multiplicity that is displayed by Salman Rushdie’s protagonist Gibreel in *The Satanic Verses* (1988). This is achieved by forging a connection between the postcolonial figure of Gibreel and R.D. Laing’s “divided self” concept. However, I begin the chapter by offering a quasi-Derridean reading of *The Satanic Verses*. The purpose of this reading is twofold; firstly it demonstrates how the poststructuralist approach is formed and allows for an illustration of its effectiveness as a discursive framework from which to develop postcolonial enquiries. Secondly, it constitutes a platform from which we can contrast the methodology offered in the wider thesis concerning existentialism and the rejection of a purely textual focus which removes any claim to objective truth in identity. Moreover, this critical strategy will simultaneously allow a consideration of the supposed ‘postmodern’ features of Rushdie’s text identified by so many critics in the past, and rather situate his novel as being thoroughly imbued with the dynamics and possibilities of magic realism. Additionally, within this deconstructionist reading I demonstrate how the religion embodied by the archangel Gibreel can be deconstructed to disrupt the assumption that religion offers a potential totalization of the construction of self. In resisting totalization, Gibreel’s persona is complicit with postcolonial efforts to offer a model of identity construction similar to that employed by the passing figure. From here I contrast this reading with my wider argument centring upon the development of the archangel Gibreel and a correlation with Laing’s unembodied self, which
allows us to theorize on the internal contradictions between the split persona of the postcolonial figure. As the archangel persona is seen as an antagonist to Gibreel’s healthy self, Laing’s divided self system illustrates the issue of authenticity in the multiplicity of the passing figure. With reference to the split identity if the schizophrenic I argue that the postcolonial figure is indicative of a more natural mode of existence over the perceived image of multiplicity as abnormality.

Chapter Three pivots from an individual approach to the passing figure to a wider societal perspective on the role of audience participation in constructing identity. This is shown through a reading of Hanif Kureishi’s novels *The Buddha of Suburbia* (1990) and *The Black Album* (1995). Specifically I argue that in light of Stanley Fish’s “interpretive communities” thesis, the characters Shahid, Karim and Haroon can be seen as passing figures as their identities are re-interpreted by different groups who operate according to their own interpretive strategies. Essentially, rather than consciously passing, Shahid, Karim and Haroon are made into passing figures by third party participants in the interaction event between the protagonists and other characters. The role of the audience illustrates the importance of wider societal ideologies in identity construction, relocating postcolonial conceptions of the self from a private to a public sphere of theoretical inquiry. The chapter also suggests a rejection of the modern assimilation model in Britain, arguing instead that Kureishi’s wider body of work supports a cultural hybridity as a more beneficial strategy for assimilation. The peripheral characters in his literature who present numerous representations of Englishness reject the notion of assimilation. These peripheral characters act to sustain the image of Britain as a multicultural society whereby the stock or “typical” Englishman is nowhere to be found.

Chapter Four offers a reading of Gautam Malkani’s *Londonstani* (2006) in which the protagonist, Jas, is shown to construct his self by paying particular attention to what Erving Goffman would term a “front”. In using Goffman’s “front” to illustrate Jas’s attempt to pass amongst the “rudeboys” among whom he desires to be accepted, Jas demonstrates the conscious processes that accompany the passing figure as he/she negotiates identity boundaries. Crucially, the performance that Jas displays acts as a bridge between the internal and external aspects of passing. He performs an identity in a bid to be accepted as such, but the audience also have a role in constructing his self, making *Londonstani* a combination of both the previous individual and wider social approaches to the passing figure. The chapter also considers the moments when a performance fails and authority to play a particular role is questioned. These moments of “slippage” reveal the discrepancy between the adoption of
social fronts and social roles. The text suggests that through slippage a genuine or true identity is revealed, although obscured by a false self. However, in transgressing the boundaries of identity through the adoption of performance, the moment of slippage reveals the discrepancy between a front and a role to the audience allowing for the acceptance of identity as a conscious construction of the self, aided by a postcolonial multiplicity.

In adopting such varied theoretical approaches to the study of the phenomenon of passing, I am offering alternative theoretical models through which we can analyse the identity of the hybrid. These alternative approaches work to circumvent the deficiencies that are demonstrably present in the poststructuralist-influenced hegemonic theory enjoying prominence today through the connection to a more explicitly existentialist account of the development of a modern identity theory.

Deconstruction, Anti-Reality and the Rejection of Objective Truth Values: The Problem with a Poststructuralist Framework

One key intention of my research is to suggest alternative approaches for the study of postcolonial figures in literature to what had until recently been an almost hegemonic poststructuralist theory in the humanities, widespread and prevalent in literary criticism. Poststructuralism’s role in the development of postcolonialism is well known, with perhaps Homi Bhabha’s work being the most extensive example of a deconstructive approach to hybridity and colonial anxiety. However, in the last two decades, other critics have begun to lament the over-reliance of postcolonialism on foundational ideas from poststructuralism. As Pal Ahluwalia rightfully states, that postcolonialism is ‘epistemologically indebted’ to poststructuralism and postmodernism means it remains susceptible to certain charges, challenging its authenticity. Ahluwalia suggests that as postcolonialism is so often linked to postmodernism and poststructuralism, to the point that similar language is often employed in all three discourses, hence a confusion arises as a key part of postmodernism is the attempted deconstruction of European logocentric meta-narratives, much like the postcolonial project of dismantling European imperialism. As such, postcolonialism is liable to the objection that it has become a discourse of Third World intellectuals who are re-located in the First World. In response to Ahluwalia’s criticism, I am suggesting a return to a more existentialist position in postcolonialism, concerning my research with a locatedness in the experience of actual lived postcoloniality as a concrete condition, rather than positioning myself strictly within the confines of Western discourse. Ahluwalia makes a compelling argument for the approach I
am adopting as an alternative to a post-structuralist informed postcolonialism. He maintains that for French poststructuralism to be thoroughly understood, one must contextualize the ‘African colonial experience’ and the ‘Algerian locatedness, identity and heritage’ of prominent figures. For Ahluwalia, ‘It is precisely the failure to confront or explicitly acknowledge the colonial experience that problematises the conflation of post-colonialism and poststructuralism.’ Ahluwalia’s criticism is perceptive in that it does not suggest that poststructuralism is a lost cause, merely that it needs to be relocated back into the contexts in which it is frequently used. I am also advocating that poststructuralism is a useful critical theory, but one that could be much more complete if it can reflect the real concerns of those living in a condition of postcoloniality.

To make his argument, Ahluwalia draws attention to Edward Said’s view that ‘the world from which the text originated, the world with which it was affiliated, is crucial.’ For Ahluwalia, by bringing together the world, the text and the critic we can highlight their affiliation, meaning that ‘the text is crucial in the way we ‘have’ a world, but the world exists as the text’s location, and that worldliness is constructed within the text.’ We can accept, then, that the text does not exist independently of the world but forms a part of it and vice versa also. As Ahluwalia notes, Said’s viewpoint appears to be significantly supportive of the approach I am adopting: ‘For Said, theory can be effective only when it is located firmly within the world.’ Consequently, Ahluwalia refers directly to Said to clarify his position on the usefulness of poststructuralist theory to postcolonialism. He quotes the following passage from Said’s *The World, The Text and the Critic* (1983):

> there seems to be no contact with the world of events and societies, which modern history, intellectuals, and critics have in fact built. Instead, contemporary criticism is an institution for publicly affirming the values of our, that is, European, dominant elite culture, and for privately setting loose the unrestrained interpretation of a universe defined in advance as the endless misreading of a misinterpretation. The result has been the regulated, not to say calculated, irrelevance of criticism…”

Ahluwalia thus quotes Said, making clear that Said’s criticism is directed towards the poststructuralists and postmodernists. Ahluwalia asserts that ‘The suppression of the worldly origin of the theory, which might lead to the recognition of the actual effects of monolithic
European discourses, establishes a chasm between the theory and its elaboration as the intellectually transformative discourse it aims to be.

By developing a postcolonial framework influenced by existentialism and the earlier work of Fanon, I am re-constructing postcolonialism as the transformative discourse it purports to be in light of the criticism offered by Ahluwalia.

Ahluwalia’s arguments also draw attention to a loss of momentum in the project of deconstruction. In 1992 Nealon similarly proclaimed dramatically that ‘Deconstruction it seems, is dead in literature departments today.’. However, it is worthwhile noting that deconstruction did still enjoy a popular following in the literary academy over the following ten years from the date of Nealon’s claims. Nealon’s description of deconstruction’s end takes the form of a symbolic ‘suicide’ or ‘murder’. In his post-mortem he offers the following suggestions as to the cause of deconstruction’s end:

Deconstruction's death is usually attributed either to suicide-to its falling back into the dead-end formalism it was supposed to remedy-or to murder at the hands of the new historicists, whose calls for rehistoricizing and recontextualizing the study of literature have successfully called into question the supposed self-cancelling textualism of the deconstructionists.

Nealon is also critical of the use of deconstruction by American academics, specifically noting the “Yale school”.

Although Nealon’s criticisms of deconstruction were made some time ago his arguments are still justifiable. In relocating the passing figure from an African-American context to a British-Indian context, I am also diverting from the American tradition of poststructuralism. Passing scholarship has problems with adequately comprehending the relationship to identity of British-Indian texts because of a very specific American pre-occupation with poststructuralist discourse. Nealon notes a link between both Rodolphe Gasché, a supporter of deconstructive theory, and the opponents of deconstruction in that they both ‘come to the same general conclusions about the inadequacy of deconstructive literary criticism as it was and is practiced in America, especially by the "Yale school" and this circle's followers.’. Nealon, however, suggests that deconstruction is not a completely lost cause, and progresses to prescribe a potential solution for deconstruction’s salvation,
if deconstruction is to be useful at all to literary criticism […] then deconstructive literary criticism must face up to the questions posed by Derrida and do something other than provide a method for producing readings, for reasserting mastery over texts—the method that most of the deconstructionist critics in America have unfortunately applied to Derrida's writings.  

Nealon here is perhaps referring to the charge against deconstruction which, as noted by Christopher Norris, is that the acceptance of all “truth-claims” as equally valid serves only to deprive those claims of any epistemic foundation from which to evaluate “truth”. Norris also notes that many cultural relativists will ‘cheerfully acknowledge’ this charge, with the conviction that their brand of relativistic thought does not need a firm epistemic foundation as their discourse serves only to disrupt and challenge pre-existing notions of truth.  

In this sense deconstruction can be considered a form of anarchy which serves to disrupt received truth values but which I argue ultimately becomes liable to charges of conservatism in that no alternative truth-value system can be imposed. Postcolonialism is also susceptible to this charge: identity can be deconstructed multiple times until the concept of identity itself becomes meaningless as there are so many “real” identities (none of which hold any ontological value over any others). This becomes a form of “free-play”, wherein relativism determines that all positions are equally valid. With the postcolonial identity, all experiential content is removed from the equation as identity can itself be subject to the free-play of deconstruction rendering the concept of identity as inherently meaningless as no ontological platform can be established. Norris is keen to point out, however, that Derrida himself did not necessarily endorse the view that deconstruction permits anything and everything to be accepted as a truth claim. For example, Norris notes that ‘Derrida is routinely taken to assert that texts can be read however one likes since there is nothing – no appeal to context or authorial intent – that could possibly decide the issue or limit the range of permissible options in any given case.’ In essence, it is this disavowal of any limits to meanings or structures that may impose meaning that constitute the free-play this thesis is rejecting. The textual free-play of deconstruction that suggests all truth claims are equally valid and which is commonly appropriated by critics is the focus of the critique of my argument. Indeed, as Norris makes clear: “[Derrida] has often been at pains to repudiate this ‘anything goes’ approach and to lay down stringent criteria for what properly counts as a deconstructive reading.” Norris argues that there are numerous examples in Derrida’s ‘writings on Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel,
Husserl, J.L. Austin and others – of the way that deconstruction both respects and complicates those received (conservative but none the less essential) standards of interpretive truth.

Norris suggests that it is primarily academics of literary theory that misread Derrida as encouraging an attitude of epistemic free-play and take for granted his ‘indifference to such standards.’

Norris follows the relativist, textual free-play variant of deconstruction to its logical end when he introduces his argument in *Language, Logic and Epistemology: A Modal-Realist Approach* (2004). Norris notes how anti-realist discourses such as that followed by the ‘‘strong’ sociologists’ tend to reject the claims of the hard sciences as offering objective truths and to promote the social or human sciences to a ‘privileged status’ when explaining the development of knowledge through the scientific enterprise. Norris notes that this view is in accordance with the linguistic turn and suggests that knowledge is only the product of ‘various language-games, vocabularies, or preferential modes of talk.’ Norris argues that to adopt such a view opens the door to some absurd “truths”. For example, if reality is really only a linguistic construct then there is no objective truth behind the ‘genetic structure of the AIDS virus’, a thought which Norris suggests is a ‘false source of comfort and – at worst- a callous exploitation of the human propensity to accept whatever suits our psychological needs and desires.’ Norris strongly urges that a realist approach to such issues will not only lead to a better understanding of science epistemologically but also from an ‘ethical or socio-political’ viewpoint as ‘there is no purpose to be served by criticising science, its practical applications or its wider social consequences unless such criticism is firmly based on a realist assessment of its powers and capacities in that regard.’

Norris advances his critique of deconstruction through a perceptive critical analysis of deconstructive musicology, suggesting that the deconstructive agenda held by some only hinders their assessment of the aural experience. It is Norris’s contention that the adoption of deconstruction by music theorists as a position opposed to aesthetic ideology is actually a position which is so far removed from our ‘cognitive involvement with music’ that it is revealed to be a discourse not about music but instead ‘certain abstract theoretical issues that often have little or no bearing on our perception of musical works.’ When Norris’s critiques are transposed to our context of postcolonial identity, I want to suggest that deconstruction fails to meet the demands of those in postcolonial countries as it is similarly too far removed from the experiences of colonialism to be of significant critical value. In the same way that deconstructive musicology becomes more about ‘abstract theoretical issues’, I would argue that deconstructive postcolonialism is similarly susceptible to distraction by
irrelevant linguistic and philosophical concerns to accurately represent the stories of those constrained by colonial relations.

In his essay Norris argues that the theoretical adoption of deconstruction is a rejection of the more traditional discourse of “musical analysis.” Although analysis has largely been rejected by the “deconstructive musicologists” as ‘complicit with a form of naïve aestheticist thinking’, Norris argues that the analytical approach has the ability to stay ‘reliably in touch with the listener’s musical experience, whereas the discourse that purports to deconstruct such claims does so, very often, from the vantage point of a theory that seems quite devoid of substantive perceptual or experiential content.’ Norris criticizes Paul de Man’s anti-phenomenalist view as it is adopted by musicologists, for pushing the interpretation of music towards a linguistic bias over any perceptual reaction so that musicology is not so much a discussion about music but the language that constitutes music. Therefore, Norris suggests, if there is nothing in the work itself that can guide our responses, the resistance to aesthetic ideology must come from the linguistic apparatus used to read the work in the first instance. Given this, Norris concludes that ‘the critique of aesthetic ideology is one that operates at a level so remote from the music itself (or from anything that analysis might hope to uncover) that it becomes entirely detached from its object and enters a realm of speculative theory devoid of any genuine critical purchase.’

With regard to postcolonial identity and the adoption by many of deconstruction, I would suggest that the emphasis upon the linguistic construction of reality shifts the focus away from individuals and humans to a depersonalized global theory which is then used to explain human conditions. The issue arises, however, that in the shift in focus from human experiences to the interpretive linguistic structure of deconstruction, those same human individuals lose the ability to self-identify and become instead the product of a (Western) language construct devoid of any moral obligation to answer to reality as an objective truth. As a result, the study of postcolonial identity is not answerable to actual identities and the objectivities of human experience but is free to describe and re-describe identity according to its own (Western) agenda.

Norris attempts to offer an alternative to the deconstructive approach to musicology by borrowing from cognitive psychology to demonstrate the interdependence of theory and perceptual responses. He adopts philosopher Jerry Fodor’s module thesis, wherein he states that certain human responses have become hardwired to avoid excessive cognitive processing, such as responses to intense heat or sharp objects which enable us to survive better. By shortening our responses through pathways of neural networks, we are enabled to
react quicker to situations of potential danger.⁴⁵ According to Mark Debellis, musical responses exhibit a significant degree of change when exposed to music knowledge, or the recognition of more complex aural thematics. Norris refers to Chomsky to note that music responses may be related to similar responses to verbal language in terms of harmonies and tones. Norris suggests that musical perceptions may be said to display a significant degree of cognitive impermeability, or it may operate in ‘virtual isolation from that whole range of other, theoretically informed or culturally acquired modes of response.’ ⁴⁶ For Norris, this leads to a strong argument for the co-dependant responses from both ‘musical ‘intuition’’ and ‘those sources of sharpened critical awareness which most listeners presumably seek from analysts, theorists, and musicologists.’ ⁴⁷ Norris’s adoption of Fodor’s cognitive module theory is significantly removed from the ‘relentless deconstructive hermeneutics of suspicion that entirely discounts the appeal to phenomenal (or quasi-phenomenal) modes of perception’ which Norris suggests serve to set listener response against what he labels as ‘counter-intuitive’, those contemporary assertions of music theory. ⁴⁸ The argument that Norris advances, that our musical perceptions are the result of something that harbours its own resistance within the work and which can be encouraged through analytical evaluation can be relocated to the discourse of postcolonial identity. It is my suggestion that with postcolonial identity, much like Norris adoption of Fodor’s cognitive module theory, we are best placed to understand identity when we accept that it has an objective value in itself that can be developed through a close critical analysis.

Identity, when reduced to a configuration in a language game is too reductive a framework and discounts any experiential value held by postcolonial identity holders. This dismantling of any significance found in experience and perception is potentially harmful to a discourse which aims to be transformative for those who are subject to ideologies of oppression and confinement. Norris’s approach is similar to what I am proposing in this study, a recasting of deconstructive theory alongside the experiential values of those whose identity we seek to deconstruct.

Norris draws upon Adorno as also supportive of the idea that our musical responses are a reaction to ‘something there in the work’, although he is equally accepting of the fact that our experiences are mediated by social and cultural forms. ⁴⁹ To make Norris’s position clear, he notes his view that ‘theory does best when it remains closely in touch with the findings of musical analysis’. ⁵⁰ My own position on deconstruction in postcolonial studies remains much the same, the explanatory power of postcolonial discourse will do best when kept in close
contact with the subjects it claims to represent. As Norris suggests in relation to deconstructive musicology:

Any theory that rejects the claims of analysis-or ‘structural listening’- as nothing more than a product of aesthetic ideology will be prone to over-estimate the role of theoretical discourse in promoting such resistance and, by the same token, to under-estimate music’s intrinsic capacity to challenge or unsettle our habituated modes of response.\(^{51}\)

I would concur that deconstructive theory in the realm of postcolonial studies will be similarly prone to misjudge the oppressed subjects ability to offer resistance, instead emphasising a misguided appeal to poststructuralist theory as an all-encompassing theory that cannot be refuted on logical grounds.

Alongside Christopher Norris, philosopher Roy Bhaskar has similarly been critical of the linguistic turn as evidenced by his development of “critical realism”. His critical realist theory is a combination of his philosophy of science, which he called “transcendental realism” and his philosophy of the social sciences, named “critical naturalism”. Over time other critics have merged the two terms into “critical realism”.\(^{52}\) The significance that Bhaskar attaches to the social world is of particular importance in the argument against a deconstructive reading of the social realities of postcolonial identities. For Bhaskar, ‘social theory and social reality are causally interdependent.’. By this Bhaskar does not refer to the social theorist constructing reality (as may well be advanced by poststructuralists when they reduce identity to the effects of subjectivized language games) but the fact that social theory is ‘conditioned by, and potentially has practical consequences in society.’.\(^{53}\) Bhaskar is insistent upon the causal relationship between theory on the one hand and society as the object of its study on the other, and even advocates direct intervention in society as a result of social theoretical development:

It always consists in a practical intervention in social life and sometimes (other things being equal) it logically entails values and actions. In these circumstances, the standard fact/value and theory/practice distinctions break down.\(^{54}\)
This locates Bhaskar’s critical realist theory squarely at odds with deconstruction which remains disconnected from its object of study and hence unable to offer any significant intervention towards the project of human emancipation. Bhaskar makes his argument with reference to Durkheim’s insistence that we are coerced into action by a range of “social facts”. Durkheim suggests that the externality of these “social facts” form a constraining framework that influences our own actions through offering resistance to violations of these established social facts. For example, Durkheim suggests that he is guided into speaking his native French with fellow countrymen and using the French currency. Durkheim notes that he can refuse to engage in these activities: he could speak an alternative language and use another currency. The result for that individual would be that he could “violate” the rules of the social structure, but this would leave him a coercive struggle against the social facts that he has rejected. For example, in speaking another language to his countrymen he will struggle to engage in meaningful dialogue and the use of another currency may make the purchase of necessary goods almost impossible. In this struggle, the coercion of the social system will be manifest in the struggle that individual feels against the social facts he has rejected.

However, Bhaskar argues that we cannot dismiss the notion that the range of social facts we encounter are themselves the product of the intentional activity of humans. He argues that ‘The individualist truth that people are the only moving forces in history – in the sense that nothing happens behind their backs, that is, everything that happens, happens in and through their actions – must be retained.’ Our own agency creates these social facts which, for Bhaskar, are in principle at least enabling as well as coercive. When adopting Bhaskar’s critical realism as a critique of deconstructive influences upon postcolonialism, it is significant to note that Bhaskar holds society as something that we inevitably reproduce and transform:

We do not create society-the error of voluntarism. But these structures which pre-exist us are only reproduced or transformed in our everyday activities; thus society does not exist independently of human agency-the error of reification. The social world is reproduced or transformed in daily life.

Bhaskar clarifies his view on the possibilities of social transformation when he notes that ‘for critical realism the social world, being itself a social product, is seen as essentially subject to the possibility of transformation.’ Bhaskar’s insistence upon the transformative power or
theory in the practical and tangible realities of the social world suggest something of the existentialist framework that I am suggesting offers a better theoretical foundation for postcolonialism than does poststructuralism. As Sartre’s existentialism suggests, when someone chooses an identity, they choose the identity of all people and hence, identity and identity theory become socially transformative through the conscious decisions reached on identity. In this sense the individual is both formed by the “social facts” of his society as well being the forming influence that creates those “social facts”. Bhaskar’s critical realism and Sartre’s existentialist theory are connected through the argument of human agency in identity construction. Both theorists intimate that the individual is (to borrow a Christian phrase) the creator and sustainer of society through their subjective agencies. I argue that both Sartre’s existentialist approach and Bhaskar’s critical realist position constitute significant tools in the dismantling of the poststructuralist hegemonic position within postcolonial studies today. Both frameworks suggest that the individual who engages in the act of passing is exercising agency (which differs him from the hybrid figure who is categorized by the recognition of biological markers by external sources) and so displays the existentialistic ability to choose identity for all people. Bhaskar refers to the significance of agency when he discusses his methodology for doing philosophy in *Reclaiming Reality*. Bhaskar suggests that although philosophy must pursue a ‘transcendental procedure’, at the same time it ‘must reject the idealist and individualist mould into which Kant pressed his own inquiries.’ Bhaskar argues that if philosophy is to be concerned with conceptual ideas then we must also recognize humans as exhibiting agency:

> it must be recognized that both social activity and philosophical conceptualization may be historically transient; that the activity may depend upon the powers of people as material objects or *causal agents* rather than merely thinkers or perceivers

For Bhaskar, then, individual humans and their agencies contribute to the historical transience of philosophy and this leads to the recognition that social activity is itself transient. The emphasis here is upon how people act rather than how people think and perceive. In a similar fashion, Paulo Freire describes the “word” as having two elements: reflection and action. He argues that both of these are locked in a synthesis which if broken will drastically hamper the
remaining element in a passage from *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970) which is worth quoting here in full:

But the word is more than just an instrument which makes dialogue possible; accordingly, we must seek its constitutive elements. Within the word we find two dimensions, reflection and action, in such radical interaction that if one is sacrificed—even in part—the other immediately suffers. There is no true word that is not at the same time a praxis. Thus, to speak a true word is to transform the world.

An unauthentic word, one which is unable to transform reality, results when dichotomy is imposed upon its constitutive elements. When a word is deprived of its dimension of action, reflection automatically suffers as well; and the word is changed into idle chatter, into *verbalism* […] It becomes an empty word, one which cannot denounce the world, for denunciation is impossible without a commitment to transform, and there is no transformation without action.

On the other hand, if action is emphasized exclusively, to the detriment of reflection, the word is converted into *activism*. The latter—actions for action’s sake—negates the true praxis and makes dialogue impossible. Either dichotomy, by creating unauthentic forms of existence, creates also unauthentic forms of thought, which reinforce the original dichotomy.

Human existence cannot be silent, nor can it be nourished by false words, but only by true words, with which men and women transform the world. To exist, humanly, is to *name* the world, to change it. Once named, the world in its turn reappears to the namers as a problem and requires of them a new *naming*. Human beings are not built in silence, but in word, in work, in action-reflection.64

The postcolonial identity, I argue, is similar to Freire’s “word”. The poststructuralist preoccupation with linguistics makes Freire’s discussion of the word even more pertinent to my argument. If, like Freire suggests, the word is formed both by reflection and by action, so also is the postcolonial identity. The hybrid figure is formed through both the word as a
descriptor (the word describes an identity and reflects what is perceived to be an ontological truth) and also the word as it becomes an action (the described identity must be seen to perform the necessary actions that are said to constitute its essence). Through the framework of the passing figure which I am suggesting is a more suitable alternative to the discourse of hybridity, I propose that the action component of the synthesis becomes much more prevalent through the agency exhibited by the person who engages in passing through performative mechanisms. If we lack the “action” that both passing and the experiential content that colonial identities provide, we are left with a ‘verbalism’. Poststructuralist perspectives can be critiqued for introducing a ‘verbalism’ into postcolonialism, the ability of some theorists to continually deconstruct identities and display a textual free-play is indicative of just such verbalism. Freire is committed to the power of the word as being capable of transformation. I argue that postcolonial identity is also capable of transformation, of creating new identities through the exercise of personal agency in attempts to pass and performative actions. This experiential aspect of identity is critical to a full understanding of what a postcolonial identity is. Freire warns on ‘false words’: ‘Human existence cannot be silent, nor can it be nourished by false words, but only by true words, with which men and women transform the world.’. My argument in this thesis can be read as a similar concern with ‘false identities’ or more specifically the multiple identities of poststructuralist theory that without any synthesis with ‘action’ or experience become themselves false representations that have no capacity to transform. Poststructuralist theory cannot account for the role of agency in social theory and identity, reducing all members of society to an effect of textual free-play and sophistry. In my thesis, I argue that existentialist and critical realist positions offer a stronger ontological platform for postcolonialism to fully explore the multiple identity of those who engage in passing to re-construct their personas in the contexts of a colonizer/colonized landscape.

Along with Bhaskar’s critical realist position and Freire’s discussion on “the word”, philosopher Edward Pols has developed a similar line of argument against the anti-realist stance of poststructuralism detailed in his text *Radical Realism: Direct Knowing in Science and Philosophy* (1992). Published towards the beginning of the demise of deconstruction in the academy, Pol’s observations still hold critical value today and are significant in informing my re-interpretation of deconstruction’s role in postcolonial studies. Pols notes that anti-realists (also referred to as nonrealists or irrealists) hold that objective truth is only an appearance or phenomena which is produced by the formative functions of our language systems. Given this reality producing power of linguistics, when we switch from the language discourse of one subject to another, and Pols gives the example of switching from ‘the
language of common sense to that of science, thence to that of art, that of morals, or that of religion’, the result is the production of multiple anti-realities, and because these anti-realities are just that, anti-realities, none can claim any authority over another and thus suggest an objective truth. Pols notes, perhaps significantly, that the discourse of anti-realism makes at least one realist or ‘absolutist’ claim. For the anti-realist, it is in the very act of recognizing the multiple realities of our linguistic framework where we reach a real objective truth about the condition of human experience. For Pols, the recognition that our reality is in fact a relativistic reality, poses a critical paradox for the linguistic doctrine. Pols extends the linguistic position to its logical end:

If we challenge them about this paradox, they concede that the position of relativism can be asserted only in a relativistic way: it is nothing more than the mode of discourse about knowledge that is found comfortable by the relativistic community of discourse. On the other hand, anyone who disagrees with this consensus position is assigned, by virtue of this imagined reply, to another language community; and this assignment in effect re-instates an absolutist claim about the supposed predicament of rationality.

It would appear from the conclusion drawn by Pols that linguistic relativism has an intellectual trick to display that means it remains unanswerable to any criticisms levelled against it. Any critique is simply another relative position, and as Pols has already stated, all such multiple positions have no real truth value as they all form different anti-realities. When such a theory is appropriated into the discourse of identity politics, the result is that a free-play ensues with the construction and re-construction of identities multiple times. Significantly, however, this free play in producing multiple anti-realities invests none of them with any authority and the identifying subject is left without the ability to offer any form of resistance to the interpretations made by other people. The free-play offered by linguistic relativism also removes any reality attached to the experiences of the identifying subjects, as this is also written off as nothing more than an epistemic effect of the anti-reality producing framework of language.

Pols disagrees, however, that reality is an effect of a language structure and that this is the only way we can come to know reality. He provides the example of naming new things and the doubleness this produces, both the name and the object that the name names, like the
observation that snow is white. Pols notes that we can now attend to the naming device ‘snow is white’ which forms our proposition or to the real experience of snow on the ground which forms the non-propositional, both of which are vastly different sensory experiences. Pols refers to the linguistic idea that rational awareness is a redundant notion, and that everything we experience is the processing of language. For Pols, this language processing is rational awareness and crucially, ‘this processing takes place in response to stimuli.’ In conclusion, Pols suggests that our doubleness in language usage is the result of an ability to attend to what is real and objective:

We can distinguish between the nonlinguistic and the linguistic as objects of attention; we can attend to the proposition emerging from the non-propositional-emerging from it in the sense that it is a consequence of our attending to the non-propositional rather than the other way round.

Pols returns to this discussion further into the text, again using the example of snow falling outside the window where he writes. He describes the experience of seeing the snow and then constructing such propositions to articulate the experience, for example the snow and the tree upon which the snow falls. Crucially, however, Pols maintains that ‘my rationality has not waked in the first instance to those propositions, nor has it waked to something shaped by those propositions, but rather to those interrelated temporospatial beings, independent of itself and its formative powers, that lie outside the window.’ Pols conclusion from this is that ‘The propositions constitute an acknowledgement of the things of which we are rationally aware, but they no more create the things (or our experience of the things) thus acknowledged than a nod creates the friend whose presence it acknowledges.’ Critically, then, our propositions that we experience are not the reality forming framework as assumed by poststructuralists but instead a response to the ability to be rationally aware of external stimuli that has an objective and independent reality of our language structure.

Following on from Pols’s observations that we can attend to the linguistic and also the non-linguistic, a similar critique is made by Norris:

Yet, as Derrida shows, this order of priority is thrown into question as soon as one adopts a structuralist, as opposed to a phenomenological approach, since then it seems – following Saussure – that the
indicative (i.e., the structural or systemic) dimension of language must always be conceived as the precondition for whatever we are able to express in the way of speaker’s meaning or intent. But then again, this approach comes up against its limits when confronted with the power of language – especially creative or literary language – to express something other and more than could ever be explained by a purely structuralist analysis.74

In this passage Norris is suggesting that with a structuralist discourse, language is a necessary ‘precondition’ through which the world is made comprehensible and we articulate experience. For Derrida, this approach is sufficient until the power of language reveals something other or greater than the mere language itself could ever indicate. It is at this point that the structuralist discourse must face its own limitations. In powerful language, specifically in this passage ‘creative or literary language’, something else is expressed which cannot be accounted for by structuralist linguistic theory. The idea that language encounters something other or something greater than itself is significant for my argument. The linguistic approach to identity and postcolonialism favours meaning that is inherited from textual analysis and theoretical sophistry. Yet as Norris shows, Derrida is aware that there is an element that linguistics cannot account for: the experiential realm of meaning. It is my contention that the creative or literary language as referred to in the passage above, is indicative of another layer of meaning that is not so easily articulated through language. To adopt Pols, we may refer to this extra layer of meaning as the non-propositional, something which is felt and experienced before the complication of linguistic articulation is added to the mix.

The significance of Pols’s observations to my own argument are that I would suggest deconstruction cannot operate in isolation from the subject it studies as Norris implies it currently does operate in the field of musicology. Instead deconstruction needs to be seen in the epistemic way of a proposition which in turn arises from a non-propositional objective ontology, constituted by the experiential value of those who have lived in the conditions of colonial/postcolonial oppression. Norris attempt to synthesize the subject and the theory through Fodor’s cognitive module theory is a critical attempt which suggests a synthesis may well be achievable and can harbour better transformative capacities for postcolonialism in the future.
Aijaz Ahmad adopts similar arguments against poststructuralism in his text *In Theory: Nations, Classes, Literatures* (1992). He critiques the poststructuralist commitment to non-attachment and the rejection of any objective truth as leading the break away from societies in favour of individuals as these are the sites of relativistic meaning production. For Ahmad, the non-attachment and ironic relationships held by individuals to the wider social structure are manifest in a number of critical ways: the practices of critics, the ideologies that advocate and emphasis upon migrancy and the theorist as a travelling figure.\(^75\) Ahmad suggests that poststructuralism in postcolonialism ‘conceals, instead of explaining the relationships between literature, literary theory and that world of which these purport to be the literature and the theory.’.\(^76\) Ahmad attacks poststructuralism as the basis for postcolonialism as it rejects the concept of nationalism not on the usual Marxist grounds that it has ignored questions of gender and class but in the all-encompassing manner of rejecting all efforts to speak of ‘origins, collectivities, determinate historical projects.’.\(^77\) For Ahmad, the result is that no nationalisms are valued as being progressive or regressive, but they are all rejected by a poststructuralist informed postcolonialism.\(^78\)

Such a reading would be supported by Marinos Pourgouris, who recently criticized poststructuralism for its intense concern with “differance”. Pourgouris argues that by concerning itself with differance, poststructuralism replicates the logocentricity which it was supposed to defeat. In effect, Pourgouris concludes that poststructuralism deconstructs the concept of identity held by those who value it most:

> the wretched of the world—the unrepresented, the minor, the have-nots and, generally speaking, many of those groups that essentially hold on to notions of identity, be it religion, ethnicity, gender, race, etc.—are themselves excluded and their notion of identity is thoroughly deconstructed by the discourse of poststructuralism.\(^79\)

Such a view on the deconstruction of identity for those who value it most follows on from Ahmad’s suggestion that no nationalisms are properly evaluated, instead they are all rejected as the concept of nationalism is itself rejected.\(^80\) Following on from Norris’s argument that it would be unethical to criticize science from an anti-realist position, we could extend his sentiment to the suggestion that it is unethical to criticize the construction of identity in postcolonial studies unless poststructuralism were to realistically assess the limits and scope of “identity” within such an epistemic framework. The logical consequence of criticizing
identity from an anti-realist position, as Said suggests, is that it removes the epistemic foundation from which any identity is constructed, rendering the entire concept ontologically bankrupt and devoid of meaning. As a result, those who depend upon the organizing concept of identity are restricted in their ability to represent themselves and in their ability to distinguish themselves from the colonizing elite.

There are also a number of criticisms that can be levelled at the specifically postcolonial adoption of deconstruction. Around the same time as Bhaskar and Ahmad, Jasper Goss criticized the appropriation of deconstruction by both Bhabha and Spivak arguing that although Derrida’s work is significant to postcolonialism, Bhabha and Spivak (along with others) have taken the methodology too far:

[Bhabha and Spivak] have taken Derrida's maxim of ‘there is nothing outside of the text’ and converted it to ‘there is nothing but the text’. In this sense all relations (colonial, personal, institutional, etc.) only have meaning as textual relations.\(^{81}\)

Without doubt, Goss’s statement is significant. If he is correct in his readings of Bhabha and Spivak as being too intensely located within the confines of the text, postcolonialism cannot be equated with the experiences of colonized and colonizing peoples in real-world situations without some degree of inaccuracy or presumption accompanying postcolonial readings. The tendency for poststructuralism to fall back onto the logocentricity it purports to eradicate is a criticism made by both Ahluwalia in 2005 and Pourgouris in 2011, indicating both the acceptance of the charge and its status as a contemporary concern. Earlier in 2010, Pourgouris also introduced the work of Rey Chow, whose book, *The Age of the World Target: Self-Referentiality in War, Theory, and Comparative Work* (2006) significantly informs his own view of poststructuralism and area studies. In this book, Chow explores the development of poststructuralism and then offers both a critique and appraisal of its potentiality.\(^{82}\) Pourgouris makes reference to Chow’s argument which stems from poststructuralism’s ‘suspicion of any fixed referent-be it the nation, nature, language, identity, etc.’,\(^ {83}\) leading Chow to question the consequences of suggesting ‘‘that African American, Asian American, and gay, lesbian and transgendered specificities do not exist?’’.\(^{84}\) As Pourgouris notes, like Said and Ahluwalia before him, that poststructuralism comes to deny the existence of the real world which has informed such identities and, therefore, reaffirms it as the logocentric Western discourse of the type it had intended to dismantle.\(^{85}\)
Pourgouris continues to introduce Chow’s analysis of poststructuralism by exploring the interiority or self-referentiality identified by Chow that suggests a ‘closed and exclusive space’. Chow then notes the potentiality of an outward-looking model, one which will begin with a native culture over any logocentric Western base, and can analyze the multiple interactions with other nations. Such an outward-looking model has similarities with the Fanon-influenced approach I am offering as an alternative to the self-referential poststructuralist brand of postcolonialism.

Critically, however, poststructuralist involvement in postcolonialism can be criticized for the hypocrisy inherent in arguing for the ‘fallacy of meaning’ and yet it ‘speaks and writes in such ways that few of the masses will ever be able to understand’. Pourgouris recognizes the significance of Chow’s point regarding the distance between language and the subject it describes:

The point is crucial in addressing not only the relationship between deconstruction and cultural studies, but also the relationship between postcolonial studies and the (subaltern) subject it claims to represent (or, to put it more bluntly, the indisputable distance between the ‘illiterate’ wretched of the earth and the hyper-literate language that represents them).

In an attempt to critique a poststructuralist influenced postcolonialism which is arguably not methodologically adequate in its ability to truly represent those it purports to represent, I am proposing a return to the work of Frantz Fanon in constructing a theoretical approach to the passing figure. This is not to suggest that Fanon and the poststructuralists stand in opposition. Goss confirms that ‘it certainly fits the rhetoric of various writers (especially Bhabha) when they claim that their selective use of Fanon is also a part of their methods of hybridity and heterogeneity’. Bhabha is particularly indebted to the work of Fanon. Goss summarizes Fanon’s legacy in postcolonial studies:

That his work should be used by people coming from explicitly poststructuralist positions has created a degree of disagreement among writers, though it is generally accepted that in speaking about the colonial or the other, it is completely remiss not to acknowledge
Fanon’s significance for writers like Bhabha was his identification of the psychological ramifications of colonialism. Bhabha’s use of Fanon’s identification of the psychological effects of colonization suggests that poststructuralist and existentialist approaches to postcolonialism are not necessarily contradictory. At least to some extent, Bhabha can be shown to consider the condition of postcoloniality from the point of view of real, lived colonial experiences of oppression. Anjali Prabhu further questions the adoption of Fanon by poststructuralist academics in pointing out that his *Black Skin White Masks* (1952) is concerned with a strict oppositionality between black and white, the two are seen as ‘onto-logically [sic] incompatible spaces’, yet Bhabha’s appropriation of his work read ‘hybridity in Fanon in ways that are untenable, undoing or at least playing down the oppositionality upon which much of Fanon's thinking is predicated even in this earlier text.’. The oppositionality which Fanon writes about between the white and black races is largely the product of his experience of oppression. The adoption of his work by poststructuralists has removed this element of personal experience from understandings of his work.

Fanon’s writing may well have been widely appropriated by the poststructuralists, but it also suggests an alternative theoretical approach dominated by existentialism, influenced no doubt by Jean-Paul Sartre. LaRose T. Parris argues that ‘While it is generally held that existentialism and materialism represent opposing philosophical modes, this perception should not occlude existentialism’s more practical and implicitly materialist preoccupation with the human condition.’ Parris effectively indicates in this quote that existentialism has a distinct materialist agenda, at least with respect to its centrality on human agency. If existentialism is to be concerned with the human condition in a ‘practical and implicitly materialist’ way, then I would argue it necessarily remains opposed to the linguistic-theoretical focus of poststructuralism. The relationship between existentialism and agency forms a central part of Paulo Freire’s position. This is noted by John Dale and Emery J. Hyslop-Margison who explain that ‘such agency and freedom are essential requirements of humanization and therefore critical to Freirean pedagogy.’ I suggested earlier that Freire’s concept of “the word” relied upon both reflection and action in order for it to be the transformative force that Freire requires it be. The agency that Dale and Hyslop-Margison identify in Freire’s pedagogy are indeed critical to its being a human centered force, it is in the agency that we exhibit combined with our reflection on words that enable us to transform the world around us. As I quoted previously from Freire: ‘To exist, humanly, is to *name* the
world, to change it’. For Freire, a humanist perspective necessarily implies a synthesis of reflection and action in order to avoid a bias towards mere ‘verbalism’ on the one hand or misguided ‘activism’ on the other.

In the evocation of Fanon’s existentialist framework, I will suggest that it is possible to recover the sense of personal experience which has since been diluted in his works. Parris supports this line of argument when he claims within Fanon’s critique of the colonial that existentialism is manifest in the act of wearing a white mask:

existential deviation is manifest in the colonized subject’s forced denial of her own native identity. Wearing a white mask negates native/Black identity and all that it represents: racial and ethnic particularity, racial self-identification, and native history and culture

The ability to metaphorically wear a white mask and so gain access to the white identity is, according to Parris, suggestive of the manifestation of the existentialist drive to form an identity without the constraints of a dominant hegemonic identity discourse. According to Parris’s account Fanon draws upon the works of Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre:

Fanon would agree with Heidegger’s thesis that individual ontology is the dichotomous reflection of the individual and her societal milieu.
For Fanon himself was a colonial subject, the very embodiment of historical, ideological, and geo-political forces

The colonial subject as a dichotomous result of both self and society is significant to my argument in this thesis. I will argue throughout the following chapters that identity is a process that is engaged in by both the individual self and also a wider social structure or audience who work to authenticate the attempts to pass of the hybrid and colonial figures contained within literary texts. My thesis will incorporate alternative existential approaches to the poststructuralist hegemonic discourse that both reflect individual and societal responsibilities towards identity construction. Fanon’s focus on psychoanalysis is suggestive of his existentialist tendencies, according to Parris: ‘I would argue further that Fanon uses psychoanalysis in the colonial setting as a contextual springboard to leap into a more nuanced exploration of linkages among psychoanalysis, dialectics, materialism, and existentialism.’
Psychoanalysis, with its intense focus on the interiority of the individual, is a fertile ground for existentialist ideas to take hold.

Sartre’s existentialism is perhaps most accessible in his essay “Existentialism is a Humanism” (1947), developed from a lecture he gave in October 1945 at the Club Maintenant in Paris, also of the same title. In the essay he seeks to clarify some of the controversies that had developed from the publication of his foundational existentialist work, *Being and Nothingness* (1943). Sartre’s form of existentialism was an atheistic existentialism\(^1\) as opposed to Kierkegaard’s existentialism which was much more welcoming of Christianity. Sartre explains how his atheism informs his view of existentialism:

> Existentialism is not so much an atheism in the sense that it would exhaust itself attempting to demonstrate the nonexistence of God; rather, it affirms that even if God were to exist, it would make no difference—that is our point of view.\(^2\)

In effect, Sartre’s existentialism is dismissive of deterministic or non-autonomous conceptions of identity development (such as those that might be supposed to derive from the doctrine of Christianity) preferring to locate the stimulus for persona within the individual and their own perceptions of their identity. It works to reject the assumption that race is a precursor to a specific identity and stresses the significance of personal perceptions and roles as indicative of identity, irrespective of any element attributable to the existence of the subject. Sartre’s view is neatly summarized by his well-known dictum, “existence precedes essence”. According to Sartre, man is only what he both conceives and wills himself to be. Given that man can only conceive of himself and will himself to be anything after the fact of his existence has commenced, this means that the “essence” or identity of a person can but follow from their “existence”. Sartre denotes this as the first principle of existentialism.\(^3\) Importantly, it is differentiated from the predominant nineteenth-century view that, in Sartre’s parlance, a person’s identity is the result of their existence. For example, in this view a black man must by necessity demonstrate an identity correlative with that ascribed to black people by stereotypical assumptions. This is because his identity as a black man is the result of his existence as a black man and this is a fact from which he cannot escape.

The result of Sartre’s philosophy and its pertinence to a postcolonial enquiry are evident in the shift in responsibility for identity unto people as individuals from ideological apparatus’
such as racism and prejudice. Sartre himself noted the responsibility that his existentialism forced onto people:

If, however, existence truly does precede essence, man is responsible for what he is. Thus, the first effect of existentialism is to make every man conscious of what he is, and to make him solely responsible for his own existence.  

By suggesting that man has control over his identity, Sartre perhaps pre-empts an underlying conviction of postcolonialism: that man is able to choose his identity free from ideological or other systems of power and control. Sartre’s relevance to this project and also to Fanon’s belief in the connection between self and society is illustrated when Sartre explains the existentialist adoption of “subjectivism”. Sartre defines subjectivism as ‘man’s inability to transcend human subjectivity.’ For Sartre, when a man chooses for himself an identity (an essence), he also chooses for all humanity. Effectively, when we create the man we wish to be, we also create an image of what we think all humanity should be. Sartre makes this explicit when he notes how ‘In truth, one should always ask oneself, “What would happen if everyone did what I am doing?”’ Sartre crucially notes an interplay between the self and society. The self reflects an image of society that corresponds to the individual’s belief in what society should be comprised of. Similarly, society becomes a reflection of individuals and their divergent opinions on the matter of being. Critically, however, the self still remains independent of the reflected image found in society and retains its autonomy.

Sartre also argues that the responsibility for essence in man is an ongoing process, similar to the developmental identities of postcolonialism whereby identities are constructed and reconstructed many times over. Sartre uses the contrast between a hero and a coward to illustrate the ongoing developmental process of essence construction. He writes about the hero and the coward who make themselves heroic and cowardly respectively, yet are by no means defined solely by these labels. The hero could well become cowardly and vice versa. In Sartre’s view, the key to the identification of one’s essence is not consistency but commitment. He suggests that ‘What matters is the total commitment, but there is no one particular situation or action that fully commits you, one way or the other.’ Such a view on the instability of identity and one’s control over it, offers a powerful theoretical framework from which to approach the adoption of passing by writers of postcolonial fiction. The act of passing is consistent with the ‘commitment’ to an identity or essence and indeed the
multiplicity of passing identities are suggestive of an identity construction process free from
deterministic philosophies. As such, Sartre’s argument that “existence precedes essence” has
explanatory power when confronted by a postcolonial figure who actively chooses to adopt
another identity or the hybrid figure who merges two existing identities to create a synthesis.
Sartre’s philosophy also complements the self and society approach I am advocating in this
thesis, due to the reflections found in society of individual essences and the reflections in the
self of what society should be comprised of. The existentialism expounded by Sartre is also
firmly rooted in the real experiences and perceptions of people on an individual level,
allowing it to negate some of the criticisms aimed at poststructuralism for being too removed
from the subject it purports to explain.

Pramod K. Nayar has noted that Fanon was exposed to Sartre’s philosophy of
existentialism from relatively early on in his life. When Fanon was studying at Fort de France
and then again at Lyon ‘he had read extensively in Sartre, especially *Les Temps
Modernes*.’. At Lyon Fanon also ‘attended the lectures of French phenomenologist
philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-61).’.

It is within the works of Sartre and
Merleau-Ponty that Fanon found ‘the philosophical grounding he needed to analyse identity
in the colonial context.’. Nayar recognizes Sartre’s emphasis upon ‘lived experience as
foundational to identity [original emphasis]’ and for Fanon, this helped to develop his idea
that ‘Colonialism denies the very Being of blackness, and thus denies him [the black man] an
existential identity.’. Nayar refers to an argument made by Ahluwalia in “Fanon’s nausea:
the hegemony of the white nation” (2003) in which Ahluwalia suggests that ‘Fanon’s
discovery of self-hate and self-revulsion for being black is akin to Sartre’s idea of nausea’.
Nayar explains that Sartre’s nausea is the ‘realization of one’s racial identity, but also a
realization that this racial identity is a source of trauma, shame and oppression. It is the
intense self-dislike that is born out of this realization.’.

Sartre’s use of existentialism was to have a profound effect upon the work of Frantz
Fanon. Prabhu notes that the chapter in *Black Skin White Masks*, “The Fact of Blackness”,
draws much from Jean-Paul Sartre's theorizing of the formation of selfhood in its relation to
otherness and the struggle for claiming subjecthood.’. Sartre would go on to write a
preface for a later edition of *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961). Carolyn Cusick acutely
explains Fanon’s adoption of Sartre as being founded on the need to remain located in the
present:
Fanon’s response to Sartre is evidence neither of Fanon’s racialism nor his universalism. Fanon says, “a consciousness committed to experience is ignorant, has to be ignorant, of the essences and the determinations of it being. […] Sartre’s mistake was not only to seek the source of the [experience of being black] but in a certain sense to block that source.”[134] This is not a call to some permanent racial consciousness; rather, it calls for a commitment to the experiences of living in the world, which is at present quite raced. When Fanon ponders “One day, perhaps, in the depths of that unhappy romanticism …”[135] the ellipsis does not clearly point to a realization of Sartre’s accuracy. When he states that Sartre “shattered my last illusion,”[137] Fanon is not admitting that authentic race consciousness is an illusion in such a way as to require the giving up of the illusion of race. Fanon is insisting we live in the present with indeterminate hopes for the future, i.e., he is demanding that we not look to some end and assume we know what is to come.117

Cusick suggests in this passage that Fanon may well have adopted the work of Sartre as it indicates the influence of temporality and of experience. Cusick perceptively notes that Fanon has responded to the work of Sartre and as a result ‘calls for a commitment to the experiences of living in the world’. Fanon rejects a permanent sense of racial consciousness instead opting for the existentialist idea of experience in the present moment, which as Cusick noted, is ‘quite raced’. Such an approach to identity is critical in my argument that poststructuralist approaches have hit an impasse due to an inability to adequately comprehend the personal accounts of colonial identity construction. As an alternative, the work of Sartre and Fanon offer a theoretical framework that both respects the multiplicity celebrated by postcolonial studies and yet attempts to integrate the personal experiences alongside such abstract multiplicity.

The connection between Sartre and Fanon is further highlighted by connecting Wehrs’ view of Sartre and Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth in which Fanon makes clear his belief in the use of violence to remove the threat of colonial oppression. Wehrs writes that ‘Sartre's thought helped shape, and was shaped by, an intellectual climate in which ethical reflection was displaced into a politics governed by the assumption that since Marxist revolution would bring justice, whatever promoted revolution was ethical.’118 The intense preoccupation with
the role of violence in casting off a colonial oppressor would become a source of criticism aimed towards both Sartre and Fanon for a significant period of time. *The Wretched of the Earth*’s opening chapter, “Concerning Violence”, clearly illustrates the conviction with which Fanon believed in the use of violence to resolve the political injustice of colonialism. Similarly, in his preface to Fanon’s text, Sartre claims that ‘to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time’;[^119] which works to justify his support for colonial violence. According to Robert Young, Sartre cannot be accused of ethnocentrism in his political stance as exemplified in *The Critique of Dialectical Reason I: Theory of Practical Ensembles* (1960), which contains substantial analyses of the political and psychological structures of colonialism and racism […] But this still allows Sartre to argue, for example, for the legitimacy of the use of violence by colonized peoples against their oppressors, thus anticipating Fanon’s dictum that colonization was achieved by violence and must therefore be overcome with it.[^120]

Critically, however, the support of violence to remedy a political injustice illustrates how Fanon and Sartre were both positioned in a geographical and temporal location which enabled them to experience first-hand the effects of colonial oppression. Fanon is well-noted as supporting the Algerian resistance but Sartre also had links with the anti-colonial struggle against France. He spoke out proclaiming that as the French army was fighting in the collective name of the French, subsequently each French person became responsible for the crimes committed against the Algerians.[^121] Consequently, first-hand experience leads them to adopt an existentialist approach compatible with the real, lived experience of colonialism. As such, both Sartre and Fanon offer what is lacking in the relationship between poststructuralism and postcolonialism, the ability to avoid divorcing theory from the subject it purports to explain.

It is this political and cultural environment from which existentialist philosophy was largely shaped and developed. Robert Bernasconi also considers the cultural and political context in which existentialism developed to be significant and suggests that in the East this is a fact which has never been forgotten:
existentialism in the 1950s was shaped not just by the Cold War, but also by wars of liberation fought by colonized peoples [...] I argue that the fight against racism and colonialism shaped the development of this central branch of existential philosophy in the 1950s. The importance of this context would not be news to philosophers in Africa and other parts of the so-called Third World, where Sartre never went out of fashion and where Fanon was early acknowledged as an important thinker, but this story has still not been fully integrated into the history of existentialism as it is told in Europe and North America.  

Alternatively, in the West Sartre’s philosophy is perhaps more remembered for its apparent rejection of religion and its focus on personal freedom. Richard Eyre, in his preface for an edition of *Being and Nothingness*, notes that from the little of Sartre he had read in his formative years he had understood what was significant to him: ‘I was growing up in a world still scarred by the holocaust, Hitler, Stalin and nuclear warfare, it wasn’t hard to grasp a philosophy which was predicated on the absolute absence of God.’ In the admission made by Eyre at least, it is likely that Sartre’s influence on the Western world was in no small part due to its relation to free will a growing atheism. By re-invoking the existentialist philosophy of Sartre and the work of Fanon, it is my intention also to recapture the contextual stimulus that helped develop the existentialist movement and which suggested a philosophy of personal identity that was sympathetic to the demands of the colonial society. I would argue, along with Bernasconi, that the context in which existentialist thought emerged is critical to a thorough understanding of the movement and furthermore that existentialism holds intellectual currency in the field of contemporary colonial identities, in no small part to its historical relationship with colonial power dynamics.

**American and British Conceptions of Race: Re-appropriating the Passing Figure**

In the following section, I will demonstrate some critical differences between the concept of passing as it is normally conceived in the American context of slavery and the following Jim Crow era and the British-Indian context of modernism and the cultural displacement of race theory. Modernism and the development of relativism played a vital role in constructing an
environment for the passing figure which differs greatly from the American race-theory context in which it principally developed. The modernist turn in anthropology was ushered in by notable figures such as Franz Boas and Bronislaw Malinowski, who worked to overturn the effects of race theory and supported the idea that culture, not race, was the governing influence on a person’s identity. As such, the multiplicity that the passing figure engages with found a fertile environment as identity is simply a matter of cultural affiliation and was no longer restricted by the essentialist philosophy of race theory. The British-Indian modernist context developed in antithesis to the American discourse of race.

The American preference for racial explanations of identity is the result of a desire to maintain the social conditions of the period, including for example, slavery and the division between white and black races which slavery relied upon. Many nineteenth-century slave owning whites engaged in sexual relationships (either consensual or non-consensual) with black women who they owned as slaves. The offspring usually had a complexion between black and white, allowing them the ability to pass in some cases. However, by definition these children were labelled as “black”. In an effort to exert control over black men and women, white people distinguished severely between the two. This took the form of the “one-drop rule”, or hypodescent which as David A. Hollinger explains, was the recognition that anybody with a visible African genetic heritage was defined as “Black”.  

Such a system of definition was taken to extremes with the label ‘octoroons’ enabling white people to define those with an eighth African heritage as black. As Naomi Pabst notes, the presence of hypodescent bars black and white racially mixed people from identifying as white and assigns them a black identity forcibly. Effectively, it was a method for preserving the barrier between the races and continuing the façade of difference. This led to the creation of a metaphorical colour line, dividing white and black people on white people’s terms. As Pabst Observes, colour-line transgressions were more common than thought:

Historically, the color line was crossed with more frequency than is generally perceived to be the case. And these color-line transgressions have long constituted a site for political strategy, a site onto which were projected agendas for social change, visions of ways in which rigid racialist thinking and rigid racist infrastructures might be undermined.
A good example of these political strategies lies in the literature of the Harlem renaissance, a cultural movement of the 1920s and 1930s. The aim was to portray Negros as cultured and possessing human emotions and thoughts similar to the white man, largely achieved through the image of the ‘New Negro’. Harlem was originally a white middle and upper class area, redeveloped by immigrant Negros. Nella Larsen’s *Quicksand* (1928) is agreed by most critics to be the best novel of the Harlem Renaissance. Passing literature peaked in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. The greater majority of contemporary studies into passing focus upon Larsen’s aptly named *Passing*.

The law of hypodescent is an example of the failure of identity as noted by Amy Robinson who explains that what is visible is not necessarily what is actually present. Robinson suggests ‘the "problem" of identity, a problem to which passing owes the very possibility of its practice, is predicated on the false promise of the visible as an epistemological guarantee.’. The American context of race theory and the development of passing exhibits a foundation upon the visual element to identity which stresses the importance of the racial sign through skin colour. Passing in the American context is very much a question of transgressing such rigid definitions of race classification in the pursuit (in the majority of cases at least) of better material prospects and security obtainable with a white identity. Closely connected to the American experience of race is Frantz Fanon’s epidermal schema introduced in the colonial work *Black Skin, White Masks*, and subsequently explained by Shirley Anne Tate as ‘the Black man must be Black in relation to the white man.’. Fanon’s epidermal schema argues for the social construction of identity: “Blackness” is constructed by the white man and forced upon the black man. This has resonance with the way I will read the construction of character in Hanif Kureishi’s work in Chapter Three. Identity becomes a construct of wider social frameworks which act according to ideologies which precede the individual. The oppositionality to which Prabhu refers in Fanon’s work between the black and white races explains how he can be appropriated into a discourse of American race theory. American race theory works to maintain the strict division between the two races, Fanon’s assertion that the white and black races represent, as Prabhu suggests, ontologically incompatible spaces, neatly fits with such a division. The very visual composition of the epidermal schema highlights the construction of black skin as the racial signifier. However, as Robinson notes, the visible is not an epistemological guarantee, removing the authority of the epidermal schema imposed upon black people. The presence of black skin, although indicating membership to an identity constructed by the enforcers of an epidermal schema,
has no innate or essential role in either the construction or maintenance of an identity. As such, the identity imposed upon black people by an epidermal schema has no authority in the identity claimed by an individual person. In the British-Indian context, the racial sign of skin colour plays a much less significant role, in contrast with the extreme example of the one-drop rule in the American South. Instead, Fanon’s epidermal schema could be more accurately labelled as a “cultural schema” if transferred to the British-Indian context, referring to the identification of people based on a supposed cultural affiliation over a racial heredity of characteristics signalled by skin colour. In essence, the schema is a cultural construction anyway, relying upon the cultural assumptions of a white dominant group to impose their subjective views of black identity onto those who are forced to receive this identity.

After the advent of slavery, there was a widespread segregation of black and white people. This was the beginning of the Jim Crow era, so named after a black-faced minstrel character. The Jim Crow era lasted approximately from 1876 through to 1965, as this was the period in which the laws were created and enforced most rigorously. As a result of the Jim Crow laws, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the adoption of a white supremacist control system in the southern states. The Jim Crow laws worked to separate the blacks from the whites in America, and achieved this by reinforcing the idea that separation was the natural relationship between the races. However, it was really a political strategy that reinforced white patriarchy. This gives some indication of the attitude towards African-Americans during the period: many previous slave owners and descendants of slave owners naturally saw the black man as occupying a hierarchal position beneath the white/Christian man. The distinction between the white and black races was integral to the success of the Jim Crow laws; it was a binarism which captured the American attitude to race theory from the nineteenth century through to the mid-twentieth century.

The laws imposed during the Jim Crow era were without doubt influenced by the maintenance of the “colour line”, that sharp differentiation between white and black. Robert Young draws attention to the American accounts of race proceeding and accompanying the American Civil War as indicating the ‘ease with which black and white were divided and set against each other’. This binary distinction served only to separate the races by making them appear as disparate and incompatible as possible. Largely, this was achieved by the “one-drop rule”, on which I have already commented. Hollinger also notes that hypodescent may not have the legal status it had once held in the Jim Crow era but it has been influential
in the civil rights era and still exists as a ‘formidable convention’ in multiple arenas.\(^\text{133}\) In fact, there were laws that prohibited miscegenation in America dating from 1661 and they were common until 1967,\(^\text{134}\) suggesting a long-established American tradition of racism and race theory. The one-drop rule is significant in that it is unique when compared to the treatment of blacks in other contexts and also to the treatment of other ethnic groups within America.\(^\text{135}\) The Jim Crow period and the rule of identification by hypodescent is critical to understanding the unique and highly context-dependant environment in which the American experience of race developed. Most scholarship on the phenomenon of passing is strictly located in just this geographical and temporal space, limiting the potential usefulness of the concept of passing to applications in other contexts.

Relations between Britain and India have taken a different course of events, leading to my adoption of the passing figure in order to consider new methods of constructing a multiple identity which differs widely from the very visual foundation to passing in the American context. This is not to deny the importance of the racial sign that skin colour held, however. There was, of course, a certain amount of racism stemming from divisions based on skin colour and exploitation due to perceived racial inferiority. However, there were also notable attempts to eradicate the significance of race and allow the two races to live more closely.

The twentieth century certainly brought about changes to the ways in which race and culture were viewed. The two concepts began to distance themselves from each other and identity construction began to undergo remarkable changes. Specific to the British-Indian context was the displacement of race by culture as the prime determinant of identity. Consequently, I am arguing that the act of passing must be re-contextualized to account for the removal of the authority of the racial sign. Relations between Britain and India negated the need for a strict division based on a visual marker. This can be evidenced by the presence of at least a few educated Indians such as Ghandi and Nehru around the middle of the twentieth century, in a period where conversely in America, the Jim Crow laws were still rigorously enforced. Much more prevalent in the British Empire was an insistence upon cultural constructions of identity, which worked to slowly eradicate the authority of the racial sign. The intellectual developments of the twentieth century led to the development of passing as a process implicated in a politics of performance, due to the flexibility that cultural discourses of identity necessitate. If identity was accepted as a cultural discourse, the previous reliance upon essentialist ideology was refuted and the only other available explanation of identity was that it is the product of learnt behaviours and influences over any.
intrinsic entity. It therefore makes sense that if identity is the product of learnt behaviours, new identities could be learnt making identity a flexible and potentially multiple concept of self-formation.

The nineteenth-century preoccupation with race as the prime determinant of character and identity was displaced as the twentieth century saw culture emerge as the focal point of identity development, probably as a result of modern anthropology and developments in genetics. Diane Paul notes that ‘Modern genetics, […] has led to a sharp distinction between biological and cultural explanations of human differences, the former assuming relative immutability, the latter, relative plasticity.’ In the context of a developing body of passing literature, the plasticity of culture becomes relevant to the acquirement and discarding of identity. Physical, racial features could only be donned with great difficulty, cultural traits were easier to assume and this had profound consequences for passing in the colonial environment. Waltroud Ernst and Bernard Harris indicate how race and culture become mixed:

In the early twentieth century […] important changes occurred as race was increasingly encoded not only as biologically determined but also as culturally based. Since then equality has become more a matter of culture than of biology alone.

This development in the early twentieth century was significant as it undercut the previous project of studying race and racial types. By accepting race as being to some degree a cultural construct, the monolithic notion of race as the irreducible determiner of identity was slowly eroded by the realization that culture played a very persuasive role in constructing a persona.

The change occurred when anthropology was re-developed by a new host of intellectuals including Franz Boas and Bronislaw Malinowski. For the first time racial and cultural explanations for behaviour were separated. The effect was that the racial hierarchy of superiority was questioned and thrown into disrepute. Thomas McCarthy confirms how around the turn of the twentieth century, the scientific basis afforded to racial explanations of cultural differences was predominantly accepted. The work of Blumenbach and Darwin in physical anthropology and evolutionary biology gave racial explanations the support they needed. However, Franz Boas, a German Jew who immigrated to the USA at the age of 29 and was recognized as an authority in physical anthropology, started to question the rationale of race theory in the 1890s. The popular rediscovery of Mendel’s work and the continuing
development of experimental genetics led to the erosion of the supreme position occupied by race theory.\(^{138}\) This had a dramatic effect on the way in which other cultures were viewed and appraised. Boas, for one, began to promote cultural relativism in anthropology. By rejecting the previous consensus that all the races had a hierarchical place as can be found in the eighteenth-century schema of the Great Chain of Being (devised of course by white Europeans with themselves occupying top place), he created instead the view that all cultures had a unique value system and should be understood in their own terms. This helped to undercut European assumptions of superiority and contributed to the destabilization of confidence in the colonial venture in India and the wider Empire. The imposition of a cultural relativism suggested the failure of the Great Chain of Being in explaining the relationship between the races. Significantly, a cultural relativism also denied the authority of the racial sign, as cultural markers gave a more accurate indication of an identity, not skin colour. The vastly different context of British-India in light of cultural relativism allowed for the recognition that multiple identities may be adopted under a cultural schema of identification, and each of these identities was as equal as any other. Boas’ influence was widespread: McCarthy notes his championing of understanding cultures in their own terms and founding of ‘the most important tradition of cultural anthropology in America, counting among his disciples Alfred Kroeber, Robert Lowie, Melville Herskovits, Ruth Benedict, and Margaret Mead, among others.’\(^{139}\) With his disciples he managed to undercut the typologies of race theory by illustrating the confusion between “race” and more tangible cultural constructions of identity.\(^{140}\)

The movement to establish a cultural hierarchy once Boas had discredited the racial hierarchy was perhaps to be expected, Britain still possessed a vast empire after all and it was around this period that Indian nationalism was gaining some strong support and a firm political base. The continued use of a hierarchy system was adopted to justify the continuation of colonial control. Imperialism was, however, weakened as a result of its justification being severely questioned. Already, the heyday of the colonizing nation was at an end and the Empire began to shrink rapidly from the mid-twentieth century onwards.

Robert Young notes the introduction by Boas in the twentieth century of the concept of ‘cultures’ with the word ‘culture’ assuming a relative neutrality. For Young, that Boas was enabled to do just this illustrates the dissolution of polygenism, which had worked to reinforce a racial explanation of cultural differences. In its place, social evolutionism instigated a revision of the eighteenth-century progressive scheme meaning that as mankind
was unified, any acknowledgement of diversity could be safely made. The result was that citizens were no longer governed by predetermined typographical identity schemas that purported to ethnographically characterize different peoples, such as resulted from a racial hierarchy. Instead, people were theoretically free to choose from a range of non-privileged modes of being that could construct an identity. The modern age brought with it a cultural flexibility that replaced traditional notions of predetermined identity constructions.

The fluidity awarded to cultural characteristics had some significant consequences for the construction of identity, especially in a colonial environment. The Anglo-Indian offers a prominent example of the dynamics of the changing landscape of identity construction. As such, I propose that the Anglo-Indian offers a unique perspective upon the development of modern identity in conjunction with a re-developed notion of the passing figure. Unlike the American context which placed a strong emphasis upon racial constructions of identity, the British-Indian climate was more preoccupied with cultural constructions of identity, as I will now demonstrate. This meant in effect that the act of passing also became more culturally centred, focusing on employing an identity as a performance of cultural markers rather than the disguise of racial features. The passing figure allows for the Anglo-Indian to be read as a person engaged in a dramatic performance, and simultaneously allows for a more adequate notion of the phenomenon of passing to develop in relation to British-Indian contexts.

Anglo-Indians often adopted the cultural symbols of the English and this became something of a status marker among the mixed-heritage Anglo-Indians. This is confirmed by Alison Blunt when she acknowledges that ‘Unlike other Christians in India, the European ancestry of Anglo-Indians-reflected by cultural markers such as language, dress, and domesticity-continued to shape a distinctive community identity that was bound to Europe, and particularly Britain, as home.’ Christine Bolt suggests that ‘The Anglo-Indian was [...] more English than the English; idealizing his homeland because of long absences, his patriotism became somewhat musty.’ Bolt’s observation is supported by Louis Wirth who, writing in 1936, discusses the concept of “marginal nationalism”. He writes that the marginal population, for example those who live on a frontier between two states, has a mixed cultural and racial construction. These populations are also bilingual or polylingual. Critically, Wirth suggests that such populations may be more nationalistic in their outlook than the general populations alongside whom they identify.

I would argue that the Anglo-Indians, with their marginalized nationalism, may have been tempted to engage in the act of passing in order to be identified as British. Given the cultural
discourse of identity politics that was developing around the early-twentieth century, the phenomenon of passing would have allowed for the embodiment of a marginal nationalism. The marginalization of Anglo-Indians on the frontier of Empire may have fostered a “marginal nationalism” with respect to Great Britain and displayed an identity strongly influenced by the colonizers. In the context of the European assumption of cultural superiority that had initiated the colonial venture, Anglo-Indians were more likely to wish to identify themselves as British rather than Indian. It is not untenable that protestations of a British identity and loyalty to Great Britain may have become stronger in marginalized Anglo-Indians as a protest against an Indian identity. Certainly, there is no doubt that Anglo-Indians fit the bilingual and mixed cultural image suggested by Wirth.

The Anglo-Indian community was used as a political tool in the early days of the Empire. With the lack of British women in India (very few women ventured out before 1833 but women really began to accompany men out after the Suez Canal had been completed in 1869) it was not uncommon for men to take a native mistress. As H.A. Stark, a prominent Anglo-Indian historian, reminds us: ‘undoubtedly marriage was often omitted in the earlier years of the company’s history; and in many such cases the children were abandoned or left destitute on their father’s death, and merged into and became lost in the Indian population.’ 146 Originally, intermarriage with native women was conceived as a political tool to enable Britain the opportunity to colonize the land. Of course the result was that after their father’s death, the children were rejected from British society as there was no legal marriage and there was no place in Hindu caste society for those of mixed-heritage. The status of mixed-race Anglo-Indians, then, was a very low one in British-Indian society, prompting the need to engage in passing to discard any Indian associations. T.G. Clarke, a sympathizer with Anglo-Indians, asked the question:

What is the race of Englishmen, Irishmen, Scotchmen, and Welshmen, now in Great Britain and the colonies? It is above all things a conglomerate race. No Saxon thinks the worse of his Norman brother on English soil! 147

In direct contrast to the American context, a form of passing had been in development from 1833, when Thomas Babington Macaulay wrote his *Minute on Indian Education* (1835). In this he desired to see a class of Indians educated to British standards to act as interpreters between us and the natives we ruled. Benedict Anderson remarks on Macaulay in his
influential *Imagined Communities* (1983) that ‘the important thing is that we see a long range (30 years!) policy, consciously formulated and pursued, to turn ‘idolaters, not so much into Christians, as into people culturally English, despite their irremediable colour and blood. A sort of mental miscegenation is intended’. Essentially, Macaulay is calling for a class of Indian natives to engage in the act of passing as British people by adopting the same identity that would be associated with a colonizer. By adopting the same identity as the colonizer, the native Indian demonstrates the phenomenon of passing. Indeed, much later this was achieved to a certain extent but with very different consequences from those intended by Macaulay. Certainly, Indians were learning from their British colonizers, and it was not necessarily so that they could continue the project of their own colonization. Often, by assuming a British identity through adopting British cultural behaviours, Indians could question the legitimacy of colonial rule and work towards an independence from colonizing nations.

Stark notes how the British husband considered it much easier for his wife to learn the English language than for him to learn the native vernacular. As a result of the predominance of the English language, English cultural influences also began to dominate the Anglo-Indian home further indicating the ability to employ passing in order to suggest a British identity. Any children would have been notified upon birth and subsequently christened. The Anglo-Indians, with their colonial context came to present a special problem with regard to maintaining the political balance of a colony. However, for many the Anglo-Indian offered a unique medical solution to the logistics of ruling over an empire in the tropics with frequent outbreaks of cholera and flu. For example, Francis Galton believed that in the first instance natural selection would ensure the survival of the minority of white people with immunity, but alternatively, some intermixture with black people, which he illustrated with different coloured fluids to demonstrate the process of hybridization, would lead to a race of whites capable of survival.

Here, the Anglo-Indian affords a unique method of colonial control. However, it can be noted confidently that although occupying a marginalized position in society, Anglo-Indians illustrated a degree of autonomy in their political allegiances. This is most visible in the period after the Empire formally ended, when Anglo-Indians demonstrated their ability to mould an identity that suited them. Stewart refers to the Anglo-Indians’ ability to change their identity at will:

for sociopolitical reasons the Anglo-Indians often represented themselves as wholly British in the decades before Indian
independence. Postindependence, as one may easily imagine, those who have remained in India are inclined to stress their Indianness.\textsuperscript{151}

The desire that Anglo-Indians have shown to re-define their identities illustrates the negative image that was attached to the mixed-race individual. Such a negative image was certainly one reason that pushed Anglo-Indians into adopting the act of passing as a means of negotiating the stigma that was attached to being in-between different races. Anglo-Indians were often negatively portrayed in literature, as indicated by D’Cruz who notes how they were marginal figures:

Neither British nor Indian, the “mixed-race” Anglo-Indian was commonly depicted as a marginal figure, who was generally disowned by both British and Indian society. Phrases such as “Bastards of the Raj” and “Midnight’s Orphans” are often invoked to describe the Anglo-Indian’s predicament.\textsuperscript{152}

Historical ethnography and oral histories indicate that Anglo-Indian culture comprised a mixture of forms, many distributed according to class position, on a spectrum between British and local South Indian cultural practice.\textsuperscript{153} Stewart makes clear the fact that cultures are porous and can become mixed with other cultures and as a result of this, are the subject of historical change. For Stewart, this has always been the case and the advent of decolonization and the subsequent development of a postmodern doubt over master narratives of purity have bolstered the recognition of cultural mixtures as an interesting topic of study. This renewed interest displaces the previous tendency to view mixed cultures as ‘inauthentic’ and therefore uninteresting for further study.\textsuperscript{154}

As I have shown, there exist marked differences between the American experience of acts of passing and the British-Indian experience of the phenomenon. With the American concept governed by a politics of race and the British-Indian context informed by culture, it becomes necessary to complete the re-appropriation of the passing figure which this research offers. In the postcolonial project of centralizing theory in the cultures in which they are concerned rather than another (usually First World) location, exploring the unique and significant context of British-Indian uses of the passing figure leads to a reconfiguration of the phenomena of passing and a new outlook on the hybrid figure of twentieth century identity politics.
Chapter One: The Passing Figure in V.S. Naipaul: Dialogical Self Theory and A Performative Politics

If, as I have argued, the Anglo-Indian can demonstrably possess two or more identities and, therefore, become a passing figure, a question is raised as to the coherence and unity of their identity. An identity that is not coherent and unified is at risk of dismissal due to charges of inauthenticity. The lack of a single, referential “true” self makes the definition of “I” somewhat complicated. In this chapter I am arguing that the passing figure has multiple “I’s” which may be defined as their multiple selves. Such a mode of identity construction not only implies a performative politics, but requires a theoretical framework capable of explaining how the presence of a multiplicity of “I’s” can combine to create a single self or persona. The fiction of V.S. Naipaul, concentrating as it does upon the displaced postcolonial figure, affords some unique opportunities to construct some answers to the inherent problem of the discrepancy between the passing figure and a general framework of identity construction.

Naipaul’s connection to England is suggestive of the socially constructed categories of identification present in contemporary identity politics. He is often heralded as an English writer, with John Thieme noting he occupies a similar position to Joseph Conrad. As well as The Mimic Men (1967) making two explicit references to Conrad (p.149 & p.162), Thieme notes that the Island’s name, Isabella, sounds remarkably allusive to the three islands of Nostromo, ‘The Isabells’. Thieme also connects Naipaul and Conrad together through Naipaul’s fragmentary and unchronological structure and the use of a narrator who filters events for the reader. For Thieme, Naipaul has found in Conrad a kindred spirit, both are non-native Englishmen whose ‘absorption into the English tradition has done little to dispel their sense of displacement.’

In a critical reading of both The Mimic Men and The Enigma of Arrival (1987), I will show how they represent the theoretical disjuncture between monologic and polyphonic conceptions of the passing figure by reading the texts alongside Hubert Hermans’ “dialogical self theory”. The narrative of The Mimic Men follows Ralph Singh, originally from Isabella, as he completes the writing of his memoirs whilst living in London. He details his childhood on the Caribbean island and his difficulties in constructing an identity in a nation of many races and ethnicities. His multi-cultural childhood is evident from his Indian origins, location in the Caribbean and the study of English education. Eventually, Ralph relocates to London as a young man in order to escape from the culture of the colonized country and to impose a
sense of order on his existence. When in London as a student, he meets and marries a white 
woman, Sandra, but the marriage in unsuccessful in providing a solution to his identity crisis. 
With Sandra he returns to Isabella and amasses a fortune in property before his marriage ends 
in failure. After his separation from Sandra, Ralph embarks on a short-lived political career 
which ends in his exile from the country after he is involved in a scandal. Ralph returns to 
London and lives a life of relative obscurity in boarding houses, during which he engages in 
the compiling of his memoirs, the basis of which is the book we read.

Likewise, The Enigma of Arrival centres upon a displaced narrator who is renting a 
cottage in the Wiltshire countryside, not far from Stonehenge. He is also engaged in the 
writing of a book and like The Mimic Men, The Enigma of Arrival is largely biographical for 
Naipaul. Upon his arrival, the narrator views England as a static landscape that remains 
unchanging through the ages. However, after a period of twenty years he comes to the 
realization that it is involved in a process of continual change and development as people and 
their relationships to each other are ever shifting. The narrator muses upon his journey from 
the Caribbean to England, and his discovery of himself as a writer. Consequently, there exists 
in the narrator two distinct identities: his original Caribbean self and the slowly emerging 
English self that the narrative develops. Although a relatively inert and passive novel, there 
are a number of astute observations made on the subject of identity and belonging as the 
narrator details his “arrival” in English society.

The ability to display two or more identities by both Ralph Singh and The Enigma of 
Arrival’s narrator results in what Hermans would term a “dialogical self”. Hermans’ 
dialogical self theory suggests that the self is split between numerous ‘I’ positions that each 
have their own voice and can interact with one another creating the dialogic self. Such a 
theory has obvious potential for explaining the multiplicity of identities that the displaced 
postcolonial or passing figure can display. In The Mimic Men, Ralph Singh can identify with 
his colonial country of birth but also with England due to an English education and 
subsequent domicile in London. This effectively means that Ralph develops an I-position for 
both his Isabellan and his English selves which interact dialogically to develop his overall 
sense of self. In a similar fashion, the narrator of The Enigma of Arrival displays a dialogic 
self with a persona constructed by composite parts. As all identity can be assumed to be 
performative and cultural in construction, dialogical self theory allows for the realization that 
different cultural identities necessarily rely upon opposing positions being adopted by the 
individual as he/she negotiates alternative modes of thinking. In applying dialogical self 
theory to the passing figure, I will demonstrate how multiple identities can co-exist within the
self and suggest that these different selves contribute to the construction of a unified persona that lays claim to a monologic authority. Hermans’ theory also establishes a secure link between the internal dimension of the self and the external dimension of the socio-cultural environment. Consequently, dialogical self theory fits with my concern to substitute the linguistic focus of poststructuralist discourse for a framework centred on existentialist theory.

Reading Naipaul alongside dialogical self theory allows me to adopt the meta-position from Hermans’ theory and suggest that it is through the act of meta-positioning that we can best understand Ralph Singh and *The Enigma of Arrival*’s narrator. The meta-position is a dialogical self theory concept centring upon a certain omniscience which allows for the ability to forge connections between various I-positions, leading to a unified sense of self to develop. Like the metanarrative, the meta-position demonstrates the first-person narrator in a process of self-construction. Like the first-person narrator who retrospectively recalls his narrative, the meta-position suggests the same process of re-constructing a narrative or identity from a multitude of contributing sources. As *The Mimic Men* and *The Enigma of Arrival* display elements of the bildungsroman narrative mode, the meta-position as a governing aspect of the psychical construction of the narrators is potentially significant in theorizing upon the construction of a self which is formed from a multitude of fragmented parts or I-positions. I will argue that through the process of meta-positioning, *The Enigma of Arrival*’s narrator and Ralph Singh engage in the bildungsroman narrative mode of reflection and arrive at a unifying identity encompassing the many identities that they may have previously displayed. Forming a coherent self becomes possible for the hybrid figures as the act of meta-positioning allows for the connections between different I-positions to be realized.

Following on from a reading of dialogical self theory and Naipaul, I will argue that the protagonist of *The Mimic Men*, Ralph Singh, displays a performed identity in his interactions with other characters within the text. Ralph’s adoption of a performative strategy indicates the method employed by the passing figure in performing one or more selves. This close reading will illustrate how not only are the passing figure and the displaced postcolonial figure connected through a shared performative agenda, but also how wider identity constructions can be considered within a general framework of performance. Throughout this chapter, I will argue that the hybrid figure offers a model to study the identity construction methods of those who have a connection to two or more cultural centres. However, I am developing my argument further to suggest that the identity construction methods employed by the hybrid figure are just as valid to a study of the identity construction of the non-hybrid
figure. Significantly, the process of creating an identity through the act of passing and performance is potentially useful in developing a theoretical framework of all identity constructions.

In making the connection between readings of Naipaul and dialogical self theory as well as demonstrating the politics of performance in Ralph Singh, I will illustrate Naipaul’s complexity as a writer and combat more sweeping criticisms that have been directed towards him. Discussing the reception Naipaul has received in the academy, Graham Huggan, writing in the mid-1990s, explains the widely held consensus that writers like Naipaul are ‘best not spoken about at all; and if they are spoken about, then it is in terms of stunned disbelief (Naipaul??) or thinly disguised contempt (Naipaul!!).’ \(^{156}\) Huggan details a conversation with one of his students, noting how ‘Some students, she said were not impressed that I was teaching Naipaul; after all, Naipaul is so politically incorrect.’ \(^{157}\) For Graham Huggan, readings of Naipaul are blurred by an ‘inbuilt critical hostility’. \(^{158}\) Huggan proceeds to detail common criticisms aimed towards Naipaul:

Naipaul has been accused of snobbery, of arrogance, of insensitivity.
His writing has been scanned for evidence of his reactionary political leanings. Contained within much of the criticism is the view that Naipaul supports colonial violence, and that he draws on his Western-style education as a means of exporting cultural prejudice. \(^{159}\)

In the following pages, I will argue for Naipaul’s engagement in the postcolonial politics of multiplicity, indicating a complexity which is often denied his writings.

**The Passing Figure and Dialogical Self Theory**

If, as I argue, identity is largely informed by a politics of performance, it is reasonable to assert that a multitude of identities may be held by one individual as any number can be acquired and performed at a given time. The displaced postcolonial figure and the passing figure can attest to this possibility. However, accounting for the theoretical explanation behind the presentation of multiple selves in a single body is fraught with difficulties. Hubert Hermans’ dialogical self theory makes some steps to remedy this by theorizing the multiplicity of ‘I-positions’ in the one physical body.

Hubert Hermans is a Dutch Emeritus Professor of psychology at the Catholic University of Nijmegen who is particularly well known for his creation of the dialogical self theory. He
began developing his theory in the early 1990s, and has devoted the rest of his career to its subsequent development and refinement. In his introduction to *Handbook of Dialogical Self-Theory* (2012), he notes the interdisciplinary possibilities that dialogical self theory affords; for Hermans, it is neither a grand theory that can offer a full explanation of all human behaviour, nor a mini theory that can detail a specific aspect of humanity. Similarly, it is also not a synthesis of two or more currently existing theories. Instead it should be seen as a ‘bridging theory’, whereby ‘a larger diversity of theories, research traditions and practices meet, or will meet, in order to create new and unexpected linkages.’.  

For Hetty Zock, dialogical self theory has had considerable success as a bridging theory; she notes its fluidity and versatility before describing how it ‘has already proved a powerful bridging concept in interdisciplinary research.’. Zock makes connections to dialogical self theory ‘from developmental child psychology to postmodern cultural / theory,’ noting its usage by ‘social scientists, scholars from the humanities, and clinical and pastoral practitioners alike’.  

Dialogical self theory forges links between the internal self on the one hand and a wider social landscape on the other. For Hermans and Gieser, dialogical self theory brings together the two concepts of self and dialogue, which are usually regarded are developing from different intellectual traditions. They highlight the distinction between the self as seen in American pragmatism in the work of William James, George H. Mead and Charles Sanders Peirce and dialogue as a European tradition in the work of Martin Buber and Mikhail Bakhtin. The essential difference between self and dialogue is that self is internalized and concerned with individuality, whereas dialogue is externalized in the form of communications between two or more people. In the dialogical self, these two concepts are merged into one:

the between is interiorized into the within and reversibly, the within is exteriorized into the between. As a consequence, the self does not have an existence separate from society but is part of the society; that is, the self becomes a ‘mini-society’.  

As a result, in adopting dialogical self theory we are making steps to modify the relationship between poststructuralism and postcolonialism to accommodate a Fanon-inspired concept of postcoloniality concerned with the relationship between the self and society.

Dialogical self theory operates on the principle that the self is constructed by a ‘dynamic multiplicity of I-positions’. Accordingly, the ‘I’ is generated through ‘intrinsic contact with
the (social) environment and is bound to particular positions in time and space.'.

Accordingly, new interactions with people and environments lead to the production of an endless stream of ‘I’s, as the self is re-formed multiple times. Previous selves are remembered and are still available to the person, leading to a proliferation of potential personalities and identities that may be displayed at any moment. As a result, the ‘embodied’ I, the conscious part of the psychical self which is aware of the presence of these multiple ‘I’s, has the ability to switch through many various differing positions as wider social situations change and time progresses. In the course of the re-positionings of the embodied I, dissimilar and even opposing positions can be adopted which inevitably leads to relative hierarchical structures of dominance and submission being demonstrated. Crucially, for the hybrid passing figure, ‘As part of sign-mediated social relations, positions can be voiced so that dialogical exchanges among positions can develop.’

Essentially, the different positions of these ‘I’s allows for a dialogic space to open up between them wherein the embodied ‘I’ recognizes any concordance or discordance between the respective I-positions. The dialogical exchange between competing or opposing voices is, in the very least, metaphoric of the internal psychic processes that the colonial/postcolonial figure experiences in the negotiation of an indigenous culture on the one hand and an all-pervasive metropolitan culture from an unknown geographical location on the other. Hermans and Gieser use the simile of fictional characters in a film or story interacting with each other in a constant process of ‘question and answer, agreement and disagreement, conflicts and struggles, negotiations and integrations’.

Each voice arises from a unique position and offer individuality, contributing to the creation of a ‘complex, narratively structured self.’

The story simile is apt given the that the development of dialogical self theory has largely been inspired by Bakhtin’s *Problem’s of Dostoevsky’s Poetics* in which he suggests that in his popular novels there is not one single author at work but instead a multitude of authors or thinkers. Each of Dostoevsky’s characters, Myshkin, Raskolnikov, Stavrogin, Ivan Karamazov and the Grand Inquisitor and more besides, represent a unique consciousness in the novel and are the authors of their own, individual world views, not the product of Dostoevsky’s own authorial perspective as literary critics have previously assumed. As Hermans and Gieser conclude, ‘Rather than a number of different characters in a unified objective world, there is a plurality of consciousnesses.’ This is the concept behind Bakhtin’s designation of a polyphonic novel.

Dialogical self theory’s development from Bakhtin’s writings illustrates the multiple contexts in which his work may be re-appropriated. The number of different perspectives in
which Bakhtin is invoked correlates with our conception of the multiplicity of postcolonial discourse. Initially, Bakhtin was applied in the fields of philosophy, semiotics, linguistics and sociology before being adopted by postcolonialists. Many of Bakhtin’s ideas and terms such as “dialogism,” “polyphonic” and “heteroglossia” fit neatly with postcolonial concepts like hybridity. This is exemplified by Bakhtin’s research into the self and other in texts such as “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”. My own approach is concerned with relocating from a postcolonialism dominated by the linguistic turn to a more existentialist concern with the condition of postcoloniality, evidenced by the adoption of Fanon’s colonial writings as a theoretical framework which remains intrinsically connected to the subject on which it is concerned. Fadwa AbdelRahman, for example, has used Bakhtin to note that Naipaul, ‘does not take into consideration that the linguistic milieu is characterized by heteroglossia—a multiplicity of speech types and social voices, the relationship between which is continually being contested as dominant voices yield to emergent forms.’ 170 Such a milieu of voices resembles the construction of a dialogic self, wherein many ‘I’s are subject to the same fluctuations of dominance and submission. Instead, for AbdelRahman, Naipaul uses language as he believes it should correctly be used and sees such languages as ‘African English’ and ‘Indian English’ as imperfect versions, neglecting the fact that language can be modified and appropriated to suit those who develop the new forms. 171 AbdelRahman is one of many scholars in recent years to adopt Bakhtin’s work to offer postcolonial readings of literature. Similarly, Cynthia Carey has used Bakhtin to read Hanif Kureishi, arguing that the juxtaposition of high language and low language (similar to the binary of high culture and low culture) in The Buddha of Suburbia offers a way in which Karim can progress in his quest to construct an identity:

If history advances through the clash of dialectical forces, the protagonist-narrator of The Buddha of Suburbia can liberate himself from an oppressive past, a difficult present and an outdated form of discourse by experimenting gleefully with language forms both high and low, welding them together, borrowing, mutilating and re-inflecting the diverse strands of language, combining them into a living hybrid text, and thereby creating his own response, through his own idiolect or his own ‘new music’. 172
Karim is able to create new forms of identity from a mixture of high and low language, and we can also view the hybrid figure through dialogical self theory as constructing new identities in a similar fashion. The combination of multiple ‘I’s leads to the mixture and synthesis of these different positions resulting in the production of new identities. Carey and AbdelRahman illustrate just two of the ways in which Bakhtin has been applied to the study of postcolonial literature. Notably, although much of Bakhtin’s work focuses upon the role of language as the site of the production of meaning, his theories can be applied as models of identity that are not specifically linguistic in focus. Hermans’ dialogical self theory is just one such illustration of the adaptability of Bakhtin, taking his increasingly popular concept of ‘dialogism’ and successfully applying it to a psychological theory of the self and the relationship between self and society.

The intrinsic significance given to the external social environment that dialogical self theory allows is useful when applying the theory to postcolonial figures. The colonial psyche is contained within a wider social environment that determines the views and value often held by colonized and colonizing individuals. John Mcleod refers to this relationship between the colonial psyche and the colonial environment as ‘colonising the mind’. Our Fanonian approach is also concerned with forging the link between the individual self and a wider social structure in identity construction, offering an alternative to the linguistic approach which has partly divorced itself from a focus on the colonial environment as integral to the construction of identity. Fanon’s work is particularly appropriate to the passing figure as, like the displaced postcolonial figure, it negotiates the boundaries which construct identity as a social category. Fanon connects the internal psychological structure of a colonized individual to the wider framework of an oppressive colonial society, clearly linking the identity construction of colonized individuals to the damaging effects of oppression.

Ralph Singh engages with centring and decentring movements in the course of his migrations between Isabella and London. Hermans and Gieser explain that centring movements are ‘organizing and stabilizing’, whereas decentring movements are ‘disorganizing and destabilizing’. They argue that in a modern model of the self, dialogue is a centring and unifying force, offering the example of people coming to common understandings following agreement and cooperation. On the other hand, in line with postmodernity, dialogue operates as a decentring force and Hermans and Gieser suggest the example of people engaging in a productive exchange through disagreement and social conflict but from which they learn to their individual benefit.
It will prove useful to further define some of the key features of dialogical self theory that will be applied to a reading of *The Mimic Men*. Perhaps most importantly, Hermans theorized the ‘I-position’. The concept of an I-position simultaneously remains loyal to opposing notions of multiplicity within the self and a unified coherence. Hermans and Gieser explain how the I-position is constructed:

The *I*, subjected to changes in time and space, is intrinsically involved in a process of positioning and is distributed by a wide variety of existing, new and possible positions (decentring movements). *I*-positions have their relative autonomy in the self, have their own specific history, and show different developmental pathways...At the same time, the *I* appropriates or owns some of them and rejects or disowns others (centring movements). Those that are appropriated are experienced as ‘mine’ and as ‘belonging to myself’ and, as a consequence, they add to the coherence and continuity of the self. By embedding *I*-positions in dialogical relationships and processing them in ‘dialogical spaces’, both within and between selves, they are ‘lifted up’ to the level of mutual enrichment and alterity. At the same time, *I*-positions structure and constrain such relationships.\(^{175}\)

The concept of I-position is central to dialogical self theory. The dialogic self is formed by the interaction between these ‘I’ positions, all of which have developed in a unique moment of time and space. These different positions can be adopted or rejected by the self, leading to an identity that is seemingly never consistent. However, as Hermans and Gieser argue, these positions can mutually benefit each other and through a dialogical contact, exert an influential force over other positions helping to develop a unified self.

Through decentring movements, the self can split into various I-positions which reflect the splitting of self that is experienced by the postcolonial figure in literature. Changes in time and space (migrations between Isabella and London, for example) act to construct different and even opposing I-positions within the self. The ‘I’ then has the task of mediating the dialogue between these constituent selves in centring movements to impose a sense of coherence. The relative dominance and submission of different selves is significant for the postcolonial figure, as all too often it is a part of a colonial education that respect for a distant motherland is taught at the cost of indigenous local knowledge. Such hierarchy of cultural
knowledge, or perhaps a ‘colonizing of the mind’ is suggestive of different selves played off against one another in an internal power struggle between colonizer and colonized cultural I-positions. It is significant that given the contemporary emphasis upon the hybrid figure as offering a new mode of engaging in multiplicity as a truer method of experiencing the world, the dialogical contact between these I-positions is thought to be based on ‘mutual enrichment and alterity.’ 176 As I have already suggested, both the postcolonial migrant figure and the passing figure are connected through a shared use of a performative mechanism in constructing their respective selves. The multiplicity they exhibit can be identified in all identity construction. Performance and its resulting multiplicity is a political strategy that any person may adopt. There are no existing barriers that may prevent the adoption of a mode of performance in the construction of the self, such a politics is not only available to postcolonial figures but also wider populations of people who consciously build an identity. It therefore makes sense, that if the dialogical interaction between multiple selves is one of development and positivity, the hybrid/passer becomes an ideal model for the construction of the self and for experiencing the world on a much more global scale. We can relocate my concept of the postcolonial/passing figure from the boundaries of this thesis and present him as a framework suitable for the development of identity in all people, whether directly connected to a postcolonial context or not.

In the following reading of The Mimic Men, I will illustrate how an Isabellan Ralph and a London Ralph can be distinguished as different I-positions engaged in a dialogical interaction according to Hermans’ work. The respective I-positions arise from changes in the geographical and temporal location of Ralph Singh as he effectively creates a new identity for each experience he undergoes. As the development of the I-position is rooted in a geographical and temporal location specific to itself, adopting Hermans’ theory to read Naipaul is a critical step in rejecting a hegemonic postcolonialism for a re-exploration of the discourse offered by more existentialist theorists. As each I-position is necessarily indebted to a real, lived moment, dialogical self theory forges a stronger association between our theoretical framework of existentialism and the question of postcoloniality. Dialogical self theory remains intrinsically connected to the experiences to be found in the real world, as these form the basis for the development of different I-positions. As such, dialogical self theory cannot exist without a consideration of the experience which has created the multiple positions which engage in a dialogic interaction with each other. Furthermore, dialogical self theory is intensely concerned with the connection between the self and wider society,
following from Fanon’s perspective in *The Wretched of the Earth* and *Black Skin, White Masks*.

It is reasonable to assume that the differences inherent in individual I-positions may come into conflict with one another in such a way that a solution is never found. If we understand each I-position as holding equal authority to any other I-position, barring temporary fluctuations in dominance and submission, the conflicts engaged in by ‘I’ positions are impossible to resolve as each may argue for its own role as effectively as any other position. In response to this dilemma, Hermans and Gieser note the ‘third position’, which holds some significance for the postcolonial figure. They argue that when two I-positions are engaged in a conflict, they can be mediated by a third position which both reduces the tension created by the original two positions whilst simultaneously benefitting from the energy that the conflict has generated. There are some obvious connections to the postcolonial hybrid figure whose ‘I’ has to mediate between two often conflictual I-positions relating to differing nations or races. The passing figure also negotiates two, again often opposing, identities and when this is a lifestyle decision constructs an ‘I’ from the conflict this generates. The presence of a third position assists in the construction of the self or ‘I’. The third position bears some resemblances to Homi Bhabha’s “Third Space”, the position that arises from the interstices between established identity centres. In an interview with Jonathan Rutherford, Bhabha explains the significance of the “Third Space”:

> But for me, the importance of hybridity is not to be able to trace two original moments from which the third emerges, rather hybridity to me is the ‘third space’ which enables other positions to emerge. This third space displaces the histories that constitute it, and sets up new structures of authority, new political initiatives, which are inadequately understood through received wisdom.

For Bhabha, the Third Space is the location in which meaning is constructed and the original sources of the hybridity are challenged. Bhabha refers to Fanon’s writings on revolution to suggest that his view cannot be proposed without acknowledging the Third Space. For Bhabha, ‘It is that Third Space, though unrepresentable in itself, which constitutes the discursive conditions of enunciation that ensure that the meaning and symbols of culture have no primordial unity or fixity; that even the same signs can be appropriated, translated, rehistoricized and read anew.’ Bhabha appears to view the Third Space as a rejection of the
previous positions that have created it, and denies any possibility of coherence as meaning is constantly changing. For Hermans, the third position does not take such an antagonistic locus but exists to mediate between the two original sources of the hybridity. However, for both Bhabha and Hermans, the third space or position is one in which the self is constructed and meaning is made from opposing histories located externally to the hybrid. By comparing Bhabha and Hermans’ conception of the intermediary space/position, we can see how both concepts rely upon a connection between the self and previous external positions or histories. The connection that both concepts offer allow for the argument to be made that identity is necessarily a product of both individual forces and wider societal influences in the form of histories or prior positions.

The problem with the third position or Third Space in mediating between two original sources is the inability to be removed from the location of the conflict between those two positions. Consequently, Hermans and Gieser describe the existence of ‘meta-positions’, a mode of positioning which is reflective and exhibits a certain omnipresence. They accordingly also describe the meta-position as ‘an observing ego’ or ‘meta-cognition’. The meta-position necessarily implies a certain distance from other positions but can also demonstrably sympathetic towards some positions over others. Hermans and Gieser note that the attraction can be emotional or cognitive in its motives. Essentially, the meta-position denotes a birds-eye view of other positions so that all become visible and potential linkages between positions can be seen effectively. Interestingly, they note how the person can adopt different meta-positions simultaneously, depending on the nature of their contact with other people. For the passing or postcolonial figure, a meta-positioning function is integral to the construction of a unified and coherent identity. It will be the function of such a position to mediate the oppositions created by loyalties to different races or nationalities. The presence of a meta-positioning function in the self allows for the visibility of all different I-positions as well as the mediation of their respective locations in the space of the single body or self. Without a meta-positioning ability, the various I-positions will be locked in a conflict with temporary fluctuations in submission and dominance without the possibility of resolution as they all command the same authority as each other. The meta-position, with its spatial abilities of organization and visibility, commands a greater authority as it has access to all positions and can initiate centring movements which individual I-positions are unable to do. The meta-position is critical to exploring the act of writing in *The Enigma of Arrival* and *The Mimic Men* as it allows for the meta-cognition of the multiple I-positions in order to construct a unified self. Both texts suggest that writing is an exercise in the omnipotence of the self.
over the potential multiple constructions of identity, forging a better understanding of how a coherent self may be formed through the multiplicity of I-positions that are experienced.

Where meta-positions may fail, however, the promoter position exists to continue the project of ensuring a unified self. Hermans and Gieser describe the ‘promoter position’ as a unique position which functions similarly to the meta-position in that it seeks to generate a unified self from the multiplicity of I-positions which are adopted and displayed in dialogic interaction consistently. Hermans and Gieser argue that the prevalence of I-positions which all exhibit individual agendas lead to a confusion of identity and lack of purposeful direction. Whilst the meta-position serves to promote unity from a spatial perspective, promoter positions do the same from a temporal perspective. In effect, promoter positions focus upon the development of the self:

Promoter positions […] imply a considerable openness towards the future of the self and have the potential to produce and organize a diverse range of more specialized but qualitatively different positions in the service of the development of the self as a whole […] Promoter positions function as innovators of the self, par excellence.180

Interestingly, promoter positions are typically influenced by either real or imagined others. These others may have been interacting with the self for a long period of time or alternatively through a short period of contact.181 The promoter position, due to its often being connected to real or imagined figures outside of the self, illustrates the interdependence of both the self and society in identity construction. In dialogical self theory, the self is explicitly influenced by external social participants through the promoter position suggesting that the individual psyche of a dialogical self is never truly independent of wider social structures.

When applied to The Mimic Men, Ralph Singh’s position is typical of the displaced postcolonial migrant. He has been exiled from his homeland of Isabella due to the failings of his political career but does not naturally fit in within English society either. Ralph denies that racial politics have anything to do with him. When discussing Kensington and a recent racialist disturbance he remarks ‘I do not now wish to become involved in battles that are irrelevant to myself.’182 Ralph’s denial that racial politics have any connection to him amount to a rejection of his racial heritage and suggest a desire to be accepted as white (as presumably, racial politics are only relevant to those who possess “race” and we can take
whiteness as the absence of race). He appears to overcome this predicament through withdrawal:

I could not, like so many of my fellow exiles, live in a suburban semi-detached house; I could not pretend even to myself to be part of a community or to be putting down roots […] I like the feeling of impermanence.\textsuperscript{183}

Ralph’s denial of racial politics having anything to do with him is perhaps nothing more than a weak defence mechanism against the realization that he occupies the position of an immigrant in London. His withdrawal from community suggests an awareness of his marginal position in society; such withdrawal allows for Ralph to pretend to himself that he really belongs, but makes a conscious decision not to participate in society. Ralph literally embodies the displacement that postcolonialism brings as peoples move from an indigenous cultural centre to a foreign, but significantly familiar cultural centre of a colonial metropole. Such displacement between the two cultural centres results, I will argue, in the creation of different I-positions. A part of Ralph will always identify with Isabella, forming one I-position from which he constructs his overall sense of self. However, he cannot help but identify with England too, due to his education along English lines and lengthy period of stay in London. This too, forges an I-position from which he develops a sense of self. The two positions stand in opposition to one another, allowing him to embody the postcolonial displacement of migrancy and forcing him to adopt the position of the passing figure as he battles with twin competing identities.

As Hermans and Gieser describe the I-position, it develops out of differing experiences in time and space.\textsuperscript{184} The presence of I-positions that are representative of previous lived experiences become apparent when Ralph describes his sexual adventures with other immigrants in England. He relays to us how often conversations regarding previous lives in another homeland arise, which has obvious unsettling ramifications for Ralph. The extract quoted below comes from an early part of the novel and depicts Ralph as a figure who apparently still suffers as a result of his displacement. The memories of other lands are painful for him and yet harbour a certain familiar interest. For Ralph,

it was the moment I dreaded. Both of us adrift in London, the great city, I with my past, my own darkness, she no doubt with hers.
Always at these moments the talk of the past, the landscapes, their familiar settings which I wished them to describe and then feared to hear about […] I never wished to hear of the relationships that bound them to these settings, the pettinesses by which they had been imprisoned. I never wanted our darknesses, our auras, to mingle.\textsuperscript{185}

Ralph fears his lovers’ detailing of their pasts as it reminds him of his own sense of displacement; he shows an aversion to relationships, landscapes and the familiar. The darkness to which he refers is metaphoric for the I-position that represents his past lived experiences in Isabella. His geographical and temporal existence in Isabella has led to the production of an I-position related to his construction of self which is based in that location. As an I-position it stands in opposition to his English (and desired) self, leading to his reference to his past as ‘darkness’. As this now is a disturbing or painful memory for him, he attempts to shut it out and abolish the sentiment in others. However, the ‘darkness’ is still present and does therefore play a role in producing the ‘I’ of his current selfhood. The above extract from the text can be used as an example of the creation of I-positions from both temporal and geographical locations, both of which become more prominent to the colonial/postcolonial figure. It also serves as evidence that Ralph is not currently defining his identity successfully. Although Ralph desires to eradicate his Isabellan past, he has not been successful. Indeed, it is unlikely he ever will succeed, and so his identity is not singular but multiple, and will remain so until this tension can be resolved. Much like the passing figure, Ralph has an inner psychic contradiction that remains unresolved in his identity construction. This is noted by John King who writing of Naipaul and J.L. Borges argues that ‘Like Walter Benjamin’s description of Baudelaire’s Flâneur, such writers maintain an ambivalent attitude towards their country and people, a simultaneous complicity and contempt.’\textsuperscript{186}

Such an impermanent perspective on identity is briefly alluded to when Ralph describes his existence in seemingly very existentialist terms which corroborate with dialogical self theory. It appears to Ralph that he is moulded and influenced by every encounter and interaction he is a part of. These encounters lead to the construction of a multiple I-positions:

And this was what I felt I had encountered again in the great city: this feeling of being adrift, a cell of perception, little more, that might be altered, if only fleetingly, by any encounter. The son-lover-brother with Lieni, the player of private games in public rooms, the sensitive
The dialogic nature of his identity construction is made manifest in his metaphor of ‘a cell of perception’ that absorbs and becomes modified by encounters with other cells of perception. Essentially, each new encounter with another person creates a new I-Position for Ralph, and subsequently a new mode of seeing the world and his place in it. Some of these I-positions are related to us, the son-lover-brother, the sensitive young man and the brute all constitute a different I-position that has developed out of a differing temporal and geographical placement. Each and every movement forces the ‘I’ to re-position itself and replicate itself anew. The proliferation of I-Positions in Ralph allows him the ability to pass as different selves; each time he assumes a new identity, son-lover-brother, sensitive man or brute, he effectively favours one I-position over the others and allows this to form the majority of his ‘I’, his self is therefore able to be characterized by a number of different selves varying over temporal and geographic spaces.

The narrator of *The Enigma of Arrival* displays a correlative dialogical self to Ralph Singh. *The Enigma of Arrival* centres on the narrator’s gradual identification with the English landscape that surrounds him and his place in English society. Although he identifies himself as an outsider and appears very unfamiliar with the country at the start of the text, his observations of the continuous changes in his surrounding environment allow him to construct a place in society, coinciding with a developing realization of his identity. Both *The Enigma of Arrival* and *The Mimic Men* are in some measure autobiographical and so draw upon the displacement of a postcolonial situation. The presence of multiple I-positions are visible in the narrator’s remarks in the text:

Possibly, too, this mode of feeling went deeper, and was an ancestral inheritance, something that came with the history that had made me: not only India, with its ideas of a world outside men’s control, but also the colonial plantations or estates of Trinidad, to which my impoverished Indian ancestors had been transported in the last century – estates of which this Wiltshire estate, where I now lived, had been the apotheosis.
As Edward Said has pointed out in his essay on Mansfield Park in *Culture and Imperialism* (1993), there exists an implicit connection between the estates of home and the plantations abroad which funded the plantations owners’ estates. That the Wiltshire estate becomes the apotheosis of the previous estates and plantations of Trinidad suggests the similarities that would be present in both cultures as the dominance of one culture exerts a guiding force over another. Although they constitute separate geographical spaces and therefore lead to the construction of different I-positions, at the same time they share a common cultural background and influence the development of one another (perhaps in the same way in which I-positions can develop each other in their dialogic interactions).

Through a process of various geographical and temporal relocations, the narrator has created a number of I-positions from each location that each display their own perspective on the wider world. For example, his Indian I-position inherits a political fatalism connected to Hinduism, whereas his Trinidadian self is characterized by a knowledge of colonial oppression, poverty and a sense of being an outsider in someone else’s land. Finally, his English I-position witnesses the decay of a post-war England standing in contrary to accepted images of the metropole as inherently superior. The narrator’s self is intrinsically split between these various positions from which he can connect to the world and construct himself. Each I-position also indicates an interpretive strategy, as I will discuss in greater detail with regard to Hanif Kureishi in Chapter Three. Essentially, an interpretive community is a group of people who share a similar world view and interpret or read a text in the same way, thereby constructing the same meaning as one another. These world views are based upon an interpretive strategy, a collection of knowledges and experiences that inform the development of their interpretive community. The narrator’s different I-positions, for example his experience of Indian fatalism, shapes his interpretive strategy for connecting with the wider world and making meaning from his own development of self. The idea of an ‘interpretive community’ underlines the concept of an I-position.

Ralph Singh and *The Enigma of Arrival*’s narrator have so far displayed a self that is riven with contradictions and inconsistencies. However, certain I-positions may dominate over others and the dialogic interaction between I-positions can lead to a stronger, more coherent identity developing from a seemingly endless multiplicity. The inner psychic tension generated by the conflicting I-positions is not latent but manifest in Ralph’s narrative:

> How could I fashion order out of all these unrelated adventures and encounters, myself never the same, never even the thread on which
these things were hung? They came endlessly out of the darkness, and they couldn’t be placed or fixed.\textsuperscript{189}

The apparent lack of unity that Ralph notes is the result of conflicting I-positions in his psyche. The postcolonial figure serves usefully as a template for the theoretical investigation of the passing figure, and vice-versa. According to Hermans and Gieser, Ralph is currently experiencing a decentring movement (a decentring movement as the I engages in positioning between old, new and possible I-positions that may be adopted making the project of unifying the self more difficult) as his I-positions appear to be incompatible and aid the disorganization and destabilization of his sense of self.\textsuperscript{190} When he refers to himself as ‘never the same’, Ralph makes clear the similarities between the postcolonial figure and the passing figure, as both negotiate the pitfalls of conscious identity construction.

The decentring movement is present again when Ralph and his new wife Sandra return to Isabella, a curiously Trinidad-like mixed society. Ralph notes that ‘We were a haphazard, disordered and mixed society in which there could be nothing like damaging exclusion’.\textsuperscript{191} As a result, ‘There were no complicating loyalties or depths; for everyone the past had been cut away.’\textsuperscript{192} As the construction of Isabella is generally mixed it would suggest an element of dialogicality pervades the constructions of identity on the island as neighbourhood boundaries and different cultural groups come into contact. The existing multiplicity may lead to a predisposal to the dialogic self, as uniformity is a rarer commodity when compared to many other nations. Such multiplicity also allows for the further proliferation of I-positions when Ralph and Sandra return to the island. The quote above demonstrates how the development of I-positions ties logically to the displaced colonial figure: when confronted with new spatial and temporal landscapes that he can appropriate and claim as his own, he forges a new I-Position which aids the construction of the ‘I’ or self. The acquisition of new I-Positions allows both Ralph and Sandra to fashion themselves again for their new audience. Parallels with the passing figure suggest that there is a close connection between the postcolonial migrant and the passing figure, through the shared use of a dialogical self to appropriate varying I-Positions that contribute to a larger idea of the self as inevitably multicultural.

As Hermans and Gieser suggest, certain I-Positions may show dominance over other I-positions due to a dialogic interaction between them. When Ralph admits to editing his own memories, I would argue this serves as evidence of certain I-positions exerting dominance
over others and perhaps even replacing them. Ralph describes the unreliability of his memory:

My first memory of school is of taking an apple to the teacher. This puzzles me. We had no apples on Isabella. It must have been an orange; yet my memory insists on the apple. The editing is clearly at fault, but the edited version is all I have.\textsuperscript{193}

Ralph’s open disdain of Isabella and desire to associate himself with England has led to the replacement of his Isabellan I-position with his English I-position. The editing he refers to is the process of a dialogical exchange in which the English position has exerted some dominance over the Isabellan position to insist on the inclusion of apples in his childhood memory. Childhood memories such as this are often considered key to the construction of self, significantly suggesting that Ralph’s ‘I’ is dominated more by English memories and I-positions than any Isabellan I-position. Further evidence of the dominance of his English I-position over the Isabellan comes from the description he offers of other school memories in this ‘version’ of his memory:

This version contains a few lessons. One is about the coronation of the English king and the weight of his crown, so heavy he can wear it only a few seconds.\textsuperscript{194}

He proceeds to reveal a recent dream in which he ‘was being carried helplessly down a swiftly flowing river, the Thames, that sloped, and could only break my fall by guiding my feet to the concrete pillars of the bridge that suddenly spanned the river’\textsuperscript{195}. The heavy English emphasis of these memories and the dream that resulted from exploring such memories, indicate the presence of an English I-Position which has served to displace the original Isabellian memory or I-position suggesting he now identifies himself as more English than Isabellan. No doubt this is the result of his internal conflict over his construction of self, mechanically enacted in the dialogic interaction between the two positions.

In the same way that Ralph Singh can demonstrate the dominance of certain I-positions over others, so too can The Enigma of Arrival’s narrator illustrate the over-riding influence of certain I-positions. For example, when discussing his writing career and his development as a particular kind of writer he notes how
I knew, and was glamoured by the idea of the metropolitan traveller, the man starting from Europe. It was the only kind of model I had; but – as a colonial among colonials who were very close to me – I could not be that kind of traveller, even though I might share that traveller’s education and culture and have his feeling for adventure.  

The narrator then refers to ‘The fight between my idea of the glamour of the traveller-writer and the rawness of my nerves as a colonial travelling among colonials’ There exists some oppositional tension between the two figures; one is an opportunistic searcher of experiences who actively seeks out interaction with other people, the other an oppressed victim of colonial attitudes who wants a withdrawal from society. The narrator becomes, then, more of a colonial figure than a metropolitan man as he feels unable to identify with that model, despite his obvious desires to do so. According to a reading of the text informed by dialogical self theory, we could summarize that his Indian/Caribbean I-position is more dominant than his English I-position which explains his difficulty in identifying himself as an English traveller-writer.

The I-positions held by Ralph Singh and the narrator of *The Enigma of Arrival* are open to fluctuations in dominance and submission. For example, at a point roughly half-way through *The Mimic Men*, Ralph confirms that he has modified his views on Isabella according to other Western cultures. He narrates to us a conversation with Browne, who informs him that much of the ‘natural’ vegetation on the island is in fact not native but transplanted from other shores. Ralph describes how his change in vision was brought about by Browne:

> He told me all about our flowers, whose colours we saw afresh in the postcards which were beginning to appear in our shops. The war was bringing us visitors, who saw more clearly than we did; we learned to see with them, and we were seeing only like visitors.  

In what can be described as a dialogic interaction with visitors to the island, Ralph modifies his view of Isabella in line with the mode of perception held by tourists who have their own cultural agendas. In coming to view Isabella from another perspective, Ralph’s inner dialogic interaction has led to the submission of his Isabellan I-position to a more dominant view held by tourists. The postcolonial figure may find after a period of absence from his homeland that they can return with a different perspective on that land than the one he held when he left.
This can be explained in part by the appropriation of new I-Positions which displace weaker ones through a process of dialogic exchange. As evidence of this, Ralph muses when he leaves Isabella for London due to political duties on the ‘houses of tin and timber, Mediterranean colours, fields, shops, hoardings, the black-face advertisements for toothpaste and stout: none of this would be seen with the eye of possession again.’. The use of “possession” indicates that he may well see these sights again but will not be able to identify them as belonging to himself or his own sense of identity. If these sights cannot be seen as belonging to himself, then they must belong to someone else or other and this means that Ralph is effectively a foreigner to Isabella in the same way in which a tourist cannot see with the ‘eye of possession’. We can surmise that his ‘I’ will be modified due to the appropriation of new I-positions during his stay in London, which in dialogic interaction with his other I-positions will emerge in a dominant position.

As dialogical self theory maintains, there is considerable movement between I-positions. Ralph indicates this when he describes how his ‘early attempt at simplification had failed; it had ended in this switching back and forth between one world and another, one set of relationships and another.’. Each set of relationships that he considers linked together, each perspective on his life contained in a closed ‘world’ is indicative of an I-position being adopted. In this brief allusion, Ralph admits to a plurality of I-positions, and perhaps more crucially, the ability to move between them. Clearly, the boundaries between I-positions are comparatively weak, as the ability to transcend the boundaries through a constant migratory movement back and forth appears to give little trouble, despite Ralph complaining that his attempt at simplification had failed. The ability to make the migration from one position to another over relatively short geographical or temporal distances suggests a dialogic interaction is present between them as the volume of ‘traffic’ in the spaces between established I-positions necessarily forges stronger links between them.

Dialogue self theory has made some moves to recognize the hybrid figure in terms of I-positions and the third position. Seth Surgan and Emily Abbey argue that hybridization occurs when multiple I-positions are ‘simultaneously active and cannot simply coexist, either because of conflict or because the creative urge towards synthesis.’ For Surgan and Abbey, this creates a space of tension between the I-positions. In a move to dispel this tension, the ‘I’ may create a third position that ‘does not deny or remove their differences’.

Ralph’s ‘I’, created out of various competing I-positions, may struggle to offer some sense of unity or coherence. Commonly the postcolonial figure is typecast as suffering a lack of
unity. Ralph admits to questioning ‘whether the personality is manufactured by the vision of others. The personality hangs together. It is one and indivisible.’. This occurs after he has spent a considerable amount of time domiciled in London and is planning to return to Isabella after hearing of his father’s death. At this point in the narrative, Ralph has also detailed at great length his childhood and formative years on Isabella. As such, the multitude of sources for the development of his identity has been made clear to the reader, prompting him to question the manufacture of an identity. Through interaction with others, such as Lieni, Browne, Sandra and his landlord, Ralph acquires new I-positions that can be appropriated to construct his ‘I’, so to a large extent his personality can be said to be constructed by the visions of others around him. Although it is significant that he concludes that his ‘I’ is ‘one and indivisible.’. To consider himself as one and unified, Ralph must have completed a centring movement (the appropriation of I-positions as belonging to the I or subsequent rejection of them as not belonging) and reached mutual agreements between his I-positions to display a coherence in his ‘I’.

Naipaul’s writings contain resemblances of not only the I-positions from dialogical self theory but also examples of the promoter position and the meta-position. I-positions form the basis of a theory of the self which is dialogic in nature and incorporates a multiplicity representative of the hybrid figure. However, as I have already suggested, I-positions may not be able to construct a coherent self without the aid of other positions which demonstrate more authority over the self. I-positions may fluctuate in their dominance and submission to the ‘I’ or self as no one has any more authority than any other. The promoter and meta-positions overcome this obstacle and develop a unified identity. The promoter position is a position normally attributed to another person who is respected by the dialogic I and whose influences form a part of the development of the self in a temporal aspect, as the promoter position has an awareness of future development possibilities. Similarly, the meta-position also strives to develop the self through a certain omniscience of all the individual I-positions, although whereas the promoter position does so in terms of temporality, the meta-position is more keenly aware of spatiality.

I would contend that Lieni acts as a promoter in the development of Ralph in the early part of his narrative which covers his first years in London, serving to offer some unity from his complexity of I-positions. At this stage of the text, Ralph is newly arrived in London and conscious of the disparity between his desire to be identified as Western and the image he portrays as an immigrant. He narrates to us how Lieni acted to construct his character:
But she it was—it is so obvious now—who, by suggestion and flattery, created the character of the rich colonial […] she pretended I was richer than I said. She made me aware of my looks, to which up to then I had paid little attention, content with the knowledge that I was no monster. It was Lieni who told me that my eyes might disturb and that my dark, luxuriant and very soft hair might be a source of further disturbance. It was Lieni who led me through the stores and chose my clothes, and suggested the red cummerbund […] It was Lieni who told me that I ought to spend the extra half-crown two or three times a week to arrive at the school in a taxi, having travelled by public transport the better part of the way.  

In this passage it is possible to recognize in Lieni something of a promoter, at the very least she fulfils the criteria of being a real significant other character in relation to Ralph as necessitated by Hermans and Gieser. At this very early stage of the text, Ralph has admitted to the reader that he cannot return to Isabella at present due to being exiled, yet does not truly understand the English mode, having to resort to copying Mr Shylock’s gestures. He is, then, characterized by multiplicity at this point, but unable to fully become one or another character completely. Lieni serves as promoter to ‘create order and direction’ in his ‘I’. The passage clearly illustrates Lieni’s guidance to Ralph in tailoring his personality, from clothing to behaviour she redesigns his view of himself creating the ‘rich colonial’ figure he will employ later in his political career. By tailoring his persona before other characters in the text, Ralph illustrates the act of passing. Passing, as we have already seen, is simply the display of an identity which is not true or natural. Ralph’s adoption of Lieni’s rich colonial character becomes for Ralph an opportunity to engage in the act of passing as he must change certain characteristic elements about himself in order to successfully be identified as the figure he wants to be. For example, Ralph is clearly pleased with his manufactured persona which Lieni has created for him:

I delighted in my act, and the boys of my island of Isabella, I was glad to see, with their feeling for the stylish […] the boys of Isabella approved of me. I exaggerated the role they admired. ‘My dear fellow,’ I said to a young man, wrapped in a college scarf, whom I
met as he was coming out of a teashop, one of a popular chain, ‘my dear fellow, never, never, never let me see you coming out of those doors again. And remember that the sole purpose of your college scarf is to shine your shoes.’

In playing at being a dandy figure, Ralph is actively involved in the act of passing as something other than a natural or true self. Ralph admits to being persuaded by Lieni to arrive at school in taxi, despite his use of public transport to cover the majority of the journey. Such an act illustrates how he is not actually a rich dandy figure as he must use public transport when he believes that he may not be seen. However, in order to keep up the pretence of his assumed identity, he must employ a taxi to deliver him to school for the section of the journey in which he may be seen and therefore have his adopted identity authorized by his classmates. His adoption of performance becomes the operative mechanism that enables him to engage in the act of passing. He admits delighting in his ‘act’, and exaggerating ‘the role they admired’. The dandy is quite positively not a part of any natural or true self, but a modified aspect or addition he wishes to display. Ralph’s travels in London as the postcolonial man have allowed him adopt this passing behaviour as he meets new audiences and can redesign his ‘I’ as he pleases. The act can be continued when he returns to Isabella and politics as his audience will assume that London will naturally have changed his persona and had a dramatic effect upon him. The postcolonial figure and the passing figure are in many ways intrinsically linked together through the migrancy over large distances and proliferation of new audiences to which to perform.

*The Enigma of Arrival*’s narrator can also demonstrate the presence of a promoter position in his psyche, illustrating the temporal omnipotence of the position. The narrator of the text describes his ambition which his promoter position believes can only be fulfilled in England. The characteristic role of the promoter position as an innovator of the self is clearly at work in the narrator’s planning of his future life and withdrawal from Trinidadian culture:

The older people in our Asian-Indian community in Trinidad […] looked back to an India that became more and more golden in their memory. They were living in Trinidad and were going to die there; but for them it was the wrong place. Something of that feeling was passed down to me. I didn’t look back to India, couldn’t do so; my ambition caused me to look ahead and outwards, to England; but it
led to a similar feeling of wrongness. In Trinidad, feeling myself far away, I had held myself back, as it were, for life at the centre of things.\textsuperscript{211}

The narrator’s promoter position, which in the above passage makes the distinction between a Trinidadian self and an English self, serves the function of foresight in developing his identity. The awareness of temporal development allows for the narrator to look towards an imagined future in England, fuelled by his ambition. No doubt, his colonial education along Western lines is responsible for the positioning of all things Western above anything native. As such, the narrator sees the path to realizing his ambitions in England and the promoter position develops the identity he displays that corresponds with English expectations. The narrator admits to not being completely himself whilst in Trinidad, evidence that he believes his true self is connected to another culture overseas.

Similar to the promoter position in \textit{The Mimic Men} is the meta-position. Hermans and Gieser argue that the meta-position is responsible for providing an ‘overarching view so that several positions can be seen simultaneously and relevant linkages between positions become visible.’\textsuperscript{212} I will argue that the meta-position in \textit{The Mimic Men} is provided through Ralph’s desire to write a book concerning his position, an act of self-medication to resolve his postcolonial disorder. I am suggesting that the act of writing is essentially the same act undertaken by the meta-position in that it provides order and coherence from a multitude of dialogic sources. The over-arching view of a person’s identity provided by the meta-position is the same view that can be achieved by writing a biography. Both the narrator of \textit{The Enigma of Arrival} and Ralph Singh engage in writing as an exercise in unifying their identities. On the subject of his precarious position between both Isabella and London Ralph narrates

\begin{quote}
I felt I had known a double failure, and I felt I continued to live between their twin threats. It was during this time, as I have said, that I thought of writing. It was my hope to give expression to the restlessness, the deep disorder, which the great explorations, the overthrow in three continents of established social organizations, the unnatural bringing together of peoples who could achieve fulfilment only within the security of their own societies and the landscapes
\end{quote}
hymned by their ancestors, it was my hope to give partial expression
to the restlessness which this great upheaval has brought about.\textsuperscript{213}

Ralph clearly indicates his inner contradiction and the psychic tension it creates for him in the
construction of his self. Writing offers the act of meta-positioning, allowing the author to
objectively position himself in an observing position to mediate the dialogic exchange
between his relevant I-positions. Critically, Ralph notes his desire to write in order to impose
a ‘calm and order’ on his life, suggestive of the unity brought about by a meta-position:

\begin{quote}
But this work will not now be written by me; I am too much a victim
of that restlessness which was to have been my subject. And it must
be confessed that in that dream of writing I was attracted less by the
act and the labour than by the calm and order which the act would
have implied.\textsuperscript{214}
\end{quote}

The implication is that the book he produces is the one we are currently reading ourselves, as
suggested in the preface by Naipaul:

\begin{quote}
because of the material, it moved back and forth. It wasn’t
convincing. It delayed me for some months until one day […] it
occurred to me that I should make the actual writing of the fictional
book part of my narrative.\textsuperscript{215}
\end{quote}

There is further evidence that the text is to a large extent biographical in sentiment. The
subject matter is taken from childhood, suggestive of a further engagement with the
biographical genre:

\begin{quote}
the material and the mood came out of that desolation in which I
searched my past for a new book. I had, as I say, no ideas; I had only
the difficult emotions of my colonial childhood-difficult because
patternless and charged with shame.\textsuperscript{216}
\end{quote}

The personal link to the text is suggestive of the book performing as a meta-position for
Naipaul as well as his protagonist Ralph. Bruce Bawer has claimed that for many critics,
Ralph Singh is a stand in for Naipaul himself, illustrating the heavy biographical emphasis of
\textit{The Mimic Men}.\textsuperscript{217} The calm and order he feels would be delivered come as a result of the
over-arching position he takes as a writer in reviewing his life so far and I-positions that he has held over the period.

Writing as an act of meta-positioning is also a significant feature of *The Enigma of Arrival*. The narrator refers to the process of becoming a writer alongside his development of his identity. His travels in the West had occasioned some unfortunate incidents by which he was embarrassed and disturbed. His meta-positioning, however, allows for the construction of a self which disregards those incidents and allows for the development of an identity to which those incidents would not have occurred. For example, he writes ‘So that, though travelling to write, concentrating on my experience, eager for experience, I was shutting myself off from it, editing it out of my memory. Editing out the airport taxi-driver, who had overcharged me – the humiliation had been too great; editing out the Negro at the hotel.’

His recollections of his journeying across the Atlantic prompt the narrator to evaluate his writing career, allowing him to come to the realization that he had ignored his real experiences in life which could form his writing material in the pursuit of specific experiences which he had read about himself in other works. His admissions underline his unreliability as a narrator: although he appears to be honest with the reader throughout the entire text, indicated by the retrospective qualities of the narrative, the accuracy of his memories must be questioned as he has been false to himself for many years. The omnipotence of the meta-position in spatial rather than temporal qualities allows for Naipaul to make the connection between different I-positions that he possesses within his self and construct a unified coherent self. There is a certain amount of the promoter position in operation here also, as his recollection is a retrospective view of his various selves over different time periods, but essentially it is the meta-position which is manifest in the act of writing in Naipaul’s texts as an exercise in observing the multiple I-positions his characters demonstrate. The act of meta-positioning suggests the novelistic tradition of the metanarrative. Unlike metafictional utterances which refer to the fictional status of a literary work, the metanarrative refrains from undercutting the text but offers reflexive references to the process of storytelling or the construction of the narrative.

We may align the meta-position with the meta-narrative because of the metanarratives function in literature. According to Ansgar Nünning, the device functions to authenticate, induce empathy and to convey parody. The meta-positioning of Ralph Singh and the narrator of *The Enigma of Arrival* bear a resemblance to the metanarrative in that the process of constructing the text is referred to alongside the process of constructing their own identities. Like the meta-narrative, the meta-position serves the function of authenticating the present identity by detailing other identities that have been held previously and their
distinctiveness from the current identity being displayed. Similarly, confidences that are conveyed to the reader, such as the narrator of *The Enigma of Arrival*’s admitting to editing out painful memories, work to generate an empathetic feeling in the reader. Metanarrative comments, then, indicate through reference to the process of constructing a text/identity the same process that meta-positioning facilitates.

The meta-position is also suggestive of the narrative technique of using a first-person narrator who represents an older version of the central protagonist. Like some canonical novels, for example *Jane Eyre* and *David Copperfield*, the use of a narrator who is an older version of the protagonist of the events of the novel allows for a degree of meta-positioning to occur, as they negotiate the identities they once held and look retrospectively upon the development of their present selves. By extension, the concept of the meta-position has much to offer the study of the bildungsroman narrative form, given the shared preoccupation with multiple identity forms and the development of a final unified identity which precipitates a sense of calm and resolution in the protagonist. The typical bildungsroman narrative, constructed by a number of unsuccessful identity forms or I-positions, is resolved by a process of gradual development in which all the unsuccessful identities are contributory to the final self that is presented to the reader, suggestive of the act of meta-positioning in which all the individual I-positions are evaluated before a final self is constructed. The process of spatially and temporally mapping the identities that have been performed by the narrators suggests the functioning of the meta-position: that ability to review and evaluate the multiple I-positions that have been constructed. The use of a first-person narrator who details their identity development is predicated on the desire to map out the multiple potential identities that may have been or could still be assumed. The act of meta-positioning to evaluate all potential selves that may be constructed through different I-positions is essentially very similar.

The meta-position creates the opportunity for the narrator to ‘edit’ unfavourable memories and I-positions from his identity and suppress them whilst more favourable I-positions are developed. Another example of the meta-position also suggests that his writing serves the function of meta-positioning:

> Racial diminution formed no part of the material of the kind of writer I was setting out to be. Thinking of myself as a writer, I was hiding my experience from myself; hiding myself from my experience.221
Clearly, the meta-position of the narrator’s psyche can view his multiple selves as independent I-positions and recognizes the dialogical contact that has occurred between them. The meta-position instigates the acceptance of his previous I-position, which attempted to disregard his racial heritage, and reunites this position with his new realization of his own source of experience and material for becoming a writer.

Like the narrator of *The Enigma of Arrival*, Ralph refers to the writing process at a later stage in *The Mimic Men*. He comments on his political articles, suggesting that they were dishonest, the ‘final truth evaded, until at last this truth was lost.’ However, he illustrates the significance of his meta-positioning when he declares that ‘The writing of this book has been more than a release from those articles; it has been an attempt to rediscover that truth.’ Again, Ralph clearly illustrates the purpose of his writing is to rediscover that sense of self which has evaded him through the better part of the narrative. His ability to link the I-positions and various selves that he has portrayed throughout the novel together is suggestive of the function provided by the meta-position that is described by Hermans and Gieser. The purpose is to resolve the conflict generated by opposing I-positions and see clearly the visible links between the I-positions. This helps to foster a coherence and unity otherwise lost in the dialogic self and provides an opportunity for future development.

The concluding pages of the novel suggest that the action Ralph has taken in using the act of writing to create a meta-position from which to work through his identity construction issues has been a considerable success:

> My life has never been more physically limited than it has been during these last three years. Yet I feel that in this time I have cleared the decks, as it were, and prepared myself for fresh action. It will be the action of a free man.

Through a period of physical debilitation and meta-positioning, Ralph has managed to resolve his postcolonial identity issue and thus developed into the free man.

For the narrator of *The Enigma of Arrival*, a sense of coherence arises from the meta-positioning which he engages with in his writing. His splitting of the self into different I-positions is evident:
The separation of man from writer which had begun on the long aeroplane flight from Trinidad to New York became complete. Man and writer both dwindled.

Evidently, as a composite of opposing I-positions, the narrator struggles to create a successful identity due to the rupture inside his psyche. Both his I-positions, the man and the writer ‘dwindled’ in their singularity. However, through meta-positioning, he reconciles both man and writer together at a later stage in life and the mixture is successful:

Knowledge came to me rapidly during the writing. And with that knowledge, that acknowledgement of myself […] I defined myself, and saw that my subject was not my sensibility, my inward development, but the worlds I contained within myself, the worlds I lived in: my subject turning out to be a version of the one that, unknown to me, I had stumbled upon two weeks after I had left home.

In true bildungsroman fashion, the narrator realizes that his true self is the self he has contained within him all along, despite its inherent multiplicity in different worlds. The act of writing allows for the meta-positioning of his self, leading to the realization that his identity is a composite of various fragments from other worlds, rather than a unified man or writer image. He learns to unite the two opposing worlds together, choosing to write about the subject material of which he is composed himself, the experience of multiplicity. Postcolonial multiplicity becomes expressed in a Western style of novel writing forging a coherent identity from fragmented selves. The narrator’s discovery is significant and he communicates this clearly to the reader:

Man and writer were the same person. But that is a writer’s greatest discovery. It took time – and how much writing! – to arrive at that synthesis.

The choice of ‘synthesis’ by Naipaul as describing the construction of the final self displayed in the text suggests the meta-position’s function of creating an identity from the individual I-positions that the I or self has to negotiate. Clearly Naipaul’s narrator has forged a self from two distinct I-positions, the man and the writer. The meta-position can account for this
construction by its ability to evaluate all individual I-positions and impose a unity resulting from the recognition of their shared characteristics. The narrator states how ‘man and writer were united in their eagerness for experience.’ The need for experience is the shared characteristic that the meta-position can use to impose the unity desired. The full extent of the significance of writing to the development of the narrator’s identity is made clear in a link to the physical landscape in which he lives. At first, as his own identity appears to him, the landscape is foreign and unknown. However, through meta-positioning he makes the links between his I-positions and arrives at a new understanding of his identity, correlating in an understanding with his surrounding wilderness. The narrator describes to the reader his developing feeling of belonging in England:

That after twenty years in England, I was to learn about the seasons here at last; that at last (as for a time as a child in Trinidad) I would learn to link certain natural events, leaves on trees, flowers, the clarity of the river, to certain months. That in the most unlikely way, at an advanced age, in a foreign country, I was to find myself in tune with a landscape in a way that I had never been in Trinidad or India (both sources of different kinds of pain). That all the resolutions and franknesses I was going to arrive at through my writing were to be paralleled by the physical peace of my setting; that I was to be cleansed in heart and mind.

The above extract suggests the meta-position has been successful in creating a unified self. The presence of other I-positions is evident, as is their inability to offer a coherence: ‘I was to find myself in tune with a landscape in a way that I had never been in Trinidad or India (both sources of different kinds of pain).’ Both Trinidad and India are influential upon his construction of self, but neither can totalize his identity and cause a degree of unrest. As they are distinct environments, I would argue that they form different I-positions in the narrator’s self. Furthermore, the act of writing, which as I have argued is a method of meta-positioning, has resulted in the sense of calm and order which the protagonist desires. Belonging is evident from his familiarity with the landscape, a belonging that has eluded him previously: ‘I was to find myself in tune with a landscape in a way that I had never been in Trinidad or India’. The narrator’s evident calm is the result of his writing efforts, which as I have argued is a manifestation of the meta-positioning function in accordance with dialogical self theory.
His development of a self, now ‘cleansed in heart and mind’ which parallels the resolutions he reaches is symptomatic of a self organized by the meta-position.

The application of dialogical self theory to a reading of the displaced postcolonial person who engages in the act of passing is significant in furthering an understanding of the processes and constructs that comprise the psyche of someone who can identify with two or more opposing cultures. Dialogical self theory allows for not only the illustration of the psychic conflicts that may occur in a person characterized by multiplicity but demonstrates how such issues can be negotiated for a unified self to develop. The role of the meta-position is particularly significant in this regard as it purposely forges links between singular selves. Naipaul’s use of writing as a method of transcending the hybridity of the postcolonial figure is metaphoric of the role of the meta-position. It is worth considering Naipaul’s relationship to the text: as previously mentioned, for Bruce Bawer and indeed, many others, Singh is a stand-in for Naipaul himself. The autobiographical nature of both The Mimic Men and The Enigma of Arrival is revealing of the real lived experiences of Naipaul, helping to suggest the use of dialogical self theory to an approach to postcolonialism that engages with the self and society rather than post-structuralist linguistic concerns. Indeed, Naipaul has himself stated that ‘I’ve decolonised myself through the practice of writing, through what I’ve learned from writing, looking at the world.’ My argument that writing has functioned as a method of meta-positioning in The Mimic Men and The Enigma of Arrival and thus allows for a unified coherence to develop in the protagonists’ of the texts is supported by Naipaul’s claim to have been decolonized through the writing he has completed in his career. Naipaul, just like Ralph Singh and the narrator of The Enigma of Arrival, both of whom according to Bruce Bawer are representative of Naipaul, has managed to create order from the multiple I-positions that he possesses through the use of writing as a method of meta-positioning. In reading Naipaul alongside such concepts as the I-position and the act of meta-positioning, I have illustrated the potential significance that dialogical self theory holds to postcolonial literary analysis. Dialogical self theory offers an approach which remains strongly linked to the subject of the colonial situation, suggestive of Fanon’s existentialist framework.

The Politics of Performance in The Mimic Men

Identity construction in Naipaul’s The Mimic Men is largely a performative activity that the characters regularly engage in which illustrates identity as a reproductive concept that is continually being formed and re-formed. Such reproduction is possible given the presence of
performance in the construction of the self, as this rejects any essentialist notion of identity. Instead, the application of performance politics to identity suggests that it is consciously constructed and can therefore be re-constructed multiple times over. I will briefly illustrate through examples how the element of performance displayed by Naipaul’s characters suggest a general framework which can explain the identity construction process of both postcolonial and passing figures with wider implications for all identity creation. In terms of identity construction, performance is almost integral to the passing figure in postcolonial literature as it is the ability to perform a second identity which allows for the act of passing to occur. Without the display of performance, there is no possibility of producing a second identity which must in some way differ from the original identity in order to be classed as a second self. For a character to pass successfully, performance is implicated in the display of the necessary characteristics of the acquired role. Failure to perform in accordance with the requirements of the role will result in the performance becoming “unmasked” and presumably some social penalty for the failed passing figure.

On the first page of the novel, our narrator Ralph Singh (recently moved to London from the fictional colonial island of Isabella) describes to the reader how he held his landlord in particular high esteem. Such esteem seems to emanate purely from a racial inferiority complex, the position to which, as a colonized individual, he has been relegated against his wishes. Thus, he views his English landlord with a little more respect than is probably deserved:

And for Mr Shylock, the recipient each week of fifteen times three guineas, the possessor of a mistress and of suits made of cloth so fine I felt I could eat it, I had nothing but admiration.232

Ralph’s deference to Mr Shylock is suggested by a visual admiration of the mannerisms displayed by Mr Shylock. In the same opening section of the novel, Ralph narrates his views on Mr Shylock:

I thought Mr Shylock looked distinguished, like a lawyer or businessman or politician. He had the habit of stroking the lobe of his ear and inclining his head to listen. I thought the gesture was attractive; I copied it.233
In a thinly disguised attempt to blend in with the London crowd, Ralph’s adoption of Shylock’s gesture is suggestive of the passing figure’s acquisition of identity. Through imitating Mr Shylock and projecting the same image to other people, it is Ralph’s intention to be viewed with a similar, if not the same, respect as he believes is afforded to Mr Shylock. In essence, he is hoping to pass as the same kind of man. Passing does not necessarily involve the act of disguising skin colour; in its basic form it represents the “passing off” of an identity that is not considered one’s own. Ralph’s identity is probably not currently considered as a respectable one at this very early stage of the text, this is suggested by his detailing of the political life-cycle in the Caribbean. Although once powerful and relatively wealthy, a Caribbean politician can expect exile and relative obscurity after a short career forcing him to ‘find his level’. In passing as the same style of man as Mr Shylock, he becomes something other than his true self, the respectable London citizen. Crucially, the ability to pass is predicated on the idea of performance, placing the act of passing in opposition to the essentialist notion of modern identity construction. Ralph’s adoption of performance to construct an identity is recognized by himself, allowing for him to come to an awareness of himself as not just an individual but a ‘performer’.

If Ralph can perform the mannerisms of Mr Shylock and adopt his persona, the nature of Ralph’s identity is rendered as incompatible with an essential or fixed notion of identity. Instead, it must be seen as fluid and multiple, allowing identity constructors the ability to modify or even transform their selves into other selves. The pre-modernist essentialism and racial hierarchies seen frequently in literature and social discourses before the development of the phenomenon of passing are displaced by through the simple act of Ralph stroking his ear and inclining his head. The race theory dominated environments of America and pre-modernist Britain are unable to account for the ability to adopt or reject identity in the passing figure. The modernist influences of Boas and Malinowski enable the acceptance of multiple ways of being in the world and the imposition of a cultural over racial schema of identity construction. Crucially, although Ralph is a colonial figure, his displaced status is not essential to his identity construction and offers no hegemonic influence. Indeed, any other character in the novel could equally well adopt Mr Shylock’s identity and pass as a similar character themselves. As such, Ralph’s performance stands as a model for the construction of all identity.

Interestingly, the minor character Mr Shylock, whom we never meet, is constructed solely through Ralph’s narrative and does not appear as an independent character. As we have seen, Ralph’s identity construction is highly influenced by his colonial position and without doubt
this elevates Mr Shylock to a, perhaps undeserved, superior hierarchical position. It is not too much to suggest, then, that identity construction is also largely a matter of audience interpretation of identity. I offer an extended discussion of the role of the audience in identity construction in Chapter Three, within which Stanley Fish’s interpretive community theory is applied to a reading of identity in Hanif Kureishi’s *The Buddha of Suburbia* (1990). Much like Mr Shylock, Kureishi’s characters are constructed not through their own behaviours but by the “interpretive strategy” of the receptive audience to the passing event. The interpretive strategy is the prior knowledge and experiences that inform an audience member what they should “read” into a given text. I argue for an adoption of this framework in “reading” identity. Ralph, as a colonial subject, has an interpretive strategy towards Mr Shylock, a member of a colonizing nation, that is informed by the supposed superiority afforded to whites and Westerners. Mr Shylock is the product of Ralph’s interpretation of his fine dress and elegant mannerisms which are significant given the absence of Mr Shylock in the text. As a consequence, a character may be perceived as passing as another identity without any intention of doing so. For example, Ralph laments early on over the cruel realities of the short political career afforded those in the pacific colonies:

There are many of us around living modestly and without recognition in small semi-detached suburban houses. We go out on a Saturday morning to do the shopping at Sainsbury’s and jostle with the crowd. We have known grandeur beyond the football-pool dreams of our neighbours; but in the lower-middle-class surroundings to which we are condemned we pass for immigrants.  

Despite the powerful and wealthy identity once held by the former politicians from Isabella and other colonial nations, they are viewed presently by the British on home territory who do not distinguish them from the typical colonial figure, generally seen as inferior and class them accordingly as immigrants. As a result, they are now identified as immigrants effectively forcing them to pass as an identity which they may personally not associate themselves with. Such involuntary passing illustrates the importance of audience interpretation in authorizing and influencing the activity of passing.

A further illustration of Ralph’s adoption of performance in identity construction exists in his taking up the identity of the dandy, despite a lack of finances to truly live the dandy lifestyle. Interestingly, Ralph explains how he was able to adopt a new character in the
second chapter of the text in which he discusses his integration into London life after Isabella:

In London I had no guide. There was no one to link my present with my past, no one to note my consistencies or inconsistencies. It was up to me to choose my character.  

His situation could be read as typical of the postcolonial migrant. With a new audience to authorize his identity, he becomes free to modify it as much as he pleases in order to re-invent himself. Assuming the identity of a dandy perhaps expresses a desire to once again experience the grandeur that came with politics, a reaction to his involuntary pass as an immigrant.

The dandy identity becomes more integral to Ralph when he returns to Isabella and embarks upon a political career. Ralph narrates how ‘the confident, flippant dandy that was my character in Mr Shylock’s house was the character I retained and promoted, almost without design now, as soon as I spoke.’ An interesting question is raised here as to the authority to portray a passed identity over lengthy periods of time. Ralph describes that the character was able to be adopted with little conscious effort, suggesting that it has almost grown to become a natural extension of his self, or even perhaps replace his previous self with the dandy figure. In a sense, it has ceased to become dependent upon any notion of performativity and its association with the act of passing becomes tenuous.

So far, both the performance displayed by the passing figure and the audience interpretation of that performance has worked to produce an identity. Ralph is not the only figure in the text who can be contained within a performatve framework, illustrating how a performatve politics can be potentially useful for a general theory of identity. Lieni offers an example of this in her attempt to pass as a typical young London girl. For Ralph, Lieni’s identity is a conscious construction:

Lieni saw herself as a smart London girl; and whenever we went out together […] she spent much time on the creation of this smart London girl, whether we were going to the cheap Italian restaurant round the corner, or to the cinema, which was not much farther.

It is significant that Lieni spends time creating her character, this directly suggests an element of performance in the identity that she displays. Consequently, Lieni demonstrates Naipaul’s
involvement in a modernist identity politics of multiplicity over fixity, rejecting the pre-modernist bias of essentialism. In writing Lieni, Naipaul opposes the rigidity inherent in concepts of race theory and embraces the culturalism of Boas and Malinowski. There is no reason to suggest that despite being Maltese, she cannot assume the local identity and pass as a member of the indigenous people of London.

As a further illustration of the audience role in creating an effective pass, Lieni’s London girl identity is shown as false when Ralph sees her after a period of twelve years apart. He concludes:

her own style had changed little. Her heels were still very high, her lipstick still a little too bright on her wide mouth: not the smart London girl, but a full-bodied woman who could be recognized at a glance as an immigrant, Maltese, Italian, Cypriot.  

By Ralph’s own admission, Lieni’s style has remained consistent, and should therefore resemble the identity he associated with her from twelve years prior to their present meeting. However, he insists that she is no longer the smart London girl but recognizable as an immigrant. As Lieni’s style has barely changed, the falsity of her London identity is revealed in the changing perceptions of her identity: although twelve years ago she may have been seen as the smart London girl, presently she is re-identified as the immigrant. The London girl identity is no longer a stable conception of her own identity but a changing perception made by others centring upon her.

Performance can be shown to be an element of identity construction which pervades both public and private spheres in The Mimic Men. Naipaul alludes briefly, but importantly, to ‘private theatre’. Ralph describes how after returning home when his wife has left he discovered she had left a few possessions such as clothing behind, no longer wanted:

I held a shoe and studied the worn heel, the minute cracks in the leather. I touched the dresses. I was light with whisky; the gestures seemed suitable for a moment of private theatre.  

Theatre has obvious connotations of performance but the term ‘private theatre’ is almost oxymoronic. Performance is generally held as a public act, contradicting the assumed lack of performance in the private sphere. The boundary between a private identity and a public identity is blurred in this short extract as Ralph appears to be performing either to himself or
subconsciously, either way suggesting that the only way he knows to construct an identity and to ‘be’ at any one time is to perform each moment. The significance of performance is made clear in Naipaul’s politics here, all identity rests upon a foundation of a performative politics in at least some measure.

Ralph concludes his narrative by describing the various selves he has performed in the course of his life so far:

> I have also fulfilled the fourfold division of life prescribed by our Aryan ancestors. I have been student, householder and man of affairs, recluse.\textsuperscript{242}

In labelling four different identities that he has assumed in the course of the text, Ralph has effectively described the act of passing which he has consistently been engaged with. If Ralph has the ability to portray four different identities throughout his life, it is hard to define what his true self is composed of. Consequently, it is easier to define Ralph as an ideology over a single identity. Ralph instead embodies the postcolonial ideal of multiplicity displacing fixity and the modernist triumph of performance over essentialism. The only real way of defining Ralph, and thus identifying him, is to link his self to this ideology and suggest he is a product of postcolonial displacement and is identified as a passing figure.

*The Mimic Men* allows for identity to be conceived as a performative act undertaken by a willing individual. In displaying a performance, the receptive audience become complicit in the act of passing through the interpretations they make regarding the identity of the passing figure. As such, identity for colonial/postcolonial figures offers a template for the study of identity in all people. The adoption of a politics of performance in constructing an identity is an option available to all people irrespective of their colonial/postcolonial status. Despite the intense focus of my research in the postcolonial figure, the identity construction methods have potentially significant ramifications for the wider study of all modern identity. Furthermore, the connection between the performed self and the audience suggest a link between the self and wider social structures, facilitating our approach to postcolonial discourse which is concentrated upon postcoloniality as a lived condition experienced by many peoples. In adopting Fanon and Sartre’s existentialist approach which champions the connection between the individual self and a wider social structure, I am offering a postcolonial discourse centred directly upon the real experiences of individuals in relation to the socio-political phenomenon of oppression. Significantly, such an approach does not
isolate the postcolonial individual from the contexts of society but suggests that their identity development is a response to social conditions.
Chapter Two: The Passing Figure and the Schizophrenic Splitting of the Self in Salman Rushdie’s *The Satanic Verses*

The role of dialogical self theory in theorizing the construction of a self in the postcolonial or passing figure is potentially significant as it recognizes the tensions generated in the spaces between identity positions. For example, the presence of multiple I-positions does not preclude a unified coherence in the overall identity of the individual, despite differences between respective positions which may appear irreconcilable. Dialogical self theory suggests ways in which these tensions can be resolved, as we have seen through the creation of a meta-positioning function.

Within this chapter, I will suggest an alternative theoretical framework for the multiply constructed identity. By applying R.D. Laing’s theory of the “divided self” to Salman Rushdie’s *The Satanic Verses* (1988), I will argue that the passing figure can be constructed from two identities, one of which is considered to be a “false-self” and like dialogical self theory, allows for a tension to arise between the two independent personas. The divided self concept is useful in studying the passing figure as it argues that through an integration of the two selves, the schizophrenia can be eradicated. When applied to the person engaged in the act of passing, this suggests that the tensions between the two identities can be dispelled. Essentially, Laing’s theory, formed by his associations with mental health patients, suggests that the multiple self is constructed through schizophrenia and presents a “real” self and a “false-self”. Laing argues that the schizophrenic has an embodied self and an unembodied self. The real self is considered to be the unembodied self and it will come to view the physical self as false and multiply constructed. The multiple constructions of the false self lead to the designation of a “false-self system”. The “false-self system” concept is particularly significant given our interest in the adoption of passing as a method of identity construction and the performance required to present a deceptive image.

I will argue throughout this chapter that the protagonist of *The Satanic Verses*, Gibreel, becomes a “passing figure” as he develops schizophrenia. His contraction of schizophrenia allows for two distinct identities to emerge and so he becomes capable of passing as a different identity. The onset of his mental illness initiates departures into the narrative mode of magic realism during his sleep, within which Gibreel develops multiple other personas that are contrasted to his waking self. Through a contradiction between Gibreel’s normal (waking) self and his schizophrenic (dreaming) self, the angel Gibreel, he becomes an example of the
divided self that typifies the postcolonial migrant condition. Furthermore, Gibreel’s development of a religious persona in the magic realist sections of text allow me to argue that religion can be deconstructed to dismantle the authority it may hold as a potential totalizer of identity. The purpose of this brief deconstructive reading is to illustrate both the significance and effectiveness that Derrida’s post-structuralist method of reading texts has offered. I will show how, through a deconstructive approach, seemingly authoritative identity categories such as religion are in fact consciously constructed and can be adopted or rejected by the passing figure through an engagement in performance.

The plot of *The Satanic Verses* reflects the complexity of its themes. The novel’s postcolonial emphasis on multiplicity is evident from its ability to deconstruct the monologic authority that opposes such fluidity. The combination of realist and magic realist narrative modes are apparent from the start of the novel when the protagonists are introduced as they hurtle to the ground from an exploded aeroplane. The use of a frame narrative is suggestive of the boundaries which constrain his characters, Gibreel Farishta and Saladin Chamcha. However, the gradual merging of the two literary modes which he invokes, realism and magic realism serve to bring the narratives together, pointing out the realities of disintegrating definitions of identity. Instead of suffering a certain death the pair miraculously survive their fall, albeit in radically altered forms of being. Their fall from above represents a rebirth, something that is not lost on Gibreel at least, who congratulates Saladin:

‘Born again, Spoono, you and me. Happy birthday, mister; happy birthday to you.’

Whereas prior to the explosion both had worked as actors and led regular lives, Gibreel as a successful Bollywood actor and Saladin as a voiceover artist in England, now they assume archetypal religious roles as an angel and devil respectively. Upon landing in England, Saladin is arrested on suspicion of being an illegal immigrant despite his many years of residence in England and adoption of an English identity. He is subsequently abused by the policemen who initiate his transformation into the devil figure, supposedly through the powers of their description, demonstrating the colonizer’s power over language. Saladin is then admitted to a specific hospital containing other patients who resemble figures comprised of a mixture of human and animal features. Whilst there, he is informed by another patient of the cause of their transformation; Saladin and the other patients are apparently the victims of racial and xenophobic stereotype: ‘They have the power of description, and we succumb to
Gibreel initially takes up residence with Rosa Diamond, an old Englishwoman who first discovers them when they make their dramatic entrance on a beach on the south coast.

Saladin is convinced that Gibreel has somehow cursed him into adopting his new form of a devil during their fall and eventually decides that revenge is needed. Gibreel on the other hand, finds Allie Cone, an Englishwoman whom he loves and, according to the realist narrative of the text, develops schizophrenia. The two competing narratives, potentially a result of Gibreel’s schizophrenia, enable Gibreel to adopt two separate identities. In the realist narrative he remains Gibreel, but during his dream episodes which intersperse the book and constitute his schizophrenic relapses, he becomes the archangel Gibreel in fantastical magic realist diversions.

As revenge for Gibreel’s cursing of him during the fall, Saladin uses his talents for voice mimicry and repeatedly telephones Gibreel pretending to be various secret lovers of Allie. Gibreel’s instability, as a result of his illness, leads him to kill Allie before he realizes he has been misled. Gibreel decides to hunt down Saladin who he finds in a burning café, trapped by fallen debris. After a moment of deliberation, Gibreel takes pity on Saladin and rescues him. Shortly after the pair return to India, where Gibreel commits suicide, having now realized that his schizophrenia is out of control and Saladin proceeds to re-engage with his Indian self, which he had previously repressed in favour of his English identity.

The dream sequences within which Gibreel experiences and assumes various different roles punctuate the text and centre on three distinct narratives. The first has attracted the most criticism from certain quarters and describes the Prophet Muhammad as he legitimizes the worship of polytheistic deities, only to later reject this as he comes to believe he has been tricked by Shaitan. One of his companions, upon doubting the authenticity of the messages the prophet has received from above, begins to makes changes to the verses as he records them. When he realizes that his tampering has not been noticed, he questions the authenticity of the Word that is received. This is the incident of the “Satanic Verses” in Islamic folklore.

The second involves Gibreel as the angel figure, instructing a lone Indian girl to lead a pilgrimage across the Arabian Sea. The journey’s end is retold with conflicting stories: some observers believe that the sea parted as was foretold and the pilgrimage was successful. Alternatively, the officials charged with investigating a suspected case of illegal immigration observe only ‘the drowned bodies [that] are floating to shore, swollen like balloons and stinking like hell.’
The third dream sequence portrays an exiled Imam in London in a contemporary setting. As he has been exiled, he summons the angel Gibreel and uses his attributes for his own purposes. As a result of Gibreel’s magic realist dream sequences, he is afforded a certain omnipresence that allows him to transcend his angel figure identity and become even more multiple as he plays other characters in the dream scenes. Within his dream sequences, he recognizes that ‘he’s not just playing the archangel but also him, the businessman, the Messenger, Mahound’, illustrating the multiplicity that his schizophrenic self displays.

The controversy caused by the novel centres largely on these “magic realist” sections of the text, so I will briefly introduce Rushdie’s chosen textual style and discuss the significance of his narrative mode. Given the tradition of Western realism, Rushdie’s novel potentially makes for hard reading by contrast to other, more canonical, non-magic realist texts and yet this was the audience for which the novel was largely written for.

However, his choice may be more suitable than might first appear as Lois Parkinson Zamora and Wendy B. Faris suggest. Their collection of essays on the magic realist narrative mode, Magical Realism: Theory, History, Community (1995), argues that rather than standing in marked opposition to the realist mode, both realism and magic realism often share coherent and identical sources, and draws attention to the ‘magical departures from realism by such master realists as Gogol, James, Kafka, Flaubert.’ The construction of “magical departures” suggests that the two modes can be complicit with one another; a factual basis or context can be utilized but fantastical departures offer new expressions of mundane ideas or offer platforms for ideas that may not be immediately accepted in a realist text. Realism, on the other hand, purports to represent the world as it actually appears. The following description of realism can be found in Penguin’s Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory (1977):

realism is the portrayal of life with fidelity. It is thus not concerned with idealization, with rendering things as beautiful when they are not, or in any way presenting them in any guise as they are not; nor, as a rule, is realism concerned with presenting the supranormal or transcendental, though, of course, the writings of Richard Rolle of Hampole, for example or the mystical poems of St John of the Cross, are realistic enough if we believe in God and the spiritual order.
I will be using the definition implied above that realism represents only what is actually present and does not represent things in a way which they are not. However, it is notable that the definition of realism is subject to interpretation. The extract above claims that if believed, mystical works may be defined as realist. Consequently, it is possible to argue that Gibreel’s angel persona is a realist narrative as it correlates with his own beliefs and may also be aligned with those views of a section of the texts’ readers. Essentially, I distinguish between the fantastical religious departures as magic realism and the narrative representing Gibreel’s schizophrenia as realist. Faris and Zamora identify some key differences between magic realism and realism, aiding the distinction between the two narratives.

One essential difference they note is the ‘intentionality implicit in the conventions of the two modes.’ Accordingly, both narrative modes can be invoked for significantly different functions. They argue that several of the essays they include in their collection stress the intention of realism to offer a ‘singular version, as an objective (hence universal) representation of natural and social realities-in short, that realism functions ideologically and hegemonically.’ Rushdie’s only partial use of realism is perhaps not so surprising, then, given the postcolonial project of rejecting hegemonic functions and objective versions of history. On the other hand, magic realism functions in an ideological, but not hegemonic fashion and does not offer a singular world view. The result is that, and this is why it serves postcolonial texts so well, the intention in a magic realist text is not to be centralizing but eccentric, allowing fictional space for ‘interactions of diversity’.

Faris and Zamora also identify the role of magic realism as a cultural corrective, suggesting that ‘In magical realist texts, ontological disruption serves the purpose of political and cultural disruption: magic is often given as a cultural corrective, requiring readers to scrutinize accepted realistic conventions of causality, materiality, motivation.’ The departures that magic realism develops from a realist narrative also suggest a departure from the ideological systems of that realist world which has been represented. The disruption of accepted knowledge structures, the ontological disruption, serves to initiate the acceptance of other modes of constructing and gathering knowledge about the realist world from which we have departed. In support of this Faris and Zamora suggest that ‘propinquity […] is indeed a central structuring principle of magical realist narration. Contradictions stand face to face, oxymorons march in locked step […] and politics collide with fantasy.’ For Rushdie, a narrative mode that encapsulates the eccentric positions of migrant characters and on a narrative level offers representations of diversity and interaction suggests a message suggestive of contemporary postcolonial world views.
That this mode allows the fantastic to become a ‘cultural corrective’ further supports the postcolonial ethic of diversity and equality which may be attributed to Rushdie given the sections of the novel which clearly show white British racism. Perhaps it is a strength of the novel and its narrative form that, as we have seen, ‘texts labelled magical realist draw upon cultural systems that are no less “real” than those upon which traditional literary realism draws’. Faris and Zamora’s observation clearly indicates the problematic distinction between realism and magic realism as both draw upon systems of knowledge that are accessible to the reader of the text.

Faris and Zamora forge a link between magic realist texts and postcolonialism. They argue that ‘Magical realist texts are subversive: their in-betweenness, their all-at-onceness encourages resistance to monologic political and cultural structures, a feature that has made the mode particularly useful to writers in postcolonial cultures and, increasingly, to women.’ Rushdie’s adoption of the narrative mode implies a similar desire to subvert the monologic structures of imperialism and develop an identity politics of hybridity. It is significant that Rushdie employs this mode of narrative for characters such as Gibreel and Saladin who represent the collision of worlds (magic-real and East-West) forcing them to adopt the liminal position that Faris and Zamora refer to. Given my argument that Rushdie’s characters engage in the act of passing in order to displace a binary notion of identity through the ability to perform multiple identities, the combined realist/magic realist narrative mode is significant in developing the in-between position of the postcolonial migrant figure. For Faris and Zamora, this is perhaps no surprise: they suggest that ‘magical realism is especially alive and well in postcolonial contexts’. For example, Gibreel’s schizophrenia can be read on the realist level, constituting one self but also on the magic realist level of an alternative new persona, suggesting a different, contradictory world, allowing him to become a passing figure in his transformation from realist to magic realist depending on how the text is read. In this chapter I will read Rushdie and his representations of multiple identities through the subgenre of magic realism as opposed to the usual adoption of postmodernism to explain the presence and significance of such postcolonial identities and complex environments incorporating the fantastic and surreal. Rushdie, like Naipaul and as I will demonstrate in Chapters Three and Four, Kureishi and Malkani, employs the passing figure to suggest that identity is fundamentally a performative act, thereby rejecting any essentialist concept of identity as false and unnecessarily limiting. For these writers, the phenomenon of passing encapsulates the postcolonial mixture of identities and offers new theoretical frameworks for the study of identity as a wider concept. Within this context, magical realism is far from exhausted and
offers a ‘replenishing force for “mainstream” narrative traditions’. Rushdie has been particularly adept at recognizing the utility of magical realism and subsequently adopting the mode for the greater corpus of his fictive writing. Magic realism, alongside Laing’s false self system offer an attractive alternative to poststructuralist methodologies due to their location in the experiential realm and lived practices (albeit often informed by ideology) of identity politics.

Faris and Zamora credit Franz Roh as having first coined the term “magical realism”. In their text they reprint Roh’s essay which offers further evidence for the relevance of magical realism to postcolonial fiction. Critically, Roh suggests that in the midst of flux, a permanence and stability can develop:

Out of that flux, that constant appearance and disappearance of material, permanent objects somehow appear: in short, the marvel by which a variable commotion crystalizes into a clear set of constants. This miracle of an apparent persistence and duration in the midst of a demonical flux; this enigma of total quietude in the midst of general becoming, of universal dissolution: this is what Post-Expressionism admires and highlights.

Roh’s suggestion that permanence and stability can develop from the fluctuations and variability is significant when applied to the fictive text that represents identity in the subgenre of magic realism. The postcolonial identity that is marked (either racially or culturally) by multiple identities has the ability (within the magic realist tradition) to synthesize and consolidate and thus negotiate the problematics of hybridity.

However, Stephen Slemon argues that both realism and magic realism remain in the dialectic which it is usually employed to reject: “‘magic realism’ is an oxymoron, one that suggests a binary opposition between the representational code of realism and that, roughly, of fantasy’ which is an inescapable fact. He describes how a diametric difference between realism and magic realism serve to keep the two from ever fully synthesizing:

In the language of narration in a magic realist text, a battle between two oppositional systems takes place, each working toward the creation of a different kind of fictional world from the other. Since the ground rules of these two worlds are incompatible, neither one can
fully come into being, and each remains suspended, locked in a continuous dialectic with the “other,” a situation which creates disjunction within each of the separate discursive systems, rending them with gaps, absences, and silences.²⁶⁰

Slemon’s observation suggests that neither realism nor magic realism can ever become an independent narrative form as each relies upon the other for an original source and continue to engage with each other in a dialectical process similar to the “self” and “other” of postcolonial studies. I would argue that there is a fundamental connection here to the displaced postcolonial migrant who navigates across two seemingly incompatible cultures. In the migrant or hybrid figure, the two cultural centres can enter a dialectical relationship in a similar fashion to the two competing narrative forms employed by Rushdie. Significantly, I argue that Slemon is accurate in detailing the relationship between realism and magic realism, which has critical results for my reading of Gibreel. If both realism and magic realism are not independent narrative modes but are instead two interrelated forms, it is logical that each of Gibreel’s identities (the realist schizophrenic and the magic realist religious figure) are also locked in a dialectical relationship with each other and cannot exist independently. Ironically, as we have already suggested, the two narratives share a certain coherence and original source, insofar as magic realism relies upon a notion of realism from which it must depart, allowing the postcolonial writer like Rushdie an appropriate platform to develop ideas of unity through difference.

For Keith Booker, much of Rushdie’s fiction explores the theme of different worlds or realities occupying the same space, comparable to our adoption of the I-positions diagnosed by dialogical self theory. He cites *Grimus* (1975), wherein an alternate dimension exists alongside the real world and *Shame* (1983) in which the idea is used to describe the duality of Sufiya Zenobia Hyder. For Booker, if the same space can be occupied by different identities and realities, surely the very notion of identity and reality is called into question. He goes on to suggest that the intolerance of Islamic fundamentalism is representative of the rejection of otherness that Rushdie questions:

> it is characteristic of certain fanatical devotees of Islamic fundamentalism to be totally intolerant of all alternative modes of thought. This intolerance of otherness amounts to a dual opposition
between self and other of the type that Rushdie relentlessly challenges in his fiction.\textsuperscript{261}

The political reaction to the publication of \textit{The Satanic Verses} is significant and deserves some explanation.

The perceived misrepresentation of Islam led to Rushdie being labelled as blasphemous and eventually resulted in the fatwa that was issued against him. Rushdie had previously experienced some controversy in reactions to his work, although nothing on the scale he would come to encounter with the publication of \textit{The Satanic Verses}. In \textit{Midnight’s Children} (1981), he suggests that Mrs Indira Gandhi had been responsible for her husband’s death due to her neglect, a fact that her son then used to overpower her will. In 1984, Gandhi claimed that the text defamed her and sought an action in court against it, which resulted in Rushdie agreeing out of court to the removal of the offending sentence in subsequent editions. Rushdie describes his willingness to remove the sentence as a compromise due to her acceptance of his portrayal of her actions during the Emergency years in India.\textsuperscript{262} However, this episode seems minor in comparison to the controversy that \textit{The Satanic Verses} was to later attract, now generally referred to as “The Rushdie Affair”. The negative reaction received by \textit{The Satanic Verses} has possibly led to the novel being seen by many as offensive and typical of Western racial worldviews. Throughout this chapter, I will work to show that Rushdie’s novel is typical of much postcolonial literature and attempts to subvert such Western racism through questioning the structures of identity, disproving the arguments set forth by his critics.

Rushdie has himself stated that he doubts the novel would find a publisher today due to a climate of “fear and nervousness”.\textsuperscript{263} Predictably, upon publication the book did well in Western countries (receiving the Whitbread Award for novel of the year, 1988) but encountered problems in the Islamic community. Offence was taken from Rushdie’s representation of the traditional folkloric tale of the Qur’an being composed of a number of verses written by Satan, rather than Allah. Furthermore, his depictions of the Prophet Muhammad as Mahound, a derogatory term used for him in bygone times, the transformation of Saladin into a devil figure, and the portrayal of Jahilia’s brothel workers as adopting the identities of Muhammad’s wives amongst other such examples led to accusations of blasphemy. Conversely, the Islamic reaction has been accused of censorship and a lack of respect for the freedom of speech that characterizes Western culture.
Upon publication, the book was subsequently banned in many Islamic countries and availability was restricted in Western areas. Following shortly was a fatwa, issued by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Supreme Leader of Iran, on 14th February 1989. The fatwa called forth all able Muslims to do their “duty” and defend Allah from blasphemers by killing Rushdie and his publishers. The result was that although Rushdie never encountered any direct harm, he was forced to adopt a new identity and spend nine years under police protection. He has recently published his memoirs from this period in *Joseph Anton* (2012), the false name he assumed in hiding.

However, for a long time the threat was real and Rushdie eventually felt moved to counteract those who had restricted his life. An article by Daniel Pipes from 1990 details an attempt to appease his opponents through the signing of a declaration affirming his Muslim faith and calling for the book to be removed from publication. For Daniel, this was a dangerous move, more likely to anger his comrades for whom free speech is a virtue than to please his enemies. A 2008 update to this article cites Rushdie in an article for the ‘Hindustan Times’ as admitting that his embrace of Islam was ““a pretence”” before labelling it ““deranged thinking””. For Rushdie, it was a ““statement of fellowship”” which was born out of the immense pressure he felt himself to be under at the time. It is fair to say that Rushdie has recovered much of his lost freedom today; he is regularly appearing for interviews and press functions and has held an academic position at Emory University.

Youssef Yacoubi, among others, also supports the project of disproving Rushdie’s critics, and has noted how the Rushdie Affair, according to Sadik Jalal al-Azm, has theorized away Rushdie’s treatment of Islam. He argues that they did not consider the question of modernity and tradition, suggesting that Rushdie may be a Muslim dissident 'who is constructively (and properly) re-imagining his religious tradition in the similarly revisionist fashion of Rabelais, Voltaire, and James Joyce.’. He cites Al-Azm’s belief that *The Satanic Verses* is ‘in the end “an angry and rebellious exploration of very specific inhuman conditions” that prevail in the Muslim world.’. Qadri Ismail similarly defends the novel:

> Its controversial reception must not make us feel that *The Satanic Verses* is an arrow aimed at the heart of fundamentalist Islam. More vehemently, most of the book is a fictional response to white (British) racism.
He suggests that many of the novel’s scenes depict non-whites being improperly treated in England, implying Rushdie’s real problem lies closer to home. He further suggests that this is an issue that has been ‘(conveniently?) overlooked by many of [Rushdie’s] western critics.’. However, as Vijay Mishra points out, ironically Rushdie’s anti-racist literature has been used to support racism through the portrayal by white people of the Muslim threat to his life, suggesting that all Muslims are inherently fundamentalist. In many ways The Satanic Verses is a continuation of the themes developed in Rushdie’s earlier novels. It would be useful to briefly consider his novel in the context of his other work for this very reason.

His first novel, Grimus (1975), was pre-dominantly a work of science-fiction, but shares some conventions with magic realism. For example, shared devices include a plot containing events not possible in the real, physical world and characters who possess supernatural or inhuman abilities. The plot revolves around the protagonist negotiating two distinct worlds, one that was physical and the other seemingly of a different dimension whose effects were nonetheless real. In this sense the central character becomes the hybrid figure. Most of the characters in the text appear to have no singular persona but a multitude of identities to display strengthening the assertion that the novel can be identified as postcolonial. For example, the narrator, Flapping Eagle, is exiled from his homeland which forces him to adopt the same position as the displaced migrant figure and allows him the opportunity to identify with two different “nations”. Flapping Eagle appears to be multiply constructed:

named ambiguously at birth because my sex was uncertain […] It was my (his) twenty-first birthday, too, and I was about to become Flapping Eagle. And cease to be a few other people.

In this short introduction we have a narrator with no definite gender and no consistent name. The narrator also has the habit of referring to himself in two opposing ways, from the internal position (my) and the external position (his) thus constructing himself as two different characters. It was, however, with Midnight’s Children that Rushdie began juxtaposing realism and magic realism for the first time, moving away from the science-fiction mode which dominated Grimus and again presenting a figure whose identity is largely unclear. As well as harbouring the magical ability to connect to other “midnight’s children”, Saleem Sinai’s paternal heritage is also the subject of doubt. He is biologically of both the East and the West, occupying the position of an Anglo-Indian. Saleem describes himself thus: ‘Fair skin curved across my features—but birthmarks disfigured it; dark stains spread down my
western hairline, a dark patch coloured my eastern ear’. The imagery constructed suggests a protagonist who physically embodies the mixture of West and East and symbolizes Rushdie’s politics of postcolonial multiplicity and heterogeneity. In his third novel, *Shame* (1983), Rushdie still uses the hybrid figure although his identity is no longer the key concern of the text. Once again, he makes use of the Anglo-Indian figure, which is alluded to by the birth of our protagonist after his three mothers’ appear to simultaneously become pregnant after a party delivered for the Sahibs. Again, he has employed the magic realist narrative mode. *The Satanic Verses* followed on from *Shame* and again employs magic realism. It is the first of his novels to be set largely in England and he returns to the theme of identity in the migrant figure of Gibreel, who develops schizophrenia allowing him two distinct personas.

Writing specifically about *Midnight’s Children* and *Shame*, Anuradha Dingwaney Needham categorizes the novels as Indo-Anglian (Indian authors writing in the English language) and suggests that these novels written by people in English from, or originally from the sub-continent display a tendency to be ‘particularly hospitable to the diverse, competing pressures the South-Asian expatriate must also negotiate in the attempt to construct a viable post-colonial identity.’ As she also points out, Rushdie’s work reaches a similarly diasporic audience. The novels are especially popular in the West and are often published by well-known publishing companies, however there is also a growing following in the urban middle-class of the sub-continent as education levels have improved. As Needham writes, the Indo-Anglian novel ‘does not have a homogenous audience.’ The Indo-Anglian novel, then, arises from the issue of diversity and is directly complicit in the experience of the post-colonial. *The Satanic Verses* can also be labelled as Indo-Anglian, not least because of Rushdie’s biographical position but also a result of its hybrid narrative that switches from the typically Western realist mode to a magic realism partly indebted to traditional Eastern narratives. Such dualism in narrative form provides a fertile environment for the development of characters and a plot that undercuts rigid definitions of identity and suggests a self that is internally divided. The division of the self in the schizophrenic is theorized accurately by R.D. Laing, whose work informs my reading of Rushdie in this chapter.

However, before we proceed to a reading of *The Satanic Verses* which offers an alternative experiential framework, it would prove useful to analyse the poststructuralist linguistic framework in order to gauge its effectiveness. In the following section, I will borrow from Derrida’s deconstructive method to suggest ways in which a typical poststructuralist informed postcolonial framework may read the fictive text. Through reading the
text in a deconstructive fashion, certain features of the text will prove strikingly pertinent to a study of postcolonial identity. Principally, I will focus upon the phenomenon of “sous rature” wherein we find conflicting or paradoxical messages within a single utterance and the relationship between the signifier and the signified. Both concepts have been of particular importance to postcolonialism, specifically the field of hybrid identity as they reject the logocentric assumption that identities hold inherent and stable meanings. The advent of sous rature and the difference between the signifier and signified suggest a multiplicity of meanings is possible and no one meaning can hold authority as representative of an objective truth (as truth becomes something necessarily obscured by multiple signs). In the course of the following reading I will analyse the religious identity in *The Satanic Verses*, making reference to Derrida’s personal relationship to the Jewish identity as an influence on his concept of deconstruction.

**A Derridean Approach to Religious Identity**

Derrida’s Jewish identity is significantly complicated, which can be noted as significant in his conception of deconstruction as a method of applying poststructuralism that works to resist totalization.\(^{279}\) John Caputo argues that Derrida is ‘Jewish without being Jewish, Jewish sans Judaism’ by which he means that Derrida rejects orthodox religion but is not without either faith or the Jewish cultural heritage which exerts a strong influence over his work.\(^{280}\) This is a key point as Derrida effectively questions the right to a Jewish identity. Derrida can sufficiently display all the necessary behaviours to gain acceptance in orthodox worship of the Jewish faith but decides not to, rejecting his Jewishness. Alternatively, he can adopt these learnt behaviours and continue with his Jewish persona. The matter is more complicated by his assertions that he retains faith, but not in the traditional sense, begging the question as to whether he really ever fully lost his Jewish persona or not. Derrida’s relationship to Judaism is not too dissimilar to Gibreel’s relationship to Islam in *The Satanic Verses*, both Derrida and Gibreel have the potential to adopt a religious identity and pass as a member of their respective faiths. Equally, both figures can reject their religion as offering a totalizing influence upon their constructions of self. I argue that it is possible to apply John Caputo’s judgement of Derrida successfully to Gibreel and claim that Gibreel is “Muslim without being Muslim, Muslim sans Islam”.

It is from such a position of multiplicity in religious identity that Derrida developed his method of poststructuralist critique, deconstruction. Consequently, a deconstructive reading
of select passages from *The Satanic Verses* illustrates how the novel opposes a religious identity as offering a potentially totalizing force by portraying it as a commodity that can be adopted or rejected at will, in much the same way that Derrida himself could effectively locate or re-locate his Jewish self.\(^{281}\)

I will argue that Gibreel’s religious persona can be deconstructed along Derridean lines to remove its authority as a totalizing construct. For example, the following passage details the Prophet’s realization that the original verses he received were satanic in origin, not godly. However, Gibreel confirms that both verses were delivered by himself, rather than two different individuals:

Gibreel, hovering-watching from his highest camera angle, knows one small detail, just one tiny thing that’s a bit of a problem here, namely that it was me both times, baba, me first and second also me. From my mouth, both the statement and the repudiation, verses and converses, universes and reverses, the whole thing, and we all know how my mouth got worked.\(^{282}\)

When Gibreel admits that ‘it was me both times’, he confirms that despite being one physical person, he has displayed two different personas with their own meanings. In effect, two opposing interpretations of his identity have been created from the one body. I will adopt Derrida’s method of “sous rature” to analyse the quote above. “Sous rature” is the phenomenon of deconstruction wherein paradoxical or conflicting messages are found in the single utterance. By single utterance I mean the single sentence, word or in our case person, who allows for different messages to be transmitted simultaneously. It is often a typographic phenomenon, as Gayatri Spivak explains in her preface to *Of Grammatology*:

This is to write a word, cross it out, and then print both word and deletion. (Since the word is inaccurate, it is crossed out. Since it is necessary, it remains legible.)\(^{283}\)

The conflicting messages of a sous rature serve to undermine the text (or identity) by the resistance it necessarily must offer to the totalization of its whole construction. In a precise example of Derrida’s “sous rature”, or “under erasure”, Gibreel narrates how the two identities are opposed to one another, ‘both the statement and the repudiation, verses and
converses, universes and reverses’. When Gibreel confirms that he communicated two opposing messages, and the messages he delivered in this quote refer to the Satanic Verses tale whereby the messages were evil and holy respectively, he makes the definition or totalization of his identity impossible to limit to one single structure but must instead admit a certain multiplicity. As such, Gibreel’s identity and by extension also his meaning, is initiated from the conflict that his sous rature illustrates. Derrida’s sous rature is demonstrably useful in reading Gibreel to a point. However, it fails to completely theorize upon the internal psychological processes that accompany the multiple identity. While conflicting utterances are certainly suggestive of a tension between the two selves or meanings that are identified, it does nothing to explain the ramifications in the individual who is split between these two selves. It also fails to offer any method for overcoming the tension generated by the conflict. We can refer back to Ahluwalia’s criticisms against poststructuralism identified in the introduction, whereby he noted that the failure to acknowledge colonial experiences is precisely what problematizes the adoption of poststructuralism by postcolonialism.

Gibreel Farishta is also the subject of contradiction and subsequently questions the relationship between the signifier and the signified. Gibreel was initially born as Ismail Najmuddin, but describes how he becomes Gibreel Farishta after his mother renamed him. Gibreel refers to his name as a pseudonym, perhaps making plain that his identity as the angel is contrived and false in some way. That the name can be acquired so easily questions the right to identify as a religious person. Gibreel’s behaviour may be seen as at odds with his supposed identity. For example, ‘Not only did he become a philanderer of the worst type, but he also learned the arts of dissimulation, because a man who plays gods must be above reproach.’ Significantly, reference to his career as an actor is made and this questions further Gibreel’s right to identify himself as an angel figure. Certainly his behaviour would suggest that he does not become this figure, and yet he is clearly capable of the performative behaviours to suggest that he is the angel figure, as is evident from his successful career.

In applying a deconstructive approach to Gibreel, the following passage during which Rekha Merchant seduces Gibreel before his development of schizophrenia is revealing of the internal contradictions in the construction of his identity. At this early stage in the novel, Gibreel is viewed as an accomplished actor specializing in religious roles:

When he sipped the champagne she teased him, surely gods should not partake of alcohol, and he answered with a line he had once read in an interview with the Aga Khan, O, you know, this champagne is
only for outward show, the moment it touches my lips it turns to water.  

Gibreel’s identity as the archangel is undermined by his behaviour in consuming alcohol. The behaviour works against his desired image, yet Gibreel manages to convince the person he is interacting with that his religious image is intact through his response, borrowed from the Aga Khan. As a result, the religious identity appears to rely upon the behaviour that is positioned as other to the image of the angel. Gibreel’s identity is therefore constructed through a contradictory opposition of elements, both of which deconstruct the other. Furthermore, in borrowing his response from Aga Khan, Gibreel is demonstrating the ability to perform an identity. The response is not an original conception of Gibreel’s, but instead is a pre-formed identity conceived by someone external to Gibreel. I would argue that there is a connection between Gibreel and Gautam Malkani’s characters’ who I discuss in Chapter Four. Like Gibreel, Jas and Hardjit (two young men who have adopted a subcultural lifestyle), construct their identities by performing the personas of famous people. Both Jas and Hardjit are influenced by films in their construction of selves, suggesting that their adopted identities are performative and opposed to the concept of essentialism. As Gibreel’s identity is largely comprised of his professional performances as religious figures, the religious identity is undermined in respect to any totalizing influence that it could offer as presumably, his performances could also be adopted by viewers of his work.

In the contradiction between Gibreel’s name and his behaviour, the reader is shown that religion itself is an entity that can be adopted or rejected at will, in no way relying upon the essentialism of a pre-modernist time. Gibreel is clearly able to participate in religion and even identify himself as a religious figure, yet this can be subverted when he desires so, removing religion of its permanence suggesting instead that identity is a constantly evolving set of relationships to various forces. In using a Derridean approach to read The Satanic Verses, I argue that Gibreel’s name can be taken as a signifier of the wider religious system of Islam, which itself represents the signified. If, as I will argue, the signifier of Gibreel’s name cannot be reconciled with his behaviour except for when a performative politics is adopted, his name becomes synonymous with a role that can be appropriated at will without any pre-designated or essentialist authority. As such, his name as a signifier of the Muslim identity becomes indicative of the ability to adopt an identity consciously without the presence of the signified which requires the assumption that certain behaviours and identity markers will also be adopted. When Gibreel does adopt the religious persona that is his namesake, I argue that it is
only because the ability to perform the role is open to him that he is able to become the angel successfully. The signifier of Gibreel’s name does not faithfully represent the signified religious ideology which he believes it does. Instead, the signifier can misrepresent the signified as does Gibreel when ‘philandering’. The breakdown of the relationship between signifier and signified suggests to the reader that identities are not totalized entities but fragmented parts that combine to form a whole. Gibreel demonstrates that he can perform in a religious manner, but may not always choose to do so. Therefore the signified to his name cannot totalize his identity. By extension, this must mean that the text supports a policy of postcolonial hybridity, as this form of identification also serves to resist totalization.

There is further evidence that the text supports the rejection of totalization after Gibreel is inflicted with the mystery illness that nearly kills him. His condition initiates a widespread religious frenzy indicated by the media panic that accompanies Gibreel’s illness:

The whole of India was at Gibreel’s bedside. His condition as the lead item on every radio bulletin, it was the subject of hourly news-flashes on the national television network, and the crowd that gathered in Warden Road was so large that the police had to disperse it with lathi-charges and tear-gas, which they used even though every one of the half-million mourners was already tearful and wailing […] In the mosques and temples of the nation, packed congregations prayed, not only for the life of the dying actor, but for the future, for themselves.  

However, Gibreel himself clearly rejects his role as a godly figure when he miraculously recovers and sets about disproving the existence of any religious deity. In his hotel room he ‘loaded his plate with all of it, the pork sausages from Wiltshire and the cursed York hams and the rashers of bacon from godknowswhere; with the gammon steaks of his unbelief and the pig’s trotters of secularism’ in a bid to disprove the existence of any religious figure. Evidently, Gibreel chooses to behave in ways not sanctioned by Islamic law, undermining his signifying name of the angel. It becomes impossible to reconcile both his signifying religious name and the seemingly anti-Muslim behaviour that opposes the signified of Islam his name represents.

However, the abandonment of any religious faith does not deter Gibreel from continuing in his profession. Our narrator describes that ‘Just because he’d lost his belief it didn’t mean
he couldn’t do his job, and in spite of the scandal of the ham-eating photographs, the first scandal ever to attach itself to his name, he signed movie contracts and went back to work. This illustrates how Gibreel can perform the required religious role that is synonymous with his name, despite his behaviour which rejects a foundational requirement of his religion. Crucially here, Islam is revealed as an orthopractic religion placing more emphasis upon the behaviour of its followers rather than the essential beliefs they hold. For example, a Christian is usually defined by their belief in God and the inerrancy of the Bible, meaning it would be hard to assume the identity of a Christian without falsely presenting oneself, the internal value system would have to be appropriated. On the other hand, Islam is defined by the actions of its followers, meaning that the identity of a Muslim would be easy to assume so long as the correct behaviours are observed. There is no requirement to internalize the belief system effectively removing the element of essentialism from the identity of a Muslim. This is why Gibreel can seemingly adopt or reject the Muslim identity seamlessly.

Gibreel’s consecutive adoption and rejection of the religious figure in his construction of identity questions the necessary authority required to identify as a religious figure. Gibreel approaches his angel persona through the perspective of his previous acting experience. This allows the text to suggest that the role can be adopted successfully and yet simultaneously reveals that the role is false as it is performed by somebody with no apparent qualification to do so. The moment arises when Gibreel meets John Maslama on the train. After a brief altercation, the train passes through a tunnel and John suddenly begs for Gibreel’s forgiveness. Gibreel realizes that he has transformed into the archangel figure once again:

they were surrounded by a warm golden light that was coming from a point just behind his head. In the glass of the sliding door, he saw the reflection of the halo around his hair.

At this point Gibreel has only just been made aware that he is an angel figure, and the signifier-signified relationship is surely in disrepute. But Gibreel decides act on his new role:

Gibreel took a decision. ‘Stand, six-toed John, ‘he intoned in his best Hindi movie manner. ‘Maslama, arise.’

That John is convinced by the religious performance lends support to the view that the ability to perform in a suitable manner is all that is required to have the authority to play a role, yet
still the thought processes that Gibreel reveals to the reader in deciding how to construct this interaction consistently undermine his authority to play a supposedly divine role.

The deconstructive method is clearly instructive in identifying the relationships between identities (as signifieds) and identity behaviours (as signifiers) suggesting that the relationship between them is not always clear and can be misleading. This is indicated by Gibreel’s misrepresentation of Islam as a signified identity by his un-Islamic signifying behaviour. However, again deconstructive efforts fail to move beyond the realm of metaphysical relationships and fall short of offering an explanatory framework centring upon the hybrid figure. In this reading, the deconstructive position allows for the identification of a complex relationship between the signified of religion and the signifiers of religious behaviour but falls short of accounting for the ramifications of the breakdown between signifier and signified for the hybrid figure. What deconstructive criticism lacks in this reading is an explanation of the personal cost for Gibreel of the breakdown of the relationship between signifier and signified and a solution for the restoration of a complete identity.

Jasper Goss’ criticism that deconstruction has become too dominant a force in postcolonialism is critically useful here. Goss, as we observed in the introduction, noted that critics such as Bhabha and Spivak have taken the deconstructive maxim that ‘there is nothing outside of the text’ to the point that it is perceived that ‘there is nothing but the text’, reducing all personal relations to the textual level. With regard to Gibreel, the failure to accurately explain his complicated relationship to Islam is a failure on the part of postcolonialism, which is supposedly primarily concerned with the colonial and postcolonial human condition. The reductionist method of deconstruction limits explanations of Gibreel’s complex identification with Islam to a textual relation, ignoring any aspect of the human condition which might usefully be explored.

The adoption of concepts such as signifier and signified as well as the phenomenon of sous rature highlight the location of postcolonialism within identities that communicate unstable meanings. Derrida’s work is thus a useful theoretical framework from which to begin to explain postcolonial concepts such as the hybrid figure. However, postcolonialism has become for many, too reliant upon such textual free-play which may be to the detriment of the formation of a truly explanatory, unified postcolonial theory. In the following section I will suggest a reading of *The Satanic Verses* based upon the medical theories of R.D. Laing which begins to address some of the criticisms levelled at the relationship between deconstruction and poststructuralism.
The “Unembodied Self”: Gibreel and the Archangel Gibreel

In *The Divided Self: A Study of Sanity and Madness* (1960), R.D. Laing distinguishes between the “embodied self”, the individual who feels ‘inextricably bound up with or in his body.’, and the “unembodied self”, those individuals who ‘find themselves to be […] somewhat detached from their bodies.’. To clarify the severity of the unembodiment, Laing distinguishes between those who experience unembodiment in moments of stress from those who permanently experience a detachment from their embodied selves. For Laing, those who can be classified as unembodied will experience the following feelings towards their self:

The body is felt more as one object among other objects in the world than as the core of the individual’s own being. Instead of being the core of his true self, the body is felt as the core of a false self, which a detached, disembodied, ‘inner’, ‘true’ self looks on at with tenderness, amusement, or hatred as the case may be.

It is in the unembodied self that the division takes place, with the body assuming a persona that is not authorized by the “true” self, which is now restricted to a virtual plane of existence. Laing muses on some of the characteristics of the perceived unembodied self, noting a hyper-consciousness and a relationship with itself and its body which can be very complex. In the one person, two consecutive identities are in operation effectively allowing the unembodied self to occupy the role of a passing figure as presumably either persona can be displayed to an audience during any particular interaction. These two personas, the embodied and the unembodied selves, correlate with the two identities of the passing figure. I argue that the person engaged in an act of passing may display a bodily identity, but also consecutively lay claim to an unembodied identity that is not revealed in the process of passing as another identity. The passing figure will exhibit an effort to assure that their embodied self is up to the standard required to make a successful passing attempt. But the unembodied self, the “true” identity (or alternative identity, since we are suggesting here that all identity is predicated at least to some degree on the phenomenon of passing) will be known only to the passing figure and this knowledge is restricted to the unembodied self in order that the passing attempt is not jeopardized.

The prevalence of more than two selves is also accounted for by Laing. As within dialogical self theory where a theoretically vast number of I-positions may be accumulated
over time, the embodied self can also develop a number of different selves. Laing asserts that the embodied, or false-self, may consist of many fragmented selves, none of which constitute a full identity individually but contribute to the construction of a false-self system. As well as perceiving a division in the disjuncture between the body and mind, the body further fragments into multiple ‘part-selves’. Of these part-selves, Laing writes that none of them are fully developed as personas on their own, but individually could signify a complete identity if it had the opportunity to develop. When we encounter an unembodied person, we may be shown many aspects of their persona which could represent a full persona if it had complete influence over the person. As they do not, these ‘part-selves’ suggest instead a system of intermingling personality components. The presence of multiple intermingling personality components brings to mind our previous reading of Naipaul through dialogical self theory. We have noted the fragmentation of his characters’ identities due to a number of “unembodied” I-positions being created from unique experiences in different times and spaces. Laing’s false-self system similarly describes a fragmented identity construction although this time encapsulated within the embodied self. Consequently, I note that there are a number of significant similarities between both Hermans’ dialogical self theory and Laing’s divided self concept. For example, Both Gibreel’s waking self and his dream self may be described as I-positions, both of which fluctuate in their positions of dominance and submission. The tension the hybrid figure generates is inevitably a result of the fluctuation between these positions or selves as they disrupt the pretence to unity and coherence which the person may desire to display. Gibreel would appear to lack the controlling influence of a meta-position in guiding his relative I-positions into a mutually agreeable direction for the self to develop. However, Laing offers an alternative view of the splitting of the self into fragmented parts and invests more authority in the unembodied self, whereas dialogical self theory makes a division between only the self or I and I-positions and other similar positions without detailing explicitly the tensions that may arise in the spaces between them.

Given the multiplicity of the physical self, the false-self system initially appears to work in contrast to the model proposed by dialogical self theory, wherein the diversity of selves are located in the mental compartment of the self. However, the multiplicity of the I-positions manifests a large number of performed physical selves, such as for example, the dandy figure of Ralph Singh. Consequently, there develops a false-self system of fragmented part-selves. If we assume that a performative politics is in operation, which we have so far identified as significant in the field of identity construction, then the bodily self may proceed to re-
construct itself numerous times over through acting different performances and so a false-self system is constructed.

As with dialogical self theory, wherein certain I-positions can stand in opposition to others, so to can the true unembodied “self” and the false embodied “self” be mutually opposed in the divided self. The unembodied self regards the actions and behaviour of the false self as false and sees itself as the true persona. Importantly, it does not consider itself a participant in the actions of the false self, lending support to the argument that there really are two identities in the same person and giving credibility to our adoption of Laing’s model for the theoretical analysis of the passing figure in *The Satanic Verses*. In this reading of Rushdie’s text, I will adopt Laing’s model but alternatively propose that the “true self” is Gibreel’s bodily identity, which acts during his waking periods and his “false-self” is his archangel persona which surfaces during his dreams and constitutes an identity which could be defined as “unembodied”. Such a division works in conjunction with Laing’s concept of the false-self system in that there is a diametric splitting of the self into two parts, where one is seen as authentic and the other “false” and both seemingly operate independently of one another. However, in my modification the bodily self is seen as authentic and the psychic self is considered “false”.

I am reading Laing’s false-self system through the materialist account of schizophrenia offered by Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* (1972). It is noted by Mark Seem in his introduction to *Anti-Oedipus* that Deleuze and Guattari ‘develop a materialistically and experientially based analysis’ of schizophrenic behaviour that is comparable to R.D. Laing’s own account of the schizophrenic. For Deleuze and Guattari, ‘A truly materialist psychiatry can be defined, on the contrary, by the twofold task it sets itself: introducing desire into the mechanism, and introducing production into desire.’ For both Deleuze and Guattari, ‘schizophrenia is the process of the production of desire and desiring-machines.’ As a result, their concept of schizophrenia offers a materialist approach. Both Laing and Deleuze and Guattari can be legitimately adopted in our existentialist approach to postcolonialism, doubtless a result of the close links they exhibit to materialism.

I will be arguing that Gibreel’s multiple personas (his waking self and his schizophrenic self) can be viewed as potentially normative when his condition is considered in the light of the existential psychiatry of R.D. Laing. Both Laing and Fanon are influenced by existentialism, evident in their shared concern with explaining the psychological inflictions of the mentally ill and their relationship with a wider social structure. Laing’s relevance to my Fanonian existentialist approach is located both in his own use of existentialist theory and his
concentration upon the self in relation to other social beings in a social system. Fanon’s argument that ‘Because it is a systematic negation of the other person and a furious determination to deny the other person all attributes of humanity, colonialism forces the people it dominates to ask themselves the question constantly: ‘In reality, who am I?’’, illustrates his intense concern with the individual in relation to a wider social structure. In making such an argument, Fanon clearly suggests that the individual psyche can be influenced by the society in which it exists. A similar concern with the individual psyche in a wider social structure is demonstrated by Laing who suggests that the schizoid individual suffers from a fear of ‘real live dialectical relationships with real live people.’ Fanon makes a direct connection between colonial oppression and mental illness:

In the period of colonization when it is not contested by armed resistance, when the sum total of harmful nervous stimuli overstep a certain threshold, the defensive attitudes of the natives give way and they then find themselves crowding the mental hospitals. There is thus during this calm period of successful colonization a regular and important mental pathology which is the direct product of oppression.

Fanon observes a connection between the oppression experienced by a society and individual responses to that oppression in the form of mental illnesses. The recognition of this relationship is of paramount significance in the theorizing of the colonial/postcolonial figure. The role of the colonial/postcolonial context is pivotal in reaching a full understanding of the structures that affect identity development. I argue that the adoption of a theory which can explain the multiplicity experienced by the postcolonial figure who is engaged in passing with a comparable focus upon relationship dynamics of the self and society would be critical to my Fanonian framework which is concerned with the study of the real, lived experiences of postcolonial people. The dynamics of the self in a society is central to the adoption of an existentialist framework, introduced by Fanon in the mid-twentieth century and similarly used by Laing.

It could be claimed, then, that schizophrenia is a normal state for the colonized individual and that to engage in the act of passing and become a “passing figure” by performing multiple identities is no longer the exception in a global environment largely influenced by the postcolonial experience. To argue for the normative status of the schizophrenic
experience, Marilyn Nelson Waniek cites John Vernon’s *The Garden and the Map: Schizophrenia in Twentieth-Century Literature and Culture*. Vernon suggests, like Laing, that Western culture is itself schizophrenic in nature due to the split between fantasy and reality, mind and body and body and world, something which implies that the resulting multiplicity of the act of passing is potentially normative. A degree of schizophrenia is also apparent in the displaced postcolonial figure. As Waniek notes, there is a ‘duality created by his ties to the culture of the mainstream and by his ties to the culture of the ethnic community.’ If the postcolonial person has links to two or more cultural centres, and Vernon is correct in asserting that even the structure of Western culture can itself be demonstrably split and full of dualities, then schizophrenia is the normal condition in which identities are constructed.

Given the postcolonial condition, riven by a loyalty to two or more opposing cultural centres, Laing’s theory of the construction of an unembodied self that remains divided between two personas is potentially very useful in describing the psychological effects of multiplicity in identity.

The experience of schizophrenia is suggested by Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* (1972), their first volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, to have significance as the normative condition of human existence. Given Deleuze and Guattari’s position on the normality of schizophrenic behaviour, I would extend their argument to suggest that the passing figure also represents a normative mode of identity construction, rather than an anomalous mode resulting from decolonization which creates hybrid figures. There are some benefits from applying Deleuze and Guattari’s account to Rushdie’s character Gibreel. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that what the schizophrenic experiences can be said to be the norm, an important consideration for our schizophrenic passing figure. If the argument holds, Rushdie’s message of plurality has a deeper significance in the text as his passing figure actually constitutes the normative mode of existence rather than the singular binary persona. Deleuze and Guattari argue how ‘schizophrenia is the universe of productive and reproductive desiring-machines, universal primary production as “the essential reality of man and nature.”’ If schizophrenia is the ‘essential reality of man and nature’, this places Gibreel in a significant position. No longer can he be the anomalous figure who resists identity totalization but becomes instead the normal figure whose multiplicity is the default mode of identity construction. The passing figure is, therefore, exemplary of the postcolonial message of fluidity and the true nature of lived experience in identity construction.

The sociological work of Stanley Cohen and Laurie Taylor can be used to support the position of Deleuze and Guattari as they focus on the frequency of escape attempts to other
realities that exist. Cohen and Taylor focus specifically on the existence of these private realities, as escape attempts, that are contained within a larger schema of a shared reality. For Cohen and Taylor, these escapes from reality are managed through ‘hobbies, games, gambling, sex, holidays, mass-media entertainment, therapy, the use of drugs and alcohol [...] to the extreme of radical escapes such as religious conversion, Utopian alternative societies, and, ultimately, schizophrenia.’. Cohen and Taylor argue that we enter these other realities on a daily basis and this behaviour constitutes the norm:

All around us-on advertisement hoardings, bookshelves, record covers, television screens-these miniature escape fantasies present themselves. This, it seems, is how we are destined to live, as split personalities in which the private life is disturbed by the promise of escape routes to another reality.

The significance of Cohen and Taylor in theorizing upon the multiplicity of worlds is illustrated by McHale’s citing of them in Postmodernist Fiction (1987), a text which is ultimately concerned with the presence of multiple and alternative worlds in postmodern studies. McHale also makes use of the work of Berger and Luckmann in The Social Construction of reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (1966), in describing their construction of “paramount reality” as a shared reality that is, generally speaking, all-encompassing. McHale notes that while this reality is shared by all and forms the foundation for interaction in society, ‘these same members also experience a multiplicity of private or peripheral realities: dreaming, play, fiction, and so on.’. Gibreel’s magic realist diversions in which he becomes the archangel Gibreel can be seen as a private or peripheral reality. That he experiences these diversions when dreaming also suggests something of Berger and Luckmann’s private reality.

Scott and Thorpe offer more evidence that the schizophrenic may be the normal mode of existence when they argue that Laing’s existential and sociological work is relevant to an understanding of the more common issues of everyday life such as the example they give of shyness. For them, Laing suggests that ‘the behavior and thought patterns of the schizophrenic patient are reasonable and understandable when interpreted in context.’. Scott and Thorpe apply Laing’s work on the schizophrenic to the “shy” person illustrating not only the contemporary currency that his work still holds but how the behaviour of the schizophrenic, like the shy person is rational in the context. However, the behaviour may be
misconstrued by others and misidentified as rudeness, for example. A reading of *The Satanic Verses* confirms how Gibreel’s actions are potentially rational in the magic realist narrative, but irrational in the realist narrative. Like Scott and Thorpe’s “shy” person, Gibreel’s behaviour is determined by two alternative realities. Such opposition means that each self will view the other as irrational and out of context, whilst the same selves are viewed within context as completely rational. The different views of Gibreel’s behaviour as in or out of context allow him to be labelled as a passing figure, according to which narrative mode the reader accepts as his true identity. They write how ‘Like Laing’s schizophrenic patients, the shy give accounts of their experiences that make absolute sense when seen in the social context of their everyday lives and yet can be defined by those around them as sick or strange behavior.’

We can even note upon a closer reading of Laing’s own writings a predisposition to accept the presence of alternative modes of being and creating identity. For example,

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\text{We almost have, if the embodiment or unembodiment were ever complete in either direction, two different ways of being human. Most people may regard the former as normal and healthy and the latter as abnormal and pathological. Throughout this study such an evaluation is quite irrelevant. From certain points of view, one may regard embodiment as desirable. It is possible to suggest from another point of view that the individual should try to disentangle himself from his body and thereby achieve a desired state of discarnate spirituality.}^{315}
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Laing’s distinction between the embodied and the unembodied selves does not result in a judgement as to what mode is the best model for human development. Instead, his assertion that ‘such an evaluation is quite irrelevant’, places Laing’s thought alongside that of Deleuze and Guattari and Scott and Thorpe. It is logical that if the distinction between opposing models of human identity is irrelevant, both models must be equally desirable methods for constructing a self, which Laing in the above quote proceeds to suggest. As such, the unembodied self, is as much a normative mode of human development as the embodied self. Given our adoption of Laing’s model in our application to the passing figure, we can suggest that the unembodiment of the passing figure is also as much a normal feature of human identity as the embodied non-passing figure.
I will now illustrate how *The Satanic Verses* can be read to suggest that Rushdie engages in a postcolonial politics that champions multiplicity over rigid binarism. As Gibreel switches between his realist and magic realist selves, he displays the same performative abilities that characterize the person involved in the act of passing. His schizophrenia suggests that it is possible for the self to be constructed by two separate identities, both of which share the same physical body. Essentially, his development of schizophrenia initiates his adoption of the phenomenon of passing. His adopted self, the archangel Gibreel, can deconstruct the totalizing authority that may be afforded to a religious identity. Gibreel’s second self I argue, reveals the theoretical structures of identity construction, which I will read in the light of Laing’s ‘false-self system’. Laing argues that the schizophrenic will be split between a false-self system and a true mental self. Both selves regard themselves as independent of each other in the divided self of Laing’s theory. Gibreel’s schizophrenic self, the archangel Gibreel, is viewed by Gibreel as an abnormality and characterized as ‘His very own Mr Hyde.’ As such, it correlates with the false physical self that Laing describes as the antithesis to the true psychical self. The multiplicity of personas that Gibreel adopts represents the presence of a “false-self system”, rather than there being a singular false-self in operation.

Laing’s approach to the multiple self corresponds to Rushdie’s own political perspective; Rushdie’s writing often shows a preference for multiple constructions of identity over binary divisions between the self and other as his various hybrid characters show. Rushdie frequently transgresses boundaries in his texts such as religion, nationality, race and even time and space suggesting that he rejects a rigid binarism in identity construction. His characters often suffer from the tensions that a postcolonial or multiple construction are assumed to entail, but with a firm conviction in the strength of the hybrid figure to offer a role model for the development of identity. For example, the character John Maslama, a religious man who recognizes Gibreel from his previous acting career argues that Gibreel is a positive model for the future development of identity:

‘Tending as I do towards the pantheistic view,’ Maslama thundered on, ‘my own sympathy for your work arises out of your willingness to portray deities of every conceivable water. You, sir, are a rainbow coalition of the celestial; a walking United Nations of gods! You are, in short, the future. Permit me to salute you.’

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John Maslama’s view reflects that of Rushdie in supporting a postcolonial multiplicity in identity construction. Rufus Cook notes that ‘Although he is obviously aware of the pain and disorientation involved, Rushdie seems to regard cultural displacement as essentially a positive and liberating experience’. Rushdie’s complicity in a postcolonial politics of multiplicity conflicts with the Islamic belief in the omnipotence of Allah as a singular God figure. For example, Rushdie’s postcolonial politics is implied in Mahound’s chastising for his message of Allah’s dominance over the polytheistic worship of multiple deities. Abu Simbel, the ruler of Jahilia who allows the worship of polytheistic deities questions his fear of Mahound:

Why do I fear Mahound? For that: one one one, his terrifying singularity. Whereas I am always divided, always two or three or fifteen.\(^{319}\)

The narrator shortly afterwards remarks on the message Mahound brings and foreshadows the negative consequences of his singularity:

This is the world into which Mahound has brought his message: one one one. Amid such multiplicity, it sounds like a dangerous word.\(^{320}\)

In portraying Mahound’s message of singularity as dangerous and terrifying, Rushdie makes clear his intention to align the novel with a politics sympathetic to the multiple constructions of the self. The above quote also illustrates the stance taken by the text against the singularity which Mahound embodies.

In my application of Laing’s model, Gibreel’s archangel self also becomes split to represent not only the angel but also Mahound. The further splitting of the unembodied self is highlighted by Laing’s argument that the false self is constituted of many fragmented parts, creating a false-self system. For example, Gibreel recognizes the multiple constituent parts to his false-self:

and now Gibreel, who has been hovering-above-looking down, feels a confusion, who am I, in these moments it begins to seem that the archangel is actually inside the prophet, I am the dragging in the gut, I am the angel being extruded from the sleeper’s navel, I emerge, Gibreel Farishta, while my other self, Mahound, lies listening,
entranced, I am bound to him, navel to navel, by a shining cord of light, not possible to say which of us is dreaming the other. We flow in both directions along the umbilical cord.\textsuperscript{[321]}

In this passage, Laing’s false-self system becomes more obvious as Gibreel plays the roles of both Mahound and the angel simultaneously. Both roles still stand in opposition to his waking self, forcing them into the same sphere, i.e. they are both representations of his psychical schizophrenic persona, made up of ‘various part selves’. The false-self system would normally apply to the self located in the body, however, with Gibreel this would be his pre-schizophrenic, non-passing self. His schizophrenic persona here shows signs of exhibiting a false-self system.

The presence of a false-self system is also evident in a latter passage in the text. At this point, Gibreel’s schizophrenia is very advanced and he is failing to control the illness. After spending several days walking the city without eating or sleeping, he remains firmly convinced that he has been charged with a divine mission, although he is still currently confused as to what that mission might be. He will soon embark on consuming London in fire in order to cleanse the city, before rescuing Saladin who becomes trapped by falling debris in the fire in a moment of compassion. The narrator describes how Gibreel perceives his self to be split into multiple independent selves:

he understands now something of what omnipresence must be like, because he is moving through several stories at once, there is a Gibreel who mourns his betrayal by Alleluia Cone, and a Gibreel hovering over the death-bed of a prophet, and a Gibreel watching in secret over the progress of a pilgrimage to the sea […] and a Gibreel who feels, more powerfully every day, the will of the adversary, drawing him ever closer, leading him towards their final embrace\textsuperscript{[322]}

In this passage, several different Gibreels’ are discernible and although they are not strictly different personas, they do inhabit different spaces at the same consecutive time. In this way, they do represent the various fragments of a false-self system.

Gibreel’s descent into schizophrenia makes it instantly clear that the second self that surfaces when he dreams offers a linear narrative that re-starts from wherever it last stopped. The imposition of two time frames which appear to run consecutively recall James Hogg’s \textit{The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner} (1824), within which the events
of the novel are recounted in two narratives, the confession of the protagonist and the editor’s own account of the protagonist’s deeds. Through the imposition of two similar, but fundamentally divergent narratives such texts like James Hogg’s and The Satanic Verses work to suggest that a single persona can be re-constructed in different ways. Thus, the individual can become a passing figure through the multiplicity of ways in which they are represented, each single representation becoming modified enough to infer a different identity.

Initially, Gibreel’s dreams appear to be just that, a series of dream sequences. However, as they progress and his schizophrenia increases in severity, his dream sequences seem to be as much a part of reality as his waking self. Gibreel also questions whether the schizophrenic self might in fact be the true self even at such an early stage in both the development of the schizophrenia as an illness and the progression of the novel:

> every time I go to sleep the dream starts up from where it stopped.
> Same dream in the same place. As if somebody just paused the video while I went out of the room. Or, or. As if he’s the guy who’s awake and this is the bloody nightmare.  

Gibreel questions whether or not his archangel identity is the true self and his waking existence is the nightmare. For Gibreel ‘the dream-worlds of his archangelic other self begin to seem as tangible as the shifting realities he inhabits while he’s awake.’ Although the archangel cannot be ascribed monologic authority over Gibreel (his waking self is, after all, still a real and independent part of his being) its seeming reality suggests an authority in the construction of his identity. Even if this part of his persona exists only in a psychical sense, nevertheless, it does still inhabit a plane of reality automatically allowing it an authoritative position in Gibreel’s identity. Significantly, the narrative consistency offered by the dreams’ linear sequencing suggests a separate persona rather than a normal dreaming experience. Already we have evidence that his archangel self could be read as a passing self.

Evidence that two selves are in existence within Gibreel comes not much further into the text: the narrator remarks on Gibreel’s becoming ‘aware, without the dream, of himself sleeping, of himself dreaming his own awareness of his dream, and then a panic begins, O God, he cries out, O allgood Allagod, I’ve had my bloody chips, me, Got bugs in the brain, full mad, a looney tune and a gone baboon.’ Gibreel’s panicked exclamation suggests he is consciously aware of inhabiting two distinct personas at the same time, to the point that he
can view each persona from the vantage of the other one. This is more compelling evidence that he is effectively performing two selves simultaneously. It can be argued that he has a self located in his body (Gibreel) and a second self located in his dreams (archangel Gibreel). We may conceive of Gibreel as the passing figure due to his ability to perform the opposing identities of his normal waking self and the dream-figure angel Gibreel through his contraction of schizophrenia. Gibreel indicates one self in accordance with the realist mode of the text and another self which may be the result of either the real development of schizophrenia or the magic realist departure which allows him to become a religious figure. The two identities are different enough to constitute separate selves, allowing for some quite distinct differences in behaviour depending upon which self can exert the most influence over his being.

Laing’s false-self system suggests that the false-self is liable to control from outside sources, for example other people who interact with the self. For example, within *The Satanic Verses* there is evidence that Gibreel’s false self is being controlled by another external identity. At the point where Saladin and Gibreel land in England from their fall from the exploding aeroplane, they are taken in by Rosa Diamond, an old Englishwoman who lives near the sea. It is at this point that the police arrive to take Saladin as a suspected illegal immigrant. Gibreel does not help Saladin despite his pleas to do so, and puts this down to an overpowering control exerted by Rosa which forces him to stay where he is (he eventually stays with her for much longer than anticipated). Gibreel is confused about this control over himself:

Gibreel Farishta often wondered about his own behaviour. In that dreamlike moment when he had been trapped by the eyes of the old Englishwoman it had seemed to him that his will was no longer his own to command, that somebody else’s needs were in charge.327

The removal of control in Gibreel’s identity exemplifies Laing’s emphasis upon the role of compliance in the false-self system and simultaneously questions the authenticity of the identity displayed. If control over the identity is removed, and autonomy is compromised, it may become difficult to label Gibreel a passing figure as he does not consciously perform the identity which is displayed. However, I would argue that it is logical to label Gibreel as a passing figure, due to the forms of control placed on Gibreel by other textual characters who each modify his identity to form another persona. I argue that there is a link between the way
in which Gibreel becomes the passing figure and the way that Haroon and Karim also engage
in passing as I suggest in Chapter Three. Gibreel, Haroon and Karim all become passing
figures as a result of the interpretations of external audience members. These external
audience members remove autonomy from the passing figure almost entirely when they
impose their own perceptions regarding their identities.

I can offer an example of compliance in the construction of the self in *The Satanic Verses*:
when the Ayesha dream sequences begin Gibreel again questions who is exactly in control of
his behaviour as it appears to him that Ayesha is exerting some influence over him to enable
her to do extraordinary things. The relationship is certainly one-sided, as Gibreel illustrates in
his description of his relationship to Ayesha:

> She comes upon him under a tree, or in a ditch, hears what he isn’t
> saying, takes what she needs, and leaves. What does he know about
cancer, for example? Not a solitary thing […] are people hearing
> voices, being seduced by words. But not his; never his original
> material.-Then whose? Who is whispering in their ears, enabling them
to move mountains, halt clocks, diagnose disease?  

The removal of Gibreel’s control over the behaviour of his own second self suggests that this
second self, the archangel Gibreel, has no authority in the construction of Gibreel’s identity.
After all, if he cannot control the actions of the archangel Gibreel, how far can it be labelled a
part of Gibreel? In some sense, the passing figure has now become split into two separate
figures sharing the same physical body rather than a single personality masquerading as two
individual identities, as is the typical construction of a person engaged in the act of passing.
As such, Gibreel demonstrates a close connection to the schizophrenic figure in the course of
his engagement in passing. The schizophrenic figure is also constructed by two different
personas but, as Gibreel illustrates, these are both located in one physical body.

A similar argument could be made regarding Saladin Chamcha, who becomes horrifically
disfigured apparently as a result of the descriptions forced upon him by the English
policemen who believe he is an illegal immigrant. This knowledge is made aware to him
when he meets with other suspected immigrants in a hospital—all of whom have become
drastically altered versions of human beings. In reviewing a case study on a patient named
James that he had conducted, Laing concludes that a feature of the divided self is a degree of
compliance in the construction of the false self:
The essential feature of the compliant component in the false self is expressed in James’s statement that he was ‘a response to what other people say I am’.\textsuperscript{330} This consists of acting in accordance with other people’s definition of what one is, in lieu of translating into action one’s own definition of who or what one wishes to be.\textsuperscript{331}

It can be argued that Saladin’s transformation into a devil figure is a false self due to its compliance in shaping itself on other people’s definitions and descriptions of what he is. Saladin is here seen as the other and translated into the image of all that Britons’ are supposedly not.

Gibreel’s multiplicity is also evident in \textit{The Satanic Verses} when the controversial truth of the verses becomes known to Mahound. At this point of Gibreel’s schizophrenic development, Mahound’s external influence on archangel Gibreel’s behaviour is discernible, highlighting the critical role performed by external audience members to the passing event. After realizing that he has been tricked into writing satanic verses instead of Godly verses by the devil posing as the archangel Gibreel, Mahound rushes to the city to proclaim the news. However, Gibreel is aware that he has delivered both verses as is noted by the passage we read in our adoption of Derrida’s “sous rature”:

Gibreel, hovering-watching from his highest camera angle, knows one small detail, just one tiny thing that’s a bit of a problem here, namely that it was me both times, baba, me first and second also me. From my mouth, both the statement and the repudiation, verses and converses, universes and reverses, the whole thing, and we all know how my mouth got worked.\textsuperscript{332}

I will argue here that as the archangel Gibreel has twice interacted with Mahound but performed differently each time, this signifies that his character is liable to be controlled by some other factor, otherwise presumably some form of singularity would act to keep his behaviour consistent. Furthermore, Gibreel admits to us how his ‘mouth got worked’, suggesting that some external force, (presumably Mahound) impacted upon the projection of this part of the false-self. Laing notes how ‘The false-self of the schizoid person is compulsively compliant to the will of others, it is partially autonomous and out of control, it
is felt as alien’. In my application of Laing’s model, the false-self of Gibreel is his unembodied dream-figure self, which in Laing’s unmodified thesis would usually be considered the “true” self. However, this false-self still displays the compliance to others that Laing recognizes. Such compliance further complicates the identity already considered false as if it can be controlled by external sources then it really has no authority of its own as a totalizing force in the construction of Gibreel’s identity.

For Laing, the schizophrenic may withdraw into his “self” and isolate this self away from interaction with other people, fearing a threat to personal identity. This is described as a defence mechanism but one that may ultimately do more harm than good to the schizophrenic individual. As Laing explains, such compartmentalization is ultimately harmful to the full integration of the two selves:

the tragic paradox is that the more the self is defended in this way, the more it is destroyed. The apparent eventual destruction and dissolution of the self in schizophrenic conditions is accomplished not by external attacks from the enemy (actual or supposed), from without, but by the devastation caused by the inner defensive manoeuvres themselves.

Laing would suggest that the lack of a dialogical relationship between the various selves stifles the integration of the two selves, leading to the successful treatment of the schizophrenic condition as dialogical self theory model would seem to corroborate. According to dialogical self theory, development of the self is brought about by the promoter and meta-positions which foster the dialogical interaction that can exist between the various I-positions. This interaction leads to the progression of the self as a healthy identity construct. In the schizophrenic individual, according to Laing, this dialogical interaction is suppressed, resulting in the termination of future development and the strengthening of the divisions between the respective personas.

The same defence mechanism can be witnessed at work in Gibreel. After recognizing his diagnosis of schizophrenia, he proceeds to compartmentalize his different selves:

He had begun to characterize his ‘possessed’, ‘angel’ self as another person: in the Beckettian formula, Not I. He. His very own Mr Hyde […] he seems to be able to think of these nightshows as separate from himself, which gave Allie and the Maudsley psychiatrists the feeling
that Gibreel was slowly constructing the boundary wall between dreams and reality, and was on the road to recovery; whereas in fact, as it turned out, this separation was related to, was the same phenomenon as, his splitting of his sense of himself into two entities, one of which he sought heroically to suppress but which he also, by characterizing it as other than himself, preserved, nourished, and secretly made strong.\textsuperscript{336}

In this textual example the isolation of the two selves into separate “compartments” is reminiscent of Laing’s defence mechanism. The scission between Gibreel and angel Gibreel is designed in an effort to protect the true self (Gibreel) from any harm that the false self (or selves) might cause through contact with other human beings. However, as Laing predicts, the action is futile and serves only to strengthen the false self of the angel Gibreel. Before Gibreel commits suicide, he meets with Saladin and reminds him to remember that ‘Always one part of me is standing outside screaming’.\textsuperscript{337}

My adoption of Laing’s false-self system illustrates the internal psychological processes that accompany the passing figure. So far, we have primarily engaged with the act of passing through medical theory which remains focused necessarily on the individual. My approach in this thesis is to offer a Fanon-influenced self and society framework for the analysis of the multiplicity of the postcolonial person. As such, the next two chapters concentrate upon the role of the audience in constructing the identity of the passing figure. In doing so, I demonstrate a balanced theoretical combination of the importance of both the individual and a wider social structure. The position of autonomy in the construction and interpretation of identity can lie with either the passing figure or the receptive audience to the passing attempt. For example, the person engaged in passing can suggest to the audience how they should be identified and the audience interpreting the passer can construct the passing figure’s identity in accordance with their own perspectives. The ability of the audience to determine identity can be evidenced in a brief reading of Gibreel. The following passage details Allie’s confiding in Saladin about Gibreel’s developing schizophrenia. This confidence occurs at an advanced stage of the novel, and allows Saladin the information about Gibreel’s condition he needs to devise his plan to take advantage of his illness by evoking his insecurities around Allie and her fidelity:
‘Three days ago he stole the car keys and they found him heading the
wrong way up an exit road on the M6, shouting about damnation.

*Prepare for the vengeance of the Lord*, he told the motorway cops, *for
I shall soon summon my lieutenant, Azrael*, They wrote it all down in
their little books.’

At this moment, Gibreel is dominated by his schizophrenic self, the archangel Gibreel,
however, unlike other passages in the text wherein only a singular version of his identity is
offered at one time, two distinct perspectives on his identity construction are made clearly
visible to the reader. According to one interpretation (Gibreel’s), he is the archangel and
desires to be identified as such in line with the magic realist textual strategy. Alternatively,
another interpretation (the motorway police officers’ interpretation) holds that Gibreel is not
the archangel, but is instead mentally ill. This is suggested by their writing of Gibreel’s
speech down in their books, which if the magic realist narrative was the “correct” version of
events, would be largely inappropriate and out of context. The diametrically opposed
narratives of realism and magical realism allow for the development of two distinct identities.
As both the realist and the magical realist modes are intertwined within *The Satanic Verses,*
the investiture of either narrative mode with any authority as the “correct” version of events
becomes increasingly difficult leading to the realization that both narratives have a strong
claim to Gibreel’s identity. Given the ability for both narratives to totalize his identity,
Gibreel can engage in the act of passing through the switch between narrative modes. When
the realist mode dominates, he is the actor Gibreel who has developed schizophrenia,
alternatively when the magic realist mode is in effect he becomes the genuine archangel
Gibreel.

In the same way that the police subscribe to one single perspective on Gibreel’s identity,
the shop attendants who witness Gibreel as the archangel Gibreel allow for another single and
independent perspective of his identity to develop. When he enters the shop and brandishes
his trumpet proclaiming his identity as the archangel, the narrative is convincingly realistic:

Then the stranger held the trumpet up over his head and shouted *I
name this trumpet Azrael, the Last Trump, the Exterminator of Men!*
– and we just stood there, I tell you, turned to stone, because all
around the fucking insane, *certifiable* bastard’s head there was this
bright \textit{glow}, you know?, streaming out, like, from a point behind his head.

A halo.\textsuperscript{339}

Obviously, Gibreel, as the individual, desires to be identified as the archangel Gibreel, evidenced by his behaviour which would corroborate with such a religious figure. The realist mode of the text suggests that the shop assistants initially refute his claim to be the archangel in their descriptions of him as ‘certifiable’ and ‘insane’. At present they stand in contrast to his identification of himself allowing for the development of the multiplicity of the postcolonial self through the role of audience interpretation. Cryptically, Rushdie remains true to the strategy of multiplicity and hints that Gibreel may actually be the archangel in line with the magic realist mode. The light that the shop assistants claim to see behind his head, labelled as a halo, indicates the interpretation of Gibreel according to his desires. However, the role of the audience in interpreting and therefore, constructing, the identity of Gibreel is clearly demarcated by the original comments made regarding his sanity.
Chapter Three: Hanif Kureishi’s Rejection of the Modern Assimilation Model and the Role of the Interpretive Community

In the previous two chapters, I have suggested that identity for the passing figure can be theorized by dialogical self theory and the work of R.D. Laing. Through my adoption of these approaches, I have positioned the phenomenon of passing as an individual activity reflected in the localized concerns of both theories. Both dialogical self theory and Laing’s divided self concept focus on the internal theoretical structure of the person engaged in the act of passing or who possesses multiple identities. However, I am now going to demonstrate the equally significant role of the audience as a wider social structure in creating the passing figure’s identity. When *The Mimic Men*’s Ralph Singh identifies Lieni after a period of twelve years, he rejects her attempt to be the ‘smart London girl’ and instead identifies her as a full-bodied woman who ‘could be recognized at a glance as an immigrant’. It is significant given my use of performance as the mechanism that constructs identity, that as with a dramatic performance, it is the task of the audience to authenticate the events and identities that are placed before them. The process of successful identification on the part of the actor necessarily relies upon the complicity of the audience in accepting the identity offered to them by the performer or passing figure. Ralph enters into the role of the audience in identifying Lieni, with the result that despite her best intentions to appear as the ‘smart London girl’, she is instead identified as something other. The example of Ralph and Lieni suggests a connection between the individual self and a wider social structure in the process of constructing an identity.

In proposing a postcolonial framework that modifies the foundational ideas borrowed from poststructuralism, existentialist writers such as Sartre and Fanon offer a more informative approach to the issue of postcoloniality as a lived condition experienced by millions of people throughout the world. As such, a primary concern of a framework complicit with underpinning a theory of postcoloniality is the connection between the individual self and a wider society. This chapter will focus on making such a connection explicit through a reading of Hanif Kureishi’s writings.

I have selected Hanif Kureishi because his work specifically addresses the struggle for the construction of identity in the midst of an ideology of multiplicity. I will illustrate how his wide body of writings rejects the modern assimilation model in England, as it relies on a homogenous notion of “Englishness” which cannot be verified in the novels and screenplays...
Kureishi has produced. I am referring to the assimilation model as ‘modern’ as it is more than likely a product of the large influx of immigrants to the United Kingdom between 1950 and 1970. The sharp rise in immigration caused a concern over the integrity of the nation-state’s racial and cultural purity and necessitated the production of a re-imagined English identity which excluded those first and second generation immigrants. Figures such as Enoch Powell, whose politics were widely considered as racist, facilitated the construction of an exclusive English identity through his use of the imagery of a military invasion as synonymous with the immigration influx.  

A reading of Kureishi’s writings will reveal the difficulty in locating a definitive notion of “Englishness” within his narratives. Instead, he offers a version of England characterized by a fluid and heterogeneous community of hybrid figures. The significance attached to a model of heterogeneity in his work signifies an involvement in a postcolonial politics of cultural hybridity. Such hybridity, exemplified in his characters switching from one identity to another, is complicit with the performed identity. I will adopt the example of Shahid from The Black Album (1995) to illustrate the performativity that Kureishi uses to reject the modern assimilation model. Shahid re-models himself into different identities in the text, illustrating the construction of identity as a conscious process of self-formation which stands in opposition to the heterogeneous nation necessary for the modern assimilation model. The employment of a performative politics underlines the multiplicity of identities that may be constructed, paving the way for a huge diversity of figures to emerge.

Developing from a demonstration of Kureishi’s politics of postcolonial multiplicity, I will closely read The Buddha of Suburbia (1990) to suggest that both Haroon and Karim are subject to re-interpretation depending upon who comprises the audience authenticating their identity, leading to them becoming the passing figure through a “mis”-interpretation. To apply such a reading, I will adopt Stanley Fish’s thesis on the “interpretive community” to theorize the important role played by the audience in “reading” the passing event subjectively. Fish’s reader-response theory allows for the demonstration of how multiple identities can be constructed in the passing figure as well as the explicit role of the audience in constructing identities for passing figures, securing the connection between the individual self and a wider social structure in the experience of postcoloniality.

Stanley Fish’s “interpretive communities” thesis argues that meaning is not inherently contained within a text but is brought to the text in the form of a reader. Essentially, Fish suggests that ‘the reader’s response is not to the meaning; it is the meaning’. Fish supports
his argument by maintaining that readers encounter texts with a plethora of knowledges and experiences which help shape an “interpretive strategy”. The subjective individualized interpretive strategy guides the reader to extracting a specific meaning from the text, opposing any notion of a meaning implicitly located within the text. People who hold different interpretive strategies form different interpretive communities, and as such read various meanings in the same text. In redeploying interpretive communities from legal theory into identity politics, I am arguing that the passing figure’s identity is interpreted differently depending on the interpretive strategy of the audience to their passing attempt. As readers of a text find meaning according to their own interpretive strategy, so do audience members “read” the passing figure in light of their own ideological framework. As such, not only does the passing figure become a multiple figure many times over in the reinterpretations of different people, but the connection between the passing figure’s construction of identity and the wider social structure of interpretation is made explicitly clear, developing our self and society approach to postcolonialism.

Kureishi’s Postcolonial Strategy: Rejecting the Modern Assimilation Model for a Cultural Hybridity

As with many postcolonial writers, Hanif Kureishi’s writing frequently supports a cultural and racial hybridity in his depictions of England. The representation of a hybrid diversity necessarily stands in opposition to the ideology of assimilation, which acts to remove all difference through the process of homogenization. In adopting a postcolonial hybridity, Kureishi rejects the binaristic logic of assimilation (immigrants either become the same as us or remain other). In discussing The Buddha of Suburbia, Ronald Shusterman asks:

Why does Kureishi wish to reject binary logic—what good will it do him—or us? Clearly, however flippant or irreverent [The Buddha of Suburbia] may be, Kureishi’s purpose is political in the final analysis.

Shusterman proceeds to answer his own question by arguing that ‘the rejection of the old logic of either-or is necessary for the emergence of a multiracial society’ before fully exploring the role of knowledge in The Buddha of Suburbia. Shusterman’s recognition of the novel’s work to ‘make firm knowledge seem impossible, if not undesirable’ before using the bildungsroman narrative structure and Karim’s gaining of knowledge throughout the text

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to argue that the unknowable can become the known suggests that Kureishi is working towards a politics of multiplicity in identity construction through the deconstruction of these binaries suggesting that the ‘ineffable in-betweenness can become part of the realm of conventional knowledge’. Without doubt, in rejecting binarism in identity construction Kureishi makes possible the multiplicity upon which postcolonialism strives to develop. He also makes assimilation into an English culture particularly problematic as there are now a myriad of ways to identify oneself; conforming to one homogenous ideal is increasingly unnecessarily restrictive. If Shusterman is correct, and the unknowable can become the known, the hybrid identity (either cultural or racial) which currently has no place to presence from, becomes not only a place from which to presence but the place due to the deconstruction of the normative mode of assimilation.

Hanif Kureishi’s own relationship to “Englishness” is problematic as was indicated when Amitava Kumar noted how an editor once informed him that “‘American’s think he’s a Brit, Brit’s think he’s an Indian, Indians think he’s all Westernized.’” In perhaps a prime example of interpretive communities applied to identity politics, Kureishi’s own identity becomes a matter of multiplicity through the various interpretive strategies brought to a reading of him. Somewhat unsurprisingly, Kureishi’s work reflects his own position between England and the East. It questions how an immigrant can assimilate to a model which is characterized by variety, diversity, geographical displacement and linguistic multiplicity. Assimilation suggests the presence of a consistent and unified construct of identity, whereas Kureishi’s politics suggests a rejection of consistency and the embracing of diversity in the figure of the cultural hybrid and the passing figure.

Once more, the employment of the hybrid figure to represent a political diversity in identity construction works to make clear the connection between the individual and society. The postcolonial figure is identified not only on their own presentation of an identity but also critically upon the reception and re-interpretation of that identity in a wide social structure. By demonstrating the rejection of the modern assimilation model and its subsequent replacement with a postcolonial ideology of cultural and racial hybridity, the foundational role played by society in shaping identity constructions becomes more explicit.

Before we proceed with a close reading of Kureishi’s writings, it would be beneficial to define more precisely the meanings of “assimilation”. I have so far used assimilation in order to represent the adoption of the cultural signs and markers of the majority of the population in order to maintain an image of homogeneity and structural rigidity in identity. However,
Chantal Lacroix’s recent book, *Immigrants, Literature and National Immigration* (2010), offers a more accurate definition of “assimilation”. According to Lacroix, assimilation can be described as a ‘one-way and one-sided process of adaptation’. When immigrants meet with the majority population in a new country, they are ‘to give up their prior linguistic, cultural and social characteristics, adopt the values and practices of the mainstream receiving society and become indistinguishable from the majority population’. Lacroix notes that this may take more than one generation to achieve. Within such an environment, it becomes impossible to recognize diversity in identity constructions. The position of the hybrid or passing figure is problematic as they cannot conform to the prescribed ideal that wider social structures designate is necessary.

With specific reference to the British context, Lacroix argues that integration policies operate under just such a one-sided approach. Integration becomes a compromise between the twin threats of coercion into adopting British practices and the possibility of separatism. However, for Lacroix there is an implicit assumption that the ultimate aim is to achieve a ‘fuller integration’ while maintaining the principal of homogeneity. Kureishi’s move to reject a homogenous England is significant in the context of an ideology that pervades all societal levels and bars minority cultural patterns from being recognized, it places him in contrast to the dominant ideology and renders his championing of the hybrid figure an effective postcolonial strategy of creating identity.

Similar readings of Kureishi’s work have been offered before. For example Benedict Alliot has suggested in a discussion of *The Buddha of Suburbia* that the novel is constructed from two halves, with South London and London City representing a Disraelian divide. Similarly, the numerous locations included within the novel, including for example Orpington, Beckenham, Bromley, and Brixton, are all markedly divergent and ruled by a rigid class structure that differentiates between them. This demonstrates that there is no homogenous identity but more likely, several identities. Alliot’s recognition that Kureishi represents many different versions of “Englishness” correlates with our argument that his postcolonial strategy supports a multiplicity of identities. *The Buddha of Suburbia* is not the only text that Kureishi has published in which his multifarious English identities are present. Indeed, it appears to be a trait that pervades the greater corpus of his work. I will demonstrate the continued re-creation of multiple English identities in his well-known novels and screenplays including *Sammy and Rosie Get Laid* (1988), *My Son the Fanatic* (1997) and *My

As an example of Kureishi’s ever-present rejection of the modern assimilation model through the portrayal of an Englishness riven with heterogeneity, we could begin by looking at smaller details in his fiction such as the dramatic description provided for the opening scene of Sammy and Rosie Get Laid. His directions indicate ‘A mixture of black and white’ people forming a crowd. Further on he refers again to ‘A crowd of black people and some whites’, with the added implicit irony that white people now occupy a racial minority. The picture he constructs is not the white homogenous nation that assimilation necessarily demands. The notion of a homogenous England is distinctly under threat when Kureishi describes ‘an injured white kid is with his black girlfriend.’ As Sammy and Rosie Get Laid is a screenplay, Kureishi visually constructs an England dominated by a heterogeneous mixture of both black and white races. The demographics of the black people are also unspecified, leaving the reader of the screenplay the uncertainty of whether Kureishi was referring to Indians, Africans or another black minority in the rather general and non-descriptive label ‘black’. The possibilities are widely distributed and the England in Kureishi’s screenplay may be one formed of a very large number of black and white people.

More overtly anti-homogenous references are also present in Kureishi’s work. His rejection of the modern assimilation model is not just confined to dramatic directions. For example, Rosie’s friends represent a particularly varied crosscut of London society. Early on we are introduced to Eva, Rani, Bridget and Margy and informed that Eva is a Jewish intellectual. Given that Rani is presumably a South Asian immigrant or at least has by way of heritage some South Asian cultural identification, only two out of four of Rosie’s friends can conform to the homogenous England ideal. Exactly half of them are rejected from identifying as English by the ideology of the modern assimilation model.

Assimilating into this nation is an impossibility given that there exists no normative standard against which cultural behaviours, manners and values may be modelled upon. Vinay Swamy has similarly noted Hanif Kureishi’s ‘(not so) implicit claim […] that a well-defined sense of the nation-state-instituted hitherto as a permanent, organic entity-is no longer a viable model in the context of contemporary (postcolonial) British society.’ The permanency of the nation-state which Swamy suggests is no longer viable, is displaced by an impermanency of identities characterized by the hybrid figure who switches between established cultural centres.
Kureishi’s rejection of a normative mode of Englishness continues from dramatic directions and character demographics through to the relatively minor and seemingly insignificant details that furnish his fiction. For example, we might take Rafi’s visit to Alice during which she offers him a stereotypical British reception: Earl Grey tea and then shortly later a piece of Jamaica Rum cake. Significantly, both items can be read as representative of the inherently heterogeneous nature of modern British society. A slice of Jamaica Rum cake implicitly refers to England’s colonial past and its involvement in the plantations where presumably such cakes among other dishes were traded back to the motherland; England’s colonial history specifically makes assertions of pure nationality difficult to uphold given the long involvement with numerous countries and their peoples. Similarly, the Earl Grey tea is reportedly derived from Chinese black tea and bergamots grown in Italy. An afternoon tea, illustrative of British values and norms, is actually suggestive of a multinational interaction whereby the influx of cultural influences has flowed in both directions.

The same representations of a heterogeneous society are also present in a cursory reading of *My Son the Fanatic*. For example, once more the mixture of peoples belie a marked diversity, as Parvez, our protagonist, drives a German visitor to a meeting with ‘a group of suited Asian and white businessmen’. The main plot features a conflict between a father and his son on the very issue of integration and separatism. Our protagonist Parvez, as the father believes in integrating within wider British society, whereas his son, Farid, rejects his father’s modernity and embraces a religious separatism. Farid argues with Parvez suggesting that ‘In the end our cultures […]} they cannot be mixed.’ to which Parvez concludes, ‘“Everything is mingling already together, this thing and the other.”’ Parvez further argues his point by asking Farid ‘Anyhow, how else can we belong here except by mixing up all together? They accuse us of keeping with each other.’ In a narrative strongly affiliated with Parvez over Farid, identification with his perspective is most likely Kureishi’s intended reader response. The reader is guided to conclude that the nature of Englishness is a continually contested entity rather than a fixed homogenous category. Parvez eventually puts his politics into explicit practice when he becomes romantically involved with the prostitute Bettina, claiming his son is incorrect on the matter of separatism:

And Farid says the cultures cannot mix. Jesus, they can’t keep apart.
Beside the continual presence of people from a variety of cultures in My Son the Fanatic, the plot’s conflict actively works to resist the separatism that develops in the absence of a cultural hybridity. Parvez bridges the divide between British and Indian, becoming the tool through which Kureishi carves his politics of the multiple identity into his fiction.

Like both My Son the Fanatic and Sammy and Rosie Get Laid, Kureishi’s rejection of a normative English identity is also evident in The Black Album. The novel’s principle character, Shahid is located in a bedsit in north-west London. Specifically, however, Kureishi describes his location as next to a Chinese restaurant and the buildings residents comprising of ‘Africans, Irish people, Pakistanis and even a group of English students.’ By tagging ‘even a group of English students’ onto the end of his description, Kureishi imparts a hint of irony which illustrates the rarity of the English students. Much more common, then, is the diverse mixture of peoples from different racial and cultural heritages. The locale of The Black Album, cannot conform to a modern assimilation model as it has no normative English identity to which its characters could assimilate. The college that Shahid attends is also described in a similar fashion: ‘sixty per cent black and Asian.’ Shahid’s brother introduces him to an even more heterogeneous England in their travels over the city. Among the various characters he meets are ‘german drug dealers […] teenage Italian girls […] English solicitors […] Bulgarian fencing champions; French croupiers […] and millionaire Bermudan barristers.’ The representation of multiplicity Kureishi offers is not specifically rooted in the neighbourhood in which Shahid lives, then, but a theme that spreads throughout the majority of the city. After Shahid becomes interested in Islam, a visit to the local mosque clarifies our representation of England’s multifarious inhabitants. The narrator describes ‘Men of so many types and nationalities-Tunisians, Indians, Algerians, Scots, French-gathered there, chatting in the entrance, where they removed their shoes and then retired to wash, that it would have been difficult, without prior knowledge, to tell which country the mosque was in.’ The intriguing aspect of the demographic in the mosque is its distinction from the politics of separatism that Riaz and his group describe throughout the text. It would seem that religion can offer no more homogeneity than can a nation-state, despite protestations otherwise.

The Black Album develops the theme of a heterogeneous Englishness through a display of the divisions not just between white and black people but also between white people. For example, the white culture is shown to be divided by class structures when Shahid refers to the white working class (a class whom he feels still commands more respect than he does as a
black individual). The working class are similarly referred to in *Sammy and Rosie Get Laid*, during a conversation between Rosie and Rafi. Even *My Son the Fanatic* contains a reference to the divisions inherent in white English culture: Schitz questions whether or not ‘we will experience some Northern English culture?’ Kureishi’s detailing of the multiplicity to be found in a supposedly homogenous nation-state brings to mind Ymitri Mathison’s suggestion that the Conservatives’ construction of a pure White Britain has marginalized not only the immigrants and racially impure but also the working and lower classes. For Mathison, “Britishness” is limited to the middle class. Accordingly, Englishness is a commodity afforded to only a very few who are located in the geographical space of the nation. These seemingly minor references made by Kureishi are potentially quite significant. All too often, Englishness is assumed to be an inherent quality of White people with a heritage based in England and this is further deemed to be under “threat” from the external nationals who immigrate into the country, thereby reducing the white portion of the population. However, the quotes from Kureishi’s texts would suggest that actually the threat comes from inside the nation. Englishness is not an inherent White quality as Mathison notes, but is restricted to very few people. Whiteness is itself greatly divided along class and cultural lines suggesting that there is no homogeneity in the label “English”.

The concern over the threat to Englishness from the difference of immigrants and other cultures is by no means a twentieth- or twenty-first-century phenomenon. Robert Young has made the observation of Mathew Arnold’s *Culture and Anarchy* (1869) that the text is ‘predicated on the fact that English culture is lacking, lacks something, and acts out of an inner dissonance that constitutes its secret, riven self’. *Culture and Anarchy*, then, is making reference to the same fictive motifs that Kureishi has decorated his work with. Englishness was not a homogenous ideal in the mid-nineteenth century, and according to Kureishi, it still is not now. Further textual evidence of the ‘inner dissonance’ of English culture pervades his writings.

For example, Sammy’s lover Anna, from *Sammy and Rosie Get Laid*, is an American national but exhibits a demonstrably keen interest in Eastern culture. The screenplay’s directions indicate ‘many Indian things: fabrics, carvings, carpets, pictures of plump gurus, etc.’ Anna’s American nationality is no problem for us here, she acts as a Western figure representing white “first-world” culture and proceeds to reject the homogenous image of the white world in her eclectic décor. Along similar lines, Rafi makes mention of the fact that his childhood friend, Alice, was ‘born and brought up in India’. Young’s argument, made by
invoking Mathew Arnold, that Englishness is a fragmented construct of many different identities is illustrated in Kureishi’s texts by both Alice and Anna who despite representing the West, are complicit in an engagement with Eastern cultural signs. Young can summarize our relationship to both notions of Englishness and the role of the East when he writes ‘The whole problem—but has it been a problem?—for Englishness is that it has never been successfully characterized by an essential, core identity from which the other is excluded.’

Certainly, Kureishi writes a Britain who displays no core identity, being formed instead of a multitude of divergent influences.

However, Kureishi’s perhaps most compelling indictment of Englishness as a homogenous construct comes from Sammy’s identification of himself and Rosie as being not Englishmen, but ‘Londoners’. When Sammy claims, ‘Neither of us are English, we’re Londoners you see’, he makes fully clear his belief that England is not characterized by a national identity formed through a unity but rather a collection of different identities that are more likely to be defined by region or proximity to other divergent identities given the multiplicity offered by London. Kureishi as a “London writer” illustrates the postcolonial possibilities offered by the city as his texts all suggest large ethnic influences and multicultural constructions of the self. London can be seen as a key part of the British postcolonial novel, the racial and cultural difference to be encountered in the London text would be a much rarer phenomenon in other major British cities such as Birmingham and Bradford where there is a lesser extent of crossover between different groups of people.

As I have demonstrated, Kureishi rejects any construction of Englishness based on a homogenous image of the nation-state. As a result, he stands opposed to the modern assimilation model to which immigrants are expected to conform. As we have mentioned, this model stresses the need to cast-off prior cultural and linguistic identities and adopt the British customs in their place. The aim is to become completely ‘indistinguishable’ from the majority population. If Englishness is a heterogeneous construct, the modern model must necessarily fail as there is an absence of a normative cultural system available for adoption in place of the rejected, original culture.

In the absence of an effective model of assimilation for immigrants to adhere to, Kureishi suggests in his writings a new system of identity construction based on the cultural hybrid. Kureishi displays a politics of postcolonial multiplicity with a postmodern emphasis on perception and audience interpretation in creating new ways of being. The cultural hybrid serves the function of bridging different or opposing cultures together to argue for a much
more integrated form of identity construction. Although difference still exists in the adoption of cultural hybridity, that difference is incorporated into a healthy schema rather than remaining an antagonistic force as it is currently viewed by the modern assimilation model. By employing the hybrid figure, Kureishi could be said to be invoking a policy of “inter-culturalism” over “multi-culturalism.” This works because multiculturalism can be criticized for the lack of interaction between communities meaning they effectively exist as separate nations within a nation-state. As Christian Joppke suggests after discussing the sights, sounds and smells that may be experienced in Brick Lane or Southall’s South Road, there is obviously ‘no presumption for these ethnic groups to become “British” in any other sense than the ownership of a British passport.’  

The pressing need for an inter-cultural framework is alluded to in The Black Album. Shahid observes the multiculturalism of London, but also the failure of any integration between the various groups. For example,

He had noticed, during the days that he’d walked around the area, that the races were divided. The black kids stuck with each other, the Pakistanis went to one another’s houses, the Bengalis knew each other from way back, and the whites too. Even if there were no hostility between groups—and there was plenty, if only implicit […] there was little mixing.

Shahid’s observation illustrates that despite London having a large number of different cultural and ethnic groupings, there is very little cross-cultural contact. Essentially, the groups continue to remain separate regardless of geographical proximity. However, the idea of inter-cultural interaction in the form of the hybrid celebrates the cross-cultural contact that may exist between these divergent nations within the geographical space of one nation. As the modern assimilation model has evidently failed in creating a homogenous national identity, Kureishi’s “inter-culturalism” allows for the hybrid figure, who represents two or more different identities, to bridge the divides between groups and ethnicities in order to create a national identity that is predicated on such difference, not an identity that fears the other’s influence.

Many of Kureishi’s characters embody his vision of an inter-cultural society. For example, Parvez from My Son the Fanatic is pictured wearing a Salwar Kurta (short Pakistani top normally worn with jeans or cotton trousers similar to the Salwar Kameez which is a
complete dress) and drinking a glass of whiskey. By borrowing from both Western and Eastern cultural traditions, Parvez indicates his position as a cultural hybrid. Furthermore, his relationship with Bettina suggests a wider benefit to be gained from interacting with other nationalities and groups. Rather than being a screenplay solely based on Farid’s adoption of separatism and fundamentalism, it is rather more concerned with Parvez’s inter-cultural liaisons, with the moral of multiplicity dominating over rigidity becoming obvious as the text progresses. The moral connection is made explicit through Parvez’s ‘beaming happiness’ as his relationship with Bettina develops being placed in direct contrast to Farid’s ever-growing dissatisfaction as he further embraces fundamentalist religion. In situating Parvez’s growing happiness in adopting a cultural hybridity over Farid’s growing unease in separatist England, Kureishi is becoming actively political in rejecting the modern assimilation model that stresses conformity to the essentialist image of a homogenous nation and instead supporting a policy of cultural hybridity as the favoured method for identity construction.

In a similar fashion, *Sammy and Rosie Get Laid*’s Alice suggests that ‘Being British has to mean an identification with other similar people.’ The choice of ‘similar’ as opposed to ‘same’ invokes the idea that a shared geographical location and the facility for linguistic communication are potentially the only requisites for a British identity. We have already noted how Kureishi does not represent Englishmen who are the ‘same’ as one another, but instead a myriad of people who differ widely. Alice is an interesting figure, given her childhood in India and adulthood in Britain. Combining her background and her view on becoming British she can be labelled as a cultural hybrid, helping to develop Kureishi’s politics of inter-culturalism. Alice is placed in direct contrast to Rafi, who embodies a worldview more suited to the modern assimilation model. For example, Rafi accuses Sammy and Rosie of living shallow, incoherent lives:

> the world and culture is a kind of department store. You go in and take something you like from each floor. But you’re attached to nothing.

Rafi’s disappointment in their lack of attachment to a specific identity reveals his firm conviction in a politics of essentialism, opposed to their hybrid methods of identity construction. Sammy and Rosie display Kureishi’s cultural hybrid politics well in their relationship, Sammy is a descendant of the East whereas Rosie is a Westerner. Yet their relationship is ultimately successful in the screenplay. Through casting Rafi as the antagonist,
his essentialism is rejected by his death through suicide. Alternatively, Sammy and Rosie are seen enjoying a significant moment together undisturbed by anyone around them:

Sammy and Rosie sit on the floor together, rocking each other […] It is just the two of them together.\textsuperscript{383}

Whereas Rafi is figuratively punished for his belief in essentialism and rigidity, Sammy and Rosie are pictured in a moment of comfort by the end of the screenplay, suggesting that everything will work out suitably for them and their politics of cultural hybridity and heterogeneity. Once more, Kureishi’s politics are favoured by his more successful or happy characters and those who are more in-line with the modern assimilation model or a rigid essentialist ideology are either unhappy or punished in some way.

Kureishi also makes his politics of inter-culturalism in the cultural hybrid accessible in a reading of My Beautiful Launderette. The culturally hybrid couple, Johnny and Omar, stand in opposition to Ghengis and Moose who represent a homogenous version of the British identity in-line with the modern assimilation model. Kureishi’s support for the culturally hybrid relationship that develops between Johnny and Omar surfaces when the car that Omar is riding in is attacked by Ghengis, Moose and Johnny. The connection between Johnny and Omar is subsequently revealed in the screenplay’s directions:

‘The LADS are alert and ready for violence but are confused by
OMAR’s obvious friendship with JOHNNY.
OMAR sticks out his hand and JOHNNY takes it.’\textsuperscript{384}

The developing confusion of the violent gang in the light of Johnny’s friendship with someone who is supposedly their enemy suggests that Kureishi’s inter-cultural politics has acted to dispel the violence about to be conducted in the name of homogeneity. By Johnny accepting Omar’s hand of friendship, Kureishi’s cultural hybridity is invoked to offer a more inclusive postcolonial model of constructing identity. Johnny and Omar form another interracial couple whose relationship is successful by the end of the screenplay. This offers further support for Kureishi’s politics of postcolonial multiplicity in identity opposing the rigidity that the assimilation model relies upon to succeed.

Up to this point, I have discussed the cultural hybrid figure as someone who crosses the boundaries between two identities and rejects an essentialist politics. More precisely, however, this is achieved through the cultural hybrid figure’s use of a performative
mechanism. If a hybrid figure can reject an essentialist ideology through displays of two or more cultural loyalties, a reliance upon performance is evident as the prime method through which identity is constructed. Identity is no longer an inherent entity prescribed at birth but instead learnt through the influences gathered in those surrounding us, which could effectively vary very greatly. It makes sense, then, that presumably any identity can be adopted through a convincing performance, regardless of the racial or cultural background of the figure. The hybrid figure becomes a passing figure through the shared ability to adopt or reject identities by the conscious decision of how to perform in their interactions with those around them.

I will now offer a close reading of *The Black Album*, a text in which Kureishi makes the hybrid/passing figure’s adoption of performativity in constructing the self particularly evident. The text also works to construct a policy of inter-culturalism through the combination of varying cultural influences in the protagonist, Shahid. Briefly explained, the novel concerns Shahid’s move into London in an attempt to start afresh after his father’s death. He falls in love with his college lecturer, Deedee Osgood, and simultaneously becomes involved in Islamic fundamentalism against her wishes. The fundamentalist group he has become involved with eventually turn against Shahid when he cannot fully embrace their beliefs and he realizes that they cannot offer him the identity framework he desired. Shahid’s brother saves him and Deedee from their house when the fundamentalist’s begin to attack it and the novel ends with Shahid and Deedee leaving London for a holiday. Principally, *The Black Album* is a novel about identity and belonging.

When Shahid initially moves to London, it is to gain a ‘new start with new people in a new place’ and he narrates his belief that in London ‘there had to be ways in which he could belong.’ According to the ideology of the modern assimilation model, a change of location within the nation should make little difference, as presumably the same people would be met wherever anyone ventures due to the homogenous national identity to which everyone can be described. However, we have already seen that Kureishi’s London is typified by an intense diversity of peoples and cultures. This variety allows Shahid to develop a new persona. In the same way that, as we shall see later, Karim performs his identity in *The Buddha of Suburbia*, the performed identity is pervasive in *The Black Album*. This is particularly clear to see in Chili, Shahid’s brother, who at one point adopts a Spanish accent to escape a house inhabited by members of the National Front. The element of performativity that underlies the text works in unison with Kureishi’s support for a cultural hybridity as legitimate method of
identity construction as opposed to assimilation to a normative model which presupposes an essentialist politics. Through portraying Shahid and others in the text as transient and displaying multiple selves, the notion of essentialism has to be rejected. Such a performativity underlies Shahid’s cultural hybridity. Even when he initially adopts Islam and becomes involved in the religious fundamentalism of Riaz and the group he commands, Shahid’s behaviour can be identified as performative, undercutting the very notions it seeks to uphold. For example,

Shahid, too, wanted to belong to his people. But first he had to know them, their past and what they hoped for. Fortunately, Hat had been of great help. Several times he had interrupted his studies to visit Shahid’s room with books; sitting beside him, he had, for hours, explained parts of Islamic history, along with the essential beliefs. Then, clearing a space on the floor, he had demonstrated what to do.  

Clearly, Shahid does not belong to “his people”, at least at this moment in the text, if he has to be taught the traditions and practices that they engage in. However, this does reveal how different cultural identities can be learned and adopted over time through the recognition of cultural markers and signs. The cultural hybridity that Shahid displays stands in contrast to the integration desired by the assimilation model, which desires a unified identity with immigrants adopting the cultural displays of the majority population. Such a normative majority, however, clearly does not exist, as we have seen. Instead Kureishi portrays the cultural hybridity of Shahid as an alternative to the assimilation model. The displacement of the normative mode of Englishness and its related essentialism brings about the recognition of the passing figure as illustrative of a more culturally inclusive postcolonial immigration policy. Shahid becomes our passing figure through repeatedly changing his identity throughout the text in order to identify with his lover, Deedee and alternatively his fundamentalist friends whose identities are clearly vastly different. Shahid uses a politics of performativity to adopt new identities and re-mould himself in the desired fashion, simultaneously foreshadowing his break with the fundamentalist group who preach a desire to observe separatism between West and East.
Quite significantly, Kureishi chooses to illustrate the leader of the fundamentalists’, Riaz, as somebody whose identity as also largely a performance. Shahid observes how Riaz was frequently late:

He seemed to enjoy creating anticipation, and then, when frustration had accumulated, making an entrance […] Perhaps he thought the others required him to show more authority.\textsuperscript{388}

In adopting theatrical elements to furnish his identity, Riaz proves that his identity is not an essentialist construction but open to the same hybridity as the passing figure in the use of external characteristics to project a desired image.

The demonstration of a cultural hybridity over essentialist ideology is even evident in Chad, the member of Riaz’s band of fundamentalists who helps persuade Shahid to adopt the same lifestyle. Deedee reveals how he was originally named Trevor Buss and was adopted by a white couple who raised him according to traditional English cultural values before he began to suffer due to a lack of knowledge regarding his Pakistani roots. It is revealed how he took lessons to speak Urdu and changed his name to portray the Pakistani identity.\textsuperscript{389} In doing so, he illustrates a cultural hybridity, switching from one nationality to another through conscious will. Despite Chad’s role in upholding fundamentalist politics in the text, his obvious cultural hybridity acts to underscore this assertion and offers more support for Kureishi’s emphasis upon the multiplicity available in postcolonialism.

Chad, however, is firmly convinced of his role in fundamentalism and often preaches to Shahid, offering him guidance on how to become more like the rest of the group. The continued contradiction between Chad and Shahid is illustrated when Chad attempts to convince Shahid to dispose of his music collection. Through the use of water as a metaphor, Chad hopes to persuade Shahid to become more committed to the Islamic tradition. He questions Shahid:

‘don’t you want to swim in a clean sea and see by a clear light?’
‘Isn’t that what art helps us do? Life would be a desert otherwise.
Wouldn’t it Chad?’\textsuperscript{390}

The issue debated here is not Shahid’s music collection but rather his wider belief system. Kureishi maintains Shahid’s acceptance of divergent cultural markers and signs through his enjoyment of music, firmly rejecting the rigid inflexibility of the groups’ fundamentalist
version of Islam. Shahid’s commitment to a cultural hybridity remains clear even when he exhibits doubt about his own sense of self in the text. His search for identity under the influence of a cultural hybridity leads him to question the lack of a rigid structure. For Shahid, a condition of hybridity leaves him feeling distinctly unsettled to begin with:

His own self increasingly confounded him. One day he could passionately feel one thing, the next day the opposite. Other times provisional states would alternate from hour to hour; sometimes all crashed into chaos. He would wake up with this feeling: who would he turn out to be on this day? How many warring selves were there within him? Which was his real, natural self? Was there such a thing? 

The presence of multiple ‘warring selves’ is the knowledge that through cultural hybridity, Shahid can lay claim to any number of personas, at any time. His discomfort arises from a lack of rigid structure defining which self, as a passing figure, he should adopt. However, this is a dilemma that the text, in true bildungsroman fashion, resolves successfully. In a link to *The Buddha of Suburbia*, in which Karim also undergoes the journey of a typical bildungsroman protagonist, both Karim and Shahid come to realize that their present selves, although riven with a multiplicity, constitute a healthy postcolonial identity framework for the construction of self. The question Shahid asks, ‘Which was his real, natural self?’ turns out to be the self he has displayed throughout the text. The multiplicity that he demonstrates does not disappear by the end of the novel, his commitment to cultural hybridity is his true self and thus provides the theoretical structure which he had been lacking in the body of the text. In this way, Kureishi is suggesting cultural hybridity as an alternative to the modern assimilation model. In Shahid’s case, cultural hybridity is preferable than assimilation to either the English or Islamic identity models that he is offered.

Shahid’s journey is complete when he begins to realize the positive values of a cultural hybridity. His thoughts turn again to consider the multiple selves within him, but without the negativity that pervaded them earlier in the text. Now, he appears to adopt this consciously and appear comfortable in doing so. For example,

How could anyone confine themselves to one system or creed? Why should they feel they had to? There was no fixed self; surely our
several selves melted and mutated daily? There had to be innumerable ways of being in the world.'

At this point, Shahid has realized Kureishi’s politics of multiplicity and has finally renounced the idea of assimilation to a fixed normative identity. Instead, he would display multiple personas through the use of performativity, identifying himself with the passing figure in rejecting the essentialism of the modern assimilation model. The ideology of cultural hybridity has gained much support in postcolonialism: Shusterman has argued that Shahid’s resolution to his previous state of confusion suggests that ‘everything is in flux, and nothing is binary or simple, the experience of the in-between is the most truthful experience that can exist.’ If the hybrid figure can offer the most truthful experience, Kureishi’s adoption of hybridity allows for a more truthful experience of identity to emerge in the place of the modern assimilation model.

**The Role of the Audience in Identifying the Passing Figure: “Interpretive Communities” and Cultural hybridity in *The Buddha of Suburbia***

Hanif Kureishi’s *The Buddha of Suburbia* is centrally concerned with the cultural hybrid/passing figure and performance as a method of constructing identity. Such concerns illustrate Kureishi’s opposition to static, binary identities. This is made possible through the performativity necessary to cultural hybridity: in order to simultaneously experience two different identities, the hybrid character must forgo any pretensions to purity or essentialism. Furthermore, the cultural aspect of cultural hybridity suggests that, as we have shown, identity is fluid and transient meaning that identity can be adopted or rejected at will. Cultural hybridity is therefore naturally tied in with our concerns over the performativity of identity. The cultural hybrid can learn and perform which aspects of either culture he/she wishes to without the constraints of essentialist rigidity. The central theme of cultural hybridity reflects Kureishi’s politics of multiculturalism over static binary identifications.

*The Buddha of Suburbia* is a significant text for both Kureishi and scholars of identity construction. The novel was his first and represented a change from screenplay writing. Perhaps due to his considerable success with *The Buddha of Suburbia* (in 1990 he was awarded a Whitbread Award for best first novel), several other novels have followed. Although a change in medium, *The Buddha of Suburbia* does continue with the themes which informed his earlier work, such as race, class and belonging. The novel was well received, and subsequently re-produced for a BBC television series in 1993 with accompanying...
soundtrack by David Bowie. Although set in the transitional period into Thatcherism of the late 1970s, it was actually published in 1990. Given the novel’s questioning of identity, the notion of “Englishness” as a monolithic category is also disputed, continuing from the themes already discussed in his earlier screenplays. The setting coincides with the influx of a large number of immigrants and a public reaction led by figures such as Enoch Powell who helped generate a monolithic “English” identity. The construction of such an ideology will no doubt have influenced the “interpretive strategies” of Britons who regarded immigrants with some suspicion leading them into identifying minorities in a particular way. Given its context, *The Buddha of Suburbia* is a significant text to apply Fish’s thesis to.

Critical responses have concentrated on the hybrid figure, Karim, who negotiates between Indian and English aspects of his identity before eventually accepting his hybrid status as a positive force. The novel has been the subject of at least one reader’s guide by Nahem Yousaf, and a number of articles which generally focus upon the novel’s engagement with diaspora, hybridity and identity politics.

Kureishi’s use of the bildungsroman structure in the novel is critical to an understanding of his implication in postcolonial identity politics. A narrative formula that allows for character development to occur and integration into a wider social system effectively questions the boundaries that maintain a division between the races. In their ability to demonstrate a progressive identity development over the course of the novel illustrates that identity is not a static structure but a flexible, adaptable process, a fact not lost on Bart Moore-Gilbert who writes how ‘Kureishi’s choice of *Bildungsroman* as a genre is particularly significant, given that it is one which insistently presents identity as a developmental, unstable and shifting process, rather than a given and stable product.’ In representing identity as a process, rather than a product, the politics of essentialism are rejected in favour of the cultural hybridity adopted by the passing figure.

In this section of the chapter, I will argue for an application of Stanley Fish’s “interpretive communities” thesis to readings of the passing figure in *The Buddha of Suburbia*. I will argue that identity is largely constructed by audience interpretation of the passing figure, informed by the “interpretive strategies” that they hold prior to the interaction event with the passing figure. By doing so, I will demonstrate how a performed identity can be re-interpreted multiple times over leading to a proliferation of identities to develop. The cultural hybrid is essential in illustrating how identity is constructed in different ways for different interpretive communities as they may focus on divergent aspects of the same individual’s identity and
thus identify them differently. Specifically, I will demonstrate how the peripheral characters of the text (Shadwell, Pyke, and the anonymous English natives) formulate different perceptions of Karim’s and Haroon’s identities as do ourselves, as readers of the text who may constitute another interpretive community altogether.

An application of Stanley Fish to *The Buddha of Suburbia* is critical in aligning the passing figure’s construction of identity with a wider social structure. So far, I have considered the passing figure in light of dialogical self theory and R.D. Laing’s divided self, both of which are intensely concerned with the passing figure as an individual. I will now suggest that while these approaches still display a critical currency and validity, it is also beneficial to consider identity construction as the relationship between an individual and a wider social structure. Fish’s reader-response theory can be invoked to explicitly connect the performance of an identity to the interpretations of the performance generated by the audience it was enacted for. By doing so, I am facilitating a modification to postcolonial theory with regard to its engagement with poststructuralist theories in order that it reflects the real, lived experiences of displaced individuals.

Fish was a dedicated advocate of reader-response theory in the United States and was influential in both literary and legal studies. His theory of the interpretive community was first explored in his essay, now frequently anthologized, “Interpreting the Variorum.” (1976). As we have already seen, the interpretive community is comprised of the reader(s) of a text and as the reader(s) illustrate, a meaning is not found to be inherent in a text but from within the reader(s) themselves. Necessarily, then, all meanings in response to literature are subjective in nature and cannot be separated from the prior experience and knowledge which the reader possesses when they encounter the text. These prior possessions are what constitute the “interpretive strategy” of a reader. To offer a basic example, a feminist is likely to read a literary text and note a particular reading of the characterization of women and male attitudes towards those women. A psychoanalyst is more likely to perhaps read into the text a psychic layering of the narrative offered by a protagonist. For both the feminist and the psychoanalyst, their respective readings will form their view of the text’s fundamental meaning, despite the text remaining consistent in its content to both readers.

Stanley Fish’s interpretive community argument has, however, attracted a considerable amount of criticism, some of which will be relevant to address when applying the thesis to the phenomenon of the passing figure. For example, some of the criticism is levelled at the theory for its construction of the interpretive community as an authoritative force. Mary Louise Pratt identifies that “The real fact that belief systems have internal contradictions is
If the authoritative force is denied the interpretive community, a coherent or consistent interpretive strategy is an impossibility. Pratt allows for Fish’s response in which he indicates an agreement with the charge of internal contradictions, but implies that it is only within the framework of such a community that disagreements can hold any meaning at all and display coherence. However, Pratt questions how a disagreement can arise in the first place within a community of (apparently) shared equal beliefs and convictions. She is somewhat disappointed that Fish ‘cops out’ by providing the example of the academy, whereby disagreements are blamed upon the requirements of the profession. As it stands, then, an interpretive community cannot be viewed as a monolithic, internally homogenous ideological group and consensus can only be reached in (presumably) the majority of cases. A lack of regular consensus does not affect the validity of the thesis in applications to identity studies, however. “Readers” of identity can be deemed to constitute their own personal interpretive community, reading identity based on their own personal knowledge and experience, consensus with the rest of a group is not necessarily a requisite. In fact, the application of interpretive communities to individuals emphasizes the multiplicity of identities that may be available as every individual constitutes their own interpretive community.

Eugene Goodheart criticizes interpretive communities with similar charges against a lack of authority. For Goodheart, Fish explains what an interpretive community is, but neglects to tell us how they develop and gain their authority. Goodheart argues that Fish explains the necessity of interpretive communities through the stability of interpretation that they offer which was once deemed to be found within the text itself. The ramifications for identity studies becomes apparent here, authority no longer lies in the individual for the construction of identity but rests in the community of audience members. However, to evidence the authority of this interpretation Fish would need to ‘provide a historical perspective that would yield, if not a general theory of the origins of authority, examples of how particular communities become authoritative.’ According to Goodheart, the absence of the historical perspective lends interpretive communities an arbitrariness that undermines its theoretical construction. The authority for identity creation in the audience is therefore rendered arbitrary, rejecting our application of his theory to our wider argument about the complicity of both the self and a wider social structure to the construction of identity. Yet Fish counters, in a response to Goodheart’s criticism of a lack of historicity, writing that critical activity is an attempt on the part of one person to persuade another party to alter their beliefs. The aim is
that evidence cited by the first party will eventually be cited by the second when conversion to the same belief occurs. This is cited from his final chapter of *Is There a text in This Class?* (1980). For Fish, the ‘configurations and boundaries of interpretive communities-and therefore the configuration of the activities of mind they make possible-are not fixed but continually changing.’ Accordingly, for Fish, if the boundaries of interpretive communities are constantly changing then an interpretive community is a historical entity. If we take Fish’s assertion that the interpretive community is an historical entity, this allows it the authority that Goodheart denies it. If the interpretive community is a continually evolving ideology, this serves to reflect the anti-essentialist position that postcolonialism adopts with regard to identity. Interpretations of identity are open to modification over time reflecting the multiplicity of the passing figure.

Gerald Graff offers a criticism of the interpretive community argument in relation to the status of the text prior to interpretation. For Graff, if the reader produces the meaning, then we have to conclude that the text cannot exist prior to the reader creating the meaning. Graff believes that such reasoning forces Fish into the ‘strange conclusion’ that no text can invite a particular reading and cannot therefore resist what he calls a determined reader. Graff concludes that ‘It amounts to a proclamation of interpretive infallibility.’ The significance of Graff’s view is that the passing figure becomes solely the product of an infallible audience member to the passing event and has no authority of their own in identity construction. In response to Graff, Fish writes that the question as to whether or not a text invites particular interpretations is only relevant if the text is considered to exist prior to interpretation, an assumption which Fish rejects. For example, if everyone sees a text as needing to be interpreted in different specific ways, everyone’s text is not the same, hence the question becomes an empty one. The priority of the text cannot be proven since the text about which everybody speaks is no longer prior. Fish furthers his explanation of the lack of independence which a text can exercise when he writes how no text can be seen as something outside of the boundaries of understanding which see the text as ‘this’ rather than ‘that’. However, the text will always be seen as something and so harbour a certain resistance against the “determined reader”. Essentially, Fish largely negates the possibility of a prior textual authority but relents in his admission that as it is always seen as something by an interpretive community, this identity will allow it a certain authority with which to resist a determined reader. In terms of the passing figure, this translated means that as they will always be identified as some form of identity by an interpretive community, this
identification allows the passing figure some form of authority in their identity to resist a
determined reader of another interpretive strategy. Critically, however, Fish’s admission that
all texts will be seen as something in one frame of reference or another and so harbour
resistance against the determined reader prohibits the free-play that Edward Pols criticizes
poststructuralism for. Therefore, although Fish’s theory borrows heavily from
poststructuralist influences, it can be adopted in this study as a useful critical tool that works
against the logical inconsistencies that deconstruction is often derided for.

I am arguing in this section, that Fish’s interpretive communities can be adopted as a
model to theorize the connection between individual identity and a wider social structure of
identity construction. Identity as a social fabrication has a performative element, as illustrated
by the passing figure’s display of multiple selves and a community element implicit in the
interpretations made by the audience to the passing event. Chapters One and Two of this
thesis have illustrated the performance of the self in Ralph Singh, The Enigma of Arrival’s
narrator and Gibreel. I have also now shown the performative politics of Hanif Kureishi
writings. Chapter Four will also offer a performative reading of Malkani’s protagonist Jas.
However, identity is also fabricated by the audience who are present to witness the passing
figure and who bring to the passing event their own interpretive strategies for meaning-
making. In applying interpretive communities to a theoretical reading of the passing figure, I
am executing Amy Robinson’s suggestion that ‘To imagine identity politics as a skill of
reading is to replace the inadequate dichotomy of visibility and invisibility with an
acknowledgement of multiple codes of intelligibility.’ In adopting Fish, I am arguing
precisely that identity is a social process of “reading,” given that reading is seen as a process
of meaning-making. Through the interpretive strategy, the identity of the passing figure is
“read” to complete his identification. The reading may confirm or deny what the passing
figure wishes to be read as his identity.

The consequences of adopting the interpretive communities approach to a reading of both
Haroon and Karim are significant in locating the construction of multiple identities in the
passing figure. Kureishi’s two main protagonists may be read as either British or Indian,
depending on which interpretive community is reading their performances. I will be arguing
that there are two main interpretive communities involved in identifying Haroon and Karim.
Firstly, we have the English characters of the novel including Shadwell and Pyke. I am also
including the peripheral English people into this interpretive community although they are
not featured as independent characters. The reason for doing so is that the English people still
participate in the identifying of Haroon and Karim, as is noted from Haroon and Karim’s
references to how ‘the English’ think of them. Although they do not explicitly feature, they obviously contribute to general views that are held on Haroon and Karim. Shadwell, Pyke and the peripheral English characters form their interpretive strategy in the context of the 1970s/1980s political opinion held on immigrants. As previously mentioned, figures such as Enoch Powell helped to reinforce a division between “them” and “us”, barring immigrants from identifying as British. Furthermore, as the Indian empire had only ended around thirty-five years previously, there was a continued ideology of superiority held by whites over Indians.

The second interpretive community I wish to introduce is the reader of the text. The reader forms another interpretive community whose interpretive strategy is founded upon the visibility of the performance Haroon and Karim demonstrate in replicating a fully authentic English identity. As the reader lacks a visual image of the characters, the priority of the racial sign as an indicator of their identity loses significant power in constructing their personas. Instead, the reader is much more likely to identify Haroon and Karim as British characters due to their credible performances. By allowing the reader to identify Haroon and Karim as British, rather than Indian, Kureishi reflects the specifically British context of identity construction in which race occupies a less figurative role in totalizing the passing figure’s identity. Such an approach stands in contrast to the American system of identity construction which relies heavily upon the racial sign as a significant indicator of an identity, regardless of how convincing a “white” performance may be.

The emphasis Kureishi affords the cultural markers of identity over racial markers is evident in most of the novel’s characters. Charlie, for example, re-invents himself after visiting a punk music event when he emerges both literally and figuratively to rip off his shirt and bundle himself into a car with other punks before disappearing into the night. Upon his return, Charlie renames his band the “Condemned” and becomes himself “Charlie Hero”. In a similar fashion, Karim’s brother Amar renames himself Allie to align more closely with his English heritage. He believes this re-identification will ward off any potential racial incidents. Furthermore, he demonstrates a keen interest in clothing and dressing up. Finally, Eva also re-identifies herself at one point in the novel as she attempts to assimilate into higher society after relocating from the suburbs into London city. Initially, she demonstrates a keen interest in Haroon’s mysticism and Eastern heritage before denouncing this and concentrating on her interior design business. Any preconceived ideas as to his characters’ identities are displaced through the constant flux and uncertainty that their
identities display. As a result of Charlie, Allie and Eva’s passing performances they are able to reject an ideology of essentialism and suggest instead a modernist conception of self as a performative act. They re-create themselves through the recognition of cultural signs of identity and the adoption of a performative politics to project those cultural signs to their audience.

If we begin with a close reading of Haroon, we can distinctly see how there are two opposing interpretations of his identity. As I have determined, these two communities are Shadwell, Pyke and the peripheral English citizens who form one interpretive community and the reader of the text who forms the second interpretive community. As a result of two communities “reading” Haroon’s identity, he becomes the passing figure in his ability to hold two distinct personas.

Haroon (or Harry as he is renamed by Jean and Ted) is the cultural hybrid figure in so far as he has an Indian heritage but fully participates in English cultural behaviours. His ability to switch between a British and Indian identity forms a central feature of the novel’s plot. Despite trying to be a British citizen, he adopts the Indian “Buddha” identity and re-invents himself. He arrived in England during the 1950s, making it perfectly clear he prefers the English way of life. Haroon’s adoption of English culture is evident from the early passages of text that detail his efforts to assimilate. For example, we are told how he made numerous trips to Bond Street in order to purchase new bow-ties, waistcoats, and socks in the English fashion. Furthermore, he is employed as a member of the civil service and marries two white women, Margaret then Eva. Karim also notes the emphasis his mother placed on Haroon’s class status through emphasizing his wealth. As well as distancing him from the masses of Indian immigrants who arrived in Britain during the 1950s and 1960s, this also allows him to relocate himself among the Englishmen through class if not race. Class becomes a key aspect of the postcolonial figure’s integration strategy; unlike race which is bolstered by an ideology of essentialism and biological fixity, class is a culturally based system of identity production and had a lead role in the context of the British Empire. In the opposite way to America, Britain’s multicultural Empire dissolved the strength of the racial sign in totalizing identity. Much more important was considered the class membership which an individual could boast of. Haroon’s use of class as a method of constructing an identity that the Englishman will accept is only possible because of the vastly different context between Britain and America. A passing figure in America would not manage to eradicate the significance of the racial sign. The reason Haroon relocated to England was a desire to

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assimilate and pass among the English: he was supposed to return to India as ‘a qualified and polished English gentleman lawyer and an accomplished ballroom dancer.’. 415 Karim later makes this intention clear when he narrates that his father and uncle Anwar were ‘both happy to live like Englishmen.’. 416 Through his adoption of English cultural values and markers, he has developed into a culturally hybrid figure, suggesting that performativity pervades the constructions of identity and works to reject essentialist ideology. Performativity is a prerequisite for cultural hybridity as the English aspect of Haroon’s persona is not a natural product. Rather, he learns to display the English cultural behaviours when he arrives in England and views other Englishmen who act as models for Haroon to re-create himself alongside. Haroon is effectively passing as an Englishman, attempting to adopt the cultural markers and desiring that his performance is “read” in the right way. The above passage describing Haroon’s wearing of English clothing, choice of career and marriage partners may be taken as evidence of his use of “props” to project the necessary image to those who read his identity.

In order to ascertain how successful Haroon’s attempt to pass as an Englishman is, it is necessary to consider who is reading his passing attempt and to which interpretive community they belong. At a textual level, Haroon is “read” by the peripheral English characters often referred to abstractly as ‘they’ or ‘them’ within the novel. The interpretive strategy of this community is informed by the legacy of imperial relations and the previous connection between Indians and a supposed inferiority when compared to white people. The period in which the novel is set, from the late-1970s to the 1980s, was typified by a fear of the dissolution of English culture and national greatness by the immigrant population. Large influxes of immigrants in the 1950s and 1960s was a cause for concern in some quarters and led to the dissemination of racist ideas typified by Enoch Powell. In being recognized as an immigrant, Haroon is identified by the interpretive strategy of this climate by the peripheral English characters. For example, the belief in English superiority is made clear through Haroon’s complaints regarding employment:

‘The whites will never promote us […] Not an Indian while there is a white man left on earth […] they still think they have an empire when they don’t have two pennies to rub together.’ 417

Here Haroon reveals the colour bias that still constrains him despite his cultural displays of Englishness. He refers to himself as Indian, knowing this is how they perceive him, and he is
placed below the Englishman in a hierarchical scale of employment effectiveness. Furthermore, this is revealed to be a legacy of the empire, whereby the power structures informed through the racial signifier are key to reading identity. Haroon’s inferiority is further confirmed when he instructs Karim that ‘You couldn’t let the ex-colonialists see you on your knees, for that was where they expected you to be.’

Haroon is, of course, aware of these power structures and initially attempts to combat them by carrying a pocket dictionary around with him wherever he went as he believed the opportunity to impress an Englishman could arise at any time. These comments that Haroon makes reveal the imperial power structures that are underpinning the perceptions of the interpretive community within Kureishi’s text. They are demonstrably influenced by the racial signifier as primary marker of identity leading to Haroon being classed as Indian, rejecting any of the cultural displays of Englishness he may project.

Final proof of Haroon’s racial signifier confining him to one identity is available in the latter part of the text when he reveals himself to a journalist:

I have lived in the West for most of my life, and I will die here, yet I remain to all intents and purposes an Indian man. I will never be anything but an Indian.

According to the ideology informing the interpretive community of the peripheral English natives, Haroon can legitimately occupy the role of Indian, but not that of Englishman. It can be concluded, then, that Haroon attempts to pass as an Englishman, but fails in the perceptions of the interpretive community reading his pass. His identity is necessarily confined to a generic identification based on his skin colour and rejects his adoption of a cultural hybridity. The rejection of Haroon’s cultural hybridity, however, is somewhat undercut by the perceptions of the other interpretive community I will now discuss.

Despite the use of the racial sign in the first communities’ identification of Haroon, his identity is not totalized by the presence of his skin colour. Unlike the American context whereby race is perceived as the totalizer of identity, different interpretive communities exist in the British context who can allow the circumvention of an identity based purely on the presence of dark skin. The second interpretive community “reads” Haroon through a lack of a real visual image making the presence of the racial sign much less problematic in assigning him an English identity. More significantly, Haroon is identified as English based upon his convincing displays of English cultural markers. Haroon’s ability to adopt these cultural
practices questions the very plausibility of an ideology of identity construction rooted in a modernist racial politics.

Haroon’s English identity is ironically also reinforced through his return to the cultural values of the East. When he practices his performance before appearing as the Buddha a second time, we read him hissing his s’s and exaggerating an Indian accent in opposition to his previous attempt to display a good command of English. Additionally, the literature that Haroon regularly reads is also indicative of his re-adoption of Eastern culture. His English identity is reinforced through the overt performativity that he employs to re-construct his Indian self. Haroon, in order to project the correct image, researches and practices the role he adopts before each performance as the Buddha. Necessarily, Haroon’s Indian identity cannot be a natural self if reliant upon performativity to make it convincing for his audience. It can be argued that his English and Indian personas are not the diametrical opposites of each other but are actually closely connected through the shared use of a performative passing strategy to create the desired impression on his audience. Furthermore, the reader’s identification of Haroon as English, which was Haroon’s initial intention and Haroon’s difficulty in now displaying an Indian identity lends support to the assertion that a text can resist a determined reader. Fish suggests that the meaning is constructed from both the reader’s interpretation and something in the text. Haroon’s English identity is a frame of reference which a determined reader could not disregard. The reader has not been misled by Haroon’s performed Indian identity but has instead noticed the English cultural markers which he unconsciously displays meaning his real identity has resisted both his attempts to portray a false Indian self and the interpretations of the unidentified English public in the text.

In a similar method to Haroon’s cultural hybridity, Karim also problematizes the use of race as totalizer of identity through the multiplicity of identities he exhibits when read by different interpretive communities. Karim also displays a cultural hybridity, and is of racial mixed-heritage therefore fully becoming the hybrid figure. At any one temporal moment, Karim can legitimately lay claim to either diametrically opposed identity construct of English or Indian.

The often quoted opening line of *The Buddha of Suburbia*, ‘I am an Englishman born and bred, almost.’, gives an indication to the reader of Kureishi’s intention to displace the entrenched notions of identity as solid and stable entities and replace them with fluid constructions more suited to a contemporary postcolonial ideology. The quote suggests that Karim understands how he is not perceived as fully English, that somehow his claim is
considered illegitimate. The imperial power structures that we have seen in operation defining Haroon are also exerting an influence upon interpretations of Karim’s identity. Karim is a victim of the development of the assimilation model; attitudes towards immigrants became noticeably harsher in the wake of figures such as Enoch Powell and the discourse of foreign invasion. Karim understands the significance of interpretation, clearly demonstrating the ability to change his identity multiple times in the novel. He describes his exploits in assuming multiple different identities with Jamila:

sometimes we were French, Jammie and I, and other times we went black American. The thing was, we were supposed to be English, but to the English we were always wogs and nigs and Pakis and the rest of it.424

In this passage Karim displays a keen awareness of the interpretation of his identity held by the peripheral characters of the novel and also his ability to mould and shape identity to suit his own needs. The harsh racial attitudes expressed by the English characters are suggestive of the fear of immigration and a perceived threat to national purity. They are also illustrative of the legacy of imperial power structures between Britain and India. The interpretive community of English peripheral characters is preoccupied with the visual aspects of identity recognition, placing a strong emphasis upon the racial sign as totalizer over any less-visible cultural construct or display.

I will adopt the same two interpretive communities in our analysis of Karim as I did for Haroon. Firstly, I will demonstrate Karim’s interpretation according to the peripheral English characters and Shadwell and Pyke. Secondly, I will argue that the reader of the text constitutes another interpretive community with the ability to re-identify Karim as something quite different form the conclusions reached by the first community. As both communities reach such different conclusions, the novel facilitates a multiplicity of readings to develop reflecting Kureishi’s postcolonial politics of cultural hybridity and performance.

Shadwell’s interpretation of Karim appears to rely strongly on the visual presence of the racial sign as indicator of his identity. Although described as ‘creamy’ by Jamila, the off-white colour is enough for Shadwell to categorize him as a full member of a lower ranking race. Shadwell identifies Karim as an Indian, believing that he identifies with India at least as much, if not more so, than he does England. This is reflected in his role of Mowgli, for which he was selected due to his display of the racial signifier:
‘In fact, you are Mowgli. You’re dark-skinned, you’re small and wiry, and you’ll be sweet but wholesome in the costume.’

Shadwell’s declaration is telling as it reveals his preoccupation with the optics of identity and also illustrates that he did not select Karim for the role because of any demonstrable acting skill. This is confirmed when he later rebukes Karim, reminding him that he has been ‘cast for authenticity and not for experience.’ Similarly, Pyke interprets Karim as Indian, once again as a result of his display of the racial sign. When requesting that the group create characters, he labels Karim as ‘black’ before suggesting that he base his character on someone from his own background. Karim’s identification is telling of the ideological changes of the period. For Paul Gilroy, ‘the word ‘immigrant’ became synonymous with the word ‘black’ during the 1970s.’

The development of the assimilation model excluded immigrants from fully participating in British life and led to the correlation of both race and national belonging.

It is apparent that both Pyke and Shadwell interpret Karim as Indian based on his display of the racial sign alone. For both of them, skin colour is an accurate totalizer of identity, linking their interpretive community to the imperial power structures of the British Raj.

The interpretations that Shadwell and Pyke draw regarding Karim are explicitly undercut as the text progresses. For example, Shadwell soon realizes that Karim does not speak Indian, labelling it Karim’s ‘own language’ and has never even visited the country leading him to deplore Karim’s in-between position. Shadwell reveals Karim’s apparent deception:

Everyone looks at you, I’m sure, and thinks: an Indian boy, how exotic, how interesting, what stories of aunties and elephants we’ll hear now from him. And you’re from Orpington.’

The wrongly informed perceptions of Karim serve to highlight his ability to pass from one identity to another in the interpretations of the peripheral characters. In order to mask the newly discovered lack of race that Karim possesses, Shadwell designs him a costume consisting only of a brown cream. This literal application of the racial signifier suggests an anxiety that he has not been successfully categorized as Indian and a need to stop him from fully identifying with the English identity. Karim’s costume also demonstrates the significance to the in-text interpretive community, for whom identity is largely influenced by the racial signifier.
However, as readers we form our own interpretive community and as with Haroon, we lack any optical images transmitting the racial signifier. This allows us to form a different interpretation allowing Karim to pass as another identity altogether. Whereas Shadwell and Pyke see Karim through the lens of two-hundred and fifty years of imperial power relations, our interpretation allows for a new identity to emerge from the space in-between the white and black polarities. As we have seen, Kureishi’s politics of the cultural hybrid suggest the significance of an identity that is connected to two or more established cultural centres. This is also noted by Berthold Schoene, who suggested that ‘Emerging from in between the imperialist black vs. white rhetoric of racial segregation, the unprecedented ambiguity of Karim’s difference threatens to permeate the rigid structures of psychic and ideological Anglo-British territorialism.’

Schoene’s observation correlates with Shusterman’s argument that the cultural hybridity on offer in Kureishi’s writings stand opposed to a binary system of identity construction, which as Shusterman suggests, means that the most truthful experience of identity emerges from the hybrid figure.

The costume that Karim wears for his performance for Shadwell is instantly recognizable as a prop for a performance not just as Mowgli but as a member of an ethnic race. The performativity of the scene reveals that his identity is not informed by any essentialism revealed only through racial signifiers but is actually a cultural construct. Indeed, as Bart Moore-Gilbert notes the “browning” of Karim whose nickname is ‘creamy’, suggests Kureishi’s idea that ethnicity is to some degree a construct. Furthermore, Pyke’s perceptions regarding Karim are undermined when Karim performs his monologue. Karim narrates to the reader how easily he slipped into the performance, and how much he had to rehearse prior to delivering his monologue. If Karim has to rehearse his ethnic performance, then this suggests it is a cultural construct and not a natural extension of his persona. The reader is here privy to evidence that Karim cannot fully identify with the Indian identity, allowing them to formulate different interpretations as to his identity. For example, when Karim reconstructs the character based on Changez, he once again practices hard, ‘working on Changez’s shambolic walk and crippled hand, and on the accent, which I knew would sound, to white ears, bizarre, funny and characteristic of India.’ Karim even creates a story for this new fictional character, Tariq, further revealing the false foundation to which the English stereotypical assumptions are based upon. Again, if Karim has to ‘work’ at being an Indian immigrant, then the English perception has been proven inaccurate. This forced performativity betrays an acknowledgement that Karim’s identity is more successfully
understood as English. Throughout the text, Karim displays the cultural markers of Englishness with ease suggesting that they form a part of his natural persona, unlike the Indian performance he must provide for Shadwell and Pyke which are explicitly unnatural and unfamiliar. This is only revealed to us in our position as reader of the text whereby we are granted particular knowledge not available to the other interpretive community, the peripheral characters.

Schoene writes that Karim embraces a new method of identity construction, free from any essentialist ideology:

Karim is only ever true to his own proprioceptive sense of authenticity [...] Any prepackaged identity or definitive self-image are rejected as encumbrances obstructive to the free realization of his individuality [...] The traditional concept of ‘identity’ has become impractical to Karim.433

Schoene’s reading of Karim corresponds with our interpretive view of his identity conception methods. The adoption of a cultural hybridity suggests the rejection of any traditional notion of identity and supports instead a culturally constructed persona free from essentialist discourse.

As an addition to Karim’s ‘work’ at being an ethnic minority, Elizabeth de Cacqueray notes how the construction of Tariq mirrors Karim’s construction of self. She writes that identity, in the same way we can think of culture, is discovered through the acquisition of multiple additions suggesting it is a process not a product and that it is always being modified. The process of creating Tariq illustrates the experience of creating identity:

I became more energetic and alive as I brushed in new colours and shades [...] I felt more solid myself434

Also, Karim later narrates that ‘if I wanted the additional personality bonus of an Indian past, I would have to create it.’435 The reader perception of Karim differs from the other characters’ perceptions resulting in a multiplicity of identity interpretations.

As I have shown, The Buddha of Suburbia is illustrative of the politics Kureishi adopts in his representation of postcolonial identity. The novel works to demonstrate how the construction of identity can be removed from a focus upon the individual and transposed onto a wider social structure, linking both self and society together. As such, The Buddha of
Suburbia makes steps towards a more workable conception of postcolonial multiplicity through the use of the passing figure in both the public and the private spheres of interaction. However, The Buddha of Suburbia is not a unique example of Kureishi’s engagement in such postcolonial concerns. Briefly, we could also apply the interpretive communities theory to a reading of The Black Album. Again, we have two different interpretive communities involved in the identification of Shahid; the interpretive community formed by the reader stands in direct contrast to the perceptions made by the interpretive community of the Muslim students in the novel. From the very beginning of the text it is acutely visible that the Muslim students perceive Shahid as Pakistani/Muslim like themselves. For example, when searching for an Indian restaurant after their initial meeting, Riaz makes it clear to Shahid how he has identified him:

‘naturally you miss such food. You are my fellow countryman.’
‘Well…not quite.’
‘Oh, yes, you are. I have observed you before.’

As Riaz exists within the text, he has access to the visual stimulus of Shahid’s skin colour. No doubt, this prompts him to mis-interpret Shahid as his ‘fellow countryman’. Given Riaz’s previous knowledge and experiences of Islam and Pakistan, it is not unreasonable to assume that stereotype has a role in his assumptions of Shahid’s country of birth. Stereotype is essentially the collective interpretive strategy that may be deployed by a given interpretive community, this being that it is based on a shared belief informed by knowledge and experience gained from prior interactions.

The misperception that Shahid is Pakistani extends to the peripheral English characters in the text in much the same way that Karim is mis-interpreted by the peripheral characters in The Buddha of Suburbia. Shahid reveals his fears to the reader early into the text:

‘Everywhere I went I was the only dark-skinned person. How did this make people see me? I began to be scared of going into certain places. I didn’t know what they were thinking. I was convinced they were full of sneering and disgust and hatred. And if they were pleasant, I imagined they were hypocrites.’

Although Shahid admits he was ‘paranoid’ and ‘confused’, this suggests that the English characters in the text interpret Shahid’s identity in the same way that Riaz does, on the basis
of the racial signifier. Here we can discern another interpretive community within the text, the peripheral, anonymous English masses. The knowledge and experience that inform their interpretive strategy is led by a history of empire and colonial hierarchy which equated skin colour with inherent characteristics. This explains the racism that Shahid felt was certain to come his way. Through his display of dark skin, Shahid conforms to the stereotype held by the interpretive community of Englishmen in that he must be an inferior human being. Interestingly, Deedee Osgood, his love interest and closest English friend in the text identifies Shahid as English and does not support his adoption of Islam. In this respect she has circumvented the interpretive strategy normally held by her racial/cultural group and demonstrated the postcolonial multiplicity possible through the divergent interpretive communities available. For example, when Shahid is attempting to convince Deedee of his Islamic conversion he explains that ‘It’s our culture, right?’ to which she promptly counters: ‘Is it your culture?’

Zulma is also affected by the interpretive community created by the peripheral English characters in the novel. Despite being an intellectual woman, Shahid argues that ‘to them she’d always be a Paki and liable to be patronized. She appreciated the truth of this, but it was a colonial residue—the new money knew no colour.’. Here the colonial history that informs the interpretive strategy adopted by the peripheral English characters is made explicit, however Kureishi introduces the idea that the new economy and focus on material wealth will outlast racism. This theme extends to My Beautiful Laundrette whereby Omar and his family integrate due to their economic means and desire to work.

This tension is concentrated in the relationship between Deedee and Shahid, who at certain points in the text, embody opposing positions regarding Islamic beliefs and arguments surrounding rationality and irrationality. For example, after the aubergine thought to hold a holy message is discovered, the two discuss Shahid’s future. Deedee offers him an ultimatum, stating ‘I’m not going to respect a communicating vegetable and I’m not going to compete with one either.’ before announcing ‘it’s me or the enchanted eggplant.’ Here the interpretive community formed by Deedee firmly holds that the practice of worshiping vegetables as holy signs is an irrational behaviour that she cannot support or become involved with. This reflects her wider view of the Islam presented by Riaz and the band of fundamentalists that he controls. Deedee in this respect becomes a stereotypical member of the interpretive community of native Englishmen. Typically, fundamentalist religion and a
great deal else that is labelled as oriental is viewed as irrational and inferior when compared to the Western model of rationality and progress.

In conclusion, the two different interpretive communities have allowed for different identities to develop, demonstrating the central role that reading has in creating identity, in much the same way that Stanley Fish argues that the reader does not respond to a meaning but instead is the meaning. Shadwell and Pyke, the anonymous English natives and ourselves constitute different interpretive communities responding not just to the information presented by the passing figure before us but actually helping to create the pass through legitimizing and rejecting certain identities. The introduction of uncertainty in identity into the text is summarized by de Cacqueray who also hints at the construction of a new model of identity construction:

An either/or binary system of organisation does not fit an analysis of the novel. Karim cannot be either/or, in spite of efforts on the part of other characters to try to fit him definitively into one culture or the other. He issues from two old histories and is representative of a “new breed”.

This fluidity, characterized by a performativity supports Kureishi’s politics of multiple identities and stands in opposition to received ideas of essentialism in identity. Karim and Haroon have demonstrated the ability to pass themselves off as different identities if desired, through presenting themselves to different audiences who “construct” them according to predefined knowledges and ideologies. As culturally hybrid characters, able to pass as multiple personas, they become the “new breed” that de Cacqueray refers to.

Of central importance to this chapter is the connection between individual identity construction and the role of a wider social structure in the interpretation of the projected identity. Chapter Four will continue this theme with an in-depth application of the construction of individual identity through Goffman’s theory of “front” and the consequences of the passing figure failing to project an accurate identity making audience members question the identity of the passing figure. “Front” is a collection of behavioural manners, props and other stimuli that are used to suggest a particular identity which the passing figure wishes to be identified as. Through Goffman’s “front,” the connection between self and society, here exemplified by the performative self and the interpretive community, further illustrates how a postcolonialism concerned more with postcoloniality can be achieved in the
wake of the poststructuralist failure to accurately theorize upon the condition of modern displacement.
Chapter Four: The Passing Figure and Performance in Londonstani

Londonstani (2006) is the debut novel by Gautam Malkani and deserves a critical reading as it engages directly with many of the central concerns of my thesis. After offering a reading of Kureishi’s work in which I have suggested that identity for the passing figure is significantly influenced by audience interpretations, Londonstani is well-placed to facilitate an examination of both the passing figure’s internal identity construction processes and the role of the audience in authorizing the pass. By reading Londonstani alongside Erving Goffman’s concept of “front” and Pattinson’s notion of “slippage”, I will argue that both internal and external approaches to the passing figure can be reconciled together in a coherent theory of identity construction thereby offering a complete “self and society” framework which distances itself from poststructuralism as a master-narrative.

Gautam Malkani was born in London in 1976 and was raised in the Hounslow area. Malkani’s mother had Indian heritage and worked as a radiographer after relocating to England from Uganda. The novel Londonstani was a fictional development of the surplus research he had conducted for a university degree dissertation, the focus of which was the Brit-Asian rudeboy scene and the rejection of their parents’ efforts to integrate into mainstream British culture.444 The novel was shortlisted for ‘Writer of the Year British Book Award 2007’. Malkani is currently employed by the Financial Times as editor of the ‘Creative Business’ section.445 “Rudeboy” as a counterculture is derived from Jamaican youths of the 1960s and 1970s who typically had little regard for the law and appeared smartly dressed. More recently, the term has extended to the Asian diaspora who as well as rejecting their parents’ integration efforts, negotiate a difficult balance of Eastern tradition and Western modernity.

The crucial element to my reading of Londonstani is the demonstration that through Goffman’s concept of “front,” which he defines as ‘the expressive equipment of a standard kind intentionally or unwittingly employed by the individual during his performance.’446 we can isolate the identities present in the text as “performances”. In revealing the characters’ identities to be performances, their engagement in the act of passing is also evident. In utilizing the performance to display multiple identities, Malkani’s characters reject an essentialist framework of identity construction and support instead a modern ideology of cultural signs as totalizing identity. The passing figure allows for a fuller understanding of the multiple reconstructions of the self that is possible when performance is actively adopted as
an identity construction mechanism. Whilst introducing the concept of “slippage,” alluded to by Goffman but defined by Pattinson as the ‘fissure between successfully passing and not quite accomplishing the performance’, I will argue for a postcolonialism centred on the connection between the individual self and wider society through the passing figure’s identification in both internal and external structures of identity construction. Pattinson’s work on slippage constitutes a chapter of her book, *Behind Enemy Lines* (2007) in which she details the exploits of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), an organisation created in May 1940 to carry out acts of sabotage and subversion against the enemies of wartime Britain. Pattinson explores the act of passing undertaken by SOE operatives as they carried out secret missions in occupied France noting how there were ‘a number of identity borders, including occupation, nationality, religion, gender, class and sexuality, that agents crossed in their attempts to distance themselves from their clandestine identity and which enabled them to carry out their undercover work.’ Pattinson’s historical account of the phenomenon of passing suggests it to be a widely embracing act, allowing the crossing of multiple identity boundaries to be performed.

The significance of Goffman and Pattinson rests in the ability to use their work to read literary texts produced by Anglo-Indians as standing opposed to an essentialist ideology characteristic of the nineteenth century. In its place, Anglo-Indian literature draws upon the modernist ideology of culture as the prime determiner of identity and given culture’s ability to be adopted or rejected at will, a multiplicity of identities is permissible through the performance of different “scripts”. Evident in the work of contemporary writers, is the legacy of early twentieth-century anthropologists such as Boas and Malinowski who worked to privilege the idea of culture over race as explaining national behaviours and who advocated a cultural relativism.

A cursory glance at the plot of *Londonstani* reveals the preoccupation of the novel with performed identities and the fear of slippage when the performed identity is not up to the accepted standard. The text revolves around a young male protagonist named Jas who is trying somewhat unsuccessfully to assimilate into a group of rudeboys or desis located in Hounslow. The desi label refers to the South Asian diaspora primarily living in the United Kingdom and America. The word was accepted into the *Oxford Dictionary of English* in 2003 and now appears as a noun, illustrating the impact that desis have made. There are various other labels within the desi community; for example, ABCD or American-born-confused-desi refers to second-generation desis’ and their ambiguous position between their parents traditions and their peers Western values. A desi is often described in one of two
different ways, either as “coconut” or “FOB-ish.” A “coconut” is one who is deemed brown on the outside but white in the middle, due to the internalization of the cultural values of white Westerners and “FOB-ish” indicates an individual who has adopted their parents traditional values and is therefore seen as “Fresh Off the Boat-ish.” In the early 1990s, many desis’ rejected their parents’ expectations and participated in a more aggressive lifestyle, with many forming gangs such as the Punjabi Mafia who sought to react against previous experiences of racism. The desi concept is key to the success of the novel’s moral communication, despite being originally conceived of as a racial grouping with acceptance predicated on the right skin colour as a signifier of membership, the desi identity is finally revealed to be no more than a cultural grouping. The final plot twist whereby the identity of Jas is revealed to be a white male rather than the Asian he is suggested to be by the narrative neatly calls into question the need for a racial politics of the desi community. In displaying a performed identity, Jas can integrate into the group through the adoption of cultural behaviours (such as violence) negating the need for the racial sign of skin colour.

The novel opens with a scene of violence, supposedly in retaliation for a racial slur and so we are introduced to Jas and his group of desi friends, Hardjit, Ravi and Amit. Hardjit occupies a leadership role in the group, and Jas is safely identified as the outsider. However, through Hardjit’s friendship, Jas has been gradually accepted. The boy the group are beating, named Daniel, demonstrates a previous friendship with Jas when the fight has ended and the rest of the desi group has dispersed. Jas is reluctant to admit to Daniel’s accusations of a personality change, but Daniel’s recognition of Jas as someone who behaved very differently in the past works to suggest that his identity cannot conform to an essentialist ideology and has instead been re-created through a performative politics. Daniel’s recognition also constitutes a slippage, as his desi identity has failed to convince Daniel of a complete persona change. Thus, Jas’s negotiation of two rather distinct identities is conveyed to the reader of the text and he becomes our passing figure.

The novel then follows the group as they become involved with the unlocking of stolen mobile phones and committing generally anti-social and violent behaviour, specifically towards whites and “coconuts”. Events take a turn when Ravi damages a stolen phone and is forced to find a replacement for it, and presently decides to steal one from an ex-teacher at their school (who is currently engaged in breaking up one of Hardjit’s many fights). The teacher, Mr Ashwood, notices the theft and summons the boys to his office where he offers them the ultimatum: integrate into society with the help of a mentor or have their actions reported to the police. Jas “slips” again as he has a respect for Mr Ashwood that the other
boys do not share and evidence of his previous impressive academic abilities are on display on Mr Ashwood’s wall, contrasting with his supposedly anti-intellectual desi self. The boys agree to the mentor, and are presently introduced to Sanjay who is regarded by Mr Ashwood as a success with a respectable career as a stockbroker in London and impressive wealth.

Unfortunately, Sanjay is far from the respectable citizen Mr Ashwood believes him to be, and encourages the boys to continue in their stolen phone business, offering them a business deal that appears particularly profitable for the boys. During this time, Jas has become romantically involved with Samira, a Muslim girl who is forbidden from dating outside of her religion. As details of his meetings with Samira emerge, local tension turns Jas’s previous suppliers of stolen phones against him and he can no longer fulfil the quota demanded by Sanjay. By now, Sanjay is revealed to be a particularly dangerous villain and blackmails Jas with faked photographs of his dates with Samira which suggest that the pair have a sexual relationship. The novel now makes painfully obvious the discrepancy between a desired social identity (desi) and the corresponding social role (criminality), and also the knowledge that Jas cannot fulfil both the image and the role leading to another slippage in his identity construction. As Jas’s father is also involved in the mobile phone industry (albeit in a legal capacity) he stages a robbery in his warehouse in order to complete Sanjay’s quota. Before it can be completed however, he is violently beaten and in trying to destroy the evidence of his role in the break-in, Jas ends up burning the warehouse extensively.

In the penultimate pages of the text, Jas is hospitalized with his parents at his bedside trying to understand how he came to rob and destroy his father’s warehouse. It is at this point that the novel’s ultimate twist is unveiled: Jas is not the Indian youth that he appears to be but a white male named Jason. The surname to which he refers to numerous times as embarrassingly long is not the typical lengthy Indian surname but actually ‘Bartholomew-Cliveden’. Throughout the text, Jas has been engaged in passing through the use of a desi “front” and this act allows the novel to commit to a modernist ideology centring on the performance of cultural behaviours in the construction of identity.

Critical Reception

In the absence of a large body of academic scholarship on Londonstani, it would be beneficial to briefly survey the reviews it generated upon publication in order to form some contextual foundation to the novel. The lack of academic material on the text, despite being published nearly seven years ago, can perhaps be explained by the disappointing sales that the novel
achieved. Expectation ran high for the novel as Fourth Estate’s six figure advance for Malkani was revealed six-months before its publication in *The Guardian*.\(^{451}\) This figure was later identified as being around £380,000, again by *The Guardian* whose Alison Flood noted that it had only sold 15,000 copies in its first two years. She blames ‘book fair buzz’, a situation in which ‘The heady atmosphere means publishers can stir each other up with excitement over something that on a dreary day in the office wouldn’t merit a second glance’.\(^{452}\) This phenomenon has been labelled the ‘Londonstani effect’ by some of the industries ‘crueller wits’.\(^{453}\) The disappointing sales have no doubt dissuaded academics from critically reading *Londonstani*. However, as I shall argue throughout this chapter, the novel can be effective in illustrating the displacement of a racial politics of identity construction and illuminating in its use of postcolonial multiplicity.

Certainly, the reviews represent a mixture of reactions to the text, although it is worth remembering that most reviewers are writing in the typical non-committal style that reads neither positively or negatively. Stylistically, the novel appears to suffer particular criticism. Writing for *The New York Times*, Harrison summarizes that ‘It’s shallow about girls. It has an embarrassingly sophomoric twist for a denouement […] it’s annoying, chaotic, overstated’.\(^{454}\) Likewise, *The Guardian*’s Kamila Shamsie wrote that the novel’s flaw was a lack of real depth on any subject: ‘the problem with Jas’s narration is that too often the slick superficiality of his life becomes the slick superficiality of the novel’.\(^{455}\) Similarly, Suhayl Saadi also raises the issue of ‘a serious lack of depth.’ in a review for *The Independent*.\(^{456}\) Christine Thomas of *The San Francisco Chronicle* was also particularly damning: ‘The peripheral characters are likewise two-dimensional, practically caricatures, who speak in stiff and unrealistic dialogue. Jas’s old teacher, Mr. Ashwood, appears at a convenient moment to […] provide Malkani’s plot with some depth, but the scene is forced, waylaying the story and boring the reader.’\(^{457}\) Sameer Rahim of the *Times Literary Supplement* argues that the second half of *Londonstani* ‘quickens’\(^ {458}\) and Suhayl Saadi maintains that with regards to plot, ‘the joints are visible, clunky.’.\(^ {459}\) Potentially the novel’s faults may be the faults of a debut writer. Christine Thomas records the sudden and unexplained use of the second person, italicization, and the combination of two times and dates in one scene concluding that ‘If the whole novel were a mix of styles, this experimentation would have made sense’.\(^ {460}\)

Alternatively, the novel did receive some considerable praise. *The Telegraph*’s Niall Griffiths describes a ‘compelling, impressively sustained, at times skilfully written and structured novel.’.\(^{461}\) *The Washington Post*’s Sarah Shun-Lien Bynum balances her criticism by ‘wish[ing] that Malkani had trusted himself and his material more; his writing achieves
moments of real verve and power that suggest he doesn’t need all the bluster and flash on which his anxious rudeboys rely.’. Similarly, *The Times*’s Christina Koning illustrates how other reviewers were ‘equally complimentary—and, for once, such praise seems entirely justified.’.

Reviewers of *Londonstani* typically centred on two specific issues that the text is largely concerned with. Firstly, is the difficulty the text presents in reading through the “text-speak” language of the rudeboys, and secondly, the overtly masculine construction of the characters. I will briefly discuss these issues respectively.

Firstly, the language of the novel, which I have labelled “text-speak,” has received considerable attention. Although by no means the first novel to use such language, it is perhaps to a greater degree that such language has permeated this text and the urban voice of ethnic youth Malkani invokes has little recognition in other current bestsellers. Saadi praises the inclusion of text-speak, describing it as ‘a harnessing of living thought-speech which allows Malkani to break away from the stultifying rigidity of “Home Counties” narrative style, and this frees his protagonist to express high-order thought in a fluid demotic.’.

Rageh Omaar of *The New Statesman* suggests the language constitutes ‘a rich, vibrant and at times chaotic mixture of young Asian street patois, American gangsta rap lyrics, text-message language and Hindi and Punjabi words.’ However, Thomas criticizes the text-speak arguing that it becomes ‘tiresome to read Jas’ narration, despite its element of authenticity as the soundtrack of rudeboy life.’. Without doubt, Malkani included the text-speak to inject authenticity into his rendition of desi youth, in much the same way that Jas adopts the language patterns to portray the desired identity which is not truly his. Language becomes a tool for the creation of an authentic self and for Malkani, an authentic text.

For Harrison, the spelling of the language employed is critical in experiencing the text. In her review she argues that the spelling produces extra sensory perceptions:

> after all, “2” sounds exactly like “two” and “u” exactly like “you.”
> But […] the way you spell it matters. Spelling carries its own extra-aural overtones: you can almost hear them, if you listen hard, and Malkani has.

Saadi is perceptive to note the role the language plays in highlighting ‘the complex self-deceptions of contemporary cultural dynamics in the UK.’. Text-speak language is particularly crucial to a reading of Jas as the passing figure in light of Saadi’s remarks. As the
plot twist reveals, Jas is not Asian but white, thereby rejecting his use of the language system as suggestive of an inherent essentialist identity. The language allows, then, for both Jas to adopt the desi identity with language acting as a cultural signifier of desi identity and Malkani to similarly reject a “Home Counties” narrative style and portray another language mode correlative with an opposing identity. Malkani’s usage of such language indicates a textual complicity in the phenomenon of passing, as Bynum remarks ‘The in-your-face language of Londonstani promises that, despite its roots in the author’s Cambridge dissertation, its portrait of British Asian Youth will be anything but academic.’, thereby illustrating the facility to display opposing identities. Language as a cultural signifier becomes a tool to reconstruct the self, falling in line with Saadi’s noted self-deceptions of cultural dynamics.

Secondly, the overtly gendered construction of the desi boys provoked discussion in numerous reviews. The role which constructions of masculinity play in the text is so significant it could be said to constitute the major theme of the novel. Indeed, Sethi has quoted Malkani as announcing “‘my book is not about race, but how race is used to bolster masculinity.’”. Bynum similarly suggests that ‘Though Jas and his friends […] put on a great show of embracing their ethnic identity, what really drives them toward desi culture is their fear of being perceived as spineless saps.’ Unsurprisingly, the novel’s ultra-machismo borders at times on the homoerotic. Shamsie notes ‘Jas’s swooning admiration for Hardjit’ while for Bynum ‘the boy’s worship of masculinity often verges on the homoerotic; with comic earnestness’. As with the adoption of text-speak language, masculinity also signifies a cultural identity that can be adopted or rejected at different moments in the text. The brand of masculinity they have selected, influenced by desi culture, becomes a commodity that they adopt, nurture and display with pride. As a commodity it is closely associated with well-toned bodies, a neat and sharp style of clothing and violence, perhaps harbouring something of the racial retribution connected to gangs such as the Punjabi Mafia. However, it can as easily be rejected or lost. As such, the novel cannot support an essentialist ideology of identity; instead the characters have the freedom to reconstruct themselves multiple times over. The adoption of a cultural masculinity is a fact not lost on the reviewers of the text, Rahim notes how ‘much of the novel’s humour comes from the contrast between the gang’s inflated self-image and their restricted lives.’.
Performing a Successful Pass: Erving Goffman’s “Front” and the Construction of Identity

*Londonstani* is a text centrally concerned with the creation and re-creation of the self in ways which, as we have already seen, reject the essentialism of race theory and support a politics of cultural performativity. The work of Erving Goffman similarly works to undercut racial conceptions of identity, arguing instead for a cultural understanding of identity made manifest in the constant performances of the self. Goffman’s first and most significant text, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959), introduces his concept of “front,” which as we have previously discovered is the expressive equipment employed during a performance. Throughout *The Presentation of Self*, Goffman uses his concept of “front” and the dramaturgical perspective to illustrate how the construction of identity is a performative act. In reading *Londonstani*, then, Goffman is critical in theorizing the social process of the passing figure as they construct and reconstruct their front before the fooled audience. Both Goffman’s front and *Londonstani* work to assert the primacy of cultural signifiers of identity over racial signifiers, leading to a commodification of identity in which the passing figure can adopt or reject different identities at will, fully embodying the postcolonial ideal of multiplicity.

Goffman’s contribution to a large body of work on performative identity illustrates the impressive impact that *The Presentation of Self* exhibited as well as the functionality of his concepts. Ann Branaman suggests that his theory of the self as a performative construction not only has a wide following but also fits with postmodern perspectives of the self.475 Branaman highlights a 1991 study (32 years after *The Presentation of Self*) in which the researcher, Blumstein, studies the self in intimate relationships. Significantly, he distinguishes between the self and identity arguing that identity becomes the projected image to the public. Similar conclusions were reached by Goffman in concepts such as self-as-performer and self-as-character. Irrespective of terminological differences the underlying principle that ‘identities shape selves’ can be retraced back to Erving Goffman.476 Branaman forms part of a wide community of researchers who still utilize Goffman’s texts. Not only do they offer evidence of his continued relevance, but also further suggest his complicity in the self and society approach I am adopting with regard to the passing figure. For example, Philip Manning’s *Erving Goffman and Modern Sociology* (1992) dedicates a final chapter to exploring his work in relation to modern developments, focusing upon his contribution in the areas of the analysis of rules, the substantive units of face-to-face interaction and his contribution to a general sociological theory.477 The entire corpus of Goffman’s work covers
not only the micro-social world of individuals but also wider “grand” theories of entire sections of society, illustrating an approach not dissimilar to Fanon and Sartre. Similarly, Charles D. Battershill explores Goffman’s contribution to the postmodern work of Lyotard and Foucault illustrating his continued relevance in a chapter in Riggings’s *Beyond Goffman: Studies on Communication, Institution, and Social Interaction* (1990).

Perhaps more significantly, Richard Jenkins relates Goffman’s ideas to the present in “The 21st-Century Interaction Order”, within which he discusses interaction through modern ICT. Including for example, telephones calls, chat rooms, networking sites, text-messaging and virtual role playing games amongst other communication methods. Ultimately, Jenkins manages to sufficiently utilize Goffman’s ideas on interaction and face-to-face communication in what is undoubtedly a contemporary setting that he was vastly unfamiliar with.  

Demonstrating not least the versatility of Goffman’s writings, Jenkins again positions Goffman as theoretically significant in contemporary sociological explanations of micro-social interaction. Furthermore, Rich Ling concludes that ‘it is hard to find another theorist who has been so liberally applied to the study of mobile communication.’

The significance of Goffman and specifically *The Presentation of Self* to discourses on the passing figure deserve some elucidation. To begin with, his work represents a rootedness in questions of the formation of the self and its relationship to wider society, supporting my re-engagement with existentialist critiques of postcolonialism. Furthermore, a sociological foundation is significant to my argument, despite the discourse of the passing figure being primarily a feature of literary criticism. Goffman’s performative framework is foundational to my argument regarding the replacement of racial for cultural explanations of identity for the following reasons.

Firstly, Goffman’s work is regarded as pioneering in terms of his involvement with both the micro-social (sociology concerned with individuals and interactions between individuals as opposed to a sociology of wider social trends) and the complex relationship of his work in committing to both theory and empirical data. Michael Hviid Jacobsen has referred to the ‘somewhat slippery character of his work’ which is ‘neither empirical nor theoretical.’ Goffman’s work illustrates a complicity in theoretical considerations as well as empirical knowledge correlating with the self and society approach I am advocating in response to failings in poststructuralism as a master-narrative. Jacobsen’s discussion of Goffman’s approach is revealing, specifically as he notes how Goffman was ‘one of the first to proclaim the micro-social world and all its myriad intermingling’s a realm worthy of serious academic attention.’ In his focus and his method for study, Goffman can be viewed as an original.
For Jacobsen, Goffman held a disregard for those scholars who engaged only in theory and advocated a mixture of approaches, some resembling our existentialist position. He writes how ‘Goffman’s perspective was a mixture of a qualitative sociologist using all his senses-systematically as well as impressionistically-to capture face-to-face interaction and a literary-poetic sociologist using metaphors, novels, short stories, newspaper clippings and movies as creative sources of inspiration to concoct a sociological storyline about his research topic.’

The study of identity, for Goffman, had to be removed from the sphere of theory as an all-encompassing approach to understanding the self. Like both Fanon and Sartre, Goffman’s work is deeply enmeshed in the micro-social world of the individual self and its relationship to a wider social structure. As such, his work is useful in furthering an understanding of the politics of a performative self whilst simultaneously allowing for a move away from current postcolonial theoretical impasses.

Secondly, Goffman is particularly famed for his use of the dramaturgical perspective in his approach to sociology. The dramaturgical perspective is a method of sociological research relying upon the adaption of theatre practices to explain social phenomena. The Presentation of Self’s critical function of addressing identity as a performative act necessarily relies upon his use of dramaturgy as every interaction between two individuals necessitates the performance of a self or front. As such it stands in opposition to the meaning imparted to the term “performative” by Judith Butler in her work on gendered identity, as outlined in her essay “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution” (1988) and her seminal books, Gender Trouble (1990) and Bodies that Matter (1993). Butler’s configuration of the “performative” works to distance itself from the theatrical and suggests instead that through a discursive production identified as performative, genders are named and reproduced within the constraints of the heterosexual hegemony. Performance is the key mechanism of the discursive process through which genders are identified and reproduced. Butler suggests how

“Sex” is always produced as a reiteration of hegemonic norms. This productive reiteration can be read as a kind of performativity. Discursive performativity appears to produce that which it names, to enact its own referent, to name and to do, to name and to make.”

Significantly, then, Butler casts performativity not as the “efficacious expression of a human will in language” but as “a specific modality of power as discourse.” For Butler, the performance of gender is the effect of a heterosexual hegemony reproducing that which it
describes and she is careful to differentiate her understanding of performance from the
dramatic implications adopted by Goffman. Critically, we differentiate both Goffman’s and
Butler’s concepts of the performative self on the issue of constraint. Goffman visualizes
performance in the contextual freedom of the theatre—the description and re-description of
multiple identities through the mechanism of a dramatic performance. For Butler, however,
constraint is the very essence of performativity:

Performativity is neither free play nor theatrical self-presentation; nor

  can it be simply equated with performance. Moreover, constraint is

not necessarily that which sets a limit to performativity; constraint is

rather, that which impels and sustains performativity.487

For Butler, ‘The “performative” dimension of construction is precisely the forced reiteration
of norms.’, reinforcing her definition of the performative as a discourse of power production
and hegemony authorization. In summary, Butler urges that we do not see performance as a
‘singular or deliberate act’ (which she claims has no power to appear as anything other than a
‘vain effort to produce effects that it cannot possibly produce’488) but rather as a ‘citational
practice’ (here taking a lead from Derrida) which works to produce that which it describes in
the name of a heterosexual hegemony.489

In this chapter I will adopt Goffman’s concept of the performance as a theatrical act as it
offers more explanatory power than does Butler’s concept of performance when approaching
Malkani’s use of the multiple identity. Specifically, in Malkani’s text we encounter a
protagonist who actively dramatizes his actions and consciously constructs his passing
attempts in multiple singular and deliberate acts. Through the function of slippage, Jas’s
passing attempts are rendered inconsistent and thus can be localised as singular events as
opposed to the consistent and unintentional performativity of the discursive production of a
heterosexual hegemony. Jas’s engagement in the act of passing fails to meet the criteria of
reiteration set forth by Butler as an indicator of the performativity of gender identity,
especially when we come to consider the disruptive mechanism of slippage. Jas’s narrative
also betrays the intentionality inherent in his adoption of passing, indeed his conscious
crafting of the dramatic performance. Given our narrator’s motives and behaviours,

Goffman’s dramaturgical theory of self-presentation allows for a fuller explanation of the
interior psyche and external physicality of identity construction of a self in relation to a wider
social structure than does Butler’s theory which remains removed from the individual in its focus of discursive productions of the heterosexual hegemony.

Furthermore, despite the heritage of passing scholarship in literary criticism, it is of course a social act which developed in the American South and has been demonstrably operative in other cultures also. Significantly, passing in literature is referring to a real phenomenon actively engaged in by people. As such, it is crucial that the discourse of passing literature has some involvement with the sociological framework of passing to allow for a full understanding of the passing figure’s complex position to be ascertained. Goffman’s work offers a sociological analysis of the construction of identity which is useful to our exploration of the passing figure, despite the fact that *The Presentation of Self* does not explicitly refer to the act of passing. Given that Goffman’s concept of identity construction is reliant upon performativity and the adoption of cultural behaviours, I would argue that all constructions of identity are in some way a form of passing. Every identity is a performed version of the persona each individual adopts, whether or not this persona is the identity accepted by others for the individual becomes somewhat irrelevant as the same process of constructing a front and maintaining a performance is critical to shape any version of the self. For example, a passing figure will pay attention to the presentation of their mannerisms, behaviour and appearance in much the same way that Goffman’s subjects maintain a “front”. A “front” can be considered as a theoretical formulation of the social process that accompanies the passing figure as he/she attempts to convince others of their new identity. Essentially, when somebody makes the decision to pass, they make the decision to adopt a “front” and vice versa. Goffman’s theory of identity and subsequent utility to scholarship on the passing figure neatly correlates with the arguments made by Deleuze and Guattari in Chapter Two that the split personality is “the essential reality of man and nature.” and that of Cohen and Taylor who suggest that ‘we are destined to live, as split personalities’. Goffman can be further adopted to support my assertion that all identity is a performance with the result that everybody is characterized by an all-pervasive multiplicity. The correlative effect of Goffman’s similarities to Deleuze and Guattari and Cohen and Taylor is the continuation of the reading of Salman Rushdie as representing the notion of multiple constructions of the self in the work of Gautam Malkani.

I have so far only briefly introduced Goffman’s concept of “front” but it would prove useful to offer more detail before we proceed with a reading of *Londonstani*. As *The Presentation of Self* is concerned with the performance of an individual in the face-to-face scenario, it is of paramount importance to understand how the individual exerts control over
definitions of his identity during the interaction. Goffman suggests the creation of a “front,” which he summarily defines as ‘that part of the individual’s performance which regularly functions in a general and fixed fashion to define the situation for those who observe the performance.’. 492 “Front” can be further sub-divided into “setting”: the furniture, room layout and general background props and “personal front”: including such things as age, race, clothing, posture, speech and body language. 493 Goffman connects social fronts to “roles,” these are a group of activities associated with the front and vice versa. He stresses that when an actor takes on a social role, he will find that the front for that role has probably already been institutionalized, and therefore he must perform the front as well as the role. 494 When we come to discuss slippage towards the end of this chapter, the discrepancy between social fronts and social roles becomes more significant. Fronts, as mentioned above, can become institutionalized and take on a meaning distinct from the role it is supposed to represent. In the case of the desi group to which Jas is attempting to integrate, the ethnic image or front is accompanied by a role of violence and physicality that Jas finds difficult to engage with. As a result, his front can “slip” before the other group members when participation in role-related activities contravenes his better judgement and outlasts his desire to perform the desi front.

With regards to passing, it is necessarily in the interests of a successful passer to pay particular attention to his “front” in order to be sure that the image that he projects as part of his performance is in keeping with the persona that he desires to received as by the audience. The adoption of a front indicates the adoption of a pre-defined institutionalized identity, in exactly the same way a passing figure will adopt an image and behaviour set with which to fool his audience.

In what is the only academic essay so far published on Londonstani, "Escaping the Matrix: Illusions and Disillusions of Identity in Gautam Malkani’s Londonstani (2006)", Michael Mitchell addresses the issue of the performed identity in the text and in doing so makes clear the potential for “front” to underpin the processes of the passing figure’s acts of deceit. Mitchell draws attention to the opening scene in which Hardjit attacks Daniel for allegedly calling him a ‘Paki’ while the group stand by offering verbal support:

-Dat’s right, Amit, Ravi an I go,-dat be da truth.

The three a us spoke in sync like we belonged to some tutty boy band,’ 495

Hardjit explains to Daniel and the reader alike how their identity is constructed:
It ain’t necessary for u 2 b a Pakistani to call a Pakistani a Paki […]
But u gots to be call’d a Paki yourself. U gots 2 b, like, an honorary Paki or someshit. 496

Mitchell suggests that Jas’s white identity, revealed to the reader in the final scene, renders his adoption of the same identity as Hardjit, Amit and Ravi as not only ‘ironic but more fundamentally a performance, a fiction: hence the imagery of the performing boy-band.’ 497

The reader will at this point in the text have visualized Jas as an Indian youth, similar to the rest of the group and Hardjit’s acceptance of Jas as an ‘honorary Paki’ would confirm his status as equal to the other group members who are also labelled ‘honorary pakis’:

So if you hear Jas, Amit, Ravi or me callin anyone a Paki, dat don’t mean u can call him one also. We b honorary Pakis n u ain’t. 498

The final twist of the plot illustrates the fragility of a visual schema of identity construction. As readers we have a lack of authentic images that are available to the other characters in the text (in essence, we as readers constitute just one “interpretive community” to Jas’s identity, seeing him in a different way to in-text characters not unlike Hanif Kureishi’s Karim and Haroon), therefore we have no problem in accepting Jas as the Indian he passes himself off as. Effectively he has projected the correct front for the identity and this informs our identification of Jas as to what he should be seen as. In projecting a front, Jas has defined the situation for the audience, principally comprised of Hardjit, Ravi, Amit, Daniel and us, as readers of the scene, leading us into a particular interpretation of his identity. Goffman specified that the audience will discover how ‘the individual has informed them as to what is and as to what they ought to see as the ‘is’’. 499 Hardjit has defined the scene and informed us how he expects the entire group, Jas included, to be identified. In a crucial link to Chapter Three, both Malkani’s and Kureishi’s texts lack a visual signifier of identity (as readers we can only visualize the characters imaginatively, not empirically) which means our interpretations of Jas’s identity is more than ever comprised of Hardjit’s definitions made in the opening scene of the novel. Hardjit fulfils the function of informing us as the audience into how we should be interpreting Jas’s identity, and without contrary evidence Hardjit’s definition is supported by Jas’s cultural performances as the passing figure.

Mitchell’s focus on the opening scene signifies the significance of its impact on the rest of the text. It is equally as crucial in pinpointing the construction of fronts by both Hardjit and
Jas. Hardjit’s front is particularly interesting given the high esteem with which Jas positions him. Hardjit becomes a template for the others to mould their own identities around, exhibiting the exemplary desi or rudeboy style which Jas admires. To an extent, Hardjit represents the institutionalization of certain fronts in light of Jas’s marked admiration and later slippage in performing the associated role. His persona has become something other than himself, an exterior entity adopted by the other group members who seek to re-mould themselves in his cast while his social role has become partly side-lined. Jas makes mention of Hardjit’s identity early into the text (many similar references to Hardjit follow illustrating his notable deference to the group leader), stating ‘I was jealous a his front-what someone like Mr Ashwood’d call a person’s linguistic prowess or his debating dexterity or someshit.’

In the interest of clarity I would note that despite using the same terminology, presumably Malkani is not referring to Goffman’s works when he writes about “front” but merely using the term as it is normally found in common parlance. However, there are striking similarities between the “front” of Goffman and the common understanding of the term as they both rely upon a performed image that is normally indicative of a false identity. Hardjit’s front is admired by more than just Jas alone, however. Jas notes ‘Most bredren round Hounslow were jealous a his designer desiness, with his perfectly built body, his perfectly shaped facial hair an his perfectly groomed garms’.

If we begin with Goffman’s definition of front as the ‘expressive equipment’ utilized during a performance we can theorize on the construction of Hardjit’s front. His identity is manifested through the manipulation of physical prowess, sculpted facial hair and relevant clothing as the expressive equipment that defines his front for the audience to interpret. Hardjit’s perception of himself as a particular type of person is also reinforced when Jas describes his method of speech: ‘After spittin his words out Hardjit stopped for a second, like he expected us to write em down or someshit’. Hardjit’s method of speech delivery also constitutes another aspect of his expressive equipment, bolstering his desi front before the expectant audience.

Hardjit’s speech pattern can be further analysed according to Goffman’s concept of front. Goffman subdivides “front” into “setting” and “personal front” to offer more levels of analysis. Presumably Hardjit has no control over the setting in which the opening scene occurs as it is a public domain rendering this somewhat redundant. However, “personal front” is itself further divided into “appearance” and “manner” with manner taken to indicate ‘those stimuli which function at the time to warn us of the interaction role the performer will expect to play in the oncoming situation.’. Hardjit’s aggressive speech and frequent pauses to allow dramatic effect to operate suggest he expects to be able to control the course of the
interaction. Furthermore, his pauses indicate he expects the other participants in the interaction to take careful note of what he is saying, placing himself in the role of a teacher or leader. Again Goffman dictates that within teams ‘one often finds that someone is given the right to direct and control the progress of the dramatic action.’ Hardjit, Amit and Ravi could be defined as a team, with membership based on a particular brand of “desiness.” Using Goffman’s front we can label them as a team confidently and also theorize upon Hardjit’s extended role as team leader, being as the construction of both the team and Hardjit’s role are formulations of front designed to exact specific effects.

The performative qualities of Hardjit’s front suggest an element of the passing figure. The expressive equipment he adopts to demonstrate his conception of self are copied from other sources outside of the interactive events during which we encounter him in the text. For example, when Hardjit begins fighting with Ravi over the mobile phone which ends up getting destroyed, Jas indicates that his identity is not completely a creation of his own input but relatively inspired by outside influences:

A big Bollywood laughter moment this. Ha ha. Hah hah haha. Hah hahahaha. An just like all them Bollywood laughs, it turned out to be just another classic Hardjit front. Make your foe feel comfortable before makin them uncomfortable, just for effect or someshit.-Show me da fuckin fone, Ravi, or I break yo fuckin face.

In borrowing his persona from a Bollywood film, Hardjit’s identity is shown to be something other than what he claims to be himself. Essentially, his identity is an exterior entity which he has adopted to project the necessary front for his conceived perception of himself. Not only does this illustrate how performance has pervaded Malkani’s text but also how Hardjit can be labelled a passing figure in attempting to display an identity clearly not attached to any true essence of his being. The performativity of the self is particularly evident from Hardjit’s rapid switching between two opposing emotions. There is a marked contrast between the violence of the threat Hardjit gives to Ravi and the laughter that precedes it. It is, of course, unlikely that it could be a genuine rapid switching of emotions, meaning either the laughter or the violence must be dramatic performance. The front that Hardjit projects in this specific scene is at least half predicated on performance, then, underlining the ease with which identity can be manipulated.
Malkani’s inclusion of this moment with Hardjit projecting a front influenced by an exterior cultural source is significant in our argument that identity for the passing figure is a matter of adopting cultural signs. Regardless of the skin colour of the performer, the cultural signs inherent within the Bollywood film may be adopted allowing for the display of the corresponding identity to be successfully performed. It can be argued that Malkani is connected to a legacy of cultural ideology over race theory instigated by the anthropological work of Boas and Malinowski. Their assertions of race theories complicity in cultural explanations of identity and a cultural relativity have underpinned the modernist work of Malkani whose passing figures extend the rejection of race theory. The passing figure illustrates succinctly the boundary negotiating resources that the new cultural ideology could offer. Malkani similarly engages in this tradition of utilizing the passing figure to represent a modernist identity politics through his narrative of a white boy passing for black.

In reading Londonstani, the performed identity is not limited to only Hardjit and Jas although I will focus upon these two specifically. It would seem that every character has an allocated role in their interactions with other characters and appear to be concerned with the maintenance of a particular image. I have already noted the instance in which Jas describes himself, Amit and Ravi as speaking in sync similar to a boy band. By speaking in sync it conveys the image that their speech is pre-determined and rehearsed, losing the spontaneity of genuine dialogue. The metaphor can be extended when Ravi ‘delivers his standard solo routine:-Yeh, blud, safe, innit.’. ‘Routine’ connotes a regularity with which the spoken comment is delivered, again removing any pretension to genuine dialogue. As a result, his speech is almost ineffective as it has no “truth” and can only exist as a formal requisite for the interactive demands of the situation. The loss of spontaneity in dialogue is suggestive of a loss of individuality in identity. Ravi has performed an institutionalized front which is knowledgeable to the other group members in their shared recognition of his “desi-ness”. However, in adopting a front that has a general accessibility to many others has removed the stamp of individuality that his non-performed self could have offered to the interactive event. The intonation Malkani makes is that Ravi is displaying a performed self and that his “true” identity is, at present, not being displayed rendering him a passing figure.

Jas particularly desires to perform a front and project the same rudeboy/desi image that has been described of Hardjit. In attempting to perform the desired front, Jas qualifies as a passing figure due to the presentation of an identity which would not normally be considered his true self. Often his attempts to project the correct front have comedic results, revealing more to the audience of his true self than his carefully crafted front can. If we refer back to
the opening scene with Hardjit beating Daniel and the rest of the group offering verbal support, Jas’s conscious performativity becomes noticeable. He narrates how he constructs his speech:

I decided to offer the following carefully crafted comment [...] This was probably a bit over the top but I think I’d got the tone just right and nobody laughed at me.  

Jas’s ability to carefully emulate the linguistic patterns of the other group members suggests they are formed through a pre-determined front to which they all aspire. Essentially, the rudeboy front has become institutionalized, a fact that Goffman warns about: ‘a given social front tends to become institutionalized in terms of the abstract stereotyped expectations to which it gives rise, and tends to take on a meaning and stability apart from the specific tasks which happen at the time to be performed in its name.’

Dick Hebdige’s work on subcultures can be informative here. Hebdige shows how white subcultures have a history for being influenced by black subcultures in a similar fashion to Jas’s relationship to the desi’s in Londonstani. In some ways, Jas embodies a white skin, black mask persona when he emulates the rudeboys he is attempting to assimilate with. With particular reference to skinheads, Hebdige explains the process of incorporating outside identities:

It was not only by congregating on the all-white football terraces but through consorting with West Indians at the local youth clubs and on the street corners, by copying their mannerisms, adopting their curses, dancing to their music that the skinheads ‘magically recovered’ the lost sense of working class community.

The cultural exchange present in Londonstani reacts against previous discourses of interaction between whites and blacks which usually represent white culture exerting its dominance over all others. Malkani is invoking an “empire writing back” ideology in Jas’s adoption of the rudeboy front. Hebdige’s assertion that white subculture is heavily influenced by black subculture has significant impact on readings of Londonstani. The standard racial pass, identified by Phillip Brian Harper as a black-to-white crossing, at least in the context of the United States, is subverted by Malkani and serves to illustrate my argument that the passing figure in the context of British colonialism/postcolonialism requires to be theorized in terms which are specific to the British cultural context. Given the existence of a cultural
exchange between black and white races in existence in British youth, as shown by Hebdige, the passing figure rejects the American context of passing for better social prospects through the removal of the black racial signifier existing instead as an exercise in the modernist politics of identity construction far removed from a visually based race theory more commonly invoked in the American discourse of the passing figure. By using Goffman, the performativity of the Anglo-Indian passing figure can be theorized allowing for a discourse surrounding the unique context to be initiated.

Jas’s adoption of the desi persona relies upon the passing figure’s performativity to succeed, a fact not lost upon himself as he reveals in his narration. Jas frequently evaluates his performances after delivery suggesting he is acutely aware of the performitivity of his behaviour. A simile may be drawn with the actor who upon attending rehearsals decides to analyse the effect of his performance upon the all-important audience concluding that his performance was ‘probly a bit over the top’ but he ‘got the tone just right’.

Jas’s use of performance in constructing his front is not dissimilar to Hardjit’s method of borrowing from external cultural sources such as the media. An example of the adoption of cultural markers from outside sources is demonstrated in Jas’s practicing of his front before the mirror:

I practised that line a hundred times in front a my bedroom mirror an a hundred fuckin times in front a the bathroom mirror. Sometimes I practised it as Johnny Depp, sometimes as Pierce Brosnan, sometimes as Brad Pitt. But in the end I went with this cross between Andy Garcia an Shah Rukh Khan

By the same method which Hardjit models his front, so too does Jas construct his front on cultural icons. Jas’s adoption of the fronts provided by famous actors is suggestive of a performative politics, more significantly so when the actors’ statuses as professional performers is also taken into consideration. Jas stands in opposition to an essentialist ideology of identity, signifying instead the ideology of postcolonial multiplicity in identity construction. Jas’s performativity is further reinforced in this scene by his conscious manufacture of the front. Twice Jas refers to “practicing” that line and in front of two different mirrors in order that he can accurately gauge the visual perception that others may receive. The performers who Jas emulates are crucially a mixture of Western and Eastern icons, suggesting a disregard of the racial sign of skin colour and more emphasis upon
equality in cultural displays of celebrated fronts. As I have so far argued, the Anglo-Indian passing figure is less concerned with racial signifiers than cultural signifiers; Jas’s adoption of foreign iconic fronts is no obstacle in his identity construction. The irrelevance of the racial heritage attached to various fronts highlights the difference between the American context of the passing figure and the British-Indian context.

The emphasis within the British-Indian context upon performativity necessarily precludes some difficulties which the passing figure must negotiate in performing multiple identities frequently. Such difficulties include the need to evaluate and monitor the quality of the performance at all times. The example I have offered of Jas practicing his front in the mirror has recurrences throughout the novel. In the same way in which a passing figure will constantly monitor their performance to ensure an authentic level of representation, Jas also constantly evaluates his front. Another example can be found when Jas interacts with Samira before Hardjit’s fight with a rival:

-Yo, ‘sup, Samira? Dey trying 2 keep dis shit one-on-one, u get me.
Like a duel or sumfink, know wat I’m saying?
That in’t bad. That’s progress. I need to work on my facial expressions a bit though, an my eyes are still too wide and won’t stay still.512

In much the same way in which an actor will evaluate a performance, Jas also exhibits an obsessive desire to note his abilities as a passing figure. ‘That’s progress’ suggests a transition from one state to another, or in Jas’s case, from one identity to another. This is more evidence that his behaviour can be seen as exemplifying passing, which is simply the adoption of an identity other than one’s own pre-existing persona. The obvious focus upon physical manipulation, ‘need to work on my facial expressions’, suggests that the desi front is highly concerned with a particular image, as we have noted with reference to Hardjit and his sculpted physique and clothing style. It would be beneficial to note at this point that although the desi front has a high importance attached to the visual image produced by symbols such as clothing and facial hair, it remains distinctly separate from a visual schema of skin colour. The significance of skin colour as a racial sign is evidently disproven by Jas’s ability to pass as a rudeboy in the novel despite the other characters clearly knowing that he is a white male. Indeed, Hardjit’s remark about Jas being an ‘honorary Paki’513 confirms that he can successfully adopt the desi identity in the absence of a display of the racial sign. The
significance of the visual image for the desi’s rests in the successful appropriation of cultural signs, which Jas (or indeed, any other nationality of youth) could adopt. Although a visual schema still operates in the British-Indian context of the passing figure, the emphasis is very much on cultural signs over racial signs unlike the current American discourse of passing research.

By constructing multiple fronts, Jas has to negotiate the competing selves that he may present to various audiences, highlighting the complexities of a fragmented persona. For example, in the final section of the novel during which Jas is talking to his nurse, he appears to be unsure of which self to display:

I wanna show her my good manners by sayin Thank you. But Jazzy Jas Man can do better than fuckin Thank you. I shoot her a look an give it, -Shukriya.514

If there was ever any doubt as to whether Jas was wrestling with two contrasting personas, this utterances provides the necessary evidence that he makes a conscious decision to switch from his natural self: ‘I wanna show her my good manners by sayin Thank you.’, to adopting his rudeboy image one last time: ‘I shoot her a look an give it, -Shukriya.’. In this final event, Jas even refers to his secondary persona renaming himself ‘Jazzy Jas Man’.515

Once more, the language which Jas is emulating and his physical displays are cultural in essence, bearing no limitation in racial heritage. Jas demonstrates the modernist conception of self as totalized by cultural markers and signs. This provides an example of the performative mechanism made possible by the acceptance of culture over race as the prime determinant in identity construction. Such a revision in theory was initiated by the early twentieth-century anthropologists when they publicized ideas such as cultural relativism. Exploited by forward-thinking Anglo-Indians, cultural signs and markers became the dominant means of creating and expressing an identity, allowing for new definitions of race and nationalism. This enables Jas to display a hybridity in culture that enables him to pass as a rudeboy without racial limitations. Through his own performativity, Jas epitomizes the adoption of a cultural hybridity as a postcolonial strategy for undermining previous power relations based upon racial superiority and essential hierarchy.

In order to continually reproduce the desi front which Jas desires to appropriate as his identity, it becomes necessary for him to devise a number of ‘rudeboy rules’ which punctuate the text illustrating the construction of the identity he is adopting. As well as serving the
technical purpose of introducing the reader to desi culture, they also function as an example of Jas’s identity construction process, demonstrating not just the adopted identity of the passing figure but the moments in which it is actually created. In one of the novel’s comedic twists, it appears both Jas and the reader of the text benefit from the presence of rudeboy rules equally. Jas is no more an expert than indeed the average reader, which really highlights my argument that identity is a performative process based on the appropriation of cultural behaviours, and not reliant upon any essentialist philosophy. For example, one rudeboy rule runs thus:

*Rudeboy Rule #1:*

My dad always said that you shouldn’t ever lie cos you’ll have to tell another ten lies to back it up. However, Hardjit’d taught me that if the back-up lies are good enough, then so fuckin what?  

The visual distinction Malkani makes between the rudeboy rules and the main body of text suggests a textbook style of learning the rudeboy identity. The rudeboy rules appear as separated sections of text, led by a bold print numerical ordering system with italicized titles representative of a body of information gathered for reference purposes. Indeed, these rules do form a reference system to which Jas refers to in the course of constructing his desi front. The reference to Hardjit is also significant. In fact, four of the seven rudeboy rules are informed by Hardjit’s own philosophy recently imparted to Jas. The rudeboy rules also serve, then, as examples of Jas’s consistent imitation of Hardjit’s front and the hierarchical system of the rudeboy group that Jas is attempting to integrate amongst.

Hierarchical relationships and group memberships are significant social formations for Goffman:

> When members of a team have different formal statuses and rank in a social establishment […] we can see that the mutual dependence created by membership in the team is likely to cut across structural or social cleavages in the establishment and thus provide a source of cohesion for the establishment.  

Here, Goffman facilitates the argument that in passing himself off as a member of the rudeboy team, Jas can negotiate the status barriers that operate against him to lay claim to the same identity and brand of masculinity they possess. The result becomes that individual
identity has less significance in a team environment, more pressing is the ability to display the group front. Through mutual dependency on a group front, all members reach a more equal platform to interact with each other. Jas as a passing figure can utilize his membership within the team to lessen the significance attached to his (at times) different individual front. The inter-relationship between an individual appropriation of a specific front and the interaction with others who possess the same front ties in with our re-formulation of postcolonial analysis as informed by a self and society approach over a distinctly theoretical postcolonialism informed by poststructuralism. By closely reading Jas’s adoption of front and the hierarchical team dynamics of the rudeboys, the central study of postcoloniality as a lived condition becomes more possible. The passing figure’s construction of self and interactions with a wider social structure of cultural markers in identity politics facilitate the switch to a postcolonial method which is more deeply rooted in the real experiences of previously colonized countries rather than serving the intellectual needs of the previously colonizing nations.

In the hierarchical positioning of the participants in the rudeboy team can be seen evidence of Malkani’s primary theme of gender construction. Jas not only adopts a racial identity in the desi persona but also a gender ideology prescribing a specific way to display his masculinity. Within the team, Hardjit is the obvious alpha male figure through constant displays of violence, misogyny and illegality. His masculine front is admired by all of the groups’ members, but specifically by Jas. Jas’s adoption of the rudeboy persona can be arguably motivated by a desire to perform the masculine role it is associated with rather than any desire to be accepted as a member of another race. We should remember that, as I have noted, Malkani himself stated “my book is not about race, but how race is used to bolster masculinity.”. 518 I will briefly argue for a gender reading of the identities Jas adopts in becoming the passing figure.

In the text’s opening scene, during which Hardjit beats Daniel, Jas describes the role of the other group members as reminiscent of a band of cheerleaders: ‘Hardjit, Hardjit, he’s our man, if he can’t bruck-up goras, no one can.’ 519 The distinct difference in status afforded to Jas and Hardjit is immediately obvious to the reader of the novel, made explicit through Jas’s jealous confessions. For example, he admits that Hardjit spoke ‘with an eloquence and conviction that made me green with envy.’ 520 A little further into the text and Jas’s focus switches to a physical appreciation of Hardjit, ‘A little higher an he could’ve probly clenched the dog tags in the deep groove between his pecs.’ 521 which is followed by a similar compliment:
Standin there in his designer desi garms, a tiger tattooed on his left shoulder an a Sikh Khanda symbol on his right bicep. He probly could’ve fit a whole page a Holy scriptures on his biceps if he wanted to.522

By adopting the rudeboy behaviour that he encodes within his rudeboy rules, Jas really aspires to demonstrate the masculinity that Hardjit demonstrates as his position over the group has powerful, almost seductive, homoerotic overtones.

Indeed, the homoerotic nature of the text suggests a powerful need to appreciate the male form and the ideology it embraces, illustrated through many such descriptions of the ideal masculine model. Although a novel about young heterosexual men, there is more space in the text dedicated to an appreciation of the male body than there is of the female form, suggesting that what Jas really wants is the masculine body. With a possible exception of Samira, Hardjit outranks all other characters with his physicality. For example, before a fight Hardjit attempts to make as dramatic an impression as possible:

Today he’d even kept his muscles under wraps in a baggy, long-sleeve Adidas tracksuit top [...] That way, all the other bulges in his chest an arms would look even more bulging when he eventually stripped off.523

As the passing figure, Jas largely adopts a specific version of masculinity over any racial identity in an attempt to discard his previous masculinity referred to as his ‘former state a dicklessness.’.524 The pursuit of a specific brand of masculinity offers another example of the British context in which the passing figure operates. In contrast to the primarily racial ideology of American passing literature, British passing literature is less concerned with race as a totalizer of identity. Malkani illustrates this with Jas’s desire to adopt Hardjit’s masculinity over any perceived desire to appropriate his Indian heritage. Instead, the cultural performance of an ideal masculinity is what drives Jas to become a passing figure suggesting that British-Indian identity politics is an arena dominated by cultural signs over any belief in an innate racial essence.
Anyway, whatever the fuck we are, Ravi an the others are better at being it than I am. Reader Perceptions and Discrepancies Between “Social Fronts” and “Roles”

Up to this point, I have argued that identity is constructed in Londonstani according to a performative politics. Erving Goffman’s concept of front offers a unique theoretical perspective from which to analyse the passing figure engaging in the performance of constructing a front. Goffman’s significance to identity studies is paramount given his involvement in theorizing on the performativity of the self. Indeed, Ann Branaman notes how his idea that identity is constituted through the display of performances has become commonplace in sociological studies today. However, when performing an adopted identity, the passing figure must maintain a particular level of quality and consistency in their display. Failure to do so will mean the identity cannot be authorized by the audience and the passing figure will be deemed to have “slipped.” In the same way in which an actor must be convincing enough for the audience to buy into a story in a stage play, the everyday passing figure must also present a convincing front, or risk exposing the passing attempt to those around them. The critical connection between the passing figure and the audience, who act to interpret and authenticate the pass as discussed in Chapter Three, underlines the significance of adopting a self and society approach to literature concerned with postcoloniality. The passing figure demonstrates the complexities of forming a coherent identity from the space in-between two or more cultural centres and as such becomes an issue deeply entrenched in both the individual and the individual’s complex relationship to wider social structures that can influence the construction of an identity. Goffman and Pattinson allow the passing figure to be theorized on both an individual and a social level, offering an alternative to postructuralist discourse.

I will be using the term “slippage” as it is used by Juliette Pattinson in Behind Enemy Lines. As previously mentioned, Pattinson defines slippage as the ‘fissure between successfully passing and not quite accomplishing the performance’. At frequent points in Londonstani, Jas fails to accurately display a rudeboy front, leaving his performance a slippage as it reveals a “true” or “natural” self underneath the bravado of his performance. Indeed, Goffman warns of ‘the precarious position in which these performers place themselves, for at any moment in their performance an event may occur to catch them out and badly contradict what they have openly avowed’. I will illustrate these moments in the text using slippage to highlight the consequences of a failed performance. Furthermore, I will also explore the self-reflexive narrative as a new method of identifying slippage in the contemporary passing novel. I will argue that Jas’s narration contains moments during which
multiple identities exist simultaneously and are revealed to the reader in a single narrative utterance. Within such utterances, one self is presented to the characters in the text, whilst simultaneously a second self is presented to the reader of the text. In looking at *Londonstani* as a self-reflexive text, comparisons can be drawn with Kureishi’s work in which certain characters, such as Haroon, Karim and Shahid for example, may be interpreted differently by in-text characters and the reader of the novel.

Within Pattinson’s research into slippage in the context of wartime Britain, she unsurprisingly notes that severe consequences may be met by the failed performer. Such consequences could well include ‘captivity, persecution and execution.’ although she allows that any instance of passing will occasion some form of penalty if it is not successful in convincing the intended audience. She specifically mentions ‘some loss of reputation’ as a potential result of slippage. The acceptance that the front can fail to project the correct image to an audience and not be accepted as accurate was briefly introduced by Goffman who describes a ‘discrepancy between fostered appearances and reality’ when we consider those performers who project a ‘false front or ‘only’ a front’. Similarly, he also warns of the consequences of delivering a failed performance, noting ‘immediate humiliation and sometimes permanent loss of reputation.’ It makes sense that when a performance has begun, the audience will have immediately been given the definition of the situation and therefore been dictated to as to how the performance should be interpreted. If the performance is then undermined by a slippage, the audience will have grounds for dissatisfaction with the performer.

For Goffman, authorization to play a role is a significant issue. He suggests when we ask if a front is true or false, we are really questioning whether or not the performer is authorized to perform the front rather than if the front was performed accurately or not. For Goffman, the significance of an unauthorized performer is that ‘a competent performance by someone who proves to be an impostor may weaken in our minds the moral connection between legitimate authorization to play a part and the capacity to play it.’ The passing figure in Anglo-Indian texts fulfils the purpose of questioning the right to a particular role through the imposition of a good performance in that role. As a result, anything other than a performance in identity construction must be rejected. Indeed, the mechanism of performance has a history in the British Empire. Figures such as Ghandi and Nehru testify to the ability to adopt a British identity if desired through the appropriation of the cultural behaviours associated with that identity. Although generally restricted to high class or wealthy Indians who could be educated in England, a state of greater equality could be reached among the British and the
Indians through the performance of a good front. All this stands in contrast to the American context where the binarism of race theory labelled all black Africans as a lower human form despite any cultural performance. The passing figure negotiates the strict colour line in the American South but in the British Empire, the passing figure was used to eradicate the ideology of prestige that functioned as the mechanism of Empire through a display of performative identity. In contemporary Anglo-Indian literature, not only is the passing figure used to illustrate the ideology of a modernist identity politics but also to develop new postcolonial methods for reading the multiplicity that current discourses celebrate. However, a performative practice in identity construction is always open to the danger of failure in projecting the correct image to the expectant audience.

_Jondonstani_ details frequently the fear pervading Jas as he performs his rudeboy front and attempts to avoid slippage. It is instantly obvious to the reader that Jas does not truly belong with the rudeboy group and struggles to find his place in their scene. Early on he complains that he has ‘watched as much MTV Base and Juggy D videos as they have, but I still can’t attain the right level a rudeboy authenticity.’ before ‘deeply lamenting [his] lack a rudeboyesque panache.’ The opening scene of the novel offers a good example of Jas’s difficulty in maintaining the desired front: whilst beating Daniel, Jas almost drops the confident and authentic rudeboy front that he so carefully constructs when he stumbles in the delivery of his speech when the group are beating Daniel:

-Yeh, bredren, knock his fuckin teeth out. Bruck his fuckin face. Kill his fuckin…well, his fuckin, you know, him. Kill him.’. He evaluates this afterwards concluding that ‘This was probly a bit over the top but […] nobody laughed at me.’

In this dialogue, it would appear that Jas has become too enthusiastic for the front he is portraying and almost lets the front slip. Furthermore, it illustrates the all-pervasive fear of slipping when performing as a rudeboy in the evaluative comments he offers in his narrative. Fortunately for Jas, his identity has remained intact despite his poor representation of rudeboy dialogue.

Jas’s identity does not always avoid slipping, however. After Daniel’s beating, Jas heads back to the spot to pick up a jacket that was left behind allowing Daniel the opportunity to confront Jas about his behaviour:
The white kid was now lookin me straight in the eye in a way that made me glad we hadn’t made eye contact while he was being beaten [...] -why didn’t you tell them I didn’t say anything, Jas? What’s happened to you over the last year? [...] You’ve become like one of those gangsta types you used to hate.\textsuperscript{538}

Jas’s audience has shifted from the rudeboys which he intends to assimilate with to Daniel with the result that Jas feels an obvious sense of shame at his previous part in the beating. This is evident from his aversion to the eye contact. Similarly, Daniel recognizes the shift in persona that Jas exhibits, by mentioning his change over the last year. Daniel is therefore in a position to see past Jas’s rudeboy front and recognize that this is not an authentic identity. Jas has, therefore, slipped through Daniels recognition of a previous persona or front that he employed. This is further compounded when Daniel reveals that he and Jas must have been acquainted to a greater degree than previously suggested:

‘[Jas] -so, swear on your mother’s life.

[Daniel] –But Jas, she’s dead. You came to the funeral.’\textsuperscript{539}

A further example of this occurs when Jas’s rudeboy friends make him phone Andy, an old friend of Jas’s, who has apparently been interested in a local Indian girl. Andy questions Jas on his speech, indicating a previous identity once performed by Jas:

-I can’t believe you just used the word Innit. You used to make fun of people for saying that, remember?\textsuperscript{540}

In this event, Andy has, like Daniel, recognized an inconsistency in Jas’s behaviour and struggles to reconcile his current rudeboy front to his past persona. For Andy and Daniel, Jas cannot be the authentic rudeboy that he makes himself out to be as he has previously performed another front which is inconsistent with the one he is presently playing.

The end of Jas’s phone call to Andy reveals another slippage, albeit a minor one that Malkani probably included purely for comic effect. Jas narrates his moment of slippage:

I don’t know whether to say Thanks or Cheers like how goras do. So I end up sayin Chanks.\textsuperscript{541}
In this utterance Jas becomes slightly confused between his previous front and his new rudeboy front and instead of maintaining a consistency with his present performance conflates the two in his mispronunciation. Jas’s conflation of the two roles he is playing can be adequately theorized by Goffman as a self that is adopting a theatrical role before others. Such slippage illustrates the dramatic motives of the role which has failed to convince and reveals this to the reader both of the text and the novels characters who “read” Jas’s identity. In such moments as these, Goffman’s work proves more useful to the overtly dramatic construction of identity than does Butler’s discursive notion of performativity which is reliant upon the consistent and unintentional reiteration of the heterosexual hegemony. By slipping in his passing attempts, Jas, in Butler’s formulation, fails to reproduce that which his passing attempts recognize. For example, Jas recognizes and “names” the desi identity in his adoption of saying ‘thanks’ over what he perceives as an appropriate goras’s response to be (cheers). However, he fails to reproduce that which he names by slipping and instead saying ‘Chanks’.

According to Butler’s concept of performativity, the discursive process must end here as the desi identity is not being successfully reiterated and so the mechanism of performativity has failed. By adopting Goffman and Pattinson, however, we can still define Jas as a self engaged in the theatrical performance of a desi identity which in moments of slippage becomes accessible and paradoxically more powerful in its revelation as a disruptive force. Goffman’s concept of front, a theoretical model underpinning the conscious construction of an identity other than one’s own natural self, is significantly more useful to the explicitly dramatic exploration of identity Malkani offers through Jas. Butler’s work on gender performativity remains detached from individual accounts of identity formation, placing it in contrast to the existentialist approach rooted in individual efforts to produce “essence” in Sartre’s model of identity formation. In adopting a Sartrean framework of identity construction (existence precedes essence), Goffman allows for the exploration of Jas’s passing attempts on a micro- and macro-social level. We can theorize upon his use of passing as an individual through “front” and also as part of a wider social structure through the development and refinement of his “front” in relation to the social group he is attempting to assimilate into. The freedom that Jas exhibits in his adoption of the desi front, along with his varied successes at performing the correct front are accountable through Goffman and Pattinson’s dramatic perspective. In Butler’s framework, constraint operates to negate the freedom offered by the theatrical perspective and fails to account for individual experiences within the construction and maintenance of gendered identities.
More significantly, perhaps, are the moments of slippage that occur before Hardjit, Amit and Ravi. Before Hardjit’s fight with Tariq, it becomes clear that Tariq is going to arrive late so that he can collect some shopping for his mother. The intention is to appear sensitive in front of the many females present at the fight location. Hardjit, correctly assuming this is a ploy for female support, adopts a similar tactic in spending time with Jas, demonstrating a willingness to interact with those more vulnerable than himself. This occurs after Jas has been boasting to Samira that that ‘I’ll jump in, you know, if that’s necessary, innit’ In this utterance Jas is performing the rudeboy front of a lack of fear and a willingness to engage in physical violence. However, Hardjit declares his intentions to use Jas to increase his own respect:

But hear me, bruv, if he finks dat’ll make him look all sensitive n shit in fronta all dese ladies then I’ll do da same shit. I’ll hang back here wid’chyu, innit.«543

Instantly, Jas becomes emasculated from physically strong rudeboy to the object of Hardjit’s sensitivity underscoring any pretences he may have held to fully integrating with Hardjit’s group.

Jas further slips when the group encounter Mr Ashwood and he offers his ultimatum. For the other group members, this is an opportunity to display their rudeboy fronts to a member of an opposite social position. Mr Ashwood represents all that the group despises such as whiteness, the British identity, a strong educational and work ethic and different forms of masculine displays. For Jas, however, this is another instance when his past ensures that for the reader at least, his new rudeboy performance will not remain unchallenged. When Mr Ashwood sarcastically asks if the boys are a version of the mafia, Ravi responds by quoting rap lyrics and striking gangster style poses. Jas however does not perform along with him but reacts in the way his old self would have done so:

How embarrassing […] I now had to explain to my old friend that my new friends weren’t really speakin but stead was just quoting hardcore rap tracks cos, well, that’s what my new friends do sometimes.«544
This situation places Jas directly in between his old persona and his new one with the result that rather than act as his new friends do, he opts to take the mature road with Mr Ashwood and agrees to meet with his former student. Jas, therefore, slips into his old performance. Furthermore, as they leave Mr Ashwood’s office, Jas reveals that he was one of the star pupils who had made his GCSE certificate unto his wall: Jas got ‘a muthafuckin A class, innit.’. Again, despite the fact that Jas cloaks his achievement in his newly adopted language, his slippage is obvious to the reader as his educational achievements act against the values of the rudeboys who he is assimilating with. After Jas’s behaviour in the office, he fully admits that he was ‘expecting the other guys to rip the piss outta me as we left Mr Ashwood’s office.’. This fear is of the penalty that Goffman describes in *The Presentation of Self*, the loss of reputation which may be permanent. The group do not, but Jas knows that his performance has been unmasked and that he has let his rudeboy front fail in front of the audience to whom it was most crucial to maintain it: Hardjit, Amit and Ravi.

It can be beneficial to align such examples of slippage with Goffman’s distinction between social fronts and social roles. As I have so far shown, Jas performs in a manner which appears to contradict a previous persona, suggesting he has an original self and a performed self. The original self is revealed in the moments of slippage when his performed self fails to convince the audience. The difference in the behaviour of the two selves illustrates the distinction between the front or image of an identity and the corresponding role to which it is attached. Goffman argues that social fronts can become institutionalized with regard to the ‘abstract stereotyped expectations’ that result from a particular front. This means that the front can take on a meaning separate from the specific tasks that correspond with that front. The front can become a ‘collective representation’ that stands apart from the role which it developed from. When somebody adopts a particular role, they will usually find that the front has already been developed for it. In effect, whether an individual takes on a role in order to perform the role or to maintain the corresponding social front, he/she will now find that they will have to perform both. Effectively, Jas desires the image associated with the rudeboys, but cannot quite appropriate the behaviours encased in the social role inherent with the rudeboy image. For example, Jas’s visit to the gym with the group he seeks to pass amongst reveals the discrepancy between the front which he wishes to portray and the role which is associated with that front, which is made clear he does not want to undertake. Jas narrates the incongruity between social front and social role:
So I headed over to Ravi and Amit who were busy laughin at a couple a obviously gay guys on the chest press machines. But I couldn’t be homophobic enough for them cos a some inner conflict with my conscience or someshit an so then I went over to the cardiovascular area. 549

Jas accompanied the group to the gym as he strongly desires the bodies that the group exhibit, especially Hardjit’s. The toned body is an outward symbol of the groups’ identity, along with sculpted facial hair and clothing. Malkani dedicates much of his text to a visual appreciation of the physical appearance of his characters. These images represent the front that the group possess, and which Jas desires. However, the social role that corresponds with the social front is not a role that Jas is comfortable with, he ‘couldn’t be homophobic enough for them’ and knowing he cannot perform the necessary role, Jas ultimately decides to leave the scene before his true self is revealed. Goffman’s willingness to engage with the adoption and rejection of different roles by the self is a further point of distinction between himself and Judith Butler. Butler notes Goffman’s view of a self which ‘assumes and exchanges various “roles” within the complex social expectations of the “game” of modern life’ but firmly roots her own concept of identity as ‘irretrievably “outside,” constituted in social discourse’ but also suggests that the interior is a ‘publicly regulated and sanctioned form of essence fabrication’. 550 Again, Butler removes the element of freedom in identity construction available to the person engaged in the act of passing and distances her work from the perspective of Sartre’s brand of existentialism which is focused upon the ability to determine an identity free from constraints such as determinism.

Jas’s narrative style also reveals moments of slippage. For example, when he is speaking to Samira he simultaneously projects a double image of himself: one for Samira and one for the reader. This is evident from:

-Yo, ‘sup, Samira? Dey tryin 2 keep dis shit one-on-one, u get me. Like a duel or sumfink, know what I’m sayin? That in’t bad. That’s progress. I need to work on my facial expressions a bit though, an my eyes are still too wide and won’t stay still. 551

Within this short utterance, two things are made clear to the reader of the novel. Firstly, Jas is consciously crafting his speech and physical appearance in order to pass as the desired
identity he wishes to be perceived as. Secondly, this conscious crafting of self relies upon a theatrical performativity as it clearly contrasts with another self that he displays. The contrast between narratorial style and dialogue reveal this split in selves that Jas negotiates. In this single utterance, Jas projects one image of himself to Samira and simultaneously, a second self is revealed to the reader through a contrast in semantics that stands in marked opposition to the projected self, providing the antagonism around which the plot develops.

The reader of the text fulfils a crucial role in authenticating the pass attempted by Jas, thereby making the reader complicit in the construction of his identity. Goffman has suggested that the audience has a key role in the construction of an identity:

When we allow that the individual projects a definition of the situation when he appears before others, we must also see that the others, however passive their role may seem to be, will themselves effectively project a definition of the situation by virtue of their response to the individual and by virtue of any lines of action they initiate to him.  

Essentially, readers of the text constitute another audience to Jas’s pass, in the same way in which Kureishi’s Haroon, Karim and Shahid are re-interpreted by the reader as well as characters within the text. The self-reflexive narrative forces the passing figures to pass twice for every interaction recorded in the text, and as a result the identity may be interpreted differently creating a multiplicity of identities for the passing figure. We may also further the link between Kureishi and Malkani by continuing Fish’s interpretive communities in our reading of Londonstani. Although this is not the focus of this chapter, it is worth remembering that the in-text characters and the reader of the novel will form different interpretive communities and re-construct Jas’s identity in possibly opposing ways. For example, Jas may be seen as the confident and rebellious youth he strives to be interpreted as by virtue of his association with Hardjit, Amit and Ravi as well as his manner and dialogue. The cultural signs he performs may lead the in-text characters’ interpretive strategies (strategies which may be pre-disposed to recognize and pre-judge certain cultural symbols as illustrative of an anti-social subcultural movement) to identify him in a particular way. Yet the reader who has access to his private narrative will more than likely see him as a less rebellious and confident figure, in many ways the opposite of the rudeboy group identity.
The ultimate slippage for the reader is revealed in the final section of the text as Jas’s real name is made accessible to the reader. When he is in hospital and his father is berating his behaviour he questions his identity:

-What nonsense is this you don’t even respond to your own name?

Jason Bartholomew-Cliveden […] Look, he says.–It says your name here on your medical chart: Jason Bartholomew-Cliveden, aged nineteen, white, male.⁵⁵³

Although this scene is removed from the other characters of the text, the reader is still granted access and perhaps for the first time, realizes that Jas is not who they most likely imagined him to be. This moment also underlines the critical element of visibility in assigning identities. With a distinct lack of visual clues as to Jas’s identity, most readers would be no doubt vastly inaccurate in characterizing him. Judith Butler informatively reminds us that when we see a man dressed as a woman, or vice versa, we take the first term of that perception as constituting the truth of the gender; ‘the gender that is introduced through the simile lacks “reality,” and is taken to constitute an illusory appearance.’⁵⁵⁴ In the case of Jas, we think we have seen a desi, or British-Indian youth but actually we are witnessing the acts of a white British male. Now this is clear to the reader, we are perhaps prone to see a white British youth dressing up as a British-Indian youth, which in Butler’s formulation renders the desi identity an illusion lacking in reality. Automatically, and in spite of the main narrative thrust, we now see Jas as Jason and endow this identity with reality (Jason is no more Jas than, for example, Paul O’Grady is Lily Savage). However, Butler cryptically questions this conclusion: ‘Is drag the imitation of gender, or does it dramatize the signifying gestures through which gender itself is established?’⁵⁵⁵ which suggests that the “reality” may be as much based upon an illusion as the simile it is reflected by.

The unveiling of Jas’s “real” identity is a key event in the text as it forces readers to confront their own conceptions of identity. Interestingly, it is through the failure of the passing figure to project the correct image (the slippage) that the moral communication can be made to the reader. If Jas never slips, his identity is never questioned and the boundaries remain intact. But through slipping, he draws attention to the fact that these boundaries are transitory and facilitates the delivery of the moral communication to the reader. Slippage therefore serves to illustrate the performative nature of identity construction in Anglo-Indian
texts and brings to mind Goffman’s assertion that a competent performance may damage the connection between legitimate authorization to perform a front and the capacity to do so.\textsuperscript{556}

Gautam Malkani’s \textit{Londonstani} engages with many of the key issues raised in my thesis. The text offers a useful opportunity to showcase the performative mechanism adopted by contemporary Anglo-Indian writers in a bid to develop a postcolonial multiplicity. Erving Goffman’s \textit{The Presentation of Self} similarly adds to the theoretical underpinning of the passing figure in postcolonial literature, primarily through his portrayal of the conscious construction of the performed identity. Goffman also allows for the connection between individual self and wider society to be actively illustrated in the arena of identity construction, forging a more existentialist theory of postcolonial identity. As with Kureishi, Malkani’s text forces the audience of readers of the text to engage in constructing the identities of its characters in the form of another interpretive community. Such complicity further demonstrates a deep connection between the individual self and a wider social structure operative in the building of an identity distancing this research from more orthodox poststructuralist postcolonial concerns. Within the medium of a novel, all characters are interpreted by at least two audiences. Firstly, the in-text characters will form their own judgements and secondly, the reader will approach the text with their own interpretive strategy culminating in a multiplicity of identities. The complicity of both the individual and society in the construction of identity is suggested by the theorists I have invoked over the last four chapters. Ultimately, contemporary Anglo-Indian novels are a significant body of literature that expose shifts in twentieth-century thinking, of which Malkani’s \textit{Londonstani} is a prime example.
Chapter Five: The British Empire’s Most Significant Legacy

Central to my thesis, explored over the last four chapters, is the forging of a connection between the displaced postcolonial figure and the person engaged in the act of passing in contemporary Anglo-Indian fiction. I have argued that the two figures are connected by a shared rejection of a rigid notion of identity, instead constructing their selves from an affiliation with two or more cultural centres. The fragmented identity constituted by a multiplicity of cultural influences allows both the postcolonial and the passing figure to display alternative and sometimes even opposing identities; such is the nature of a single persona constructed from a multiplicity of behaviours, images, linguistics and other character building props. Crucially, in aligning the two figures together, I have suggested new methods for the continued exploration of the hybrid identity through the re-interpretation of the postcolonial figure in light of the engagement of performance as demonstrated by the passing figure.

In my appropriation of the passing figure, commonly found in African-American fiction, I have noted some critical differences between the African-American and British-Indian methods of representing the phenomenon of passing. Anglo-Indians engaged in the act of passing do not usually pass in the conventional sense, by which I mean using disguise and masquerade to perform a black-to-white racial pass (the standard racial pass in African-American culture due to the colour line that influenced passing fiction and narratives of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century-the period in which much seminal passing literature was produced). Instead, Anglo-Indians who engage in the act of passing display an involvement with the spirit of misrepresentation through the display of multiple personas. All of the featured writers have included characters in their fiction that project multiple identities either intentionally or unintentionally.

Much of the significance of the passing figure in Anglo-Indian fiction is derived from the employment of performance in constructing the pass. In the adoption of a performative politics, essentialism is necessarily rejected in favour of the fluidity offered by postcolonial discourses of hybridity. The passing figure reveals the ability to construct and reconstruct identity based on an acquisition of cultural traits. In making the pass, the passing figure illustrates the porosity of boundaries previously accepted as impermeable. The manufacturing of artificial divisions is questioned and the postcolonial figure can be seen as a passing figure in their reconstruction of themselves from multiple established cultural centres.
I have primarily analysed modern writers, the significance of which is twofold: firstly I can make the connection between the passing figure and debates around domestic multiculturalism in Great Britain, an issue that has considerable coverage in the media and academic journals of sociology and contemporary and postcolonial literatures. For example, my argument concerning inter-culturalism in Chapter Three pinpoints the failure of a multicultural agenda in increasing the contact between different ethnicities or races, suggesting instead the role of the passing figure better encapsulates the cross-cultural contact necessary for the elimination of boundaries between minority/majority group formations in Britain. Secondly, the preoccupation of identity in fiction produced by Anglo-Indians suggests an enduring legacy left by the dissolution of the Empire’s control over India, indicating links between the colonial/postcolonial relationship of Britain and India and the re-appropriation of the passing figure from an American context to the British imperial context.

By re-appropriating the passing figure from the American to the British context, I argue that it is necessary to operate within an ideology of identity construction characterized by a fluidity and multiplicity of cultural interpretations of identity over the race-theory influenced rigid system that can be found in America. The imposition of this ideology is perhaps the British Empire’s most significant legacy. Evidence of the impact of the British Empire can be found in many forms. Charles Carrington, for example, notes the ‘internal security, communications, precautions against famine, irrigation, afforestation, even the rudiment of an educational system’, which were crafted by colonial officials over many years of occupation. Added to this list could also be a comprehensive road and railways system, a legal and educational infrastructure, architecture and engineering works, Christianity, and medical and scientific research industries. Given that the Empire ruled through a continual show of prestige in order to negate the use of military force as much as possible, such demonstrations of superiority were necessary tools for the political domination of the many by the few. However, the demise of the Empire has left a legacy consisting of more than infrastructure and architecture; the mixture of British and Indian people led not only to the creation of the Anglo-Indians but a realization that identity was a process of consciously forming and reforming of the self, in line with modernist sociological developments. Almost certainly, this was not the intention of the ruling British colonials, as it calls into question the displays of prestige that the Empire relied upon. Such an ideology opposed the essentialism that divided the races in the name of superiority at the outset of Empire. The Anglo-Indians played a pivotal role in embracing this ideology, due to the ability they demonstrate to identify with both British and Indian cultures as the passing figure similarly switches between
personas. Ralph Singh is perceptive in noting how ‘the empires of our time were short-lived, but they have altered the world forever; their passing away is their least significant feature.’.

Whilst bringing together the postcolonial figure and the passing figure to explore the use of hybridity in Anglo-Indian literature, I have invoked a number of critical perspectives in order to illustrate the varied ways in which postcolonialism can approach the multiplicity of identity. Given both the increase and nature of criticism directed towards poststructuralism and deconstruction over the last two decades, a return to Fanon’s idea of the self as constructed in relation to wider society seems an appropriate direction in which to turn. Fanon suggests that the black man is constructed in relation to the white man:

White civilization and European culture have forced an existential deviation on the Negro. I shall demonstrate elsewhere that what is often called the black soul is a white man’s artefact.

According to Fanon, the colonial self is constructed by a wider society dominated by white men. An existential position such as this is significant not least because the existentialist politics supporting such a theoretical position is correlative with the critical perspectives I have adopted within this study. Furthermore, in reading the passing figure from a theoretical position rooted in the relationship between self and society, the dramatic performance employed can be accounted for more successfully. In the same way in which existentialist thought rejects traditional methods of philosophy as being too far removed from actual lived human experience, poststructuralist theories on the postcolonial figure can also be criticized. For example, in adopting R.D. Laing to explore Gibreel’s false-self system the connection between a fragmented self or hybridity, and the performance of a false self to an audience are shown to be related processes of identity construction through performativity. Similarly, Goffman’s “front” is informed by an existentialist politics merging micro-social and macro-social investigations of the performativity of the self.

I have suggested, as far as possible, the continuation of Fanon’s existentialist concern of the self and society as intrinsically relational. The first two chapters of this study, focusing upon dialogical self theory and R.D. Laing, attempt to situate the fragmented identity of the postcolonial/passing figure within an interior psychological framework. The passing figure is viewed as a collection of selves consciously constructed and demonstrating a degree of stability. Ralph Singh’s meta-position overcomes his displaced condition of postcoloniality.
and Gibreel, although schizophrenic, is operating within a normative framework in light of both Taylor and Cohen’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s work on the splitting of self as a normative act. Developing from the self as an individual construction is the self in relation to wider social structures, observed in Chapters Three and Four through Fish’s “interpretive communities” and Goffman’s “front”. These chapters illustrate the passing figures complicity in the public interaction event where identity becomes multiple in audience interpretations. For example, Haroon, Karim and Shahid become passing figures when performing before audiences who (re)construct the pass in light of their own interpretive strategies. Similarly, Jas may perform a textbook pass in front of the rudeboy group to which he is attempting to assimilate, however, the authentication of his identity stems from their interpretation of his performance. At any point they may choose to disbelieve the performance he gives and consequently his performance must “slip” before its audience. The self can only be performed in relation to a position in a wider social structure.

There are many alternative approaches this research could have taken in forging a connection between the passing figure and the displaced postcolonial figure. As previously discussed, the literature of passing is closely enmeshed with the socio-historical location of the American South. It would be an interesting and significant step forward in postcolonialism if further research were to investigate the passing figure in other geographical and temporal postcolonial cultures. All too often, postcolonialism is accused of a Eurocentric agenda that neglects the specificities unique to each occurrence of postcoloniality as a lived condition. If the passing figure is to become a useful concept to postcolonialism in offering a further understanding of the hybrid identity, then it is crucial that the passing figure be applied to a variety of geographical and temporal locations in order to combat the Eurocentrism seemingly inherent in postcolonialism today.

In the study of the construction of identity, the adoption of the passing figure by postcolonial writers can take multiple forms. Other expressions of a cultural identity which can be rejected or adopted can be noted in a cursory reading of modern postcolonial “British” literature. For example, an overlooked and perhaps significant feature of many postcolonial British writers is the employment of a very British style of humour for their characters. Despite the varied heritage that many of these characters can claim, their portrayal is often one of comedic value through plot, dialogue and imagery. Humour may be read as another indication of the cultural foundation of identity, easily adopted to display a British identity regardless of racial heritage. Given the vast range of texts which could be labelled as comedic, I would suggest that such methods of blurring the boundaries between identities are
worthy of further investigation, perhaps offering a further illustration of the hybrid figures adoption and rejection of cultural behaviours. Specifically, this approach could be adopted in reading Hanif Kureishi and Zadie Smith. For example, Kureishi’s *The Buddha of Suburbia* opens with Haroon asserting his desire to practice his meditation before Karim, during which the following conversation takes place:

‘I must practice,’ he said in a stifled voice.
‘Practice for what?’ I said reasonably, watching him with interest and suspicion.
‘They’ve called me for the damn yoga Olympics,’ he said. He easily became sarcastic, dad.  

Haroon’s sarcastic style of humour may be said to replicate a typical British mode of comedy, invoking associations with a distinctly British male form of humorous dialogue. We can take Haroon’s response to Karim’s bisexuality as a further example of his adoption of an English identity relayed through humour:

He was disappointed in me. He jumped up and down in anguish as if he’d just heard the whole house had been burned to the ground. I didn’t know what to do. So I started to imitate the voice he’d used earlier with the advertisers and Eva.
‘Relax, dad. Relax your whole body from your fingers to your toes and send your mind to a quiet garden where—’
‘I’ll send you to a fucking doctor to have your balls examined!’

The very Western response to homosexuality is contrasted to Karim’s parody of Haroon’s Eastern mysticism with the result that although the scene is comedic, it is also very revealing of the identity Haroon has constructed for himself in his period of domicile in Britain. His Eastern self is subjected to slippage by his outburst and his curiously Western sarcastic response to Karim, ‘I’ll send you to a fucking doctor to have your balls examined!’, belies a British identity.

Comedy is an ambivalent mode for the postcolonial writer to adopt. Laughing necessitates a degree of detachment from the object of humour. Henri Bergson notes ‘the absence of feeling which usually accompanies laughter.’ Bergson does make the significant connection, however, between individual laughter and a wider social function. He offers the
example of sitting on a train and overhearing a humorous conversation held by a group sitting close by. The group may laugh heartily, and if the lone passenger was to be a member of that group, may well find themselves laughing alongside them. However, as he is not a group member, he feels no desire or compulsion to join in with the laughter. As such, laughter ‘always implies a kind of secret freemasonry, or even complicity, with other laughers, real or imaginary.’ In Bergson’s study of laughter, he argues that ‘It must have a social signification.’ Taking Bergson’s example of the group complicity in producing laughter, the postcolonial writer’s adoption of comedy is potentially suggestive of new readings of the construction of identity. The ability to join in with group laughter illustrates the accessibility of certain ontological spaces and acts as a visible confirmation of membership to that group. Haroon’s adoption of a British style of humour suggests he has access to the knowledge that informs such a comedic style and his joining in with the comedy of a group of Englishmen illustrates his professed membership to that group, confirming his identification as British. The use of personal comedy to indicate a wider social identification furthers the Fanon-inspired approach adopted in this study which seeks to connect the individual self and a wider social structure in identity formation.

The position Haroon occupies, the postcolonial migrant who employs comedy to initiate group acceptance, is detailed more precisely by Angelia Poon, whose considers Mary Seacole’s *Wonderful Adventures of Mrs. Seacole in Many Lands* (1857). She argues that ‘Seacole makes a joke out of her position as colonial mimic’, engaging with Homi Bhabha’s formulation of mimicry as ‘“not quite/not white”’. For Poon, Seacole’s text is characterized by a sense of license and theatricality: there is both the impression that she revels in her performance of Englishness and that she creates a position for her readers to be suitably indulgent and appreciative of her often comic performance. Humour and the inside knowledge that makes some privy to a joke thus functions as a way of naturalizing Mary Seacole's relationship to Englishness.

Critically, Poon refers to the theatricality and performance of an Englishness derived from playing the comic figure. The adoption of humour to suggest an English identity is a prime example of a politics of performance in operation. Presumably, it would be as easy to adopt the style of humour relevant to another identity group and profess an identity akin to that
group, rendering the identity displayed by the comedic figure as a constructed performance. Poon also notes the significance of ‘inside knowledge’, or the access to supposedly restricted ontological spaces. The transgression of these spaces calls into question the role of essentialism in identity construction, demonstrating a method through which another identity may be adopted. The shared experience of laughter furthermore confirms the hybrid status of the performer, at once they are accepted as portraying an authentic identity but simultaneously that identity is ridiculed and made the object of laughter. As a result, for Mary Seacole, the ability to share a joke with other Englishmen initiates the construction of a group based on their shared laughter, of which she is a fully active member. Poon is right to argue that humour naturalizes Seacole’s relationship to Englishness.

The construction of character is particularly significant in reading the comedy of a postcolonial text. The adoption of humour illustrates both a character’s self-identification and the writer’s implied identification of that character. Haroon at a later stage of the novel is pictured walking around London in a humorous scene that rejects his earlier identification with Englishness:

Then I thought I saw my father. As there were so few Asians in our part of London it could hardly have been anyone else, but the person had a scarf over most of his face and looked like a nervous bank robber who couldn’t find a bank.572

Harrow’s apparent inability to blend in with the crowd exacerbates his Indian identity, which as Karim points out, makes him stand out from the crowd in the first instance. Alternatively, there are moments in which Haroon’s Eastern identity is undercut by the presence of comedy in the novel, for example his portrayal of the Buddha figure as narrated by Karim:

Bubbles of laughter rose in my throat. I wondered if he were going to con them and sit there for an hour in silence (perhaps just popping out one mystical phrase such as, ‘Dried excrement sits on the pigeon’s head’) before putting his coat on and tramping off back to his wife, having bought the Chislehurst bourgeoisie to an exquisite understanding of their inner emptiness. Would he dare?573

Karim employs humour to ridicule his father’s adoption of an Eastern identity, realigning him once again to an English self. Quite obviously, Karim believes his father is a fraud Buddha,
indicated by the comedy line he uses to describe his father’s wisdom, ‘Dried excrement sits on the pigeon’s head’. Karim also adopts a comedy to help construct his own sense of self in the narrative, as is indicated in the following passage:

As the dentist’s nurse led me to the dentist’s chair and I nodded at him in greeting, he said, in a South African accent, ‘Does he speak English?’
‘A few words,’ I said.\textsuperscript{574}

The sarcastic response that Karim offers to the dentist’s stereotypical view of Karim highlights the inaccuracy of his remark. As well as employing a British style of comedy in the use of sarcasm, Karim also severely undercuts the assumptions made by the dentist and offers the reader confirmation of his intention to be identified as British. The shared laugh between Karim and the reader of the text constructs a group identity of which Karim is a central part, placing his location in opposition to the opinion formed by the dentist.

Haroon and Karim, like Mary Seacole, find themselves in an ambivalent position between English and other, a position that is often reiterated in their use of comedy. Poon offers a similar reading of Mary Seacole and her description of being the first woman to enter Sebastopol with relief supplies during the Crimean War and subsequent decision to pass as Queen Victoria in front of the Russian soldiers. Poon argues that Seacole’s engagement in passing is an ambivalent act:

The sheer incongruity and absurdity of the comparison is the obvious source of comedy here. Yet Seacole's casual inclusion of this incident in her text belies the boldness of her gesture in forcing the comparison between her own person and that of Victoria, Queen and mother of England. Despite the latent disruptiveness of this carnivalesque moment, such play can only be short-lived (as the war drew to a close) and ambivalent at best. For the laughter Seacole invites is a double-edged sword: at once destabilizing conventional ontological categories and hence suggestive of the precariousness of Englishness, while simultaneously reiterative of her subordinate position as the butt of a collective joke.\textsuperscript{575}
Haroon and Karim similarly negotiate an ambivalent position most of the time. However, they both successfully manage to reject Englishness as a monologic authority by illustrating the ease through which an imposter can convince a willing audience.

So far I have neglected to define the British style of humour, but Gerald Noonan has made some steps to identify the source of British comedy in an investigation into Canadian comedic writing. Canada is poised between both a British and an American style of comedy, indicative of their colonial history. As such, Noonan follows Stephen Leacock in making the distinction between an American style of humour based upon what can happen in the imagination and the use of exaggeration, contrasted to the British sense of humour predicated upon fact and what is literal. Noonan explains how the British style of humour has developed from the experience of Empire:

British humour, on the other hand, has historic reason to be literal and fact-oriented. The British Empire stretched out, from its small island base, from sun to sun. Her Majesty's order throughout the empire depended on efficient communication, on literal ties that bind, and loose, hard facts. Unlike the broad ever-extending expanse of the American frontier, where the tall-tale hyperbole merely escalated the already large-size national dream, the British Isles were conscious of layers of power that relied on precise networks of the literal.

The British style of comedy, defined by Leacock, hints at the history of imperialism suggesting the significance of postcolonial writers adopting the British humour to include themselves in the national identity. If humour is an expression of the colonial construction of Englishness, the postcolonial migrant’s adoption of this mode of expression to portray a British identity illustrates the failings of the imperial ideology of prestige and the imperviousness of Englishness to invasions of the other. Noonan refers to R.E. Watters in defining the Canadian style of humour, who suggests that it reflects both British and American cultural contexts:

As a people bent on self-preservation, Canadians have had to forego two luxuries: that of forgetting themselves in gay abandon and that of losing their tempers in righteous wrath. Yet there is a kind of humor that combines full understanding of the contending forces with a wry recognition of one's ineffectiveness in controlling them-a humor in
which one sees himself as others see him but without any admission that this outer man is a truer portrait than the inner—a humor based on the in-congruity between the real and the ideal, in which the ideal is repeatedly thwarted by the real but never quite annihilated. Such humor is Canadian.  

I would argue that we may transpose the postcolonial construction of Canadian humour into readings of British-Indian postcolonial novels. Like their Canadian counterparts, British-Indian writers have a partly English cultural heritage extending to humour, but also a comedy heritage distinctly other. Self-perception in the postcolonial comic hints at the duality Watters refers to in seeing oneself as others see but also knowing that the outer performed self is not what is real. We can see such a definition of Canadian humour in Poon’s reading of Mary Seacole, wherein she fully participates in the portrayal of a British identity yet is always aware that others will see her as something other in her humorous attempts to pass as Queen Victoria.

Characterization appears to be an integral aspect of postcolonial comedy. Given the preoccupation of postcolonial texts with identity, the development of character is hardly surprising. Like Hanif Kureishi, Zadie Smith borrows from a Dickensian mode of characterization which is influenced by the British tradition of caricature. Monica Ali has also been aligned with a Dickensian style of characterization in a review by *The Observer*.  

The development of character has an integral place in British comedy. “Character” as a form of comedy has its roots in Restoration comedies. Edward Chauncey Baldwin notes how “The English character-sketch, or “character” as it came universally to be called in the seventeenth century, was a short account usually in prose, of the properties, qualities, or peculiarities that serve to individualize a type.” Ben Johnson is attributed with popularizing the character sketch.  

Zadie Smith is particularly adept at constructing the humorous character, as *White Teeth*’s Alsana illustrates. Her comedic appearance and manners are manifested in a form of textual visual comedy. Imagery of her dramatic actions lends her character a uniqueness that stands her apart from others in the novel, perhaps more specifically, the Chalfens whom are the antithesis to Alsana and Samad. For example, in one of Samad and Alsana’s frequent rows, her appearance assumes a comedic form:

‘Don’t, Alsi, I warn you-’
‘Oh, go on, you old pot-boiler!’ Alsana gathered her spare tyres around her like a sumo wrestler.\textsuperscript{582}

Bergson argues that ‘what is most comic of all is to become a category oneself into which others will fall, as into a ready-made frame; it is to crystallise into a stock character.’.\textsuperscript{583} Alsana has arguably become the stock character of both an unattractive wife and the passionate Indian woman prone to outbursts of temper. Smith appears to condone these stereotypes upon an initial reading of the text but it is possible that she employs the comedic mode to satirize these stock constructions. It is difficult to reconcile the image of Alsana we construct with any real-world people as her actions are indeed eccentric and unfamiliar. For example, if we look at another Samad and Alsana row we can confirm how extreme her “stock” behaviour really is. In the novel Alsana is pictured berating Samad for the lack of friends they have and a similar lack of food in the kitchen cupboards:

‘Who are they?’ She slammed her little fist on to the kitchen table, sending the salt and pepper flying, to collide spectacularly with each other in the air…But tell me,’ she shouted, returning to her favoured topic, ‘where is our food?’ Theatrically, she threw open every cupboard in the kitchen. ‘Where is it? Can we eat china?’ Two plates smashed to the floor. She patted her stomach to indicate her unborn child and pointed to the pieces. ‘Hungry?’…Alsana punched him full square in the stomach.

‘Samad Iqbal the traditionalist! Why don’t I just squat in the street over a bucket and wash clothes? Eh? In fact, what about my clothes? Edible?’

As Samad clutched his winded belly, there in the kitchen she ripped to shreds every stitch she had on and added them to the pile of frozen lamb, spare cuts from the restaurant. She stood naked before him for a moment, the yet small mound of her pregnancy in full view, then put on a long, brown coat and left the house.\textsuperscript{584}

Her actions are certainly comedic and confirm the stereotype of the passionate Indian woman ruled by emotions over reason, yet the absurdity of her behaviour at once negates any pretence at reality the novel may have constructed. As such, her characterization is undercut by suggestions of the fantastic.
Likewise, Neena, Alsana’s niece, is also heavily caricatured. Her epithet, ‘Niece-of-shame’, both constructs her as the outcast renegade to her traditionalist family and constructs Alsana as identifiable with an Eastern identity through her engagement in Eastern discourses of shame. For example,

it used to come in longer sentences, i.e., You have brought nothing but shame…or My Niece, the shameful…but now because Alsana no longer had the time or energy to summon up the necessary shock each time, it had become abridged to Niece-of-Shame, an all-purpose tag that summed up the general feeling.  

Significantly, Alsana’s inability to summon up the necessary shock each time she addresses her niece undercuts the image she constructs of her shameful. Her actions have since ceased to cause any aversion to Alsana and the whole interaction appears to have become nothing more than rhetoric. Bergson is specific to note on the subject of caricature that the caricaturist must detect often minute or minor feature of a person which would be revealed in a situation of extreme emotion and make it visible for all to see. Crucially, the caricaturist must work with a tendency of the subject which is present and not fictional, suggesting that although the fanciful nature of Smith’s literary caricatures seem extreme, they hint at a reality located within the character working to reinforce colonial stereotypes. The art of literary caricature is somewhat persuasive in altering our constructions of identity. Bergson notes a potentially significant facet of caricature when he suggests that repeated readings authorize the examples made by the caricaturist:

The caricaturist who alters the size of a nose, but respects its ground plan, lengthening it, for instance, in the very direction which it was being lengthened by nature, is really making the nose indulge in a grin. Henceforth we shall always look upon the original as having determined to lengthen itself and start grinning. In this sense, one might say that nature herself often meets with the successes of a caricaturist.

Given Bergson’s argument that nature will appear to meet with a successful caricature, we can suggest that the successful literary caricaturist will work to reinforce a particular image of
a character of stock type of characters and subsequent readings will appear to corroborate what the writer has identified as a character’s defining trait.

The identification of Smith’s characters is, like Kureishi, defined in some extent by the employment of her humorous narrative. When Archie attempts suicide, Mo offers him a response steeped in sarcasm, indicating a British style of humour:

‘No one gasses himself on my property, ‘Mo snapped as he marched downstairs. ‘We are not licensed.’ […] ‘Do you hear that, mister? We’re not licensed for suicides around here. This place Halal. Kosher, understand? If you’re going to die round here, my friend, I’m afraid you’ve got to be thoroughly bled first.’

Despite reinforcing his culture of Halal meat Mo also hints at a British cultural identification in his adoption of a style of humour based on the literal and factual, to take Leacock’s definition. Although heavily sarcastic, the humour stems from the fact that to slaughter meat on Mo’s premises means to conduct the process according to the rules of his religion. The process of Archie being killed in the same manner, although highly improbable has basis in fact and is on a literal level a truth. As such, Mo is not strictly restricted to an Indian identity, but has demonstrably adopted a British identity in his use of humour. In a similar fashion, Millat also adopts comedy to suggest a certain identification of his self. For example, the following interaction between Millat and Joyce, during which she questions him as to his origins, illustrates his firm conviction in his English identity:

‘You look very exotic. Where are you from, if you don’t mind me asking?’

‘Willesden,’ said Irie and Millat simultaneously.

‘Yes, yes, of course, but where originally?’

‘Oh,’ said Millat, putting on what he called his bud-bud-ding-ding accent. ‘You are meaning where from am I originally.’

Joyce looked confused. ‘Yes, originally.’

‘Whitechapel,’ said Millat, pulling out a fag. ‘Via the Royal London Hospital and the 207 bus.’

Millat’s performance of a ‘bud-bud-ding-ding accent’ indicates his non-identification with India, which would necessitate the absence of a performance to confirm itself. Instead his
adoption of a performed accent can only suggest he does not naturally identify with such an accent. Similarly, his grammatical errors, ‘You are meaning where from am I originally.’ also indicate a performed identity as it stands in contrast to his speech in the rest of the text. Millat’s Indian accent is complicit with the same accent adopted by Englishmen when laughing at the sound of an Indian accent in jokes and sketches. Indeed, it is frequently referred to as a ‘bud-bud-ding-ding accent’ in common English parlance. Millat’s complicity in his adoption of this performed accent illustrates his real affiliation with British culture. Furthermore, his sarcastic response, ‘Whitechapel,’ said Millat, pulling out a fag. ‘Via the Royal London Hospital and the 207 bus.’, operates in line with the British style of humour defined by Leacock as rooted in facts and the literal, further identifying Millat as British.

Millat’s possibly harsh response to Joyce demonstrates a prime intention of comedy, the desire to correct social transgressions. For Bergson, comedy fulfils this very purpose:

Laughter is above all, a corrective. Being intended to humiliate, it must make a painful impression on the person against whom it is directed. By laughter, society avenges itself for the liberties taken with it. It would fail in its object if it bore the stamp of sympathy or kindness.\(^\text{s90}\)

Millat’s reception of Joyce’s questioning as indicative of stereotypical or racist views find both punishment and solution in the comedy he introduces to the situation. Both Joyce and the reader are warned off from making the same mistake again regarding making an assumption of identity based upon skin colour through his making them the subject of his humour and the resulting public humiliation and simultaneously, as a result of their humiliation, he offers a solution in the transference of knowledge that the racial signifier of skin colour is not an effective totalizer of identity.

However, not all postcolonial writers are happy to introduce comedic elements into their texts. Pritchard notes Naipaul’s recent admission to his biographer Patrick French that The Mimic Men contains a distinct lack of comedy:

The Mimic Men was “an important book for the cultural emptiness in colonial people. But it is very dry.”\(^\text{s91}\)

For Pritchard, Naipaul’s rejection of comedy is significant:
This statement is of significance for suggesting that “importance”—the serious treatment of colonial, cultural emptiness—can better be brought out without the distractions of humor, of comedy. "Dryness" is presumably in the service of a larger import; or so, it seems, Naipaul convinced himself, turning his back on the comic sensibility central to his novels thus far—as well as to The Novel—in favor of something larger.592

Consequently, we can assume that humor has a role to play as is evidenced by Hanif Kureishi and Zadie Smith among others, yet it is not an all-pervasive feature of the postcolonial text. Humor can be conspicuous in its absence, as Naipaul's texts, specifically The Mimic Men and The Enigma of Arrival, would appear to suggest.

The methodology of reading the postcolonial figure alongside the passing figure in order to underpin hybridity with a notion of performativity is a versatile mode of re-reading postcolonial literature. This study acts as a springboard for discussions of the passing figure allowing a variety of seemingly unrelated theories to be considered in an interdisciplinary fashion. Such an approach signifies the myriad of future directions such a methodology may take, one of which I have endeavoured to describe briefly here. Crucial to such a thesis, however, is the understanding of performance as the modern ideology driving the construction of self. Erving Goffman's dramaturgical method is undeniably useful in reading the literature of postcolonialism as well as gender, in that it illustrates the conscious input of individuals in the formation of identity. I have also shown how identity is a social process constantly in flux, audiences may change, and their interpretive strategies are by no means stable either. As with the postmodern dissolution of the grand narrative, the master racial ideology of identity has also become fragmented and subject to intense scrutiny. Emerging from the fragments are composites of personas, hybrid figures who can pass themselves off as different identities, depending on how they decide to perform their own versions of themselves. Identity construction in the postcolonial figure lacks the certainty of nineteenth-century essentialism. Passing figures become actors whose identity is a self-determined concept, lending support to Jaques’ often quoted line from Shakespeare’s As You Like It:

‘All the world’s a stage,
And all the men and women merely players’.593
Conclusion

The argument I have made in this dissertation for viewing the postcolonial migrant as a person engaged in the act of passing serves to illustrate a fundamental reliance on the adoption of performativity when constructing an identity. If the migrant or passing figure has access to two or more established cultural or racial centres from which they can construct their personas, both can be afforded a more or less equal authority in the identity displayed by the individual. As such, the individual can consciously choose what identity he or she wishes to assume at any given moment. Such multiplicity is predicated on the notion that identity is the product of a performative mechanism. This mechanism allows for the migrant figure to effectively adopt or reject whole identities or elements of identities at will, in the same way that a passing figure can re-mould an identity. My dissertation has argued that the multiple identity is best thought of through an existentalist philosophy, rather like that described by Sartre in *Existentialism is a Humanism*. The individual is shaped by involvement in a wider social structure which is in turn shaped by those contained within. Sartre notes how our created identities reflect an image of what we believe society should be, which likewise means that society is the reflection of what individuals believe it should be. Chapters One and Two illustrate how the hybrid person can be studied as an individual suggesting that contemporary poststructuralist concerns may be more detrimental than productive in facilitating a full understanding of the experience of multiplicity. Alternatively, Chapters Three and Four link the individual to the wider social sphere and show how multiplicity is constructed in the interactive spaces between people and groups of people. Again, poststructuralism, as a master-narrative in the field of postcolonial identity, is critiqued in favour of Sartre and Fanon’s existentialist framework.

More implicitly, but perhaps more significantly, I have suggested that all identity (irrespective of whether involved in colonial/postcolonial politics or not) can be approached through the same performative framework. Given the potential pervasiveness of my argument that all identity is predicated on the adoption of performativity as a mechanism complicit in the act of passing, my work has significant ramifications for the fields of identity studies and postcolonialism, amongst other areas of cultural inquiry. Specifically, my research could be adopted by a growing number of scholars working on defining and theorizing the construction of the multiple identity. For example, Stephanie Rose Bird’s *Light, Bright, and Damned Near White: Biracial and Triracial Culture in America* (2009) questions the
effectiveness of identity boundaries in contemporary America. Her focus on biracial and triracial categories of identity suggest a need to move beyond simple binaristic thinking on identity. One method for theorizing on such multiple and fragmented constructions can be the act of passing discussed in my work. With a plethora of potential identities that can be created from an individual with two, three or more cultural and racial heritages, a flexible framework such as is offered by the performative act of passing is necessary to theorize the seemingly ever-shifting identity displayed by that individual. The passing figure allows for the construction of an identity where the knowledges required to participate in multiple identities are present. Bird’s biracial and triracial subjects could be quite usefully considered as engaging in temporary acts of performance in the switches between one identity and another.

However, the postcolonial project of dismantling identity boundaries is threatened by Linda Hutcheon’s postmodern paradox. Sinéad Moynihan notes in her book, *Passing into the Present: Contemporary American Fiction of Racial and Gender Passing* (2010), that Linda Hutcheon’s postmodern paradox at once acknowledges both the inherent instability of identity categories whilst reinforcing their presence through recognitions of their authority. Essentially, when an individual transgresses an identity boundary they will reveal its ineffectiveness as a category yet also reinforce its presence through the fact that any movement is considered transgressive and draws attention to its presence. Present research into diasporic literature and wider investigations into postcolonial identity have failed to find a way to negotiate the affirmative qualities of the postmodern paradox. Future research surrounding multiplicity could profit from appropriating mechanisms such as passing and performance in order to navigate around the theoretical impasse which implicitly endows “pure” identities with an authoritative status. By recognizing the performative nature of all identity, no single monolithic notion of identity can be invested with an authoritative status, perhaps offering one solution to the postmodern paradox of multiplicity. Taken to extremes, if all identity is performative, then every persona is constructed from a vast number of boundary transgressions to the point that such transgressions become normative, hence divesting them of any “transgressive” status and simultaneously removing their authority as a divisive structure. This constitutes one potential future development of the research I have conducted. Doubtless, there are more besides. The developing fields of research into the phenomenon of passing and postcolonial identity are dynamic and rapidly shaping themselves anew, not unlike the identities upon which they focus.
2 Ibid., 9.
33 Ibid., 15.
4 Ibid., 15.
5 Ibid., 17.
6 Ibid., 22.
7 Ibid., 26.
8 Ibid., 24.
12 Ibid., 31.
13 Ibid., 34.
14 Ibid., 33.
15 Ibid., 34.
16 Many critics have interpreted *The Satanic Verses*, and Rushdie’s work in general as being “postmodern”. For example, Sabrina Hassumani in her text *Salman Rushdie* (2002) reads his major works from a combined poststructuralist and postmodern perspective suggesting that Saladin deconstructs the colonizer/colonized binary and inhabits a “third space”. Consequently, this allows Rushdie to expose other myths such as Islam (Sabrina Hassumani, *Salman Rushdie: A Postmodern Reading of His Major Works* (Rosemont Publishing, USA: 2002) 135. The link between a postmodern literary mode and the exposition of Islam becomes a dominant theme in readings of his texts. This idea is extended in critics including Ziauddin Sardar who notes that *The Satanic Verses* ‘seeks to consign the Grand Narrative of Islam to the rubbish heap of history’ (see Ziauddin Sardar, *Postmodernism and The Other: New Imperialism of Western Culture*, (Pluto Press, London: 1998) 182.).
17 Stephen Morton also argues that the conventions of the textual mode adopted by Rushdie work to subvert his attempt to engage with the historicizing of Islam due to a textual instability present in numerous binary oppositions (Stephen Morton, “Postcolonial Secularism and Literary Form in Salman Rushdie’s *The Satanic Verses*” in *Salman Rushdie: Contemporary Critical Perspectives* Ed by Robert Eaglestone and Martin McQuillan pp. 45-58 (Bloomsbury, London: 2013) 58.)
However, not all critics agree that Rushdie should be read as a “postmodernist”. Aijaz Ahmad notes that if Rushdie is a postmodernist, he is so in the sense that he is a modernist who displays ‘distinct articulations and emphases in which he clearly exceeds that basic formation.’. Ahmad reminds the reader of Lyotard in that postmodernism is ‘a set of tendencies within Late Modernism itself’ (both quotes from Aijaz Ahmad, *In Theory*, 137). Catherine Cundy similarly writes that ‘to acknowledge even this high degree of engagement in Rushdie’s writing with the vocabulary of postmodernism is not to see the label of ‘postmodern text’ as sufficient in itself for explaining the various impulses and projects within his work.’ (Catherine Cundy, *Salman Rushdie* (Manchester University Press, Manchester: 1996) 103.). The adoption of a postmodern perspective in Rushdie’s work may lead to the oversight of certain key features of the texts that may be critical if reading Rushdie from a postcolonial perspective. For example, Stephen Baker in his text *The Fiction of Postmodernity* discusses the dream sequences of *The Satanic Verses* in terms of the debate in the text between secularism and theism rather than as an identity crisis. Baker refrains from discussing the moral or immoral intent of the dream sequences:

> Without necessarily ascribing to the dreams some form of didactic, moral (or immoral) intent, which would have to rely on a clear understanding of the intentions of the narrator, it nonetheless remains important to acknowledge them as Gibreel’s unconscious attempt to discover a reconstituted religious or transcendent sense, to fill up the God-shaped void. (Stephen Baker, *The Fiction of Postmodernity* (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham: 2000) 185.)

For Baker, the dream sequences form a part of the struggle between secularism and theism as identified by a postmodern reading of the novel. However, it fails to account for the experiential content of Gibreel’s dreams as a part of his ongoing identity quest. Baker notes an absence of the narrator’s intentions and this appears to restrict his reading of those key sections of the novel. My own existentialist framework allows for a fuller understanding of those dream sequences to be acquired and contextualises it within the concerns of a postcolonial identity crisis by focusing upon the experiential aspects of these magic realist events.
19 See also Aijaz Ahmad’s, *In Theory* (1992). Within this text Ahmad attempts to ‘mark a break with the existing theoretical formation both methodologically and empirically, and to base alternative ways of periodization, for theoretical production as a whole and for individual authors, not on discrete developments within literary theory but at points of confluence between literary theory, other kinds of theories and the worlds whose knowledge these theories offer.’ Crucially, Ahmad notes that his purpose (which is remarkably similar to my own objective) ‘necessarily involves raising the suppressed questions of institutional site and individual location’ showing he is aware also of the significance of location in line with Ahluwalia’s own critique. Both quotes taken from Aijaz Ahmad, *In Theory: Nations, Classes, Literatures* (Verso, London, 2008) 7.
20 Ibid., 140.
21 Ibid., 140.
22 Ibid., 141.
23 Ibid., 141.
24 Ibid., 141.
28 Ibid., 1266.
29 The Yale School was particularly influenced by Derrida’s method of deconstruction and included notable academics such as Geoffrey Hartman, J. Hillis Miller, Harold Bloom, Barbara Johnson and the now controversial Paul de Man.
31 Ibid., 1273.
34 Ibid., 19.
35 Ibid., 19.
36 Ibid., 19.
37 Ibid., 5.
38 Ibid., 5.
39 Ibid., 5.
40 Ibid., 5.
41 Ibid., 6.
42 Ibid., 187.
43 Ibid., 187.
44 Ibid., 203.
45 Ibid., 208.
46 Ibid., 209.
47 Ibid., 209.
48 Ibid., 209.
49 Ibid., 213.
50 Ibid., 220.
51 Ibid., 220-221.
53 Ibid., 5.
54 Ibid., 5.
55 Ibid., 81
56 Ibid., 81
57 Ibid., 81
58 Ibid., 81
59 Ibid., 4.
60 Ibid., 4.
Ibid., 14
66 Ibid., 13-14.
67 Ibid., 14.
68 Ibid., 47.
69 Ibid., 47.
70 Ibid., 129.
71 Ibid., 129.
72 Ibid., 129.
73 Ibid., 129.
74 *http://www2.lingue.unibo.it/acume/acumedvd/Essays%20ACUME/Norris.pdf* 18.
75 Aijaz Ahmad, *In Theory* 36.
76 Ibid., 37.
77 Ibid., 38.
78 Ibid., 38.
80 Ahmad, *In Theory* 38.
81 Jasper Goss, “Postcolonialism: Subverting Whose Empire?,” *Third World Quarterly* 17, no. 2 (1996) 244.
83 Ibid., 278.
85 Pourgouris, “Rey Chow and the Hauntological Spectres of Poststructuralism,” 278.
86 Ibid., 280.
87 Ibid., 280.
89 Pourgouris, “Rey Chow and the Hauntological Spectres of Poststructuralism,” 278.
91 Ibid., 241.
93 Ibid., 189.
97 Ibid., 69.
98 LaRose T. Parris, “Frantz Fanon: Existentialist, Dialectician, and Revolutionary,” 8.
99 Ibid., 10.
100 Ibid., 12.
101 Sartre, *Existentialism is a Humanism* 22.
102 Ibid., 53.
103 Ibid., 22.
104 Ibid., 23.
105 Ibid., 24.
106 Ibid., 24.
107 Ibid., 25.
108 Ibid., 39.
110 Ibid., 33.
111 Ibid., 33.
112 Ibid., 33.

Ibid., 34.

Anjali Prabhu, “Narration in Frantz Fanon’s “Peau Noire Masques Blancs” 193.


Jean-Paul Sartre, “Preface”, in Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London: Penguin, 2001) 19


James D. Le Sueur, Uncivil War: Intellectuals and Identity Politics During the Decolonization of Algeria, (University of Nebraska Press, 2006) 159.


Ibid., 181.


Shirley Anne Tate, Black Skins, Black Masks: Hybridity Dialogism Performativity (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) 82.


Ibid., 180.


Hollinger, “The One Drop Rule & the One Hate Rule,” 18.


Ibid., 83.

Ibid., 83-84.

Young, Colonial Desire 50.

A further example of the more flexible British attitude towards race can be found in the ‘racialized cultural assumptions’ made towards the Irish. Often seen as “black” and described as “simian” despite white skin these attitudes demonstrate how race theory allowed for relative flexibility in identifying and categorizing people (Robert J.C. Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race (Oxon: Routledge, 2006) 72.). Race was less about skin tone than about a wider cultural set of behaviours that could be linked to a schema loosely called “race”. The Irish ‘represented a particular threat as a debased or degenerated form of whiteness.’ (John Brannigan, Race in Modern Irish Literature and Culture (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009) 180.). It is because of this view that Brannigan claims that ‘The Irish were thus an anomaly, an aberration, in an otherwise effective visual schema of racial distinction, and it is this anomalous position—a ‘white colony’ in an empire premised upon white superiority […] which has absorbed the attention of some of the most astute analyses of Irish cultural history in recent decades.’(Ibid., 180.) If, as in the example provided by representations
of the Irish, we can accept that skin colour as racial signifier has lost a great deal of authority, the locus is transferred to cultural conceptions of identity construction in its place. As such, it is open to changes in different places and times.


145 Louis Wirth, "Types of Nationalism," *The American Journal of Sociology* 41, no. 6 (1936): 733.


149 Stark, *Hostages to India* 22-23.


154 Ibid., 41.


157 Ibid., 200.

158 Ibid., 202.

159 Ibid., 202.


162 Ibid., 178-79.


164 Ibid., 2.

165 Ibid., 2.

166 Ibid., 2.

167 Ibid., 2.

168 Ibid., 2.

169 Ibid., 2.


171 Ibid., 180.


175 Ibid., 14-15.

176 Ibid., 15.

177 Ibid., 15.


181 Ibid., 16-17.

Ibid., 9.


Naipaul, *The Mimic Men* 27.


Ibid., 57.

Ibid., 97.

Ibid., 97.

Ibid., 97.


Ibid., 167.

Naipaul, *The Mimic Men* 158.

Ibid., 242.

Ibid., 167.


Ibid., 153-54.

Naipaul, *The Enigma of Arrival* 199.


Ibid., 17.


Ibid., 20.

Naipaul, *The Enigma of Arrival* 141-42.


Naipaul, *The Mimic Men* 32.

Ibid., 32.

Ibid., viii.

Ibid., vii.


Ibid., 305.


Ibid., 205.

Ibid., 274.


Ibid., 160-61.

Ibid., 119.

Ibid., 119.

Ibid., 189.


Ibid., 3.

Ibid., 7.

Ibid., 85.
236 Ibid., 7.
237 Ibid., 19.
238 Ibid., 39.
239 Ibid., 10.
240 Ibid., 28-29.
241 Ibid., 200.
242 Ibid., 274.
244 Ibid., 168.
245 Ibid., 504-05.
246 Ibid., 108.
247 Ibid., 200.
248 Ibid., 274.
250 Ibid., 168.
251 Ibid., 504-05.
252 Ibid., 108.
253 Ibid., 200.
254 Ibid., 274.
255 Ibid., 2.
256 Ibid., 2.
257 Ibid., 2.
260 Ibid., 409.
263 There were several significant incidents of bombings in book stores which sold the novel, a number of which occurred in London.
264 It should perhaps be noted that blasphemers are held in a similar contempt as paedophiles are in the West according to Anthony McRory (Anthony McRory, *Why Muslims Feel Angry About the Rushdie Knighthood* (http://www.circlebakote.com/forum/index.php?topic=34.0, 2007 cited 19/11 2012.).)
265 In 2007, Rushdie was quoted as saying he still receives a “‘sort of valentine’s card’” on 14th February each year reminding him that Iran has not forgotten the fatwa it pledged. However, the same article in ‘The Hindu’, also quotes Rushdie as saying that “‘It’s reached the point where it’s a piece of rhetoric rather than a real threat.”’ (Rushdie’s Term, (www.thehindu.com/2007/02/15/stories/2007021501382200.htm, 2007 [cited 19/11 2012]).).
270 Qadri Ismail, "A Bit of This and a Bit of That: Rushdie's Newness,” *Social Text*, no. 29 (1991): 121.
271 Ibid., 121.
There is evidence that Derrida returned to his Jewish sources for philosophical development, especially in his later work when he turned towards ethics. Mikics writes that 'Derrida turned to Jewish tradition and, at different moments, to Nietzsche in order to stake a far wider claim for his philosophy…He assumes a prophetic tone in his treatment of Lévinas and Jabès, suggesting that an ethical demand connected to Judaism was somehow implicit in the deconstructive project.’ (David Mikics, Who Was Jacques Derrida: An Intellectual Biography (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009) 139.)

Derrida’s deconstruction is connected to his own experiences between established cultural centres, meaning Derrida was himself something of a hybrid figure. He was born in El Biar, French Algeria in 1930. His family were Sephardic Jews, which serves to complicate his identity further still. He left Algeria in 1949 at nineteen years of age but later returned as a soldier serving the French army and as a teacher in 1957-59 during the War (Mustapha Cherif, Islam and the West: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008) xiii.). For Baring, Derrida was torn between a colonial power for which he felt misgivings and a French republican tradition to which he felt a strong allegiance. Perhaps as a consequence, ‘Derrida was confronted with questions as to the univocity of identity and the structural limitations of critique-themes that would preoccupy him in his more theoretical writings. Derrida first developed deconstructive ideas during this period, from the tortured political stance of a French Algerian liberal.’ (Edward Baring, "Liberalism and the Algerian War: The Case of Jacques Derrida," Critical Inquiry 36, no. 2 (2010): 241.). To reinforce his unique position, Derrida himself once stated regarding the French Algerian colonial War how ‘some, including myself, experienced it from both sides, if I may say so.’” (Cherif, Islam and the West 35.). In this respect, he fully resembles our hybrid, migrant figures and postcolonialism’s links to deconstruction hardly need explanation.

Rushdie, The Satanic Verses 123.


Ibid., 25.

Ibid., 26.

Ibid., 28-29.

Ibid., 29.

Ibid., 31.

Ibid., 193.

Ibid., 193.

Jasper Goss, "Postcolonialism: Subverting Whose Empire?,” 244.


Ibid., 68.

Ibid., 71.

Ibid., 71.

Ibid., 76.

Ibid., 76.

Ibid., 76-77.


Ibid., 24.

Ibid., 26.

Ibid., 26.

Ibid., 26.

Ibid., 26.

Ibid., 26.

Ibid., 26.

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Laing, The Divided Self 80.

Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth 201.


Waniek, "The Schizoid Implied Authors of Two Jewish-American Novels," 23.

Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 5.

Brian McHale, *Postmodernist Fiction* 37.


Ibid., 348.

Laing, *The Divided Self* 68-69.


Ibid., 192.


Ibid., 103.

Ibid., 110.

Ibid., 457.

Ibid., 83.

Ibid., 83.

Ibid., 205.

Ibid., 92.

Ibid., 143.

Ibid., 234.

Ibid., 157-68.

Laing, *The Divided Self* 105.

Ibid., 105.

Rushdie, *The Satanic Verses* 123.

Laing, *The Divided Self* 102.

Ibid., 79.

Ibid., 81.


Ibid., 544.

Ibid., 432.

Ibid., 448.


Stanley E. Fish, "Interpreting the "Variorum"," *Critical Inquiry* 2, no. 3 (1976): 483.


Ibid., 45-50.

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Ibid., 99.

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Ibid., 302.
Ibid., 313.
Ibid., 333.
Ibid., 354.
Ibid., 24.
Ibid., 41.
Ibid., 131-32.
Ibid., 209.
Ibid., 317.
Young, *Colonial Desire* 3.
Kureishi, *Hanif Kureishi: Collected Screenplays 1* 94.
Ibid., 119.
Young, *Colonial Desire* 3.
Kureishi, *Hanif Kureishi: Collected Screenplays 1* 140.
Kureishi, *The Black Album* 133.
Ibid., 354.
Ibid., 163.
Ibid., 145.
Ibid., 176.
Ibid., 24.
Kureishi, *The Black Album* 16.
Ibid., 52.
Ibid., 92.
Ibid., 181.
Ibid., 106-08.
Ibid., 79.
Ibid., 147.
Ibid., 274.
Shusterman, "Neither/Nor," 44.
Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class?* 3.
Ibid., 226.
Ibid., 220.
Ibid., 221.
Ibid., 236.
Ibid., 120.
Robinson, "It Takes One to Know One," 716.
Ibid., 19.
Ibid., 12-13 & 150-51.
Ibid., 212-13.
Ibid., 24-25.
Ibid., 26.
Ibid., 24.
Ibid., 64.
Ibid., 27.
Ibid., 250.
Ibid., 28.
Ibid., 263.
Ibid., 21.
Ibid., 26.
Ibid., 3.
Ibid., 53.
Ibid., 142.
Ibid., 141.
Kureishi, *The Buddha of Suburbia* 188-89.
Schoene, "Herald of Hybridity," 120.
Kureishi, *The Buddha of Suburbia* 213.
Ibid., 10.
Ibid., 10.
Ibid., 209.
Ibid., 87.
Ibid., 209 & 10.
Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class*? 3.
de Cacqueray, "Hanif Kureishi's Fragmentation of Self and Text in the Buddha of Suburbia," 166.
Goffman, *The Presentation of Self* 32.
Ibid., 2.
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Ibid.

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Ibid., 88.


Ibid., 3.

Ibid., 3.

Ibid., 21.

Ibid., 21.


Ibid., 139.

Ibid., 59-60.

Ibid., 70.

Ibid., xii.

Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus* 5.


Goffman, *The Presentation of Self* 32.

Ibid., 32 & 34.

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Ibid., 6.


Ibid., 4.

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Goffman, *The Presentation of Self* 35.
Ibid., 101.
Malkani, Londonstani 72.
Ibid., 3.
Ibid., 9.
Goffman, The Presentation of Self 37.
Malkani, Londonstani 149.
Ibid., 101.
Ibid., 6.
Ibid., 342.
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Sethi, "The Curse of Being Labelled the 'New Zadie'."
Malkani, Londonstani 3.
Ibid., 3.
Ibid., 4.
Ibid., 5.
Ibid., 85-86.
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Pattinson, Behind Enemy Lines 85.
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Pattinson, Behind Enemy Lines 86.
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Goffman, The Presentation of Self 66.
Ibid., 66.
Ibid., 66.
Ibid., 67.
Malkani, Londonstani 6.
Ibid., 7.
Ibid., 9.
Ibid., 12-13.
Ibid., 13.
Ibid., 147.
Ibid., 149.
Ibid., 101.
Ibid., 103.
Ibid., 122.
Ibid., 133.
Ibid., 132.
Goffman, The Presentation of Self 66.
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Malkani, Londonstani 194.
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Goffman, The Presentation of Self 20.
Malkani, Londonstani 340.
Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (Oxon: Routledge, 2007) xxiii.
Ibid., xxxi.
Goffman, The Presentation of Self 67.
Naipaul, The Mimic Men 32.
Nealon, "The Discipline of Deconstruction," 1266.
See Anne McClintock’s 1992 essay “The Angel of Progress: Pitfalls of the Term ‘Post-colonialism’” first published in *Social Text*. The essay is reprinted in her important book *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Imperial Contest* (1995) and other literary readers. Her discussion of the variances to be found in postcolonial countries questions the univocity of postcolonialism as a “first world” academic discourse capable of accurately theorising on the “third world”. The argument has been made repeatedly by other academics since, but McClintock’s essay is perhaps the first to do so and a seminal example of such a position.

A complex case in point could be both the Irish and Australian relationship to British imperialism. In the complete absence of a racial signifier and with a much closer cultural affiliation, the passing figure may well occupy a much more complex role in the postcolonial literature produced. Presumably, there is a lack of a premodernist essentialism informed by race theory for which the passing figure can employ the performative mechanism to react against a racially centred hegemony. The passing figure has a less pressing need to employ subversive political strategies in these two environments, illustrating the diversity of approaches required to formulate a postcolonial theory.

*Kureishi, The Buddha of Suburbia* 3-4.

Ibid., 18.


Ibid., 7.

Ibid., 8.


Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* 131.


*Kureishi, The Buddha of Suburbia* 64.

Ibid., 35.

Ibid., 258.


Noonan, "Canadian Duality and the Colonization of Humour," 914.


Ibid., 66.


Ibid., 63.


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Ibid., 319.

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