Lying: A Gricean Account

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Abstract

It is widely assumed that in order to lie, a speaker must at least assert a falsehood. I offer an analysis of lying based on the Gricean notion of communicative-intention and show how lying through assertion operates. I show that certain recently developed assertion-based accounts of lying are either problematic or at least not compelling. In defending an account of lying based on communicative-intention, I show how it is possible to lie in ways which do not involve assertion and how better to accommodate certain problematic cases than competing accounts.
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1 Introduction

My thesis is divided into three parts:

Asserting & Lying:

I present Williams' (2002) definition of lying to draw out certain connotations of lying, such as deception and assertion. I present my own definition of assertion, which has Grice's notion of communicative-intention as its base. I then present Grice's Co-operative Principle and Maxims to show how co-operative communication is achieved, generally. I am then able to describe how my account of assertion fits within this wider field of co-operative communication, demonstrating how speakers come to abuse the speech act of assertion in order to lie. I finalise this section by presenting my preliminary Gricean definition of lying.

Bald-Faced lies:

I defend my analysis of lying against the growing literature on so-called 'bald-faced lies', which are claimed to be cases of lying without the intent to deceive the addressee. The reason they are considered to be genuine lies is because they are assumed to be genuine assertions. I show that the account of assertion on which this claim rests is either problematic or at least not compelling. (For instance, defenders of bald-lies face difficulty distinguishing them from sarcastic remarks, assumptions, jokes, make-believe scenarios, etc.) I argue that bald-faced lies are not genuine lies, because they are not genuine assertions. In addition, I argue that it is likely that some people have the intuition that bald-faced lies are genuine lies because bald-faced lies share normative characteristics with genuine lies, though this is not sufficient to class them as genuine lies.

Lying with Implicatures:
Sorensen (2012), along with others, claims that all lies are assertions. He argues that you cannot lie using *conversational* implicatures, because conversational implicatures are not said, and so are not asserted. However, he argues that you can lie using *conventional* implicatures, because conventional implicatures are said, and so are asserted. I show that Sorensen’s account of lying with indicative conditionals is flawed, because it depends on Bach’s (1999) account of conventional implicatures, which misconstrues Grice’s original conception of conventional implicatures. I argue that conventional implicatures do not contribute to what is said, and so are not asserted. In addition, I argue that Sorensen, along with Adler (1997), Carson (2006), Fallis (2009), Saul (2012), and Stokke (2013), are wrong to think that you cannot lie using all (or any) implicatures. Instead, I suggest that since the crucial aspect of lying is not what is said, but what was communicatively-intended to be believed, all implicatures, as well assertions, are sufficient for lying. I adjust my preliminary Gricean definition of lying in order to rule-in cases of deception using assertions and implicatures, and present my final Gricean definition of lying.
2 Asserting & Lying

2.1 The Traditional Definition of Lying

Williams (2002) presents what has come to be known as the traditional definition of lying:

[A]n assertion, the content of which the speaker believes to be false, which is made with the intention to deceive the hearer with respect to that content (Williams (2002: 96)).

The traditional definition of lying has four necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. A must assert that p. For example, you do not lie if you deceive someone into believing that you have hair by wearing a wig. A must assert that p to an addressee. For example, you do not lie if you deceive someone who is eavesdropping on your conversation, whether you know of their presence or not. (Note, it is not necessary that there actually be an addressee, simply that you believe that you are asserting that p to an addressee.) A must intend that the addressee believe that p. For example, you do not lie if you assume that something false is true for the sake of argument or if you tell a joke. A must believe that p is false. For example, you do not lie if you say to someone what the time is when you have unknowingly acquired your information from a clock that is wrong. The traditional definition of lying seems to capture the fundamentals of lying. However, it is only a template, since the details regarding deception, content and assertion need to be filled in.

2.2 Deceiving & Misleading

‘Deceiving’ and ‘misleading’ are success terms. That is, if A deceives B, then B is deceived, and if A misleads B, then B is misled. In both cases, A causes B to believe that p when it is not the case that p. The difference between deceiving and misleading is that deceiving
necessarily involves intention, whereas misleading does not, necessarily. Therefore, if \( A \) deceives \( B \), then \( B \) is misled. But, if \( A \) misleads \( B \), then \( B \) is not necessarily deceived:

\[
\begin{align*}
(M) & \quad A \text{ misleads } B \text{ iff } A \text{ causes } B \text{ to believe that } p \text{ when it is not the case that } p. \\
(D) & \quad A \text{ deceives } B \text{ iff } A \text{ intentionally causes } B \text{ to believe that } p \text{ when it is not the case that } p \text{ and } A \text{ believes that it is not the case that } p \text{ (Carson (2010: 48)).}
\end{align*}
\]

Lying, then, is a kind of attempted deception. It is worth mentioning what I take 'cause' to amount to in (M) and (D), in order to avoid any hasty objections. Chisholm and Feehan (1977: 144) spell out four different ways in which 'cause' might be interpreted:

\[
\begin{align*}
(i) & \quad A \text{ contributes causally toward } B \text{ acquiring the belief that } p. \\
(ii) & \quad A \text{ contributes causally toward } B \text{ continuing in the belief that } p. \\
(iii) & \quad A \text{ contributes causally toward } B \text{ ceasing to believe in not-}p. \\
(iv) & \quad A \text{ contributes causally toward preventing } B \text{ from acquiring the belief in not-}p.
\end{align*}
\]

My proposal, here, is that 'cause', when used in (M) and (D), captures interpretations (i) – (iv), since it is unnecessary to have separate definitions for each.

2.3 Assertion

To assert something is to perform a certain type of speech act. The question, as MacFarlane (2011: 79) puts it, is: "what features of an act qualify it as an assertion, and not some other act?" In order to answer this question, we first need to ask another question: what is it that is asserted? Answering this second question is more straightforward than answering the first, since there is agreement across the board about what the answer is. Grice (1989) explains that what is said is "closely related to the conventional meaning of the words (the sentence)... uttered" (Grice (1989: 25)). What this amounts to is the truth-conditional content of the sentence: a proposition. This is what is asserted. I consider the following formulation of sentence meaning, based on Lewis's (1969) account of convention, to best capture this:
Sentence $S$ means that $p$ in language $L$ iff there is a convention among $L$-utterers that $S$ means that $p$ in language $L$.

Note, what is said is different to saying itself. Cappelen (2011) illustrates this, as follows:

$S$ can be used to express the proposition that there are blind mole-rats in Sweden (call this proposition $p$) because that proposition is its meaning. A speaker of English can use $S$ to express $p$, and that’s what it is to use $S$ to say that $p$. Of course, you don’t need to use a particular sentence, $S$, to say that $p$, it can be done in languages other than English (and, even, using other sentences of English). One way to do that is to say, in some language or other, that there are blind mole-rats in Sweden. If you do that, then you have performed a saying, and in so doing you have expressed the proposition that $p$.

Contrast this with simply uttering a sentence you don’t know the meaning of. For those who don’t speak Norwegian, try uttering, "De er mange svensker som jobber i Oslo." This sentence can be used by those of us who speak Norwegian to say that there are many Swedes working in Oslo. Those who don’t speak Norwegian, can make the sounds, and so utter the sentence, but they cannot use it to say that there are many Swedes working in Oslo (Cappelen (2011: 23)).

With this mind, we can give a working definition of saying, as follows:

$A$ says that $p$ iff

(SY1) $A$ utters sentence $S$.

(SY2) $S$ conventionally means that $p$ among $L$-utterers in language $L$.

(SY3) $A$ intends to express $p$ by uttering $S$.

We have, then, the following necessary conditions regarding assertion:

(i) Asserting entails saying (though not the converse).
(ii) 'What is said' only consists of propositional content (i.e. truth-conditional content).

It will be obvious to the reader that speakers often say that $p$ without performing what we should consider to be an act of assertion. For example, a speaker might say that $p$ in making an assumption, a presupposition, being sarcastic, cracking a joke, playing make-believe, etc. We are brought back, then, to our first question: what features of an act qualify it as an assertion, and not some other act?

### 2.4 Communicative-Intention

Grice (1989) argues that what individuals mean when they communicate with each other is best described in terms of his account of non-natural meaning (hereafter, Meaning$^{NN}$). He defines Meaning$^{NN}$ in terms of complex psychological states, where the individual intends to produce certain psychological states in the addressee: belief and recognition. This has come to be known as communicative-intention:

\[
A \text{ Means}_{NN} \text{ that } p \iff \\
(M_{NN1}) \text{ A intends that } B \text{ believe that } p. \\
(M_{NN2}) \text{ A intends that } B \text{ recognise A's intention.} \\
(M_{NN3}) \text{ A intends that } B \text{ form the belief that } p \text{ on the basis (at least in part) of recognising A's intention (Grice (1989 : 19)).}
\]

This, I believe, is the answer to our first question. (Note, for the sake of brevity, I will collapse conditions $(M^{NN1}) - (M^{NN3})$ into the following condition: $A$ communicatively-intends that $B$ believe that $p$.)

### 2.5 My Gricean Definition of Assertion

I present my Gricean definition of assertion:
$A$ asserts that $p$ to $B$ iff

$$
\text{(GDA1) } A \text{ says that } p \text{ to } B.
$$

$$
\text{(GDA2) } A \text{ communicatively-intends that } B \text{ believe that } p.
$$

### 2.6 The Co-operative Principle and the Maxims

Grice is concerned with the way in which people interact with each other, i.e. how speakers and addressees communicate co-operatively. He believes that what enables co-operative communication between speakers and addressees are normative principles and maxims. The core feature that he observes is the Co-operative Principle:

- Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged (Grice (1989: 26)).

Grice divides the Co-operative Principle into the following Maxims (Grice (1989: 26 – 28)):

**Maxim of Quality**

The super-maxim:

- Try to make your contribution one that is true.

Specific maxims:

- Do not say what you believe to be false.
- Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

**Maxim of Quantity**
• Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
• Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

Maxim of Relation

• Be relevant.

Maxim of Manner

The super-maxim:

• Be perspicuous.

Various maxims:

• Avoid obscurity of expression.
• Avoid ambiguity.
• Be brief.
• Be orderly.

2.7 The Co-operative Principle, the Maxims & the Significance of Communicative-Intention

If we consider my Gricean definition of assertion in relation to the Co-operative Principle and the Maxims, we find a credible explanation regarding the uptake of assertion. Not only does the speaker intend that the addressee believe what she says, intend that the addressee recognises this, and intend that the addressee form this belief because that is what she intends. But also, when the speaker makes her assertion, there are normative principles in place whereby she is presumed by the addressee to be saying what she believes to be true
and what she has adequate evidence for. This pairing creates traction, and so assists in the uptake of her assertion. Faulkner (2007: 899) adds to this by recognising that it is the relation between a speaker’s intentions and an addressee’s recognition of them that invokes trust. An interesting aspect of this is that saying what you believe to be true and what you have adequate evidence for are not necessary conditions for making an assertion. Speakers, then, are in a position to abuse the act of assertion in order to lie.

2.8 Implicature

Grice’s investigation includes an account of what he calls implicature. He found that by utilising the Co-operative Principle, the Maxims and the conventional meanings of certain words themselves, when a speaker says that $p$, she is able to indicate to an addressee, and so implicate to an addressee, a proposition that is additional to, but independent of, what she has said. He divides implicatures into three types: conversational implicature, scalar implicature and conventional implicature.¹ Note, I believe that implicating propositions should also be explained in terms of what a speaker MeansNN. That is, the mechanics of implicature differ from the mechanics of assertion (as I have presented it), but they share a key component: communicative-intention. This means, then, that when a speaker implicates a proposition, she determines a specific proposition that she communicatively-intends the addressee to believe, though the potential propositions that she can implicate are indefinite.

2.8.1 Conversational Implicature

Conversational implicatures are generated when a speaker says that $p$ and utilises the Maxims (either by observing them or not fulfilling them) in order to indicate to an addressee, and so implicate to an addressee, something additional to, but independent of, what she has said. Grice explains how conversational implicatures are generated, as follows:

¹ Grice introduces, as terms of art, the verb ‘implicate’, and the related nouns ‘implicature’ and ‘implicatum’ (plural, ‘implicata’). See Grice (1989: 24).
He [the speaker] has said that \( p \); there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle; he could not be doing this unless he thought that \( c \); he knows (and knows I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that \( c \) is required; he has done nothing to stop me thinking that \( c \); he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that \( c \), and so he has implicated that \( c \). (Grice (1989: 31))

He provides the following example:

A is writing a testimonial about a pupil who is a candidate for a philosophy job, and his letter reads as follows: "Dear Sir, Mr. X's command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc." (Gloss: A cannot be opting out, since if he wished to be uncooperative, why write at all? He cannot be unable, through ignorance, to say more, since the man is his pupil; moreover, he knows that more information than this is wanted. He must, therefore, be wishing to impart information that he is reluctant to write down. This supposition is tenable only if he thinks Mr. X is no good at philosophy. This, then, is what he is implicating) (Grice (1989: 33)).

2.8.2 Characteristics of Conversational Implicature

Non-detachability

- If you replace utterance \( p \) (which generates a conversational implicature \( c \)) with another utterance \( q \) with the same literal meaning as \( p \), then the same conversational implicature \( c \) remains (Grice (1989: 31 – 43)).

Cancelability

- If you utter \( p \) that generates a conversational implicature \( c \), it is possible to cancel the conversational implicature \( c \) by adding but not \( c \) or I do not mean to implicate that \( c \).
Also, utterance $p$, depending on the context and situation, can be found not to carry conversational implicature $c$ (Grice (1989: 31 – 43)).

Calculability

- If a conversational implicature $c$ is to be present, then it must be capable of being worked out. That is, if it is not possible to infer the conversational implicature $c$ from the fact that $p$ was uttered, then $c$ will not count as a conversational implicature (Grice (1989: 31 – 43)).

Non-Conventionality

- Conversational implicatures are not generated by the conventionally fixed meaning of the words themselves (Grice (1989: 31 – 43)).

2.8.3 Scalar Implicature

Scalar implicatures, generally speaking, are generated when a speaker says that $p$ and specifically utilises the Maxim of Quantity in order to indicate to an addressee, and so implicate to an addressee, something additional to, but independent of, what she has said. Grice considers scalar implicatures to be a kind of generalized conversational implicature, whereas he considers the conversational implicatures mentioned above to be of a particularized kind (Grice (1989: 37)). He explains that a particularized conversational implicature "is carried by saying that $p$ on a particular occasion in virtue of special features of the context, cases in which there is no room for the idea that an implicature of this sort is normally carried by saying that $p$" (Grice (1989: 37)). Yet, in cases of generalized conversational implicatures "one can say that the use of a certain form of words in an utterance would normally (in the absence of special circumstances) carry such-and-such an implicature" (Grice (1989: 37)). Nonetheless, the way in which scalar implicatures are
generated is essentially the same as the way in which conversational implicatures are generated. Consider the following example:

(S1) Someone has taken the spare tyre out of the boot of the car.

A speaker who says (S1) will be in a position to know whether or not it was them who took the spare tyre out of the boot of the car. If an addressee has no reason to suppose that the speaker is not observing the Maxim of Quantity, and so is being as informative as required, the speaker is implicating the following:

(S1I) It wasn't me who took the spare tyre out of the boot of the car.

(Note, the characteristics of scalar implicature are also similar to those of conversational implicatures.)

2.8.4 Conventional Implicature

Conventional implicatures are generated when a speaker says that \( p \) and exploits the conventional meaning of words within the uttered sentence itself in order to indicate to an addressee, and so implicate to the addressee, something additional to, but independent of, what she has said. Grice explains how conventional implicatures are generated, as follows:

\( U \)’s doing \( x \) might be his uttering the sentence “She was poor but she was honest”. What \( U \) meant, and what the sentence means, will both contain something contributed by the word “but”, and I do not want this contribution to appear in an account of what (in my favoured sense) \( U \) said (but rather as a conventional implicature) (Grice (1989: 88)).

To clarify Grice’s characterisation, consider (S2) and (S3):
(S2) She was poor but she was honest.
(S3) She was poor and she was honest.

Grice explains that (S2) and (S3) are logically equivalent (i.e. they have the same truth-conditions): (S2) is false if and only if at least one of its conjuncts is false, and (S3) is false if and only if at least one of its conjuncts is false. They are both true otherwise. However, if you say (S2) instead of (S3), due to the word 'but', you indicate that there is a contrast. By exploiting the word 'but' you can generate a conventional implicature. Since the contribution of the word 'but' in the uttered sentence and the conventional implicature are not part of what is said in (S2) (i.e. not part of the propositional content of (S2)), Grice concludes that the contribution of the word 'but', and the conventional implicatures generated by it, have no bearing on the truth-conditions of (S2). Here is an example:

(S4) I’ve had three bowls of porridge but I’m still hungry.

By exploiting the word 'but', a speaker might implicate the following proposition, as follows:

(S4I) I’m surprised that I’m hungry after eating so much.

2.9 My Preliminary Gricean Definition of Lying

Using my Gricean definition of assertion as a base, I present my preliminary Gricean definition of lying:

A lies to B iff

(PGDL1) A says that p to B.
(PGDL2) A communicatively-intends that B believe that p.
(PGDL3) A believes that p is false.
3 So-Called Bald-Faced Lies

3.1 Setting the Scene: Defenders of Bald-Faced Lies

Carson (2006), Sorensen (2007), Fallis (2009) and Stokke (2013) claim that it is possible to lie without the intent to deceive the addressee. These so-called lies are known as bald-faced lies. Carson explains as follows:

Sometimes people lie when they know that others know that they are lying. I can lie to you in claiming that \( p \), even if I know that you know that \( p \) is false and I also know that you know that I know that \( p \) is false. In such cases, I lie to you, even if I don’t intend to deceive you either about the truth of \( p \) or about what I believe (Carson (2002: 295)).

Defenders of bald-faced lies argue that bald-faced lies are assertions, and so strong restrictions must be imposed on what any definition of assertion can entail, and, by extension, on what any assertion-based definition of lying can entail. They conclude that any definition of assertion, and so any assertion-based definition of lying, that does not comply with these strong restrictions must be rejected. It seems, then, that my Gricean definition of assertion and my preliminary Gricean definition of lying are in danger of being rejected.²

3.1.1 Example 1: The Witness

² Since these philosophers formulate assertion-based definitions of lying, they necessarily rule-out cases of implicature as lies. Instead, they call deceptive implicatures cases of misleading, confusingly.
During a court trial, a witness to a crime is called to the stand. The witness knows that the crime, and her presence at the scene of the crime, were recorded on a video camera and shown to the members of the court. The witness knows that the members of the court know that the witness saw the individual commit the crime. And the witness knows that the members of the court know that the witness knows that the witness saw the individual commit the crime. However, the witness decides to testify that she did not see the individual commit the crime, because she is scared that she will be punished by the individual, if she testifies that she did.

Lawyer: Did you see the individual commit the crime?
Witness: No, I did not see the individual commit the crime.

The witness says something she believes to be false, but she does not intend to deceive the members of the court (Carson (2001: 289)).

3.1.2 Example 2: The Nurse

During the Iraq war, a journalist sneaks into a civilian hospital. She is surprised to see a ward full of wounded soldiers, as this suggests that Iraqi military hospitals are already overcrowded. The journalist approaches a nurse. The nurse knows that the journalist knows that there are soldiers in the hospital (and that the nurse can see the uniforms). And the nurse knows that the journalist knows that the nurse knows that there are soldiers in the hospital (and that the nurse can see the uniforms). However, the nurse thinks that it is best not to talk to journalists about what is going on in the hospital.

Journalist: How many soldiers have you admitted today?
Nurse: There are no soldiers here.
Journalist: But they are wearing uniforms.
Nurse: I see no uniforms [pushing the journalist out of the hospital]. You must go now, do you hear?
The nurse says something he believes to be false, but he does not intend to deceive the journalist (Sorensen (2007: 256)).

3.1.3 Example 3: The Host

During a party, a guest is being troublesome. He drank too much before the party and is now causing a scene. The host of the party has had enough, and asks the guest to leave. The guest complies and walks out with the host to the taxi that has been arranged to pick him up. The guest knows that the host knows that it has been unpleasant to have the guest there. And the guest knows that the host knows that the guest knows that it has been unpleasant to have the guest there. However, the host is a well-mannered individual, and she thinks it best to be polite.

Guest: Thank you for having me over to your home.
Host: That’s ok. It was a pleasure to have you here.

The host says something she believes to be false, but she does not intend to deceive the guest.

3.2 Going on Record

Defenders of bald-faced lies claim that, in cases such as these, the speaker is lying, regardless of the fact that she does not intend to deceive the addressee. They argue that the speaker is lying, because the speaker is making an assertion. And they argue that the speaker is making an assertion, because the speaker wishes to go on record with what she says to the addressee. Going on record has been described as "playing it straight," "looking grave and serious" (Carson (2009: 295)), and "defending... propositions by words and deeds" (Sorensen (2004: 252)). Although defenders of bald-faced lies share the thought that, in cases such as these, the speaker is making an assertion, they each formulate their own assertion-based
definitions of lying in attempt to rule-in deceptive-lies and bald-faced lies, and rule-out cases that should not be classed as lies. (Note, Carson does not technically give an assertion-based definition of lying. However, his definition of lying has been developed into an assertion-based definition of lying without any significant changes. So, to class Carson’s definition of lying as assertion-based is acceptable.)

3.3 Restrictions on Assertion

If you accept that all lies are assertions, and you accept that bald-faced lies are lies without the intent to deceive, where the speaker and the addressee mutually-know that what is said is believed to be false by the speaker, then there will necessarily be strong restrictions on what your definition of assertion can entail. This can be put schematically (where ‘≠>‘ represents no entailment), as follows:

(R1) A asserts that \( p \neq > A \) intends B to believe that \( p \).

(R2) A asserts that \( p \neq > A \) intends B to believe that A believes that \( p \).

(R3) A asserts that \( p \neq > A \) believes that \( p \).

(R4) A asserts that \( p \neq > A \) knows that \( p \).

The challenge that defenders of bald-faced lies face, then, is to define what an assertion is in broad enough terms to satisfy (R1) – (R4), but in narrow enough terms to rule-out cases that are obviously not assertions, and, in turn, not lies.

3.4 Stokke: Assertion & the Common Ground

Stokke (2013) presents the most current and durable assertion-based definition of lying in defence of bald-faced lies: the common ground definition of lying. He defines assertion in terms of Stalnaker’s theory of common ground ((1978); (1998); (2002)).

3.4.1 The Theory of Common Ground

---

3 This schematic explanation is taken and developed from Stokke (2013: 41)
Stalnaker claims that conversations take place and evolve against a background of mutually shared information called the common ground. He defines the common ground as the presuppositions of the participants of a conversation, and the participants' beliefs about those presuppositions. Its purpose is for the participants of conversations to be able to communicate successfully and efficiently. For example, consider (PM) and (CC):

(PM) The Prime Minister of England is in America.
(CC) I ate all the cookies in the cookie jar.

For an assertion of (PM) to be felicitous, it needs to be common ground that there is a Prime Minister of England. Equally, for an assertion of (CC) to be felicitous, it needs to be common ground who the speaker is.

### 3.4.2 Possible World Semantics

Stalnaker claims that the content of a presupposition is a proposition, and he analyses propositions in terms of possible worlds:

A proposition is a function from possible worlds into truth-values (true or false). More roughly and intuitively, a proposition is a rule for determining a truth-value as a function of the facts of the way the world is. Or, a proposition is a way... of picking out a set of possible states of affairs... all those for which the proposition takes the value true (Stalnaker (1978: 79)).

His motivation for analysing propositions as a function from possible worlds is that propositions are defined by, what he believes to be, their essential function, which is to represent the world:

A proposition – the content of an assertion or belief – is a representation of the world as being a certain way. But for any given representation of the world as being a
certain way, there will be a set of all the possible states of the world which accord with the representation – which are that way. So any proposition determines a set of possible worlds. And, for any given set of possible worlds, to locate the actual world in that set is to represent the world in a certain way. So every set of possible worlds determines a proposition (Stalnaker (1978: 79)).

Furthermore, Stalnaker explains that any two assertions or beliefs will represent the world as being the same if and only if they are true in all the same possible worlds. He argues that if one assumes that representations, which represent the world as being the same way, have the same content (i.e. express the same proposition), then there is, what he describes as, a "one-one correspondence between sets of possible worlds and propositions" (Stalnaker (1978: 79)). He concludes that this correspondence makes it reasonable to use sets of possible worlds, or (equivalently) functions from possible worlds into truth-values, to play the role of propositions in his theory.

3.4.3 Presupposition and Possible Worlds

Since Stalnaker takes propositions to be functions from possible worlds into truth-values, he believes that a speaker's presuppositions should not be represented as a set of propositions, but as a set of possible worlds. His motivation for representing the speaker's presuppositions in terms of a set of possible worlds is that it describes the conversational process in terms of what he believes to be its essential purpose: to distinguish among alternative possible ways that things might be (Stalnaker 1978: 85). In other words, it is the presuppositions that define the limits of the set of alternative possibilities among which speakers intend their expressed propositions to distinguish, whilst it is the purpose of expressing propositions to make such distinctions.

3.4.4 The Context Set, the Main Context Set & the Common Ground
Stalnaker explains that there is a distinction to be made between what the participants of a conversation presuppose individually, what they presuppose collectively and what they presuppose mutually (Stalnaker (2002: 716 – 717)).

The Context Set

- The Context Set is the set of presuppositions of a single participant of a conversation for the purpose of the conversation.

The Main Context Set

- The Main Context Set is the union of Context Sets of the participants of the conversation (i.e. everything that is presupposed by all of the participants of the conversation individually for the purpose of the conversation).

The Common Ground

- The Common Ground is the intersection of the Context Sets of the participants of the conversation that are mutually shared by the participants of the conversation for the purpose of the conversation.

3.4.5 Non-Defective Main Sets & Defective Main Sets

Stalnaker claims that part of the concept of presupposition is that a speaker assumes that the members of her audience presuppose everything that she presupposes. Moreover, he claims that it is the case, generally speaking, that a speaker’s audience does presuppose everything that she presupposes. This means, then, that, generally speaking, the Context Set of each participant of the conversation, the Main Set and the Common Ground are identical.

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4 The label 'Main Context Set,' is my own. I added it for a clearer explanation of the distinction between what participants of a conversation presuppose individually, collectively and mutually.
However, Stalnaker notes that it is possible for a speaker to falsely assume that the members of her audience presuppose everything that she presupposes, and so it is possible for there to be a discrepancy between the Context Set, the Main Set and the Common Ground (Stalnaker (2002: 716 – 717)).

Non-Defective Main Context Set

- If all the participants of the conversation share the same presuppositions (i.e. the same Context Set), then the Main Set of the conversation is non-defective.

Defective Main Context Set

- If at least one participant of the conversation does not share the same presuppositions as the other participants of the conversation (i.e. has a differing a Context Set), then the Main set of the conversation is defective.

Stalnaker explains that a defective Main Set is likely to lead to a failure of communication between participants of a conversation, because addressees will interpret the purpose and content of what is said in terms of their own presuppositions. However, Stalnaker further explains that communication is the point of the enterprise, so everyone will have a motive to keep the presuppositions the same (Stalnaker (2002: 717)).

3.4.6 Accommodation

Stalnaker claims that a defective Main Set can reveal itself when a speaker says that $p$, thereby shows that she believes that $p$, the addressee not believe that $p$, and the addressee recognise that the speaker is presupposing that $p$. He gives the following example.

Alice says to Bob, who is holding his baby daughter, “How old is he?” (Stalnaker (2002: 717)).
In this case, Bob recognizes that Alice is taking something to be true that he knows to be false: it is a baby girl, not a baby boy. The most straightforward response would be for Bob to correct Alice. Stalnaker explains that if such a correction is made, then what the participants of the conversation each believe will be brought in line with what both participants of the conversation are presupposing.

In the first example, he [Bob] might simply say “It’s a girl”, or he might say something that shows that he is presupposing that the baby is a girl (“She is ten months old.”), requiring Alice to accommodate (Stalnaker (2002: 717)).

However, Stalnaker also explains that if the false presupposition is irrelevant to the purposes of the conversation, then at least one of the participants of the conversation might decide to ignore it.

[I]f the false presupposition is irrelevant to the purposes of the conversation... Bob might decide to ignore the matter, tacitly accepting what Alice is manifestly presupposing for the purpose of facilitating communication without disrupting the conversation with a distracting correction. That is, Bob accommodates, not by coming to believe the false proposition that Alice is presupposing, but by accepting it (Stalnaker (2002: 717)).

3.4.7 Common Belief

Stalnaker explains that, on an over-simplified picture, what a speaker presupposes can be understood as what she believes to be common belief, and that the common beliefs of the participants of a conversation are the beliefs that they share, and that they recognize that they share. Therefore, on such a picture, we can understand the common ground to just be common belief. Stalnaker gives the following definition of common belief:
It is common belief that $\phi$ among a group of believers if and only if all believe that $\phi$, all believe that all believe that $\phi$, all believe that all believe that all believe that $\phi$, etc (Stalnaker (2002: 708)).

However, as we have seen above, Stalnaker shows that it is possible for there to be a divergence between what is believed and what is presupposed. He maintains that even though it is possible for there to be a divergence between what is believed and what is presupposed, and so a divergence between common belief and common ground, the logic of common belief is exactly the same as the logic of common ground. In other words, common belief is the model for common ground.

3.4.8 Acceptance

Stalnaker defines the common ground in terms of acceptance, rather than belief. Note, Stalnaker describes the notion of acceptance differently throughout his work on the common ground, which allows for various interpretations. In his most recent work, he describes acceptance as a non-factive propositional attitude that is weaker than belief, but which includes belief. That is, $A$ accepts that $p$ does not entail that $p$ is true, nor that $A$ believes that $p$.

Acceptance... is a category of propositional attitudes and methodological stances toward a proposition, a category that includes belief, but also some attitudes (presumption, assumption, acceptance for the purposes of an argument or an inquiry) that contrast with belief, and with each other... Belief is the most basic acceptance concept: the simplest reason to treat a proposition as true is that one believes that it is true (Stalnaker (2002: 716)).

Stalnaker claims that there are a number of reasons why the participants of a conversation might accept that a proposition is true, though not believe that it is true, and so make

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5 It is this description of acceptance that Stokke subscribes to for his common ground definition of assertion, and so his common ground definition of lying.
accommodations for the sake of the conversation. He provides a collection of examples that illustrate such cases.

[I]t could be the speaker who is the one doing the accommodating. Perhaps Alice knows that the man is drinking Perrier, but believes that Bob believes that it is a martini, and so believes that the best way to identify her intended referent is to use this description. Perhaps both are accommodating – both truly believing that it is Perrier, but both falsely believing that the other believes it is a martini. Or perhaps it is mutually recognized that it is not a martini, but mutually recognized that both parties are accepting that it is a martini. The pretense will be rational if accepting the false presupposition is an efficient way to communicate something true – information about the man who is falsely presupposed to be the man drinking a martini (Stalnaker (2002: 718)).

3.4.9 The Definition of Common Ground

Stalnaker gives the following definition of common ground using the logic of common belief as a model, and adopting the weaker propositional attitude of acceptance in place of belief.

It is common ground that $\phi$ in a group if all members accept (for the purpose of the conversation) that $\phi$, and all believe that all accept that $\phi$, and all believe that all believe that all accept that $\phi$, etc (Stalnaker (2002: 716)).

3.4.10 Stalnaker on Assertion

Stalnaker does not give a definition of assertion as such. Instead, he makes a claim about the effect that assertions have. The following, he insists, must be a component or consequence of an adequate definition of assertion.

To make an assertion is to reduce the context set in a particular way, provided that there are no objections from the other participants of the conversation. The particular
way in which the context set is reduced is that all of the possible situations incompatible with what is said are eliminated. To put it a slightly different way, the essential effect of an assertion is to change the presuppositions of the participants in a conversation by adding the content of what is asserted to what is presupposed (Stalnaker (1978: 86)).

In other words, for Stalnaker, the essential effect of an assertion is to add the content of what is said to the common ground.

3.4.11 Stokke’s Common Ground Definition of Assertion

Stokke uses Stalnaker’s theory of common ground and his notion of the essential effect of assertion to formulate his common ground of assertion.

A asserts that \( p \) to \( B \) iff

\[(CGA1) \ A \ says \ that \ p \ to \ B.\]

\[(CGA2) \ A \ proposes \ that \ p \ is \ added \ the \ common \ ground \ (Stokke \ (2013: 14)).\]

3.5 Stokke: Lies & the Common Ground

3.5.1 Stokke’s Common Ground Definition of Lying

Stokke adds the necessary condition that the asserter believe what she asserts to be false to his common ground definition of assertion in order formulate his common ground definition of lying.

A lies to \( B \) iff

\[(CGL1) \ A \ says \ that \ p \ to \ B.\]

\[(CGL2) \ A \ proposes \ that \ p \ is \ added \ the \ common \ ground.\]
(CGL3) A believes that \( p \) is false (Stokke (2013: 14)).

Note, deceptive lies are straightforwardly explained on Stokke’s view. Since belief entails acceptance, if \( A \) says that \( p \) to \( B \) with the intention that \( B \) believe that \( p \), then \( A \) will have necessarily proposed that \( p \) is added to the common ground. Therefore, \( A \) will have lied to \( B \). In addition, on Stokke’s view, since conversational, conventional and scalar implicatures are not said, and so do not satisfy (CGL1), they cannot be used to lie, though he concedes that they can be used to deceive.

### 3.5.2 Bald Faced Lies & The Common Ground

Stokke’s common ground definition of assertion, and so his common ground definition of lying, are defined in terms acceptance. Acceptance, as discussed above, is most recently described by Stalnaker as a non-factive propositional attitude that is weaker than belief, but which includes belief. That is, accepting that \( p \) does not entail that \( p \) is true, nor that the addressee believe that \( p \). This is the particular description of acceptance that Stokke utilises for his definition of assertion and his definition of lying. It is clear, then, that Stokke’s common ground definition of assertion satisfies the strong restrictions, (R1) – (R4), mentioned above. Let us see how Stokke’s common ground definition of lying handles cases of bald-faced lies by working through the three examples.

The Witness’s utterance:

(CGL1) Satisfied: the witness says that she did not see the individual commit the crime to the judge.
(CGL2) Satisfied: the witness proposes that it be added to the common ground that she did not see the individual commit the crime.
(CGL3) Satisfied: the witness believes that she did see the individual commit the crime.

Evaluation according to Stokke’s account: the witness is lying.
The Nurse's utterance:

(CGL1) Satisfied: the nurse says that there are no soldiers in the hospital to the journalist.

(CGL2) Satisfied: the nurse proposes that it be added to the common ground that there are no soldiers in the hospital.

(CGL3) Satisfied: the nurse believes that there are soldiers in the hospital.6

Evaluation according to Stokke's account: the nurse is lying.

The Host's utterance:

(CGL1) Satisfied: the host says that it was a pleasure to have the guest at the party to the guest.

(CGL2) Satisfied: the host proposes that it be added to the common ground that it was a pleasure to have the guest at the party.

(CGL3) Satisfied: the host believes that it was not a pleasure to have the guest at the party.

Evaluation according to Stokke's account: the host is lying.

On Stokke's account, (CGL1), (CGL2) and (CGL3) are satisfied in all three cases, and so the witness, the nurse and the host are all lying. The central point is that (CGL2) is satisfied (i.e. the witness, the nurse and the host are proposing to add what they have said to the common ground). Stokke maintains, then, that the notion of going on record with what is said is plausibly explained in terms of the common ground. In other words, to say that the witness,  

6 Note, the same evaluation would be made for the second of the nurse's utterances:

(CGL1) Satisfied: the nurse says that she sees no uniforms.

(CGL2) Satisfied: the nurse proposes that it become common ground that she sees no uniforms.

(CGL3) Satisfied: the nurse believes that she does see uniforms.
the nurse and the host want to go on record, is just to say that they each propose what they have said to be added to the common ground.

3.5.3 Sarcasm & the Common Ground

Sarcasm is a potential source of counterexample to Stokke’s common ground definition of lying. If someone says something that is mutually-known to be false, then sarcastic remarks seem dangerously similar to bald-faced lies on Stokke’s account. Fallis presents the following example:

In one memorable scene [from Star Wars], our heroes use the garbage chute to escape from the detention block of the Death Star. But once they land in the garbage, Han Solo sarcastically says:

The garbage chute was a really wonderful idea. What an incredible smell you’ve discovered!

He is trying to communicate something that he believes to be true...But he is certainly saying something that he believes to be false (Fallis (2009: 53)).

Stokke claims that the common ground definition of lying can easily distinguish between bald-faced lies and sarcastic remarks. He explains, as we have seen, that when someone bald-faced lies, they propose to update the common ground with what they say. However, he explains that when someone makes a sarcastic remark, they do not propose to update the common ground with what they have said. Instead, they propose to update the common ground with what they have implicated. We can run this idea through Stokke's common ground definition of lying, as follows:

Han Solo’s utterance:
(CGL1) Satisfied: Han Solo says that the garbage chute was a wonderful idea.

(CGL2) Not satisfied: Han Solo does not propose that it be added to the common ground that the garbage chute was a wonderful idea.

(CGL3) Satisfied: Han Solo believes that the garbage chute was a bad idea.

Evaluation according to Stokke's account: Han Solo is not lying.

Stokke argues that in this case (CGL1) and (CGL3) are satisfied, but (CGL2) is not, and so Han Solo is not lying. Han Solo says something that he believes to be false, but he does not propose to update the common ground with what he says. Instead, he proposes to update the common ground with what he has implicated, namely, that the garbage chute was not a wonderful idea, but a bad one. In other words, Han Solo is not asserting the proposition he proposes to add to the common ground, instead he is implicating it.\footnote{Stalnaker presents a more abstract way of understanding sarcasm in terms of the common ground. When someone says that $p$ in order to implicate $q$, in cases where $q$ is incompatible with $p$, it can only be $q$ that gets added to the common ground, not $p$, and not $p$ and $q$. Since, it is impossible for $p$ and $q$ to both be added to the common ground, as $p$ and $q$ contradict each other. Contradictions would cause the common ground to explode, logically speaking (Stalnaker (2014: personal correspondence)).}

3.5.4 The Official and the Unofficial Common Ground

Stokke is aware that his common ground definition of lying is in danger of ruling-in certain other cases that we should not consider to be lies. For example, as mentioned above, participants of a conversation will often say mutually-known-to-be false propositions when they make assumptions, propound proofs, crack jokes and perform plays. This potential danger is apparent because the common ground is defined in terms of the weak notion of acceptance, rather than the stronger notion of belief. Therefore, these propositions are also proposed to become part of the common ground, and so, it seems, will be considered to be lies on Stokke's account. In an attempt to bypass this potential danger, Stokke capitalizes on a comment made by Stalnaker regarding assumption and the common ground:
One may make assumptions, and what is assumed may become part of the common
ground, temporarily. (Stalnaker (2002: 704)).

Stokke claims that because assumptions are merely temporarily added to the common
ground, this indicates that there must be different types of common ground used for
different purposes. He introduces a distinction between, what he calls, official common ground
and unofficial common ground. He explains, as follows:

When an assumption is made, a temporary common ground is opened up in which the
information used for the purpose of the argument is stored (Stokke (2013: 54)).

Stokke argues, then, that some mutually-known-to-be false propositions, such as proofs,
jokes, plays, and assumptions, among others, are added to an unofficial common ground,
not to the official common ground. His plan is to completely separate bald-faced lies from all
other mutually-known-to-be false propositions that we do not consider to be lies. He
provides two examples to try to motivate this picture. The first example is that of actors on
stage performing a play. Consider the following:

Imagine we are witnessing the performance of a play set in a monarchy. We are in
the middle of an intense scene, where, after the exit of her husband, the hero is
declaring his love for the heroine. Indexicals are being used in lines such as, “I love
you”. And presuppositions are being invoked by utterances involving “the King”.
Without even thinking about it, we are taking these indexicals to refer to the
characters in the play, which suggests that the common ground we are using to
evaluate these utterances is one that corresponds to the reality of the play. And
similarly, we are resolving presuppositions by using this common ground of the
play. Suppose now that in the middle of this scene, the cuckolded husband suddenly
bursts in, runs to the edge of the stage and shouts in a distressed tone of voice,

Ladies and gentlemen! I have just received word that the President has been
shot!
Most likely, we will all take this utterance to express the proposition that the actor has just received word that the (real) President has been shot. In particular, we will not be puzzled by the fact that there is no president in the play. And we will take I to refer to the actor, not the character he was playing a few minutes ago (Stokke (2013: 55 – 56)).

Stokke argues that in this case there are two common grounds operative at the same time: the unofficial common ground, in which information about the play and the characters, including presuppositions, indexical content, location and events, is stored, and the official common ground, in which information about the actual world, the actors on stage and the audience, also including presuppositions, indexical content, location and events, is stored. The second example is that of a politician who gets her speeches mixed up at two separate banquets. Consider the following:

A politician is invited to give a humorous speech at a festive banquet and a serious speech at a formal banquet. She confuses the dates, and ends up delivering the humorous speech at the formal banquet and the formal speech at the festive banquet. Take the first event. Suppose that during the humorous speech the politician tells a story about the President having “broken wind” during a meeting with some ambassadors. The politician knows that this event did not actually happen and is only relating it to make a joke. The common verdict on this case is that the politician is not lying. She was only joking, although her audience was expecting something else. Now consider the second event. Suppose that during the speech she says something she knows to be false, say that the President withheld important information (Stokke (2013: 52)).

Stokke argues that when the politician says that the President broke wind, she proposes to update the unofficial common ground, whereas when the politician says that the President withheld important information, she proposes to update the official common ground. What is important, here, is which common ground the politician is proposing to add what she said
to. Stokke concludes that such cases as assumptions, proofs, jokes, and plays, are added to a common ground, but not the relevant common ground. And so, this is what distinguishes them from bald-faced lies. The precise formulation of the common ground definition of lying, then, is as follows:

3.5.5 The (Official) Common Ground Definition of Lying

A lies to B iff

(CGL1') A says that \( p \) to B.
(CGL2') A proposes that \( p \) is added to the official common ground.
(CGL3') A believes that \( p \) is false.

3.6 My Beef with Stokke

3.6.1 The Problem with Acceptance

The notion of *acceptance* is key to Stalnaker's theory of common ground, and so it is key to Stokke’s common ground definition of lying. However, as mentioned above, the notion of acceptance is described differently throughout Stalnaker's work, and so allows for various interpretations. In addition, as mentioned above, in his most recent work, Stalnaker describes acceptance as a non-factive propositional attitude that is weaker than belief (i.e. believing is one way of accepting). That is, \( A \) accepting that \( p \) does not entail that \( p \) is true, nor that \( A \) believes that \( p \). This is the description of acceptance that Stokke subscribes to for his common ground definition of assertion, and so his common ground definition of lying.

Kölbel (2011), like Stokke, develops a common ground definition of assertion. Note, however, in developing his common ground definition of assertion, Kölbel does not consider lying, let alone bald-faced lying. Yet, he does notice that Stalnaker’s notion of acceptance is described differently throughout his work, and so allows for various
interpretations. In an attempt to formulate his common ground definition of assertion, Kölbel presents two plausible interpretations of acceptance.

The first interpretation Kölbel offers is that acceptance is a propositional attitude concept, of which belief is the most basic and fundamental instance. Acceptance, then, includes belief, presupposition, presumption, postulation, assumption, supposition and speculation. Kölbel explains that this suggests that the propositional attitude of accepting a proposition could be explicated disjunctively as, "believing, presupposing, presuming, postulating, assuming, supposing, speculating, etc." (Kölbel (2011: 58 – 59)). The second interpretation Kölbel offers is that acceptance is not a propositional attitude at all, but, instead, a public or social attitude or commitment, governed by the rules or conventions of some social practice, which counts the participants of the conversation as committing themselves to the truth of a proposition for the purpose of the conversation, without believing that it is true (Kölbel (2011: 59)).

Kölbel, here, inadvertently shows us something problematic about Stokke’s common ground definition of lying. Stokke argues that when a speaker bald-faced lies, she proposes to add her mutually-known-to-be false proposition to the common ground. Since the common ground is defined in terms of acceptance, this means that the speaker proposes that her proposition be accepted. But what is it for a proposition to be accepted? Stokke’s answer to this question is found in the first of Kölbel’s interpretations. However, this raises a serious problem for Stokke. If acceptance can be explicated disjunctively, then it is quite clear which disjunct deceptive-lies fall under (i.e. belief). But, it is not at all clear which disjunct bald-faced lies fall under, since it cannot be belief, presupposition, presumption, postulation, assumption, supposition or speculation. If Stokke wishes to hold on to the notion that when a speaker bald-faced lies that she proposes to add her mutually-known-to-be false proposition to the common ground, when, on his view, acceptance is nothing more than a laundry list of propositional attitudes, then he must show exactly which disjunct on that laundry list bald-faced lies fall under. Stokke, however, does not show which propositional attitude bald-faced lies fall under, and it is not clear that he can.
I conclude that until Stokke can show which propositional attitude bald-faced lies fall under, he must abandon the first interpretation of acceptance and, instead, subscribe to the second, as Kölbel does.

### 3.6.2 The Problem with the Unofficial Common Ground

Stokke's conception of the official and unofficial common ground is seemingly compatible with the second interpretation of acceptance that Kölbel has on offer. As we have seen, Stokke's aim is to distinguish bald-faced lies from all other mutually-known-to-be-false propositions said in conversation that we should not consider to be lies. According to Stokke, the former are proposed to be added to the official common ground, whereas the latter are proposed to be added to an unofficial common ground. Stokke claims that we have evidence that a proposition is part of an unofficial common ground, rather than the official common ground, because a proposition added to an unofficial common ground is unproblematically revocable.

Assertions...added to an unofficial common ground can later be unproblematically revoked. For example, suppose that, after the politician has given her humorous speech, someone charges her with having lied. She can defend herself by saying,

> No, no, you didn’t realize that I was just joking.

And although the politician will be expected to apologize for having made this mistake, she is not obviously reproachable for having lied (Stokke (2013: 23)).

Stokke claims that the parallel is not the case for cases like the witness in the court room.

If later charged with lying, she cannot claim to have merely been joking, speaking unseriously, or the like. In particular, note that even though [she] can admit later on
that she only said what she said in order not to get punished, someone can equally well point out that, even so, she lied (Stokke (2013: 23 – 24)).

There are a number of problems that arise from Stokke’s conception of unofficial common ground, and the way in which it is designed to distinguish bald-faced lies from other cases. Note, Stokke says that the unproblematic revocability of a proposition is evidence that the proposition is part of an unofficial common ground and that a proposition is part of an unofficial common ground because it is unproblematically revocable. Therefore, what Stokke seems to be saying is that a proposition is added to an unofficial common ground if and only if the proposition is unproblematically revocable.

First, it is not clear what governs unproblematic revocability. If Stokke is arguing that when a speaker says that $p$, when it is mutually-known that $p$ is false, and she can plausibly deny that she has lied, making $p$ unproblematically revocable, then Stokke’s notion of unproblematic revocability seems to be governed by the plausibility of a speaker denying whether she has lied or not. The problem is that this is what the notion of unproblematic revocability is supposed to establish. That is, we want to be able to determine whether it is plausible for a speaker to deny that she has lied or not based on whether $p$ is unproblematically revocable or not. But whether $p$ is unproblematically revocable or not is determined, then, by whether the speaker has lied or not. Stokke’s notion of unproblematic revocability seems to be circular. Alternatively, if Stokke is arguing that when a speaker says that $p$, when it is mutually-known that $p$ is false, that there is something else governing whether $p$ is unproblematically revocable or not, and so is part of either an unofficial common ground or the official common ground, then very well. The problem is that Stokke has not provided us with that. The way that the concept of the unofficial common ground is designed to distinguish bald-faced lies from other cases, like assumptions, jokes, make-believe, etc. seems arbitrary.

Second, it is not clear how the notion of unproblematic revocability is supposed to work across diverse cases. Consider, again, the cases of the witness, the nurse and the host. Due to
the different environments that the speakers are in, and so the different contexts they are
conversing within, as well as the different conventions that will inevitably be in place, what
governs unproblematic revocability seems like it is going to be drastically different across
these three cases. For example, although there might be a problem in regards to the witness
in the courtroom revoking her false testimony, it is not obvious, at least, that there is a
problem regarding the host revoking her polite gesture to her insufferable guest. Hawley
illustrates this point in the following way:

Maybe [giving testimony] has more of a performative aspect (like saying 'I do'
during a wedding), i.e. it has extra significance for actually being said in the
courtroom under oath as opposed to on another occasion. That seems compatible
with it having very serious consequences, including being prosecuted (Hawley (2014:
personal correspondence)).

Third, as mentioned above, Stokke argues that individuals, such as the witness in the
courtroom, can be classed as lying, because they cannot claim to have merely been joking,
speaking unseriously, or the like. But lying or joking do not seem to be the only options on
offer. For example, when the witness says, "No, I did not see the individual commit the
crime," Stokke could present his argument to her, and the witness could plausibly respond
by saying, "No, I did not lie, since I did not intend to deceive anybody. I simply gave false
testimony."

Fourth, it seems possible for propositions to be unproblematically revoked from the official
common ground. For example, participants of a conversation will sometimes lie to the other
participants, if only temporarily, for the sake of playing tricks on them. In such cases, it is
quite normal for the liar to reveal the lie to the participant and enjoy the look on the other
participants' faces when they realise that they have been deceived. In this case, is not clear
that what the liar said is problematically revocable, since it was just a bit of fun, and that
would be understood by the other participants. Indeed, they might (and usually do) share in
the fun. (Note, I am not disputing whether or not this is actually a case of lying or not, as I
think it clearly is. Stokke, on the other hand, might conclude that it is not. If so, I think that
would be a particularly unattractive route to take.) This seems to show that it is not the case that a proposition is added to an unofficial common ground if and only if the proposition is unproblematically revocable, because it is not necessarily the case that if a proposition is unproblematically revocable, that it is part of an unofficial common ground.

I conclude that until Stokke clarifies what governs his notion of unproblematic revocability, his common ground definition of lying has no credible way of ruling-out cases that we should not consider to be lies.

3.6.3 The Problem with Going on Record

Stokke claims, along with other defenders of bald-faced lies, that, in cases such as the witness, the nurse and the host, the speaker is lying, regardless of the fact that she does not intend to deceive the addressee. He argues that the speaker is lying, because the speaker is making an assertion. And he argues that the speaker is making an assertion, because the speaker wishes to go on record with what she says to the addressee. Stokke concludes that to say that the witness, the nurse and the host want to go on record, is just to say that they each propose what they say to be added to the common ground. The problem with this is that it is not clear what happens when speakers go off record, as they regularly do. For example, speakers sometimes request to go off record when they are speaking to lawyers, journalists, doctors, etc., because they do not want what they have said to go on record. It seems that Stokke has two options here, neither of which are much use to him. Before I present the two options, note that Stokke says that the notion of going on record distinguishes which propositions are added to the official common ground and which propositions are not.

Therefore, what Stokke seems to be saying is that a speaker goes on record if and only if the speaker proposes what she says to be added to the official common ground. First, he could argue that when a speaker goes off record with what she says, she is operating exclusively within an unofficial common ground. If he argues this, then it is clearly possible to lie (deceptively or bald-facedly) within an unofficial common ground. Second, he could argue that when a speaker goes off record with what she says, she is still operating exclusively within an official common ground. If he were to argue this, then it is not the case that a
speaker goes on record if and only if the speaker proposes what she says to be added to the official common ground, because it is not necessarily the case that when a speaker adds what she says to the official common ground, that she goes on record.

I conclude that Stokke's account of going on record is muddled, and so is not plausibly explained in terms of the common ground, as he presents it. (Note, all defenders of bald-faced lies who hinge their arguments on the notion of going on record are going to have difficulty explaining what is going on when a speaker goes off record.)

3.7 Kölbel & the Common Ground

Kölbel, as mentioned above, defines assertion in terms Stalnaker's theory of the common ground. He agrees with Stalnaker and Stokke that the essential effect of assertion is to add what is said to the common ground. In addition, he agrees with Stalnaker and Stokke that there are other speech acts that will inevitably share this essential effect, which should not be classed as assertions. However, unlike Stokke, he does not subscribe to the conception of the official and unofficial common ground.

Kölbel claims that the participants of a conversation acquire certain rights and undertake certain obligations, just by being participants of a conversation. He argues that assertions have normative consequences, and that by making an assertion, the assertor implies certain obligations on herself. In addition, he argues that the obligations that assertions imply on the assertor are what distinguish assertions from other speech acts.\(^8\) Drawing on the work of Stalnaker ((1978); (1998); (2002)) and the work of Brandom ((1983); (1994)), Kölbel defines assertion in terms of the common ground and the obligation of justification.

According to Brandom (1983: 646 – 647), asserting that \(p\) has two rules:

\[
\text{(B1) The asserter incurs a justificatory responsibility, i.e. the obligation to justify his or her assertion if challenged.}
\]

\(^8\) Kölbel maintains that we must allow for a good deal of variation in whether or not and how these obligations are enforced in different kinds of conversation.
(B2) The other participants of the conversation obtain the license to rely on the assertion as a premise - in particular the license to defer to it when themselves justifying assertions.

Kölbel attempts to capture these two rules in a simplified form. He argues that the license to rely on someone else’s assertion is just an aspect of the asserter’s obligation to justify it. He illustrates this with the following example:

Suppose Sally has told Peter that the shop is open. In what sense does this “license” Peter to rely on Sally’s assertion for justification? If Peter himself asserts that the shop is open and is asked for justification Peter can say: “Sally said so.” If Sally has a decent reputation as an informant, this will usually be good enough. For suppose someone were to challenge Peter’s justification by uttering “So? What if Sally said it?” In that case Peter can say that Sally usually has good reasons for what she asserts or that she is reliable in these matters and doesn’t lie etc. The only way for the challenger to carry on challenging is either to refuse to accept that she usually has good reasons etc. (which may be difficult for him), or she’ll have to refuse to accept that Sally’s good reasons etc. are sufficiently good reason for accepting that the shop is open. In the latter case, the challenger will, in many ordinary contexts, appear uncooperative, unless she has some special reason for denying that Sally’s reasons are good enough in this case (in which case it is now the challenger who is taking on new justificatory responsibilities). It might be objected that this story depends on the assumption that Sally “has a decent reputation as an informant.” It is of course true that the story depended on this, and that the amount of weight Peter should be prepared to put on Sally’s testimony should depend precisely on her reputation as an informant. But of course if Sally didn’t have a good reputation then it is hard to see what license would result from her asserting that the shop is open (Kölbel (2011: 67 – 68)).

Kölbel, then, proposes to capture Brandom’s two rules in the following simplified form:
(K1) If a participant asserts that \( p \) then she thereby undertakes the obligation to justify \( p \) upon request (Kölbel (2011: 68)).

Taking Kölbel's considerations of Stalnaker's theory of the common ground and Brandom's account of the obligation of justification, we are able to formulate Kölbel's common ground definition of assertion.

### 3.7.1 Kölbel's Definition of Assertion

\( A \) asserts \( p \) iff

(KA1) \( A \) says that \( p \)

(KA2) \( p \) is added to the common ground

(KA3) \( A \) undertakes the obligation to justify \( p \) upon request

In just the same way as Stokke does, we can add the necessary condition that the asserter believe what she asserts to be false to Kölbel's common ground definition of assertion, in order to formulate a Kölbelean common ground definition of lying.

### 3.7.2 The Kölbelean Definition of Lying

\( A \) lies to \( B \) iff

(KL1) \( A \) says that \( p \) to \( B \).

(KL2) \( p \) is added to the common ground.

(KL3) \( A \) undertakes the obligation to justify \( p \) upon request.

---

*I have adapted the necessary condition regarding adding \( p \) to the common ground for Kölbel's definition of assertion for the following reason: "I do not think that assertion can be reduced to the asserter's intentions. It's a social activity that is governed by rules. Hence, if you are a participant of a conversation, your utterances of certain sentences will count as assertions no matter what you intend" (Kölbel 2014: personal correspondence). Unlike Stokke, Kölbel claims that adding a proposition to the common ground does not depend on any intention or proposal of the speaker. It is not necessary for me to explore this any further here, but the reader may want to follow it up. See Kölbel (2011).*
(KL4) $A$ believes that $p$ is false.

Note, deceptive lies are straightforwardly explained on this Kölbelean account as well. Again, since belief entails acceptance, if $A$ says that $p$ to $B$ with the intention that $B$ believe that $p$, then $p$ will necessarily be added to the common ground. Therefore, $A$ will have lied to $B$. In addition, on this Kölbelean view, since conversational, conventional and scalar implicatures are not said, and so do not fulfil (KL1), they cannot be used to lie, though they can be used to deceive.

3.7.3 The Kölbelean Definition of Lying: Bald-faced Lies

Kölbel's common ground definition of assertion, and so the Kölbelean common ground definition of lying, are defined in terms of acceptance. Acceptance, as discussed above, is now interpreted not as a propositional attitude, but as a public or social attitude or commitment, governed by the rules or conventions of some social practice. It is clear, then, that the Kölbel's definition of assertion satisfies the strong restrictions, (R1) – (R4), mentioned above. For the sake of brevity, I shall not show how the Kölbelean common ground definition of lying handles the cases above, but the reader can verify this for herself. To help understand the Kölbelean account, the reader may want to use the following as a guide. The general idea, regarding the three cases, is that (KL1), (KL2), (KL3) and (KL4) are all satisfied, and so each speaker is lying. The central point is that not only that (KL2) is satisfied, but that (KL3) is satisfied (i.e. they have not only added what they have said to the common ground, but they have also undertaken an obligation to justify what they have said upon request). Note, although they have undertaken an obligation to justify what they have said upon request, they may not and, perhaps, cannot comply with this obligation, due to what the addressee already knows. Nonetheless, Kölbel claims that (KL3) is still satisfied, since they have undertaken a conditional obligation to justify what they have said upon request (Kölbel 2014: personal correspondence).

3.7.4 The Kölbelean Definition of Lying: Bald-faced Lies vs. Assumptions
The Kölbelean common ground definition of lying, like Stokke’s, is in danger of ruling-in certain cases that we should not consider to be lies. Again, for example, participants of a conversation will often say mutually-known-to-be false propositions when they make assumptions, propound proofs, crack jokes and perform plays. This potential danger is apparent, as we have seen, because the common ground is defined in terms of acceptance, rather than belief. Therefore, these propositions are also added to the common ground, and so it seems, will be classed as lies on the Kölbelean account. However, using the Kölbelean definition, we need not subscribe to the conception of the official and unofficial common ground in order to distinguish lies from other cases. Instead, Kölbel offers an alternative strategy which, like Stokke’s, is based on a comment made by Stalnaker regarding assumption. Recall that Stalnaker says the following:

One may make assumptions, and what is assumed may become part of the common ground, temporarily. (Stalnaker (2002: 704)).

Kölbel claims that what distinguishes assertions from assumptions is twofold. First, he explains that assumptions do not involve the justificatory obligations involved in asserting. He argues that there may be an issue as to whether or not it is useful to assume something in particular, but the participant of the conversation making the assumption does not have the obligation to provide any justification. Second, he explains that assumptions have an expiry date. He argues that at the time of adding the assumed proposition to the common ground, participants have already agreed to drop the assumption once they have concluded their exploration. Again, to help understand this, the reader may want to use the following as a guide. The general idea regarding cases of assumption is that (KL1), (KL2), and (KL4) are all satisfied, but (KL3) is not, and so assumptions are not lies. The central point is that although (KL2) is satisfied, as Stalnaker claims, (KL3) is not satisfied (i.e. when you make an assumption, you add what you say to the common ground, but you do not undertake an obligation to justify what you have said upon request). In addition, if this is the case, what you have said will have an expiry date, which will be agreed when the assumption is made. It is plausible, then, that a defender of the Kölbelean common ground definition of lying
could roll this strategy out across other problematic cases, like propounding proofs, cracking jokes and performing plays.\(^\text{10}\)

I conclude that I have presented a plausible definition of lying in defence of bald-faced lies, as an alternative to Stokke's less credible definition of lying.

### 3.8 Bald-Faced Lies Are Not Lies

Assertion, as I consider it, is a speech act that has communicative-intention as its base. As we have seen, this makes assertion a somewhat penetrative act; in that, when a speaker makes an assertion, she intends to affect the beliefs of her addressee, intends for the addressee to recognise this, and intends for this to happen based (at least in part) on the addressee's recognition of her intention, thus invoking trust between them. That being said, I am sympathetic to some of Stalnaker's, Stokke's and Kölbl's notions. That is, I think that the theory of common ground is attractive; I think that adding a proposition to the common ground is an essential effect of assertion; I think that there generally are certain obligations of justification on speakers when they make assertions. However, I do not think that any of these play a constitutive role in assertion, only an evidential one. Consider, again, my preliminary Gricean definition of lying, which consists of my Gricean definition of assertion, and so has communicative-intention as its base:

\[A \text{ lies to } B \text{ iff}\]

\[\begin{align*}
(PGDL1) & \quad A \text{ says that } p \text{ to } B. \\
(PGDL2) & \quad A \text{ communicatively-intends that } B \text{ believe that } p. \\
(PGDL3) & \quad A \text{ believes that } p \text{ is false.}
\end{align*}\]

With this in mind, let us take another look at the three examples.

\(^{10}\) It is obvious that Kölbl's definition of assertion, and so the Köbleean definition of lying, will handle cases of sarcasm in the same way that Stokke does.
The Witness’s utterance:

(PGDL1) Satisfied: the witness says that she did not see the individual commit the crime to the judge.

(PGDL2) Not satisfied: the witness does not communicatively-intend that the judge believe that she did not see the individual commit the crime.

(PGDL3) Satisfied: the witness believes that it is false that she did not see the individual commit the crime.

My evaluation: the witness is not lying.

The Nurse’s utterance:

(PGDL1) Satisfied: the nurse says that there are no soldiers in the hospital to the journalist.

(PGDL2) Not satisfied: the nurse does not communicatively-intend that the journalist believe that there are no soldiers in the hospital.

(PGDL3) Satisfied: the nurse believes that it is false that there are no soldiers in the hospital.

My evaluation: the nurse is not lying.

The Host’s utterance:

(PGDL1) Satisfied: the host says that it was a pleasure to have the guest at the party to the guest.

(PGDL2) Not satisfied: the host does not communicatively-intend that the guest believe that it was a pleasure to have the guest at the party.

(PGDL3) Satisfied: the host believes that it is false that it was a pleasure to have the guest at the party.
My evaluation: the host is not lying.

I argue that (PGDL1) and (PGDL3) are satisfied, but (PGDL2) is not satisfied in any of the three cases, and so neither the witness, the nurse nor the host is lying. The central point is that (PGDL2) is not satisfied. That is, none of the speakers have actually asserted anything, because what they have said lacks assertoric force: communicative-intention. I conclude that bald-faced lies are not genuine lies, because they are not genuine assertions. Instead, the witness, the nurse and the host have only made-as-if-to assert a falsehood, and that is not sufficient for lying.\footnote{The only other philosopher that I know who has seen this option is Faulkner (forthcoming), whose view that bald-faced lies are not genuine lies because they lack communicative-intention, I discovered after I had formulated my own.} Therefore, neither my Gricean definition of assertion, nor my preliminary Gricean definition of lying, should be rejected.

3.8.1 Undermining the Intuition that Bald-Faced Lies Are Lies

I understand and appreciate that some people have the intuition that bald-faced lies are genuine lies. I would like to offer an explanation as to why I think people have this intuition, and to undermine it accordingly. As mentioned above, Grice explains that participants of a conversation operate under a normative principle called the Co-operative Principle, as well as a set of Maxims. When a speaker lies, she fails to fulfil the Maxim of Quality. In addition, when a speaker bald-faced lies, she fails to fulfil the Maxim of Quality. That is, a genuine liar and a bald-faced liar each contravene a normative principle of co-operative communication. In this respect, bald-faced lies are very similar to genuine lies. However, the similarities stop here, since there are a number of ways by which the Maxims can fail to be fulfilled, as Grice explains:

\textit{Violate}

He may quietly and unostentatiously violate a maxim in various ways; if so, in some cases he will be liable to mislead (Grice (1989: 30)).
Clash

He may be faced by a clash: He may be unable, for example, to fulfil the first maxim of Quantity (Be as informative as required) without violating the second maxim of Quality (Have adequate evidence for what you say) (Grice (1989: 30)).

Opt Out

He may opt out from the operation of both the maxim and the Cooperative Principle; he may say, indicate, or allow it to become plain that he is unwilling to cooperate in the way the maxim requires. He may say, for example, *I cannot say more; my lips are sealed* (Grice (1989: 30)).

Flout

He may flout a maxim; that is, he may blatantly fail to fulfil it (Grice (1989: 30)).

Exploit

On the assumption that the speaker is able to fulfil the maxim and to do so without violating another maxim (because of a clash), is not opting out, and is not, in view of the blatancy of his performance, trying to mislead, the hearer is faced with a minor problem: How can his saying what he did say be reconciled with the supposition that he is observing the overall Cooperative Principle? This situation is one that characteristically gives rise to conversational implicature; and when a conversational implicature is generated in this way, I shall say that a maxim is being exploited (Grice (1989: 30)).

Lying is a violation of the Maxim of Quality, because in order to communicatively-intend the addressee to believe a falsehood, the speaker must do so quietly and unostentatiously, otherwise she cannot plausibly communicatively-intend for it to be believed. However,
bald-faced lying is a flouting of the Maxim of Quality, because in making-as-if-to assert a mutually-known falsehood, the speaker will have blatantly failed to fulfil it. In this respect, Bald-faced lies are more similar to sarcastic remarks, since they both flout the Maxim of Quality. However, the similarities, again, stop here, since in making sarcastic remarks, the speaker not only flouts the Maxims, but exploits them in order to implicate propositions, whereas the bald-faced liar does not. This shows a more fundamental distinction between genuine lies and sarcastic remarks compared to bald-faced lies: genuine lies and sarcastic remarks each involve communicative-intention, and so they each inform the addressee in way that bald-faced lies do not.

I conclude that although bald-faced lies share some of the normative characteristics of genuine lies, since they lack assertoric force – communicative-intention – the intuition that they are genuine lies should be dropped.

### 3.8.2 A Gricean Explanation of Bald-Faced Lies

The Gricean account offers a framework to explain what is actually happening in the three cases of bald-faced lies discussed above. In the case of the nurse, she flouts the Maxim of Quality, because she wishes to opt out of the conversation. That is, she is faced with a situation in which she does not want to divulge information regarding her surroundings, but feels she must say enough in order to end the conversation, without giving honest answers. She does this by making-as-if-to assert a falsehood – she does not lie. In the case of the host, she flouts the Maxim of Quality, because she is faced with a clash between the Maxims of Quality and the more general Maxim of Politeness. That is, she is faced with a situation in which she feels that she should be polite, but should not say what she believes to be false to her guest. She decides to be polite by making-as-if-to assert a falsehood – she does not lie. In the case of the witness, she flouts the Maxim of Quality by giving a known-to-be false testimony. This case is particularly interesting, because it illustrates that my

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12 In order to be sarcastic, it is not necessary to flout the Maxim of Quality. It is possible to be sarcastic by flouting other Maxims as well, like the Maxim of Relation, etc.
13 Grice explains that there are all sorts of other Maxims, including aesthetic, social, and moral in character, including "Be polite." See Grice (1989: 28).
preliminary Gricean definition of lying runs in line with a pre-existing distinction between lying and perjury (See Mahon (2008)). Perjury (UK) is defined as follows:

If any person lawfully sworn as a witness or as an interpreter in a judicial proceeding wilfully makes a statement material in that proceeding, which he knows to be false or does not believe to be true, he shall be guilty of perjury, and shall, on conviction thereof on indictment, be liable to penal servitude (Perjury Act: 1911. [1 & 2 GEO. 5. CH. 6.]).\(^\text{14}\)

When the witness testifies that she did not see the individual commit the crime, she lawfully swears in a judicial proceeding and wilfully makes a statement in that proceeding, which she knows (and is mutually known by everyone in attendance) to be false, and so she commits perjury. However, since what she says lacks assertoric force she makes-as-if-to assert a falsehood – she does not lie. Note, this shores up nicely with Hawley’s remark, mentioned above, that maybe giving testimony has a more performative aspect (like saying ‘I do’ during a wedding). Interestingly, it seems that all bald-faced lies have this aspect or a similar aspect to them, though the contexts, and so the surrounding conventions, may vary widely. That is, what the nurse says and what the host says seems somewhat performative, similar to, if not just like, phatic expressions.

4 Lying with Implicatures

4.1 Setting the Scene: Sorenson’s Account

Sorensen (2012) claims that nearly all definitions of lying have been developed from a one-sided diet of examples: straight declaratives. He argues that this leaves us unprepared for lies involving indicative conditionals, because lies involving indicative conditionals are dependent on conditional probability, whereas lies involving straight declaratives are dependent on truth-value. He concludes that the connection between lying and falsehood is

\(^\text{14}\) http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/1-2/6
broken when lying with indicative conditionals. My preliminary Gricean definition of lying, then, seems to be in danger of being rejected once again.

Sorensen claims that all lies are assertions, and so defends an assertion-based definition of lying. However, he has not yet clearly presented his own assertion-based definition of lying. Nonetheless, he accepts the necessary conditions related to assertion:

(i) Asserting entails saying (though not the converse).
(ii) 'What is said' only consists of propositional content (i.e. truth-conditional content).

Sorensen argues that you cannot lie using conversational implicatures, because conversational implicatures are not said, and so are not asserted. This, he claims, is because conversational implicatures are a pragmatic phenomenon. However, he argues that you can lie using conventional implicatures, because conventional implicatures are said, and so are asserted. This, he claims, is because conventional implicatures are a semantic phenomenon. He explains, as follows:

Lying stands to misleading as conventional implicature stands to conversational implicature. A conversational implicature is inferred from the fact that $p$ was uttered rather than from $p$ itself (Sorensen (2012: 825)).

Drawing on Jackson’s account of conditionals and Bach’s account of conventional implicatures, Sorensen argues that it is possible to lie by asserting believed-to-be true indicative conditional sentences by virtue of their believed-to-be false conventional implicatures.

4.2 Jackson: Asserting Indicative Conditionals

Jackson (1979) defends the Equivalence thesis: indicative conditionals are logically equivalent to material conditionals. However, he maintains that the standard explanation for
the assertability of indicative conditional sentences – assert the stronger rather than the weaker – is incorrect. He argues that indicative conditionals are logically equivalent to material conditionals, but, due to the conventional meaning of the term ‘if, then,’ indicative conditionals indicate that the material conditional is robust with respect to the antecedent, and so generate conventional implicatures. He explains that robustness is defined in terms of conditional probability, and so what governs the assertability of indicative conditionals is whether or not Probability(\(p\)) and Probability(\(p/q\)) are close, and both high. He concludes that if indicative conditionals are understood in this way, then the Equivalence thesis is secure.15

4.2.1 The Indicative Conditional & the Material Conditional

The indicative conditional, symbolised as \(p \rightarrow q\), is a natural language logical operator. It is characterised by natural language sentences of the form ‘if \(p\), then \(q\’.

The material conditional, symbolised as \(p \supset q\), is a formal language logical operator. Equivalence theorists argue that indicative conditionals and material conditionals are logically equivalent (i.e. they have the same truth-conditions). The following truth-table shows that \(p \supset q\) is false if and only if \(p\), the antecedent, is true and \(q\), the consequent, is false.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(p)</th>
<th>(q)</th>
<th>(p \supset q)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(T)</td>
<td>(T)</td>
<td>(T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T)</td>
<td>(F)</td>
<td>(F)</td>
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<td>(F)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(F)</td>
<td>(F)</td>
<td>(T)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 There is a lot to be said about material conditionals and indicative conditionals. I intend only to give a simple overview of a fraction of the debate in order to discuss what matters for my purposes: the expectations concerning the use of indicative conditional sentences.
4.2.3 The Equivalence Thesis

The Equivalence Thesis is as follows:

\[ p \rightarrow q \] is logically equivalent to \[ p \supset q \] (i.e., the indicative conditional has the same truth-conditions as the material conditional).

The standard argument for the Equivalence Thesis is as follows:

\[ p \supset q \] is logically equivalent to \[ \sim p V \sim q \] and \[ \sim p V \sim q \] is logically equivalent to \[ p \rightarrow q \].
Therefore, \[ p \rightarrow q \] is logically equivalent to \[ p \supset q \].

Suppose that it is the case that if you drink poison, then you will die. This can be translated into disjunctive form: either it is not the case that you will drink poison or you will die. This shows that \[ p \supset q \] and \[ p \rightarrow q \] are logically equivalent to \[ \sim p V q \]. Therefore, the indicative conditional and the material conditional are logically equivalent.

4.2.4 Assertability & Probability

Jackson explains that, as a rule, our intuitive judgements of whether it is appropriate to assert sentences or not matches up with our intuitive judgements of probability. That is, it is appropriate to assert indicative conditional sentence \( S \) if it has high subjective probability for its asserter. So, when \( p \supset q \) is highly probable, but both \( \sim p \) and \( q \) are not highly probable, it is appropriate to assert \( p \rightarrow q \) (Jackson (1979: 565)). The conditional probability of \( p \) is the probability that \( q \) will occur given the knowledge that \( p \) has already occurred.\(^{16}\)

Consider the following material conditional:

\[(MC) \text{ It rains tomorrow } \supset \text{ the match will be cancelled}\]

\(^{16}\) See Adams (1965) for more on the definition of conditional probability.
Suppose that the material conditional is highly probable, but it is not highly probable that it is not the case that it will rain tomorrow and that the match will be cancelled. If this is the case, then it is appropriate to assert the following indicative conditional:

\[(IC) \text{ If it rains tomorrow, then the match will be cancelled.}\]

The problem, however, is that if defenders of the Equivalence thesis follow this strategy, they are faced with counterexamples where, despite the high probability of either \(\sim p\) or \(q\), it is not appropriate to assert \(p \rightarrow q\).

### 4.2.5 Paradox of Material Implication

Consider the following:

\[\sim p \therefore p \rightarrow q\]

\[p = \text{The Earth is made of jelly beans.}\]

\[q = \text{London is the capital of England.}\]

\[(PX) \text{ If the Earth is made of jelly beans, then London is the capital of England.}\]

The material conditional is true and highly probable, and it is highly probable that it is not the case that the Earth is made of jelly beans and it is highly probable that London is the capital of England. If assertability is governed by probability, then it is appropriate to assert (PX). This is counterintuitive.

### 4.2.6 Assert the Stronger, Not the Weaker

Jackson observes that the standard way for Equivalence theorists to explain away such counterexamples is to say that you should only assert the stronger sentence, not the weaker sentence. Suppose that \(S_x\) is logically stronger than \(S_y\): \(S_x\) entails \(S_y\), but \(S_y\) does not entail \(S_x\). And suppose that \(S_x\) is nearly as highly probable as \(S_y\). There is no significant loss of
probability in asserting $S_x$, and $S_x$ must yield everything and more that $S_y$ does. Therefore, $S_x$ is to be asserted instead of $S_y$ (Jackson (1979: 566)). In other words, the standard way that defenders of the Equivalence thesis explain away the inappropriateness of asserting $p \supset q$, when one of $\neg p$ or $q$ is highly probable, is to say that you should simply assert either $\neg p$ or $q$.

4.2.7 A Reason for Sometimes Asserting the Weaker, Not the Stronger

Jackson, however, explains why this account is insufficient. Suppose, again, that $S_x$ is logically stronger than $S_y$, and that $S_x$'s probability is only marginally lower than $S_y$'s. It might be that the impact of new information, $I$, on $S_x$ is very different from the impact of $I$ on $S_y$. That is, it might be that $I$ reduces the probability of $S_x$ substantially without reducing $S_y$'s to any significant degree (in fact, $S_y$'s may rise) (Jackson (1979: 569)). Jackson describes such situations as ones where $S_x$, but not $S_y$, is robust with respect to $I$ (Jackson (1979: 570)). Consider the following example:

Suppose I read in the paper that Hyperion won the 4.15. George asks me who won the 4.15. I say "Either Hyperion or Hydrogen won." Everyone agrees that I have done the wrong thing. Although the disjunction is highly probable, it is not highly assertable. Why? The standard explanation is in terms of "Assert the stronger instead of the weaker." But is this the whole story? Consider the following modification to our case. What I read is that $H-$ won. The name is too blurred for me to do more than pick out the initial letter. However I happen to know that Hyperion and Hydrogen are the only two horses in the 4.15 whose names begin with "H," and in addition I know that Hydrogen is a no-hoper from the bush. Clearly it is still the case that "Hyperion won" is highly probable and it would be quite proper for me to say so. But it would also be quite proper for me to say "Hyperion or Hydrogen won," despite its being weaker and only marginally more probable. Indeed the natural thing to do would be to say something like "Either Hyperion or Hydrogen won. It can't have been Hydrogen- he's a no-hoper. So it must have been Hyperion (Jackson (1979: 570 – 571))."
Jackson argues that there is a marked change in the assertability of the disjunction in the first case compared to the second case, because in the first case if he were to learn that Hyperion was not the winner, he would have to abandon the disjunction. However, in the second case he would not. That is, in the first case Probability(Either Hyperion or Hydrogen won/Hyperion did not win) is low, whereas in the second case it is not. Therefore, in the second case there is point to asserting that Hyperion or Hydrogen won instead of simply that Hyperion won, even if the probabilities are very close (Jackson (1979: 571)). Jackson believes that this shows a gap in the Equivalence theorist's thought. Even if \( S_x \) and \( S_y \) are both highly probable and \( S_x \) entails everything \( S_y \) does, there might still be a good reason for asserting \( S_y \), either instead of or as well as \( S_x \). This is because it might be desirable that what you say should remain highly probable, should it turn out to be the case, and it might be that Probability(\( S_y/I \)) is high while Probability(\( S_x/I \)) is low. Robustness, then, in respect to \( I \), might be desirable and (consistent with \( S_x \) entailing \( S_y \)) \( S_y \) might have it while \( S_x \) lacks it. Jackson concludes that robustness is an important ingredient in the assertability of indicative conditionals.

### 4.2.8 Robustness Explained

Jackson defines robustness for indicative conditionals as follows: an indicative conditional is robust if and only if you would not abandon your belief that \( p \supset q \) if you were to learn that \( p \). That is, robustness is not satisfied if you believe \( p \supset q \) solely on the grounds that \( \neg p \), because if you find that \( p \), you will abandon your belief in \( p \supset q \) rather than conclude that \( q \). This amounts to you having a high probability for \( p \supset q \) given \( p \) (i.e. having high probability for \( \neg p \lor q \) given \( p \)), which is to have a high probability for \( q \) given \( p \) (Jackson (1979: 572)). The importance of signalling robustness with respect to the antecedent is to ensure that an assertable conditional is fit for modus ponens:

\[
\begin{align*}
 p \supset q \\
 p \\
 \therefore q
\end{align*}
\]
Jackson observes that although modus ponens is a valid formal argument, there is difficulty using it in practice. He explains that your evidence might make \( p \supset q \) highly probable, but you might not have any evidence for \( p \). If \( q \) is of interest to you, then you might set about finding evidence for \( p \), if you can. He maintains that the problem is that you might find evidence that makes \( p \) highly probable, but that might not be enough in itself for you to conclude \( q \) by modus ponens, which is because the evidence that makes \( p \) probable might make \( p \supset q \) improbable (Jackson (1979: 577)). Jackson argues, then, that you must distinguish the validity of modus ponens from its utility in a situation where you know \( p \supset q \) but do not know \( p \). He concludes that the robustness of \( p \supset q \) relative to \( p \) is what is needed to ensure the utility of modus ponens in such situations.

### 4.2.9 Indicative Conditionals & Conventional Implicatures

Jackson argues that when you assert an indicative conditional, you are expected to have committed yourself to *modus ponens* inferences. Consider the following example from Lewis (1986):

> We are gathering mushrooms; I say to you "You won’t eat that one and live." A dirty trick: I thought that one was safe and especially delicious, I wanted it myself, so I hoped to dissuade you from taking it without actually lying. I thought it highly probable that my trick would work, that you would not eat the mushroom, and therefore that I would turn out to have told the truth. But though what I said had a high subjective probability of truth, it had a low assertability and it was a misdeed to assert it. Its assertability goes not just by probability but by the resultant of that and a correction term to take account of the pointlessness and misleadingness of denying a conjunction when one believes it false predominantly because of disbelieving one conjunct (Lewis (1986: 152 – 153)).

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17 Jackson actually presents two definitions of robustness: one in terms of probability and the other in terms of what is learned (evidence). Although this is an interesting distinction, it is not necessary to discuss it here. See Lewis (1986: 152 – 156).
Jackson explains that, in this case, when the speaker asserts the conjunction, "You won’t eat that one and live," the addressee expects the conjunction to be robust with respect to "You eat that one," when it is not. That is, the addressee takes the speaker to be providing her with relevant information, and so constructs for herself the following piece of practical reasoning:

(Prem1) I won’t eat that one and live. (Premise supplied by speaker.)
(Prem2) I eat that one. (Premise addressee can make true.)
(Con) I won’t live.

The addressee is led to refrain from making (Prem2) true, because the conclusion is clearly undesirable. Jackson explains the reason why the addressee is tricked, as follows. The argument is valid, (Prem1) has a high probability, and the addressee is able to give (Prem2) a high probability. However, in order to infer the conclusion of a valid argument, all the premises need to be highly probable together. But, if the addressee were to make the second premise highly probable, (Prem1) would no longer be highly probable. The addressee, then, was entitled to take it that not only was "You won’t eat that one and live" as highly probable, but that it was also robust with respect to "You eat that one" (Jackson (1979: 572 – 573)).

What Lewis’s example and Jackson’s treatment of it bear out, is that robustness plays an important role in the assertability of sentences. Jackson explains that when speakers assert indicative conditionals, there is an expectation that the material conditional is robust with respect to the antecedent, and that this expectation is in place because conventions regarding the material conditional have become fixed due to the way indicative conditionals are generally used. He argues that it is specifically the syntactical constructions of indicative conditional sentences themselves that have come to conventionally indicate that the material conditional is robust with respect to the antecedent, and so, by exploiting the term ‘if, then’, speakers can generate conventional implicatures. Consider (S2) and (S3) again:

(S2) She was poor but she was honest.
(S3) She was poor and she was honest.
Grice explains that (S2) and (S3) are logically equivalent: (S2) is false if and only if at least one of its conjuncts is false, and (S3) is false if and only if at least one of its conjuncts is false. They are both true otherwise. However, if you assert (S2) instead of (S3), due to the term 'but', you indicate that there is a contrast. That is, you do not say that there is a contrast. Thus, there are at least two separate, but related, aspects to asserting (S2):

(i) What is said: 'p and q'
(ii) What is indicated: there is a contrast.

Now, consider (C1) and (C2):

(C1) If you touch me, then I will scream.
(C2) You touch me ⊃ I will scream.

Jackson explains that (C1) and (C2) are logically equivalent: (C1) is false if and only if its antecedent is true and its consequent is false, and (C2) is false if and only if its antecedent is true and its consequent is false. They are both true otherwise. However, if you assert (C1) instead of (C2), due to the term 'if, then', you indicate that the material conditional is robust with respect to the antecedent. That is, you do not say that the material conditional is robust with respect to the antecedent. Thus, there are, again, at least two separate, but related, aspects to asserting (C1):

(i) What is said: 'It is not the case that p and not q’\(^18\)
(ii) What is indicated: \(p \supset q\) is robust with respect to \(p\).

The distinction that Jackson is making regarding (C1) is the same distinction that Grice is making regarding (S1). That is, in (C2), as in (S1), (i) is what is said (i.e. the propositional content), and so is asserted. Yet, in (C2), as in (S1), (ii) is not part of what is said (i.e. is not propositional content), and so is not asserted. Note, because (ii) in (S1) and (C2) is not

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\(^{18}\) As we have seen, \(p \supset q\) is logically equivalent to \(\sim p \lor q\). In addition, \(\sim p \lor q\) is logically equivalent to \(\sim(p \land \sim q)\). Therefore, \(p \supset q\) is logically equivalent to \(\sim(p \land \sim q)\). For the sake of clarity I will refer to the propositional content of \(p \supset q\) in the following form: \(\sim(p \land \sim q)\).
propositional in content, and so not truth-conditional, it does not affect the truth-conditions of the conjunction or the material conditional at base, respectively.

Lewis's example and Jackson's treatment of it also help to highlight an important aspect of Sorensen's argument regarding the difference between deceiving with conversational implicatures and deceiving with conventional implicatures. "You won't eat that [mushroom] and live" is not an indicative conditional, it is a conjunction. The conjunction, then, does not contain the term 'if, then' in order to indicate robustness, and so does not generate a conventional implicature. Consider, though, the conjunction, "You won't eat that [mushroom] and live," in relation to the following indicative conditional, "If you eat that mushroom, then you will not live." Notice, the sentences are logically equivalent. That is, both sentences share exactly the same propositional content: 'it is not the case that you will eat that mushroom and live.' In addition, notice that they both indicate robustness. However, the crucial difference between the conjunction and the indicative conditional is that the conjunction indicates robustness due to the fact that it was uttered, and so generates a conversational implicature, whereas the indicative conditional indicates robustness due to the term 'if, then', and so generates a conventional implicature. As we have seen, Sorensen argues that you cannot lie using conversational implicatures, because conversational implicatures are not said, and so are not asserted. But, he argues that you can lie using conventional implicatures, because conventional implicatures are said, and so are asserted. He needs to show, then, that conventional implicatures are said in order for them to be eligible for assertion.

4.3 Bach: The Myth of Conventional Implicature

Bach (1999) claims that conventional implicatures are a myth. He argues that terms typified by 'but', 'still' and 'even' do in fact contribute to what is said (i.e. they are part of the propositional content of the sentences in which they are imbedded). Bach's IQ test is designed to prove that certain terms within uttered sentences do contribute to what is said, and to specify which terms within uttered sentences contribute to what is said. He concludes that the common assumption that uttered sentences, in which these terms are imbedded,
only consist of one proposition, is incorrect, and that such sentences actually consist of more than one proposition. In addition, he concludes that these ancillary propositions, though truth-conditional, are independent to the main proposition.

4.3.1 Bach’s Conventional Implicature Thesis

Bach presents his own account of conventional implicatures using Grice’s characterisation as a guide:

A proposition is a conventional implicature of an utterance just in case (a) the speaker (speaking seriously) is committed to the truth of the proposition, (b) which proposition that is depends upon the (or a) conventional meaning of some particular linguistic device in the utterance, but (c) the falsity of that proposition is compatible with the truth of the utterance (Bach (1999: 331)).

Bach calls expressions that supposedly generate conventional implicatures Alleged Conventional Implicature Devices (henceforth, ACIDS).

4.3.2 The IQ Test

Bach believes that there is a very simple problem with the CI-thesis. He observes that the CI-thesis says that using certain expressions (or ACIDs), as a matter of their meaning, commits a speaker to a proposition that is not part of what is said. However, he argues that the ‘that’-clause of an indirect quotation specifies what is said in the utterance being reported, and ACIDs can occur in specifications of what is said (Bach (1999: 338 – 339)). Consider the IQ test:

An element of a sentence contributes to what is said in an utterance of that sentence if and only if there can be an accurate and complete indirect quotation of the utterance (in the same language) which includes that element, or a corresponding element, in the ‘that’-clause, that specifies what is said (Bach (1999: 340)).
Bach argues that the IQ test shows the true nature of the terms that are thought to generate conventional implicatures. He calls these particular ACIDs *preservative operators*.

### 4.3.3 The Results of the IQ Test: Preservative Operators

Imagine that Mr. X says (S5):

\[(S5)\] Shaquille O' Neil is huge but he is agile.

- (a) Mr. X said that Shaquille O' Neil is huge but he is agile.
- (b) Mr. X said that Shaquille O' Neil is huge and he is agile.

Bach argues that (S5a) is an accurate and complete indirect quotation of (S5), because (S5a) includes the element 'but' in the 'that'-clause, that specifies what is said. However, he argues that (S5b) is an inaccurate and incomplete indirect quotation of (S5), because (S5b) does not include the element 'but' in the 'that'-clause, that specifies what is said. He concludes that because (S5a) is an accurate and complete indirect quotation and (S5b) is an inaccurate and incomplete indirect quotation, the term 'but' in (S5) must contribute to what is said (i.e. must contribute to the propositional content of (S5)) (Bach (1999: 339)). Moreover, Bach argues that the IQ test shows that terms of this type are not detachable, as Grice claims them to be. (Grice claims that it is possible to replace utterance \( p \), which generates conventional implicature \( c \), with another utterance \( q \), and say the same thing as \( p \), and not generate conventional implicature \( c \) (Grice (1989: 30)).) Bach concludes that to use detachability as a test for the presence of a conventional implicature is to beg the question, because if a conventional implicature is part of what is said, you cannot leave it out and still say the same thing.

Sorensen's view, then, is that the term 'if, then' is analogous to the term 'but'. That is, he considers the term 'if, then' to be a preservative operator whose content is propositional, and so contributes to the propositional content of the sentences in which it is imbedded. In other
words, Sorensen thinks that the contribution of 'if, then' is part of what is said. If he is right, then conventional implicatures might be eligible for assertion, and so it might be possible to lie by asserting believed-to-be true indicative conditionals by virtue of their believed-to-be false conventional implicatures on an assertion-based definition of lying.

4.3.4 Expressing Multiple Propositions

Bach claims that there is an insidious assumption that lies behind the CI-thesis:

(OSOP) Every indicative sentence expresses exactly one proposition (Bach (1999: 350)).

He argues that if we reject this assumption, then we will no longer be forced to choose between treating the contribution of preservative operators as either an entailment, a conjunct or as not part of what is said (i.e. a conventional implicature). Instead, his view is that sentences that contain ACIDs, like 'but', comprise more than one proposition, that an ACID can be responsible for one of them, and that each proposition is independent of the other(s) (Bach (1999: 350 – 351)):

Terms like 'but', 'so', 'still', and 'even' function as operators of a special sort. I call them preservative operators because in operating on a sentence (or phrase) to yield a new proposition, they preserve the original proposition. If, for example, ‘O’ is a unary preservative operator on sentences and expresses the property of being F, and ‘S’ expresses the proposition that p, then ‘O(S)’ expresses both the proposition that p and the proposition that F(p) (Bach (1999: 352)).

Consider (S5) again:

(S5) Shaquille O’ Neil is huge but he is agile.

Bach argues that due to the ACID 'but', (S5) comprises two propositions:
(i) Shaquille O’ Neil is huge and he is agile.
(ii) Being huge tends to preclude being agile.

He concludes that primary proposition (i) and secondary proposition (ii) are part of what is said (Bach 2014: personal correspondence).

4.4 Combining Jackson and Bach (and Potts)

Sorensen adopts Jackson’s account that indicative conditionals are logically equivalent to material conditionals, and that due to the conventional meaning of the term ‘if, then’ indicative conditionals indicate that the material conditional is robust with respect to the antecedent, and so generate conventional implicatures. That is, as we have seen, there are at least two separate, but related, aspects to asserting indicative conditionals:

(i) What is said: 'It is not the case that p and not q’
(ii) What is indicated: p ⊃ q is robust with respect to p

However, Sorensen adopts Bach’s account that sentences that contain terms thought to generate conventional implicatures express more than one proposition, and that the truth-conditions of each proposition is independent of the other(s). In addition, Sorensen follows Potts (2003) – an advocate of Bach and his IQ test – in the view that if sentences that contain terms thought to generate conventional implicatures do express more than one proposition, and that the terms themselves are responsible for one of those propositions, then each proposition that is expressed by that sentence is asserted. Sorensen’s view, then, is that when an indicative conditional is asserted, two propositions are asserted simultaneously:

(i) What is said: 'It is not the case that p and not q’. (Primary proposition.)
(ii) What is said: ’p ⊃ q is robust with respect to p’. (Secondary proposition/conventional implicature.)
4.5 The Doctor

A doctor is visited by a patient who is well-known among the local medical community as a hypochondriac. The patient tells the doctor that he believes that he has a fatal illness. The doctor makes the necessary checks to determine whether the patient has a fatal illness or not. She finds that he does not, and so will live. However, the doctor believes that the patient will not listen to reason, and that he will not leave her office unless he is given what he believes to be some form of medication to save him from what he believes to be a fatal illness. So, the doctor gives the patient some placebos and asserts the following:

(S6) If you take these tablets, then you will live.

Sorensen explains that when the doctor makes her assertion to the patient, the following happens:

(i) The doctor asserts the believed-to-be true primary proposition, 'it is not the case that you take these tablets and you will not live'.
(ii) The doctor asserts the believed-to-be false secondary proposition/conventional implicature, "you take these tablets ⇒ you will live' is robust with respect to 'you take these tablets'.
(iii) The doctor intends to deceive the patient into believing that the believed-to-be false secondary proposition/conventional implicature is true.

Sorensen concludes that examples such as this show that it is possible to lie by asserting a believed-to-be true indicative conditional sentence with a believed-to-be false secondary proposition/conventional implicature. In addition, he concludes that since Jackson's notion of robustness is defined in terms of conditional probability, rather than truth-value, the connection between lying and falsehood is broken (Sorensen (2012: 824)). My preliminary Gricean definition of lying, then, seems to be in danger once again.
4.6 The Shortcomings of Sorensen's Account

Fallis (2012b) points out an obvious problem with Sorensen's account of lying with believed-to-be true indicative conditionals by virtue of their believed-to-be false conventional implicatures. If the doctor asserts (S6), then, according to Sorensen, she asserts what she believes to be a true primary proposition (i.e. 'it is not the case that you take these tablets and you will not live') and she simultaneously asserts what she believes to be a false secondary proposition/conventional implicature (i.e. "you take these tablets ⊃ you will live' is robust with respect to 'you take these tablets"). The fact, then, that Jackson defines robustness in terms of conditional probability is redundant, because although its truth-conditions are derived from conditional probability, on Sorensen's account, the secondary proposition/conventional implicature, due to being truth-conditional, is simply either true or false, and so simply believed to be true or believed to be false, regardless. In other words, on Sorensen's account, lying with believed-to-be true indicative conditional sentences by virtue of their believed-to-be false conventional implicatures does not break the connection between lying and falsehood, and so is no different from lying with standard declarative sentences. Therefore, my preliminary Gricean definition of lying is not in danger after all.

4.7 My Beef With Bach

4.7.1 The Problem with the IQ Test

Bach claims that the IQ test proves that certain elements of an uttered sentence contribute to what is said (i.e. contribute to the propositional content). In addition, he claims that it specifies which elements of an uttered sentence contribute to what is said. Consider the IQ test again:

An element of a sentence contributes to what is said in an utterance of that sentence if and only if there can be an accurate and complete indirect quotation of the utterance (in the same language) which includes that element, or a corresponding element, in the 'that' clause, that specifies what is said (Bach (1999: 340)).
Bach argues that an indirect quotation of an uttered sentence which does not include the element, or a corresponding element, in the ‘that’-clause, that contributes to what is said, is an inaccurate and incomplete indirect quotation, and therefore, does not specify what is said. However, this raises the following question: if you do not already know whether or not the element in the uttered sentence contributes to what is said, how can you know whether or not the indirect quotation is accurate and complete when the element, or corresponding element, is not included? The answer is: you cannot know, because you first need to know whether or not the element in the uttered sentence contributes to what is said in order to know whether or not the indirect quotation is accurate and complete when the element, or a corresponding element, is not included. Consider the example of Mr. X saying (S5) again:

(S5) Shaquille O' Neil is huge but he is agile.

(a) Mr. X said that Shaquille O' Neil is huge but he is agile.
(b) Mr. X said that Shaquille O' Neil is huge and he is agile.

Bach argues that (S5a) is an accurate and complete indirect quotation of (S5), because (S5a) includes the element 'but' in the 'that’-clause, and therefore, specifies what is said in (S5). However, he argues that (S5b) is an inaccurate and incomplete indirect quotation of (S5), because (S5b) does not include the element 'but’ in the 'that’-clause, and therefore, does not specify what is said in (S5). He concludes that 'but’ does contribute to what is said in uttered sentences. The problem is that the IQ test can only prove that (S5b) is an inaccurate and incomplete indirect quotation of (S5) if we already know whether or not 'but’ contributes to what is said in (S5). Yet, that is exactly what the IQ test is designed to prove. In other words, the IQ test begs the question.

In addition, as mentioned above, Bach argues that using detachability as a test for the presence of a conventional implicature is to beg the question, because if a conventional implicature is part of what is said, then you could not leave it out and still say the same thing. Ironically, in trying to show this, Bach begs the question himself.
I conclude that because the IQ test begs the question, it is an invalid test, and so does not prove whether or not any term contributes to what is said.

4.7.2 The Problem with Bach's Construal

Grice clearly explains that conventional implicatures do not contribute to what is said in asserted sentences, and so do not contribute to the propositional content of asserted sentences:

\[
U's \text{ doing } x \text{ might be his uttering the sentence } "\text{She was poor but she was honest}."
\]

What \( U \) meant, and what the sentence means, will both contain something contributed by the word “but”, and \textit{I do not want this contribution to appear in an account of what (in my favoured sense) \( U \) said (but rather as a conventional implicature)} (Grice (1989: 88) – my italics).

The problem is that Bach misconstrues Grice's characterisation, and so confuses the three separate, but related, aspects of asserted sentences that contain terms like 'but', which generate conventional implicatures, for just two:

(i) The propositional content of the asserted sentence.
(ii) The conventionally fixed operational content of the term within the asserted sentence.
(iii) The implicated proposition that is independent of the asserted sentence (i.e. the conventional implicature itself).

I conclude that Bach's construal of conventional implicature is not true to Grice's characterisation, and that a better account of conventional implicature should be adopted.
4.8 Conventional Implicatures Explained

Consider (S4) and (S4a):

(S4) I’ve had three bowls of porridge but I’m still hungry.
(S4a) I’ve had three bowls of porridge and I’m still hungry.

Grice explains that (S4) and (S4a) are logically equivalent: (S4) is false if and only if at least one of its conjuncts is false, and (S4a) is false if and only if at least one of its conjuncts is false. They are both true otherwise. This is because (S4) and (S4a) consist of exactly the same propositional content. That is, they both express the single conjunctive proposition, 'I’ve had three bowls of porridge and I’m still hungry.' The difference between (S4) and (S4a) is that (S4), as well as expressing the same conjunctive proposition as (S4a), contains the term 'but', and the term 'but' consists of conventionally fixed content. However, this conventionally fixed content is not propositional content. Instead, it is what I shall call operational content. Therefore, the term 'but' does not contribute to what is said in (S4) (Bourne (2014: personal correspondence)). Specifically, the term 'but' performs the operation of indicating that there is a contrast. A speaker is able, then, to exploit the conventionally fixed operational content of the term 'but', in order to implicate a proposition that is independent of (S4). It is important to understand that when a speaker exploits the term 'but', she determines the specific proposition that she communicatively-intends the addressee to believe, although the potential propositions that she can implicate by exploiting the term 'but' are indefinite. For example, as explained earlier, if a speaker asserts (S4), by exploiting the term 'but', she might implicate the following proposition:

(S4I) I’m surprised that I’m hungry after eating so much.

Note, since the term 'but' consists of conventionally fixed operational content, rather than propositional content, and since conventionally implicated propositions are independent of asserted sentences, if you indirectly quote somebody who has asserted, for example, (S4), and you replace the term 'but' in (S4) for the term 'and', your indirect quotation will be
accurate and complete, because you will have *said* exactly what they *said*. This, then, is a clear example of why/how conventional implicatures are detachable, as Grice claims. We can now see what the three separate, but related, aspects of (S4) are and how they work:

(i) The propositional content of the sentence: ‘I’ve had three helpings of porridge and I’m still hungry’.

(ii) The conventionally fixed operational content of the term ‘but’ indicates that there is a contrast.

(iii) The implicated proposition generated by exploiting ‘but’: ‘I’m surprised that I’m still hungry after eating so much’.

Jackson argues, as we have seen, that the term ‘if, then’ is analogous to the term ‘but’. Consider (C1) and (C2), again:

(C1) If you touch me, then I will scream.

(C2) You touch me ⊃ I will scream.

Again, (C1) and (C2) are logically equivalent: (C1) is false if and only if its antecedent is true and its consequent is false, and (C2) is false if and only if its antecedent is true and its consequent is false. They are both true otherwise. This is because (C1) and (C2) consist of exactly the same propositional content. That is, they both express the single proposition, ‘It is not the case that you will touch me and I will not scream’. The difference between (C1) and (C1) is that (C1), as well as expressing the same proposition as (C2), contains the term ‘if, then’, and the term ‘if, then’ itself consists of conventionally fixed content. However, this conventionally fixed content is not propositional content. Instead, as we have seen, it is *operational content*. Therefore, the term ‘if, then’ does not contribute to what is said in (C1). Specifically, the term ‘if, then’ performs the operation of indicating that the material conditional is robust with respect to the antecedent. A speaker is able, then, to exploit the conventionally fixed operational content of the term ‘if, then’ in order to implicate a proposition that is independent of (C1). Again, it is important to understand that when a speaker exploits the term ‘if, then’, she determines a specific proposition that she
communicatively-intends the addressee to believe, although the potential propositions that she can implicate by exploiting the term 'if, then' are indefinite. For example, if a speaker asserts (C1), by exploiting the term 'if, then', she might implicate the following proposition:

(C11) Touching me will cause me to scream.

I conclude that Bach's account of conventional implicature should be rejected and that this account should be adopted. In addition, I conclude that by understanding the terms that generate conventional implicatures, as well as the conventional implicatures themselves, as I have presented them here, it is clear that neither are part of what is said, and so neither are eligible for assertion. Sorensen's account of indicative conditionals, then, should also be rejected.

4.9 Revisiting the Doctor

We are now in a position to revisit the doctor example to see exactly what happens when a speaker deceives an addressee by asserting a believed-to-be true indicative conditional sentence by virtue of its believed-to-be false conventional implicature. Consider (S6) again:

(S6) If you take these tablets, then you will live.

On my account, when the doctor makes her assertion to the patient, the following happens:

(i) The doctor asserts the believed-to-be true proposition, 'It is not the case that you take these tablets and you will not live'.

(ii) The conventionally fixed operational content of the term 'if, then' indicates that the material conditional is robust with respect to the antecedent.
The doctor exploits the conventionally fixed operational content of the term 'if, then' to implicate the believed-to-be false proposition, 'Taking these tablets will cause you to live'.

I consider this to be a case of lying by asserting a believed-to-be true indicative conditional by virtue of its believed-to-be false conventional implicature. However, my preliminary Gricean definition of lying does not rule-in the doctor’s assertion as a lie, because it is the conventionally implicated proposition that does the deceptive work, not the asserted proposition. I conclude that my preliminary Gricean definition of lying needs adjusting.

4.10 Lying with All Implicatures

Many philosophers (Adler (1997); Carson (2006); Fallis (2009); Saul (2012); Sorensen (2012); Stokke (2013)) argue that you cannot lie using all (or any) implicatures, because it is the proposition that is said that is the crucial aspect of lying. I think that this is misguided. I appreciate that the mechanics of asserting are different from the mechanics of implicating. However, I also understand that there is a key component that both assertions and implicatures share: communicative-intention. My suggestion, then, is that it is the proposition that is communicatively-intended to be believed that is the crucial aspect of lying. Therefore, since all implicatures, as well as assertions, deal in communicative-intention, all are sufficient for lying.

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19 Remember, implicating a proposition, whether conventionally or conversationally, is a communicatively-intentional act. Therefore, by implicating a believed-to-be false proposition, a speaker will have attempted deception.

20 Sorensen makes the following observation: "if it were impossible to lie with conditionals, then all lying could be prevented by translating everything into universalised implications of the form ‘For all x, if. .. then ...’" (Sorensen (2012: 821)). Interestingly, if Sorensen sticks with his view, instead of adopting mine, then he will be in danger of fulfilling G. C. Lichtenburg’s fantasy: ‘I often wished that there would be a language in which it were impossible to tell a lie.’
4.10.1 Lying with Conversational Implicatures

Mr. X and Mrs. Y have had a serious falling out. In addition, they have both been invited to Mrs. Z's party. Mrs. Y will go to the party, but only if Mr. X is not going. Unknown to Mrs. Y, Mr. X, who is sick with a cold, is going to the party, nonetheless. Mrs. Y talks to Mrs. Z about her predicament. However, Mrs. Z has already spoken to Mr. X, and so she knows that he is sick, but that he is going to the party. Moreover, Mrs. Z thinks that it would be best for Mr. X and Mrs. Y to meet at the party in order to sort out their problems. When Mrs. Y asks Mrs. Z if Mr. X is going to the party or not, Mrs. Z asserts the following:

Mrs. Z: Mr. X is sick.

In asserting something true (i.e. that Mr. X is sick), Mrs. Z exploits the Maxim of Relation (specifically, 'Be relevant'), indicating that she is communicating something over and above what she asserted. What she implicated is as follows:

(IP1) Mr. X is not going to the party.

Since Mrs. Z believes that it is false that Mr. X is not going to party, she has attempted to deceive Mrs. Y. In my view, she has lied.

4.10.2 Lying with Conventional Implicatures

Mr. X wants to buy the car that Mrs. Y is selling. However, Mr. X is not willing to pay the amount that Mrs. Y is asking for, even though the car fits his exact specifications and is his favourite colour: Burlesque Pink. Mr. X knows that Mrs. Y has had difficulty selling the car because of its colour, and Mrs. Y has no idea what Mr. X's favourite colour is. When Mr. X goes to view the car, in an attempt to drive the price down, he asserts the following:

Mr. X: The car fulfils my exact specifications but it is Burlesque Pink.
In asserting something true (i.e. that the car fulfils his exact specifications and is Burlesque Pink), Mr. X exploits the conventional meaning of the term 'but' (specifically, that there is a contrast), indicating that he is communicating something over and above what he has asserted. What he implicated is as follows:

(IP2) I [Mr. X] do not like the colour Burlesque Pink.

Since Mr. X believes that it is false that he does not like the colour Burlesque Pink, he has attempted to deceive Mrs. Y. In my view, he has lied.\(^{21}\)

### 4.10.3 Lying with Scalar Implicatures

Mr. X has cooked an apple crumble for Mrs. X and the children. He proudly takes it out of the oven, puts it to one side, and then leaves the kitchen. Moments after, Mrs. X walks into the kitchen and sees Mr. X's apple crumble. Mrs. X decides that she will have some of it. However, Mrs. X finds the apple crumble so delicious that she ends up eating all of it, and then leaves the Kitchen to go and play with the children. Mr. X returns to the kitchen and notices that his apple crumble has gone. He walks out into the garden where Mrs. X and the children are playing and asks Mrs. X what happened to his apple crumble. Mrs. X sees that the children are out of hearing distance, and then she asserts:

Mrs. X: I ate some of the apple crumble.

In asserting something true (i.e. that she ate some of the pie), Mrs. X violates the Maxim of Quantity (specifically, 'Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)'), indicating that she is communicating something over and above what she asserted. What she implicated is as follows:

(IP3) I [Mrs. X] did not eat all of the apple crumble.

\(^{21}\) I have already shown how lying with the conventional implicatures generated by 'if, then' operate, above.
Since Mrs. X believes that it is false that she did not eat all of the apple crumble, she has attempted to deceive Mr. X. In my view, she has lied.

4.11 My Final Gricean Definition of Lying

I think that it is possible to lie with all implicatures, as well as assertions, and so I wish to make an adjustment to my preliminary Gricean definition of lying. I will use the word 'inform' as a technical umbrella term to capture the acts of asserting and implicating, as I think the notion of informing can plausibly be construed in a broad enough sense to capture the notion of communicative-intentions, but in a narrow enough sense to restrict that to only cases of asserting and implicating. I present the final formulation of my Gricean definition of lying:

\[(GDL)\ A \text{ lies to } B \text{ iff } A \text{ informs } B \text{ that } p \text{ and } A \text{ believes that } p \text{ is false.}\]

Grice explains that although the Co-operative Principle, and so the Maxims, may be contravened or unfulfilled, respectively, at the level of what is said, the addressee is entitled to presume that the Co-operative Principle, and so the Maxims, are observed at the level of what is implicated (1989: 33). We can see, then, that lies involving implicatures, as well as lies involving assertions, will be a violation of the Maxim of Quality.

4.12 A Web of Lies

By understanding conversational, conventional and scalar implicatures as they are presented here, we have the potential to explain how different types of sarcasm and more complex cases, such as metaphor and figurative speech, operate. Second, since we have the potential to explain how these phenomena operate, we then have the potential to explain how more interesting cases of lying involving such phenomena operate. I will be researching this in the future.
5 Conclusion

In this thesis I have presented my own Gricean definition of assertion and my own Gricean definition of lying. What lies at the heart of each of these definitions is Grice’s notion of *communicative-intention*. I have argued that if we focus on what speakers communicatively-intend addressees to believe, rather than what speakers say to addressees, then we need not class bald-faced lies as genuine lies, and we can class deceptive implicatures as genuine lies. In doing so, we are left with a simpler picture of lying that offers ethical and legal theorists something to hang their hats on.
References


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