

Seeking to Control Enterprise with Architecture

the limits and value of an engineering approach
from the perspective of an Enterprise Architect.

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*To my wife, Mette,
my daughter, Mathilde
and my son, Magnus,
who have stood by me every day of my endeavour
to contribute something to the practice and theory of enterprise architecture,

and to my mother, Helga,
who, more than anyone else, instilled in me
a deeply-felt desire to find ways of being helpful to others.*

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Abstract

In this thesis, I challenge assumptions underlying my discipline of enterprise architecture that led to two choices facing practitioners: either to work with tools and techniques which predict and control changes towards predetermined ends or to accept informal processes that are unpredictable and wasteful. Orthodox enterprise architecture defines an enterprise as an organisation, which is a system, and prescribes methods that seek to provide control over the transformation of an organisation into a desired state of affairs by achieving complete knowledge of the system before initiating the desired transformation.

Drawing on complexity sciences, I offer a different perspective on organisation and claim that organising what we do is an aspect of doing what we do. Organising is process. I furthermore claim that the people who are organising what we do can act spontaneously and surprise both themselves and others, but often they act habitually. Habitual ways of acting allow us to anticipate to some extent how others are likely to respond to us and, as we grow up, we learn how to behave ourselves, that is, how to adjust our behaviour to what we judge socially acceptable to increase the likelihood of being able to garner support and collaboration. I posit that social control is exercised in this way as mutual self-adjustment that forms what is normal and valued conduct. In other words, our shared social norms and values thus paradoxically and simultaneously form individuals and their conduct and are formed by individuals and their conduct. I claim that in this way we have partial, but never full, knowledge of how others generally respond to certain behaviour of ours. We can ever have only partial knowledge of that which is—in the words of Mannheim—in the process of becoming.

I therefore reject the central assumptions upon which orthodox enterprise architecture is based. In organisations, we engineer and exploit mechanical mechanisms that can conduct certain action more effectively and efficiently than people can. Materiality, objects in the world, can resist attempts to shape them to suit our needs but do so without intentionality or spontaneity. Accommodating material resistance is thus repeatable. Enterprise architecture as a discipline grew out of engineering of physical mechanisms and assumes a similar repeatability and predictability when working with the social, which I find to be an unwarranted assumption. I argue against the claim of orthodox enterprise architecture that we can bring about a pre-determined state in a controlled fashion and against the claim that without such control we have informal processes that are inevitably unpredictable and wasteful. I posit that what emerges is paradoxically stable instabilities of socially enabled and constrained recognisable patterns of behaviour.

When devising a mechanism in a physical object, such as a software programme, a repertoire of scripted action is transcribed into it which remains constant until transcription is renewed. Transcription has a tendency to render action less fluid. Some members of an organisation may judge particular scripted action to be awkward or detrimental while others may judge the same scripted action to be efficient and beneficial.

Thus, determining which scripted action to transcribe into mechanisms is a highly political decision which attracts the attention of skilful political players.

Enterprise architects can have a valuable role to play, since we have a better than average partial knowledge about technology, and since technology is increasingly important for many enterprises. I posit that becoming more aware of power and power plays, developing a feel for the game, and becoming more detached about our involvement will allow us to play into what is emerging socially with more political awareness and expertise.

Key words: Organising, Ways of working, Change, Enterprise architecture, Mechanism, Physical object, Social object, Social figuration, Relating, Complex responsive processes, Social control, Self-adjustment.

Key authors: G. H. Mead, K. Mannheim, N. Elias, H. G. Gadamer, R. Jackall, J. Scott, D. Griffin, R. Stacey, C. Mowles, Open Group, B. Latour, A. Pickering, F. Taylor, J. Kotter.

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If it is true, that life affords possibilities of knowledge and understanding even where science plays no part, it is no solution to designate such knowledge as ‘pre-scientific’ or to relegate it to the sphere of ‘intuition,’ simply in order to preserve the purity of an arbitrary definition of ‘science.’ On the contrary, it is above all our duty to inquire into the inner nature of these still unformulated types of knowledge and then to learn whether the horizons and conceptions of science cannot be so extended as to include these ostensibly pre-scientific areas of knowledge. —Karl Mannheim, Ideology & Utopia

Introduction

I began my professional career of managing changes to businesses by exploiting new technology in the Danish Postal Services in the 1990s. Inspired by James Martin (1989), we were applying the latest and greatest theory within the field to transform how we did business, information engineering. An element of this theory, Strategic Information Planning, prescribed building a comprehensive model of the functionality of the desired state of the enterprise by breaking down the *raison d'être* of the company—the logistics of delivering mail to people and companies—into discrete functions and processes, and to create a comprehensive model of all of the information needed to perform these functions and processes. In short, we knew everything about the new way of doing business before we initiated the first implementation project. It took a few years to implement this first project, and that worried decision makers. We had around 70 projects left to go, before the new business model was fully implemented and we were sure that stakeholders would not give us upwards of a hundred years to complete them. Thus, we bundled together the next five projects into one, a project too big to fail, to borrow from today's terminology when talking about banks, but fail it did. I was in shock. When I discussed with experienced colleagues how we could have failed when all we did was exactly according to the latest and greatest theory, they asked me, 'Don't you know that there is a difference between theory and practice'?

Over the coming years, I had the opportunity to work with even more modern and presumably better theories for how to determine and model a desired future state, model and map out the steps required to get from here to there and implement what was needed. I heard many variants of the theme 'there is a difference between theory and practice' over these years, and experienced both some successes and some fairly dramatic failures of projects. Increasingly, I became frustrated with our seeming acceptance that we would never be able to produce a theory that explained well what happens in practice. I decided to seek theoretical approaches that had better explanatory power of what I experience.

To augment my original training in the engineering and architecture fields, I therefore pursue in this thesis an inquiry into what Elias calls 'social control' and 'self-control'. Elias suggests that social control and self-control arise both at the same time and, as we learn to regulate ourselves as social beings, greater and greater degrees of social coordination become possible. Based on empirical material from my professional career, I inquire into how we conduct changes in larger organisations, how we do what we do together, or, in other words, how change management more generally and enterprise architecture more specifically are conducted in my lived professional experience. Throughout my professional career, it has bothered me that what I hoped would lead to the celebration of new ways of working, where new IT/IS was exploited to make things so much better, actually often led to 'resistance to change' or at least to unanticipated challenges. First and foremost, I seek a better understanding of what happens in practice when we attempt to conduct change, and secondly, I seek to compare and contrast what happens in practice with what different theories describe, in

order to test the explanatory power of these theories in light of practical experience. I will not study the actual construction of tools and technologies in any detail, but leave such an avenue of research for others to pursue.

My research consists of four reflective research projects. The first (P1) is autobiographic and provides a more thorough introduction than the above to how I came to perceive organisation, organisational changes, and enterprise architecture the way that I did. In the second project (P2), I describe how I participated in my former job at Nykredit, a Danish mortgage and retail bank, in formulating a corporate strategy for IT. I experienced this process of strategising as very different from theories that describe how to define a vision and mission, assess the current state of affairs, and map out the changes required to get from current to desired state. What I experience is a political game between interdependent people vying for power and influence, where I risk becoming isolated and losing influence if I do not develop a feel for the game, and learn to play the game not only in accordance with official rules but also in accordance with unwritten and unofficial rules. Between the second and third projects, I joined Nordea, the largest bank in the Nordic region. In the third and fourth project (P3 and P4), I describe how we struggle to fulfil our strategic ambition of becoming the leading digital-relationship bank in the Nordic region. I experience this as a collaboration and to some extent competition between many people who belong to different teams, business units, professions, companies, and other groupings, each with somewhat different intentions and ideals. In such a complex organisational setting, I experience that we cannot have full knowledge of what we together will be capable of achieving before we begin to act in that which is in the process of becoming.

In a recent meeting between the management team of our initiative and some development teams located in Finland, one developer dared to speak up and say that not only had he lost faith in our plans, but since management acted as if they had complete faith in the plans he was also losing faith in his managers. He knew from gossiping in the office that others shared his views. I knew that in the management team we did not have faith in current plans either and had in fact been in the process of re-planning for a while, but I also knew that we never spoke to non-managers about changes to plans until we had defined exactly which changes we wanted to make. I chose in the situation to take a risk and share what we had been up to in the management team, the risk of being perceived as someone that you cannot entrust delicate information and thereby a risk of becoming isolated and powerless, since I felt that it was warranted in the situation. I told the developer that I agreed with his assessment, and shared some insights into assumptions we had made before putting together the previous plan, and how these assumptions had now been proven unwarranted. After the meeting we spent some time in the management team discussing this breach of normal protocol, and I was relieved to find that my colleagues in the management team agreed that the situation had warranted this change to our normal conduct, and that we should probably attempt to be a bit more transparent. This little narrative I provide not because I see it as a recipe for success. Things could easily have turned out differently

in the situation, and as I allude to in the narrative managers often withhold information from people they feel that they cannot trust to keep the information to themselves. I provide the narrative partly as an example of how difficult it is to predict what acting in a certain way in a certain situation will lead to, and partly as an example of how my conduct has changed since my early career, which I describe in P1. As a relatively novice manager and enterprise architect I obsessed with following protocol, but I also did not have the experience and expertise necessary to make a practical judgement call about whether not following some protocol in some situation would lead to severe, mild, or no repercussions at all.

What I offer in this thesis is not another prescriptive method or framework to be followed. I present insights into the taken-for-granted assumptions which my original training has provided me with, and I present a reflective and reflexive analysis that challenges most of these assumptions and provides a radically different perspective on how organising could also be perceived. I focus in my thesis on how we organise what we do both when we develop IT/IS and when we exploit IT/IS to conduct business differently, and provide insights into how and why our collaborative efforts in such work sometimes turn out more satisfactorily than at other times. I posit that in our professional lives we can benefit from developing more critical awareness of assumptions underlying the theories and methods we use, and that we should be more aware of the practical judgments we necessarily make when determining how to follow these in the particular situations we find ourselves in. In other words, I invite fellow practitioners to take their practical experience seriously, and to critically consider whether different assumptions might open up possibilities for acting differently. Over the last few years I have experienced that when I challenge my assumptions and prejudices, and even reject some of these, I am presented with new opportunities. I cannot however promise repeatability or guarantee success of any kind. I am aware, that it has ethical implications to provide a perspective that invites participants to think for themselves and make practical judgments without giving a guarantee of success. If things go wrong, what we refer to in organisations as ‘the blame game’ might turn ugly.

I invite you to experience a different theoretical perspective on what it is we do when we act into the emergent enterprise and how thinking differently might lead to opportunities for acting differently in practice. Although this approach does not promise success in fulfilling your strategic objectives, it has the potential at least to reconcile theory on how things change with our practice of engaging in making changes.

P1: The humane professional at work

My journey towards letting myself feel and be felt by others emotionally in complex responsive processes of conversation conducting my everyday work

January 2014

Courage doesn't always roar. Sometimes, courage is the quiet voice at the end of the day saying, 'I will try again tomorrow'. —**Mary Anne Radmacher**

My early aspirations to learn how to use computers

I work as the leader of the enterprise architecture team in a financial institution in Denmark. My profession, enterprise architecture (EA), has, in general, grown out of the information technology and information systems (IT/IS) development units of businesses around the world. The following is my story of how I came to work within the EA field, and how my thinking about this field and my work has evolved throughout my life.

I was born in 1969 and grew up a few kilometres north of the Danish-German border in a home with frequent quarrels between my parents. After a period of separation, they divorced when I was 9 years old. I moved with my mother and three siblings to a nearby hamlet only five kilometres from my birth town, while my eldest brother stayed with my father. I found myself starting third grade in an elementary school in a rural hamlet where, to my surprise, I did not understand the dialect and where even the concept of divorce seemed alien to my classmates. In many ways, I found that through our move, our position had changed from being part of the 'established' to being 'outsiders' (Elias & Scotson, 1965). This feeling continued to evolve during my stay as I became increasingly aware that especially my mother, as a strong independent woman, was the target of much vicious gossip that grew ever more imaginative and, in my opinion, unfair.

My first experience with computers was in elementary school, visiting a local teacher's college where they had received their very first computers. I was fascinated by the potential of being able to program a machine to do virtually anything and I decided on the spot that I wanted to study computer science when I grew up. After high school, I began to study computer science, but found this to be primarily about proving mathematically that a given algorithm would produce a preconceived result. Reflecting now, I find that I was more intrigued at the time by all the ideas I had for things computers could be used to accomplish. Therefore, I abandoned computer science and began at the business college to study how to exploit computer systems in a business context. Here, the dominant methods, inspired by thinkers such as Edward Yourdon, James Martin, and John Zachman (Beyer et al., 1988, 1991), prescribed creating various models of important aspects of the organisation to be changed in order to arrive at a manageable description that one can work with. The models typically describe processes as things that occurs repeatedly with little or no variation,

actors participating in these processes as roles to be performed in exactly the same way regardless of which individual fulfils the role, and the information needed to perform these processes as flawlessly captured and structured data. What fascinated me most at the time was how James Martin took this to the strategic level (Beyer et al., 1991), writing about how a process of Information Strategic Planning can align development of IT/IS to corporate strategy through a process of decomposing step by step, from *raison d'être* all the way to required processes, information needed and individual tasks to be performed to fulfil the strategic vision for the development of the company. I found the intersection at the Business College between business strategy and strategic information planning fascinating, especially ideas around how to seek competitive advantages for a company by innovatively exploiting IT/IS, and I yearned to work with such intriguing ideas after completing my studies.

Early experience with changes involving information systems

I found myself luckily able to work with the ideas of James Martin at the Danish National Post Services after graduating. I began working with organisational changes involving exploitation of new tailor-made IT/IS solutions, and with overall strategic planning of how to develop shared information resources. After a few years, I left for an opportunity at Maersk Data, which supplied IT/IS to the worldwide shipping company Maersk Line and other Maersk subsidiaries. I thought I would continue to work with Information Strategic Planning. However, Maersk Line and Maersk Data found themselves disagreeing on the strategy for IT/IS. Maersk Data had proposed a strategic plan based on the Strategic Information Planning approach. This plan entailed approximately seven years of development of new and more suitable IT/IS solutions, assuming that the plan held. The timespan worried Maersk Line, as they found themselves having only a two-year technological lead over competitors, who had other advantages such as working from low-cost countries. Maersk Line refused to commit to this long-term plan. My new colleagues expressed frustration and disbelief over the possibility that anyone could come up with a better plan, since they had followed state-of-the-art methods.

Being curious by nature and normally quick at working out how something works, it worried me that I seemed unable to comprehend how the model-driven approach was supposed to lead to actual controlled changes in the organisation. These methods are based on thought before action and assume that a leader of change can step outside the organisation and view it from the outside in planning the necessary changes by a stepwise approach in which simplified idealised models are created of the current state (of affairs of the organisation) and the desired state. These models reduce from the empirical world any force or aspect deemed irrelevant by the method, or simply too complex to handle. Any uncertainty about what is desired—and thus what IT/IS must support—can be resolved by asking people from ‘the business’ who are presumed to be in agreement and capable of predicting what will be needed. Thus, the future state is not designed, but analysed; only the IT/IS solutions are designed. A plan is then created for changing the modelled current

organisation into the modelled desired organisation (Beyer et al., 1991). This methodological approach is based on what Ralph Stacey (2011:89) calls strategic choice theory, which takes ‘a realist position’ in assuming ‘a pre-given reality.’ Not only is the current state treated as reality, which can be observed and analysed from the outside, but the ‘future is talked about as a pre-given reality too’. On reflection, I find that at this point in my career I needed some prescriptive method to follow, as I had not acquired the experience and expertise necessary to improvise. I had strong doubts though about the wisdom of basing plans and designs on models that are simplified and idealised. Such plans and designs do not deal with left-out forces and aspects of the organisation such as culture, power figurations, and politics, or, for example, a technological lead in terms of a timespan and, correspondingly, the limit of the window of opportunity for innovating exploitation of IT/IS. Attempting to apply the changes described in these plans to the complex real world, we frequently experienced problems seemingly related to these left-out forces and aspects. These escalating problems seemed not to surprise or unduly bother my colleagues, but were explained away as ‘differences between theory and practice’ without apparent thought as to whether we should consequently come up with an approach based on a theory that better fitted the empirical world we were trying to change. As I became more experienced myself, I found that I began to doubt that anyone knew how to get these methods to work, or whether they ever could be made to work.

Early experience with running and managing a business

After two years, I was recruited by InCase, a consulting company, and worked as a subcontractor for the multinational technology and consulting company IBM with a newly acquired core banking system. Through this assignment, I learned a lot about banking and, on a different level, I also learned something about running a consulting business like InCase. It was a small company, compared to my previous experience, and it was quite transparent how dependent everyone one of us was on the success of each other and on the income each of us generated for the company when on consulting assignments. IBM had hired most of our employees for this one endeavour and, thus, we were as a company somewhat vulnerable. When IBM later abandoned its venture into core banking, it hurt our consulting company greatly.

I found another job at a small tech company, which was a spin-off from a research facility working with artificial intelligence. I joined as manager of the Professional Services Department responsible for implementing solutions for customers using our technology. Owners and managers frequently expressed a strong desire to simplify our technology to a packaged software product that we could just sell and deliver to customers. However, I found actual encounters with customers to be much more complicated. As line manager, I felt myself increasingly hard-pressed to perform. As a project leader, I had earlier found myself quite successful at ensuring that projects delivered required results on time, on budget, and according to specifications. I started to realise that also in my new role as line manager I had initially focused mostly on ensuring that the projects we ran delivered on time, budget, and according to specifications. Other managers

counselled me to focus more on the members of my unit— not on specific deliveries from projects. This I found to be sound advice since, with the diversity and sheer number of things that my department had to handle, it was becoming impossible for me to have a direct influence on each specific task. As the department grew from five to 14 employees, I had to delegate more responsibility to others and focus more on the development of their competencies than on the tasks we were responsible for. In this effort, I found it an unhelpful complication that I had myself become an expert in the field. When things went badly, as they often did and often do in IT/IS-projects, the other managers would encourage me to assist personally in ‘getting projects back on track’. I thus found myself in a dilemma of having to choose between engaging directly in directing the work of each project and helping the company to succeed, or giving my employees an opportunity for learning from their own experience. The management team agreed that as the company was itself failing economically we could not afford any problems that were not strictly unavoidable, and thus I often felt compelled to intervene personally.

I experienced personal frustrations particularly with an employee who accepted all tasks I assigned to him without complaint. I would wait for him to deliver what I had asked him to produce, but sometimes I waited in vain. It was hard for me to help him because I felt uncomfortable checking up on him when he was not complaining or asking questions. To me, that felt like mistrust, towards which I had a strong antipathy. Since I found him to accept tasks that he afterwards did not handle satisfactorily, I could not help myself over time developing a feeling of mistrust anyway.

An experience where I found that I succeeded in managing people more than tasks was with another employee who had been hired to become a consultant in customer projects once she mastered the required expertise. She was a fast learner and quickly got to the point where I was comfortable to include her in customer projects. When I approached her about this, she did not seem happy at being perceived by her manager as having mastered this requirement or about my intended praise of her dedication, effort, and results. In this situation, I stayed in the conflicting emotions of the experience probing my way through our conversation and finding myself arriving in a totally unforeseen situation. She told me that she did not have anything suitable to wear at customer sites, and did not know what to buy for such an endeavour. I was happy to invite her on a shopping trip where we found something she felt comfortable wearing. I was pleased to have managed to do something good for a team member and I perceived her as being happy about both my concern for her wellbeing and my intervention.

Reflecting on the two experiences described above, I find the change that occurred in the latter example to be outside the realm covered by our methods for managing change. I also find in reflection that in the first experience I failed to connect at the personal level with my employee and ‘get to the bottom’ of what was actually occurring. This prevented me from learning what was required to achieve movement. On reflection, I begin to see that I believed other people to be more like me than was probably the case, and my lack of

probing into the differences created *stuckness* for me as a leader as much as for my employees. I later read about a model for situational leadership (Hersey et al., 1996), where employees are categorised by their need for support and instruction. Today, I find this model to be an oversimplification, but in honest reflection I also find that I was probably at the time operating with an even simpler mental model.

I had fallen into a routine of arriving at work at around 6 a.m. to 7 a.m. to be able to get some managerial tasks done by the time my team arrived at around 9 a.m. Once they arrived, I spent office hours mostly handling crisis after crisis with customer projects, new malfunctioning versions of our product, and so forth. Usually, when I finally reached my home, I was dead tired. Most weekends, I spent performing tasks impossible to fit into the normal day-to-day routine, including our management team meetings. I finally found that I had to ask the CEO to fire me from this job, to get a few months' time in which to take a break before finding myself a new job. I was beginning to realise that I had a high stress level; I was told in no uncertain ways by people around me that things could not continue the way they had so far.

Paying attention to formative processes

I feel that I took this break just in time before a potential stress-related breakdown. I began to realise that I was not as strong as I had thought. I found this hard to accept at the time. I had recently attended a project management course where the teacher also happened to be a psychologist. We had had several talks around the differences between managing projects (i.e. ensuring that project deliverables meet specifications and that cost and time meet budgets) and managing people (i.e. ensuring that employees have or grow the required competencies and are motivated to meet our goals—which could of course be one way to manage projects). I found that I had also been able to talk to her about personal issues that I did not talk to anybody else about. I therefore contacted her and asked if she might be interested in talking through with me the changes that I found to be going on in my life. She told me that what I proposed sounded like actually consulting her in her professional capacity as a psychologist and we agreed that that was indeed what I wanted.

Thus, I found myself in the company of an adult to whom I could tell anything that bothered me, which was, at the time, a completely novel experience for me. We talked a lot about recent events, about my frustrations in my work life, about a particularly hurtful recent break in a personal relationship and, as she helped me to find meanings and the origins of patterns of behaviour, we started to discuss my childhood. As I mentioned briefly before, my parents divorced when I was nine years old. I rarely contemplated what had happened during my childhood, but now I began to perceive it as having an influence on the way I conducted myself and on issues I experienced as a grown-up. My mother grew up in Germany during World War II and, among other things, survived the bombing of Hamburg that practically destroyed the entire city and killed or wounded tens of thousands of civilians (Küssner, 2016). At the time of my birth, she thought that I would be her last child. She chose to leave work and take care of the home and spend as much time with me as

possible. My earliest childhood memories are of conversations with her, which often would be about some of her experiences during the war. As I retold childhood memories, I realised that I had vivid memories of my mother's traumatising experiences and that it must have been unhealthy for me to participate at this young age in these conversations of a therapeutic nature. Taking another reflexive turn with these childhood memories upon embarking on this autobiographic narrative, I came upon descriptions of 'processes of transmission of trauma from parent to child' in recent research (Kellermann, 1999; 2001) that resonated intensely with my personal experiences.

When I was eight months old, my mother became pregnant and my parents decided on an abortion. My mother seemed unable to cope with having terminated a life and spent several months away from home trying to find ways to deal with this. Thus, I lost for the time being my primary care person. Later, when my parents separated while contemplating divorce, I experienced a similar loss for almost a year. After the divorce, I proclaimed that 'now I would take the role of the man of the house'. My mother was still struggling with having terminated a life, with consequences of her traumatic experiences during the war, and with being a single mother, which was not easy. After some time, she suffered a breakdown and was hospitalised. It took quite a while for her to resume a more or less normal life. These breakdowns came to repeat themselves every few years.

As I reflected on my childhood, I found that after my mother's abortion and period away from home, I had begun to take responsibility upon myself for my mother as her care person. This pattern was intensified after the divorce and, reflecting further on the matter in the present, I find that I took responsibility for something that was entirely too much for a child to handle. I also find that I chose not to disclose a lot of the trouble I experienced as a child, not entirely unlike the trouble any child experiences. I protected my already troubled and vulnerable mother by not seeking her help with my problems also. As I recently read about 'processes of transmission of trauma from parent to child', I found this described as a typical pattern. As my mother was a teacher, I found that I could not disclose these issues to my other teachers, as I knew there was already a lot of gossip about my mother and I could not further damage her reputation by seeking aid from her colleagues. Actually, I was unable to seek help from any grown-up in my community and thus was stuck with dealing with my issues on my own. In reflection, this led to an intense feeling of loneliness. When I started to contemplate reflexively on the kind of care I needed at the time, and what possible meanings I could have made at the time from feeling that I had not received the care I needed and craved—either from my parents or other grown-ups—I found that I had unconsciously concluded at the time that there must be something wrong with me and that I must be unworthy of care, affection, and love. No other explanation seemed to fit.

As I began to reflect on this as an adult, I also began to see a pattern of me making unconscious choices of partners that in a sense gave me a second chance of working with the same issues that I faced as a child (Hendrix & Hunt, 2004). In particular, my feeling unloved and unlovable became a recurring pattern in my

relationships, typically expressed as rejection or abandonment. I still struggle with many of the same feelings in my personal life and accept that I must deal with the consequences of these experiences both in my personal and professional life. I found this passage from *Paradoxes of Group Life* to be especially descriptive of what is occurring as a result of the childhood experiences I carry with me into all spheres of my adult life:

Disclosure and feedback are the necessary conditions for the development of interpersonal relationships (Luft, 1970). The question that we each must face is what to disclose about ourselves when we are eager to gain acceptance and what we keep hidden. The most natural thing to do is to reveal only those things that we are sure will be accepted and keep private what we anticipate others will reject. Yet, this sets in place the inner sense that, when others do accept us, it is all a sham—they are not in a position to reject the ‘real me’ because I have kept it hidden. If others were to know ‘what I am really like’, if I let them see the ugly parts of me that are unacceptable even to me (which is, after all, why I keep them locked away inside), then they would reject me.

Thus, the acceptance I gain is unacceptable to me, because it is not based on the parts of me that I ‘know’ are unacceptable... Of course, were I able to accept myself, with all my flaws, acceptance by others would be less important to me, and hence I would be less prone to reject the acceptance I am offered. (Smith and Berg, 1987:112.)

I realise now that my feeling unloved and unlovable is part of what I have never disclosed. Reflecting in the now, I find that I unconsciously became adept at concealing from others when I felt miserable, by perfecting putting on a bravely smiling face and accepting as my fate inwardly feeling abandoned, due to my being unlovable. In hindsight, I carried these feelings that originated in my early childhood into my adult life, as described by Smith and Berg, where they became part of my inability to accept acceptance, and thus feel loved, and, on a more mundane level, giving and receiving praise and affection.

Having concluded, that I had to work with my past to change my present and future, I began a process of self-healing inspired by a book that advises the reader to, as an adult, take the role of care person towards the child that you once were (Bradshaw, 1990). This might seem to present a time paradox. I found it to resonate though with what I later read about the social sciences perspective of identity as negotiated and renegotiated (Mead, 1934; Stacey, 2011) where our reflective and reflexive processes around our past can give rise to new interpretations and new meanings of past events and thus give form to a new identity. In a sense, this is a process that I have been involved in now for more than 10 years and I still feel that I have only just begun to turn things around for myself and my closest. I married around the age of thirty, just as I was beginning to consider my formative experiences, but before having come to these insights. My self-healing process must a large degree been a process of forgiving myself for my shortcomings, particularly in my assumed role of care person towards my mother, and of learning to love myself for who I am. I attempt to hereby break the pattern

of not allowing others to love me, or rather break the pattern of my rejecting their displays of praise, affection, and love, and simultaneously become better at giving praise and showing affection and love. Furthermore, as my very first attempt at sharing thoughts and emotions in conversations with another person, my mother, resulted in an overwhelming invasion of retold and relived war traumas, I am also trying as an adult not to walk away from allowing myself to feel others, including their dreams, desires, fears, and pains. I know on a conscious level that I will now be better able to handle this kind of opening myself to others, who will not overwhelm me in the same way. Likewise, I struggle with letting myself be honestly felt by others, allowing myself to disclose both my dreams, desires, fears, and pains, and to trust that I will not be abandoned or rejected the way I found myself to be abandoned and rejected on several occasions as a child. Since it took me several decades to build up my problems, I realise that it will require perseverance to solve them. I find it well worth the effort however, if I can become able to participate in a more giving and rewarding way in relationships of both personal and professional nature. In particular, having been blessed with two wonderful children through my marriage, I find it of utter importance to continue to struggle with my self-healing processes in an attempt to improve my ability to give to my beloved wife and children the care, affection, and love that I have myself always (secretly) desired.

Working with complexity at an ever-increasing scale

Today, I am responsible for the enterprise architecture (EA) of Nykredit, a larger Danish financial institution. Nykredit is a client of the leading information technology research and advisory company Gartner, who defines EA¹ as ‘a collaborative, shared process’ for change where ‘EA teams work with business and IT stakeholders to define a future-state vision in terms of requirements, principles, and models’ and compare this with the ‘current state to identify gaps and plan investments to fill them. EA is not IT-focused, but business-driven and comprehensive.’ Like the method of James Martin that we used at the Danish National Post Services and at Maersk, this definition of EA is based on strategic choice theory, which assumes a pre-given reality that can be observed and analysed from the outside. I have, however, recently begun to question this ability to observe and analyse the empirical world from the outside, and the ability to reliably predict outcomes of changes we set in motion. I am not alone in having qualms about these abilities. One reaction in Nykredit is that we have reduced the planning horizon to now only two years, with half of the first year spent planning. We strive to manage coherent change at the enterprise level and feel that our success in this depends upon the degree to which we can align individual change initiatives into a cohesive transformation. I find that, in effect, actual changes occur when members of the organisation behave differently and thus achieve different outcomes for the business. These members of the organisation are people and their behaviour is inherently unpredictable. Moreover, our business outcome is to a large degree also dependent on the behaviour of competitors, legislators, business partners, customers, and the financial markets. Thus,

¹ Gartner IT Glossary. Available at: <http://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/enterprise-architecture-ea> [Accessed 1st November 2013]. NB: Gartner updates these definitions on an ongoing basis.

predictability is hard to achieve and I find this definition of success therefore to entail some challenges for my profession and me. In comparing the above to literature, I find that Ralph Stacey points out some of the key reasons for my qualms:

Both cybernetics and cognitivism . . . take the position of the objective observer who stands outside the system of interest and makes hypotheses about it. They build models of the system to guide behaviour. The emphasis is on the ability to control. Little importance is attached to the notion that people may construct reality in their social interaction with each other. There is no notion of reflexivity and the position of understanding through participating. . . . When a manager takes this position, that manager immediately assumes that it is his or her task to design and install some system, set of actions, motivators, and so on. (2011:93)

I find this use of models, which is a key element of the dominant methods of my field (Zachman, 1987), (Sowa & Zachman, 1992), (Doucet et al. 2009), to be troubling and I would like to consider this further in my continued research.

In 2007, I finished a diploma degree at Copenhagen Business School (CBS), studying Organisation and Management. In my final thesis (Brahm, 2007), I grappled with the concept of processes emerging from people relating to each other and having conversations in the local micro (Stacey, 2011). Reflecting now on what I wrote at the time, considering how I am now beginning to view the world, I find that there are many things I now perceive differently. I think this has to do with something that genuinely frightened me at the time about the acceptance of life emerging unpredictably from interactions in the local micro. I felt that if I accepted that, then I could not ensure that I could live up to my job responsibilities, which are formally defined entirely in terms of the macro level.

In reflection, I seem to have obsessed somewhat over the terms ‘micro level’ and ‘macro level’. At the time, I envisioned these as spatially separated levels. Now, I find that micro level can describe patterns experienced between directly related actors, whereas in the same network of actors the same patterns could also be part of population-wide patterns or themes, which could be called themes on the macro level. I no longer see the network as consisting of levels in a spatial sense. This is very different from my prior schooling, which deals with models of systems that can recursively be broken down into sub-systems at lower levels. In my reflections on this, I take comfort that my challenges with understanding this seem to be experienced also by others and can be linked to our thinking being thought in terms of our language, which implies that a reorientation of thinking might require learning a new language alongside gaining insights into new ways of thinking. In the words of Norbert Elias (1978: 20), ‘many of the nouns that are used in social sciences—and in everyday speech—are formed and used as if they referred to material things, visible and tangible objects in time and space existing independently of people.’

I also struggled with the concept of uncertainty and ambiguity because I found these concepts to invalidate my prior schooling in ways that left me without working methods for achieving the alignment of development initiatives I was formally in charge of. The plans and models upon which much of my work is based suddenly appeared somewhat bogus to me. In order to get another perspective on this aspect of my work, I attended a nine-month programme at the consulting company Dacapo, which helps leaders and employees navigate the tension between the planned and the unexpected. Dacapo had made a guest appearance at CBS and seemed to have mastered a more fruitful practice than the dominant methods of my field. At Dacapo, I came to see my plans and models as ‘props’ useful in achieving what Stacey (2011:345-346) calls ‘good enough holding of anxiety’ to allow ‘more fluid spontaneous conversations’ from which innovation might emerge. On reflection, I find that I do not now think that I can predict any better than before. I have accepted, though, that models and plans play another important role in giving us a shared image of some goal we want to achieve, thus enabling a conversation about what it would mean to achieve it. That goal may or may not be achievable, but if we gain the courage from having the plans and models available, which is necessary for us to act (to some degree) into the unknown, then I find that to be enough of a reason to have the plans and models. Today, I view the process of coming up with plans and models as more valuable than the plans and models themselves, since we are negotiating the meaning of the changes we strive to achieve in the processes of planning and modelling, which I consider a valuable sharing of ideas and negotiation of meanings.

My evolving understanding of ‘the enterprise’ and ‘the business’

Gartner’s above definition prescribes a business-driven focus, and this use of the noun business I see reflected almost universally in descriptions of EA. There seems to be some debate, however, over what this actually means. One interpretation seems to be that the change process needs someone to take the role of a driver and that this driver has to be from ‘the business’, which typically means someone not from ‘IT’. Others (Potts, 2008; 2010) seem to interpret business-driven as driven by a desire to make better businesses in the future than the businesses we make today, that is, earn more money, spend less, delight our customers more, and so forth. A colleague showed me an article concerning how we use metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). We discussed the widespread use of ‘bridge builder’ as a metaphor often used to describe enterprise architects. We decided that it did not exactly visualise EA as ‘a collaborative, shared process’, but instead reified ‘the business’ and ‘IT’ as being two separate ‘islands’ bridged (only) by EA. I have disliked the term ‘bridge builder’ ever since. I do not find that which department people belong to matters to our ‘collaborative, shared processes’ and the relevance of their competencies.

Nykredit reorganised in 2002. Senior management found that IT was playing an ever-bigger role in almost all changes, and merged development of business and IT into a single ‘Group Development’ department. A director from ‘the business’ became head of Group Development and I thought that now the debate among us

about who was ‘the business’ could be put to rest. To some extent, I also found that to be occurring initially, but lately these debates have resurfaced. I find myself increasingly engaged in political manoeuvrings where my mandate and ethics are challenged. Since there is widespread agreement that strategic planning should be business-driven, I find in reflection that this is a power struggle, in that claiming to be ‘the business’ puts you in a position of great influence over the strategic direction of the company. In light of what I am reading, as part of my research, I am, in my reflections on this issue, beginning to perceive a pattern of ‘splitting’ (Smith & Berg, 1987). I suspect that groups within the organisation attempt to avoid having to deal with certain aspects of modern (digital) banking that they find difficult to handle and with which they have little experience and expertise. By splitting ‘IT’ as a subgroup of people who ought to know all about these issues and be able to deal with them in isolation from another subgroup, ‘the business’, the latter subgroup is then protected from having to deal with this or even know about it. In reflection, however, I find this to create stuckness in the development process. I am also beginning to see how daunting a challenge it will be to attempt to get un-stuck, if such a splitting process is really occurring, probably not only in Nykredit, but in most companies where IT/IS are increasingly becoming an important aspect of doing business. As described by Smith and Berg (1987: 216-222), ‘there is no movement without stuckness’ and ‘there is no possibility of movement without the temptation of remaining where you are.’ On reflection, I begin to see that there are potential advantages for various members of the organisation in maintaining this split. It makes it easier for business units to scapegoat the IT department, should they find themselves unable to reap the desired business value by exploiting delivered IT/IS solutions. It also makes it easier for project managers to claim success if they are measured only by their ability to deliver some IT/IS solution according to some (more or less arbitrary) specifications, rather than by participating in a more unpredictable endeavour to create actual business value. This split is an issue I find most troubling and something I would also like to look into further in my continued research.

I recently met Tom Graves at an intriguing seminar in Barcelona that tried to bring together designers and enterprise architects to see if we could inspire each other with our respective thinking. Here, Graves presented a view different from the one presented above—of who and what is ‘the business’ and ‘the enterprise’. Graves describes the enterprise as the story in a narrative approach to enterprise architecture. He finds that many enterprise architects are focusing too narrowly on structure itself, since the structure is (only) there to support a shared story. He holds that we create an architecture for an organisation but about an enterprise, and while ‘the organisation is bounded by rules and responsibilities; the enterprise is bounded by values and shared commitment’ (Graves, 2012:15). I find this to resonate with my own experience of business as something we do, that is, we are doing business with our customers and it can be a profitable business for both parties if the goods, services, and money we exchange in doing business leave each of us with something we find more valuable than what we had to give in exchange. I find the enterprise to be the overarching story of doing business with customers and suppliers under consideration of values and a

commitment that we share with them. The word organisation I find to have many meanings. When Graves talks about *the* organisation in the quotes above, I find *the* organisation to be the subset of people bound by legal rules and responsibilities typically stipulated in employment agreements with the legal entity we work for. In my situation, *the* organisation is the company Nykredit and its employees. These employees are also members of a wider organisation, which includes customers and suppliers of Nykredit and more. When Graves states that ‘the enterprise in scope is at least three steps larger than the organisation in scope’ (ibid: 15), I find this to say that when considering potential strategies, EA should look beyond the company and the employees of the company termed *the* organisation and also investigate suppliers and customers of that company, as well as other players in the market such as competitors, regulators, and the wider community. Graves quotes Chris Potts, who holds that to maintain an open mind towards architecting,² our enterprise and making decisions about such things as restructuring our offerings and business models, out- or insourcing, and so forth, we must adapt an outside-in view on the enterprise we serve. This is a spatial metaphor, but I find that it can make sense also in a relational view on organisations. I find ‘inside’ to refer to people employed by the company and ‘outside’ to refer to people who do business with the company, regulate that business, or similar. Focusing, for example, on core competencies of the company to investigate how to optimize what we offer to customers may lead to different ideas about what we can change in the future than looking at the unmet desires in the lives of customers. Thus, by looking at our relationship with customers starting from our end, something different might emerge than if we look at the relationship starting from the customer’s end. Potts writes, that ‘the customer has the process and to design your enterprise’s architecture, you must start by deciding which of your customer’s processes and experiences you want to appear in, and how you want to appear’ (2010: 52). I take this to mean that the process that a customer is going through when they consume what we offer starts before we ‘make our appearance’ and ends after we leave ‘the stage’. To understand what value we bring to the customer and how to make the customer’s experience of our appearance better, we must understand better the wider process the customer has in which we hope to make an appearance. Furthermore, Potts describes ideas for how to manage investments in changes, stating that ‘the process of investing in change starts with innovation and ends with exploitation’ (ibid: 194) and describes how the role of development units is not assured, which I found to reflect my experiences, especially at Maersk, as ‘there are competencies in IT departments that also exist elsewhere in a company’ and ‘the future value of the CIO role is not assured’ (2008: 175).

On reflection, I now find the company I work for to be a legal entity acting in a market where we can play a valuable role in the experiences of our customers and where the enterprise that I need to architect is a story played out in the wider market or ecosystem. In this sense, I perceive the company as a legal entity to be an actor with which human actors can have relationships (e.g. an employment relationship), and something

² The words ‘architect’ and ‘architecting’ are used by some authors in the field as verbs like ‘design’ and ‘designing’ to signal that architecture artefacts are not goals in themselves but tools of a trade with a goal of influencing change.

more than solely an organisation/network of human actors. Other factors of production such as capital, machinery, and other non-human actors play significant roles, and I find that individuals relate both to other individuals and to things such as plans, designs, and economic incentives. Thus, I would say that over time economic and engineering theory have not become *unimportant* to me, but that understanding human behaviour has become much *more* important to me. I now find that to bring to fruition a strategy for change requires the collective efforts of many individuals. These individuals participate both in doing and in changing the business, which our company is party to in the wider enterprise which I am tasked with architecting.

My evolving understanding of change and the role of EA and myself herein

The mandate and responsibilities of our EA team are formally defined in a charter to the envy of fellow EA's from other companies. I find the formal charter to contribute to our authority. Lately, I have begun to view authority as something neither static nor objective, but as something that is negotiated and accumulated over time. When discussing this at our team meetings, we often talk about our possibilities being enabled and/or constrained by our 'track record'. I find this view to be reflected in the writings of Smith and Berg (1987:134) who describe an 'authorizing process' where 'authority is something that is (dynamically) built or created' and 'flows from many places to many people'. Norbert Elias (1978) similarly explains power as emerging from functional interdependencies in relationships. This resonates with my experience that the formal mandate as such helps us to get a say in matters, where other non-managers might otherwise find it difficult to join the ongoing conversations, but that the way we act has more impact on our actual influence than the mandate itself. The EA team is responsible for contributing to aligning with overall corporate strategy any and all change initiatives, concepts, business plans, project plans, and development of IT/IS necessary to fulfil these plans. Our current corporate strategy aims for 'One new Nykredit' and the IT strategy aligned hereto aims to connect and integrate elements of the IT/IS portfolio into 'One IT' that is comprehensive and cohesive and continues to evolve and meet current and future business needs. Roughly one fifth of our yearly spending is IT-related, and thus the development of IT/IS is an area of intense political interest. After the financial crisis, we have focused more on cost savings, and, for example, prioritised ensuring efficient exploitation of the shared resource that IT/IS provides. I find that over time EA has increasingly become engaged in the political games that constitute the management of change and, moreover, I find that my own awareness of the political games is increasing. I find now that with regards to authority and power, 'concepts of balances are far more adequate for what can actually be observed in investigating the nexus of functions which interdependent human beings have for each other, than are concepts modelled on stationary objects' (Elias, 1978: 75).

In conversations with our managers, a setting emerges that is laden with power differentials, inevitably leading, to some degree, to my acting out as a presenter a 'public transcript' (Scott, 1990) that does not feel

completely honest. I find that we need to adapt a stance of accepting the dominant views to some extent in order to appear competent in the eyes of the decision makers we need to address in seeking to have an influence in the affairs of Nykredit. Some of the concerns that I have, some of which I present on behalf of fellow employees, I find I must downplay and rephrase to match a currently politically and culturally acceptable language. Furthermore, I realise that managers cannot be experts in all the domains they manage. Being a fairly new domain, it is only fair that senior managers generally have little experience with IT/IS. Thus, I accept that I cannot disclose all details and technicalities of the issues I perceive, since technical details have no meaning for the decision makers. Simultaneously however, I want to participate as honestly and fully in the change management process as humanly possible. Adding to my dilemmas around disclosure and concealment is the fact that, in the culture of Nykredit, issues that must be resolved at higher levels of authority are typically carried up the chain by the managers in this chain. I will therefore often prepare a presentation and deliver it to either my VP or director, who will then take it to the next level of management. Thus, I am not part of the discussions around the matter being resolved. When the result returns down the chain, I sometimes feel that it is hard to convey the results to fellow employees without knowing what was said as the matter was discussed and decided upon.

On this political stage, I find myself personally in an atypical role as a team manager who is accountable for the state of the enterprise architecture, but who is not responsible for the team members themselves. My manager has staff responsibility for the team members including myself and, in this regard, I am not a manager. Nonetheless, I participate in various processes otherwise restricted to managers, such as 'Leader Meetings' in our unit where all other participants are managers with staff responsibility. I find that most non-managers perceive me as *manager-like*, and that I probably act the part. Simultaneously, I find that most managers outside my own team perceive me as a non-manager, and thus I feel bound more by the public transcript (Scott, 1990) in my dealings with them. I find myself between the spheres of managers and employees. Themes of disclosure and concealment also come into play when dealing with sharing information with fellow employees. Participating in many meetings and processes that are otherwise restricted to managers, I am often privy to confidential subjects. To some degree, this is a lonely situation to be in, as it hinders my ability to participate fully in the 'gossip' and hidden transcripts typically formed by employees towards managers (Scott, 1990). Feeling unable to participate fully in this blame-gossip amplifies my natural tendency to perceive myself as somewhat of an outsider (Elias & Scotson, 1965) towards fellow employees, while also not quite being a member of management either. Reflecting on this, it may even act in a circular manner to let myself feel more alone than I really am. I feel that some of the members of my team perceive me as having more of a managerial role than is strictly my mandate. This simultaneously enables and constrains me as I am compelled to display loyalty both towards management, towards my team, and towards the company in general. In my continuing research, I would like to look into themes such as power,

the authorising processes, and trust, since I find it troubling that these important issues seem absent from the dominant methods and frameworks of my field.

My research question in summary

I would like to investigate more thoroughly the premises of the dominant methods and frameworks of my field and compare these to alternative views on processes for being influential in an organisational setting working as an expert with the complex domain of business changes involving IT/IS. I find the prescribed use of models in the dominant methods of my field to be troubling, as the models leave out important aspects of the organisation and enterprise we architect. In the process of coming up with plans and models, however, I now find us to be negotiating the meaning of the changes we strive to achieve. I find this sharing of ideas and negotiation of meaning to be in itself valuable. In my reflections on the polarisation of IT as something apart from the business, I am beginning to perceive a pattern of splitting, which is an issue I find most troubling. I am also beginning to see more and more clearly aspects of political games and power plays as important elements of change management processes. I would therefore like to research ways of managing change that acknowledge IT as an integral part of business and which deal with themes such as power, the authorising processes, and trust, since I find these themes typically left out in a troubling degree from the dominant methods and frameworks of my field.

P2: Strategizing

Negotiating the role of IT in our emerging Corporate Strategy

September 2014

Since Socrates and Plato, we usually call thinking to be engaged in that silent dialogue between me and myself. In refusing to be a person Eichmann utterly surrendered that single most defining human quality, that of being able to think. And consequently, he was no longer capable of making moral judgments...

The manifestation of the wind of thought is not knowledge, but the ability to tell right from wrong, beautiful from ugly. And I hope that thinking gives people the strength to prevent catastrophes in these rare moments when the chips are down. —Hannah Arendt

In this project, I want to investigate some of the themes that I find emerging in my research around negotiating the meaning of changes within the business enterprise where I am employed and the role of power in these negotiations. I will narrate my experience of such processes and will reflectively interpret my experience in the light of various theories, including the dominant methods and frameworks of my field, as well as— and perhaps predominantly—alternative and critical views on processes for being influential in such a setting. I hope that these alternative theories might make better sense of my experience, similar to what I have found throughout my career to be poorly explained by orthodox theories, as described in P1.

One of the most widely adopted methods of my field is found in The Open Group Architecture Framework, TOGAF, version 9.1 and the accompanying Architecture Development Method, ADM (Open Group, 2013). Together, I refer to TOGAF and the ADM as TOGAF throughout the project. Other widespread orthodox frameworks and methods are similar to TOGAF and, therefore, I will in this project compare and contrast my experience and various alternative theories mainly to TOGAF. I find, however, that what I describe concerning TOGAF applies similarly to PEAf, FEAF, EA3, the Zachman framework, and any other framework or method based on the same fundamental belief systems.

Prologue

A new CEO took over leadership of Nykredit in the fall of 2013. Ever since, tier-one and tier-two managers have been in a process of redefining both corporate strategy and organisation and, among other things, reducing costs. Several teams of external consultants have assisted in this process. During this process, staff has been reduced by approximately 300 employees and both our COO and CIO have left the company. A member of the board has been appointed COO and provisional CIO. As mentioned in P1, the unit I belong to was formed by merging Business Development with IT Development. For a while, my unit was 'Group Development,' then it was renamed 'Group Development and IT,' then 'IT-development'. In the new organisation, we are simply called 'IT'. I find this change of name to indicate that our role in the wider organisation is being challenged.

We seem to be approaching a point in the corporate strategy process where we need to decide upon our intentions both for the goals of my unit and the role my unit should play in the company. So far, my role in this strategy process has been peripheral. I have been consulted a number of times by investigating groups led by external consultants, and I have made some suggestions in the form of presentations for my VP to carry up the chain of command.

Multi-tier games

Narrative

At a department meeting, Hanne, my VP, asks me if I have time to attend a lunch meeting she is having with Peter, another VP. They are going to talk about certain aspects of the future strategy for IT. This is a topic that Hanne and I have recently discussed, and I readily agree. Entering the room, I realize that Svend, a third VP, is joining us as well. We begin to discuss the role of IT in the corporate strategy, and, from the get go, I find the three of them to be trying to take the discussion in three different directions. Hanne starts to talk about what portals will be required to provide the necessary self-service solutions for customers and customer-service solutions for employees. Svend talks mainly about his ideas for rethinking how to construct such portals and other IT solutions. Peter raises the question of whether our branches and our partner banks should be given equal competitive opportunities, since that would make a difference as to whether we should provide the same portal to both branches and partner banks, or provide our branches with one portal and partner banks with another—to some extent different—portal.

I find that all of these views and special interests can probably fit into an overarching story of the journey the company is embarking on with the new strategy that is in the making. However, I find that they fit into different chapters of such a story. At this particular meeting, I find myself struggling to encompass it all. I find myself having trouble particularly supporting the views expressed by my VP while simultaneously attempting to encompass the different views and angles on the subject expressed by the other two VPs in a more overarching understanding. Furthermore, I have my own ideas, which have to do with the processes of getting to a conclusion. I feel that we need to understand more thoroughly what goals our new corporate strategy aims for before we can claim that some IT solution can be said to support it. I am acutely aware at this particular meeting that my social capital is limited in such a setting where I am the only non-VP present. I therefore carefully choose on what to comment.

As we get into a discussion about what desired business state we attempt to support, I experience increasing agreement in the group that the new corporate strategy does not describe in useful detail what senior management desires. Thus, it is *not* clear to us what our future IT solutions will need to support. I suggest some variant of scenario planning, where we can express various options and can describe what will be the consequences of choosing one or the other of these options. I have recent experience of working with

scenarios, which has proven useful in the current situation of vague direction. I am not sure Hanne likes my suggestion, but Peter seems to approve, and at least I hear no direct objections.

The discussion drifts towards how we are going to present what we produce and to whom to present it. We agree that we will need to present these options to our provisional CIO and that it is important not to be perceived as making this decision on behalf of management or ‘the business’. I sense that agreement is growing in the group on this approach, but we still do not agree on which options to present and with how much detail to describe them. I have my own opinion regarding how much detail can be expressed in a meaningful way in a presentation, and I have an inkling about how to tie our proposal into already disclosed topics from our future corporate strategy.

At the end of the allotted time for the meeting, I feel that we are still not quite in agreement on what should be the options to consider. We seem, however, to be in agreement that the various aspects we have been discussing are interdependent. I am given the task of outlining what we have discussed and preparing some input for the next meeting in this group. I readily accept this assignment. My head is already full of ideas about how to write up what we have discussed. I find the process exciting and of great importance and would therefore very much like to manoeuvre myself into as central a role in the process as possible.

Functional interdependence leads to enabling/constraining power figurations

Reflecting on what I find to transpire in this narrative and how I am now beginning to interpret it, I can see how having started on the research programme towards which this project is a contribution, I am beginning to view the processes that I participate in quite differently from how I used to view them. According to Ralph Stacey ‘strategies of organisations [can be] seen as population-wide patterns that emerge in the interplay of local responsive interaction’ (2011:330). This contrasts the dominant methods of my field that determine a certain sequence of events and a rational linear process of defining strategic position and strategic choice (Hatch, 1997:101-110; Johnson et al., 2005). What I experienced, as described above, was less ordered, and I find the actual strategic process to be a patchwork of processes such as jockeying for power. Norbert Elias describes a relational view of what happens when people participate in ‘playing games’ and the figurations they form in doing so:

By figuration, we mean the changing pattern created by the players as a whole—not only by their intellects but by their whole selves, the totality of their dealings in their relationships with each other. It can be seen that this figuration forms a flexible lattice-work of tensions. The interdependence of the players, which is a prerequisite of their forming a figuration, may be an interdependence of allies or of opponents (1978:130).

I find Elias’s view on relationships forming figurations to describe more adequately what I experienced, than dominant models of processes with participants as roles to be played independently of other

interdependencies and plays between the people performing the roles. Elias deliberately uses a word that conveys that the relationships do not form a fixed *configuration*, but that the *figuration* is in constant flux, although it is also recognisable as a paradoxically stable instability. Concerning how power comes into play in these *figurations*, Elias describes a relational view of power:

Whether the power differentials are large or small, balances of power are always present wherever there is functional interdependence between people. In this respect, simply to use the word ‘power’ is likely to mislead. We say that a person possesses great power as if power were a thing he carried about in his pocket... Power is not an amulet possessed by one person and not by another; it is a structural characteristic of human relationships—of *all* human relationships (ibid:74).

My interpretation of Elias’s views on power in this situation is that the functional dependencies between the participants of the meeting resulted in a particular *figuration* of power in relation to what we were doing in this particular situation. In other previous situations, where I had been alone with Hanne, a completely different *figuration* of power ensued, enabling and constraining other dynamics than the ones enabled and constrained at this particular meeting. Stacey describes how power *figurations* enable and constrain us: ‘Human agents can never simply do whatever they like because they will be excluded if they do. In their local interactions, human agents constrain and enable each other, which is what power means, and these patterns of power constitute social control and order’ (2012:14). Rather than a static view that Hanne is my boss and thus the dominant person in our relationship, I find this relational view to explain more plausibly why certain things that I am confident doing when just the two of us are together, suddenly felt anxiety provoking and dangerous in the company of other VPs in the context of an ongoing shakeup.

Authorizing is a continuously ongoing process of negotiation

As the only non-VP present, I could have attempted to take a neutral stance as facilitator and recorder of what was discussed, but instead I chose to participate and voice my own ideas and sentiments. That there is a process going on and not just a static relationship is described in different terms but with similar dynamic aspects by Smith and Berg who say that ‘authority ... can be understood to be a derivative of an authorizing process’ and ‘can be defined as sanctioned power’ (1987: 134-135). Thus, it is in particular relationships in a particular situation that authorizing takes place. I find this view apt not only concerning my attempting to find or negotiate my role in the meeting but also in my choice to accept the invitation and join the meeting. I may appear at first glance to stumble into this process more or less coincidentally. I find this not to be the case however. Although my formal role as enterprise architect does not figure as a formal participant in a well-defined process of negotiating our contribution to corporate strategy, I am in no way surprised by Hanne’s invitation to join. Every prior encounter Hanne and I have had with each other has been part of shaping the relationship we have today, and we also both have relationships with the other participants. By

inviting me to the meeting, Hanne changed the overall power figuration and I believe our relationships and shared history influenced her to make this choice. Similarly, I made a choice in accepting to come. Of course, Hanne is my manager, and thus it might be expected that I always accept any invitation she extends towards me. This however, I find not to be the case. I have a very busy schedule and Hanne expects me to prioritise what I judge to be most important for the company. At the time of this meeting, I had other assignments to attend to as well, but I really wanted to join. I felt that the subject was central to my field of work in enterprise architecture and that I could contribute distinct and valuable perspectives. Also, and not the least important reason for my wanting to participate, I felt that Hanne had too much on her plate lately, and I wanted to support her in this task to the best of my ability.

For me, this resonates with advice given by one of the critical writers in the field of enterprise architecture, Chris Potts, who suggests that ‘the core skill of an enterprise architect is knowing when to “play” and when to “pass”’ (Potts, 2010:168). This contrasts with the dominant methods which define formal roles to be played out in formal processes and defines which role has (static) responsibility or authority, or is consulted or informed in a specific process, as in the RACI-model (Smith & Erwin, 2005), and where ‘clear definition of processes and roles’ is often seen as important criteria of success or high quality (Niemi, 2013:10) in processes such as those conducted as part of enterprise architecture. Similarly, business activities can, according to TOGAF, be formally defined in ‘Activity Models’ (also called ‘Business Process Models’) and refers to an Object Management Group standard called BPMN, Business Process Modelling Notation, with which these processes can be formally described (Open Group, 2013:81-82). In the BPMN, it is assumed that activities are carried out by actors who perform formally defined roles and have formally defined responsibilities. According to this understanding of processes, an actor who currently has a certain role will perform the activities formally assigned to the role and only those activities. What I experience actually to be happening when I participate as an actor in business processes is that I negotiate my role, responsibilities, and authority all the time in an ongoing responsive process that determines my being included in or excluded from certain groups and activities and thus influences my identity.

Morality emerges from shifting patterns of relationships and is thus always situational

I felt some anxiety while making my moves in my negotiation of my role in this meeting, especially in engaging in a counter play towards my own boss in giving comments from my perspective as enterprise architect in which I challenged some of the ideas presented by her and the others. Hanne and I have had previous conversations, where I have challenged her views. This, however, usually occurs when we are alone. In these settings she had previously expressed that she valued my insights and counter plays in the process of coming up with proposals. In the context of this meeting, however, I was very much aware, that the relationships with the other VPs and the power figurations between them were influenced by the ongoing shakeup and recent departure of our former CEO, COO, and CIO. How such corporate shakeups and

upheavals influence managers and the importance in such situations of alliances and other ties between people in ‘managerial circles’ is described by Robert Jackall (2010:35-36; 66-67). I found at this particular meeting that the uncertainty and anxiety inherent in such a shakeup had created a new dynamic in their group. This I felt as an above normal tendency for them to be more guarded and less relaxed than usual and, in addition to anything that transpired ‘on the surface’ of things, I was aware that a power play was also transpiring, albeit less obviously. I sensed this more as an absence of normal patterns of being together, than the presence of something new—an absence of jovial banter, relaxedness, and openness.

I felt that I had to tread very carefully in choosing when and how to play my counter plays. I felt compelled to challenge the work items so as to participate honestly and fully in our innovative process and thus attempt to have a positive impact on the outcome we produced, benefitting Hanne and the group as a whole towards the new COO who had also been appointed provisional CIO. On the other hand, I had to be careful not to be seen to challenge Hanne and her leadership and in so doing adversely affect the power play between the VPs, which I clearly felt was forming an undercurrent of events at the meeting. Although I am not a manager myself and thus perhaps have less of a formal position to protect or jockey for in this particular setting with a group of VPs, I do have a position to protect in the wider organisation of Nykredit where I do have above average influence on the development of the company. The position Hanne can attain in the wider organisation will also influence my own position since she is my manager. Thus, I felt a moral dilemma between supporting ideas that might improve my own position and influence either directly or via Hanne, and supporting ideas that I felt were likely to be better for the business outcomes of Nykredit or more in line with my perception of the desires of senior management. Jackall describes the moral ethos of managerial circles as

an ethos most notable for its lack of fixedness... [Morality emerge] from ongoing albeit changing relationships with some person, some coterie, some social network, some clique that matters to a person. Since these relationships are always multiple, contingent, and in flux, managerial moralities are always situational, always relative (Jackall, 2010:106).

This description fits well with what I found to be transpiring between the VPs, but also for what I found myself enabled and constrained in doing at this meeting. I found that in the particular situation the moral imperative that emerged for me was an inclination to secure my continuing influence on matters in the corporation by attempting to build and strengthen ties to managers who most likely could in the future be helpful to me and use this influence to the best of my ability to contribute to the success of Nykredit.

It is not possible and perhaps not even desirable to eliminate ambiguity and uncertainty

In our discussion on strategy, desired state, and arguing over whether to present a specific proposal or some options to consider, I felt that each of us had distinct understandings of what these concepts mean and how

useful each of them were. I also felt that the VPs displayed a strong desire to express strategic options as they related to their particular domains of responsibilities and knowledge. Jackall describes one characteristic of a hierarchical bureaucracy to be that

details are pushed down [the chain of command] and credit is pulled up... Pushing details down protects the privilege of authority to declare that a mistake has been made... Moreover, pushing down details relieves superiors of the burden of too much knowledge, particularly guilty knowledge... (2010:21-22).

Furthermore, hierarchical 'bureaucracy breaks work into pieces and, in the process, the knowledge required and conferred by each piece of work' (ibid:84). Combined, these characteristics

create great pressure on middle managers not only to transmit good news but, precisely because they know the details, to act to protect their corporations, their bosses, and themselves in the process. They become the "point men" of a given strategy and the potential "fall guys" when things go wrong (ibid:21-22).

I find this understanding to be in stark contrast to dominant methods of my field that seem to be based on taken-for-granted assumptions that all knowledge is possessed by the organisation as such and by top executives in particular, and is shared without limitations or compartmentalisation between members of the organisation. TOGAF prescribes a process to develop a vision where 'business principles, business goals, and strategic drivers of the organization' are assumed to be well-defined (Open Group, 2013: 70), that is, written down and generally available to members of the organisation. I find that making such information generally available in detail and in written form has implications for power figurations; however, this is not mentioned in TOGAF and neither are any implications for corporate agility if potentially having to go through a formal process of maintenance of written interrelated documents each time business direction has to be adjusted. In contrast, Jackall's notion that absence of details 'protects the privilege of authority to declare that a mistake has been made' to me provides a very plausible rationale for not necessarily desiring to share such information, especially in written form. I also find that the absence of written down decisions prevents such decisions from being then interpreted in situations where decision makers are not present and cannot exert their influence directly, and thus I find that the absence of written decisions strengthens the dependency of others on decision makers and thus shifts power even more in favour of decision makers. When TOGAF further prescribes ensuring 'that existing definitions are current,' I sense at least some recognition that, even if written down, such things are not likely to be continuously maintained as the direction of the business is adjusted. TOGAF goes on to state that 'otherwise, it involves defining these essential items for the first time,' which to me signals a rejection of the idea that a meaningful option to consider would be *not* to write down these things at least not in a detailed or well-defined way. Finally, when

TOGAF then prescribes to clarify ‘any areas of ambiguity,’ I find that it is implied that any and all ambiguity can be removed and thus that dilemmas and paradoxes should not exist (ibid).

I draw attention to these underlying assumptions of TOGAF, because I find them not to be reflected in my own experience. In our new corporate strategy, we are aiming at increasing the satisfaction of partner banks, who are distributing our mortgage products under one brand, while simultaneously strengthening our own distribution of the same products under our own brand. I find our desire for our branches to compete *in general* while desiring partner banks to perceive us as not competing *with them* to be a dilemma for which there is no easy fix. I recently attended an after-work meeting with our new CEO, where he addressed this very dilemma and expressed that we all must strive to keep finding ways to handle it. I did not sense from him any expectation that we could solve this dilemma or make it unambiguous. In the above narrative, the tension of such dilemmas seems to me to have contributed to our choosing to present a number of useful scenarios rather than a specific proposed optimum solution. We agreed in the group that the meaning senior managers have of the evolving corporate strategy is indeed not clear to us in useful detail and is to a certain extent ambiguous. I find the uncertainty I perceived in this situation to be characteristic of working with changes in organisations in general and with shakeups and strategizing in particular. The idea in dominant methods that uncertainty and ambiguity can be eliminated altogether I consider somewhat naïve.

Power and influence are exercised on multiple interrelated levels

My affinity for working with options rather than a specific proposal in this situation could very well contrast with the views of the VPs whom I could imagine thinking along the lines of more orthodox methods for working with strategic scenarios (Johnson et al., 2005:74-77). My hope is that by not presenting a ‘take-it-or-leave-it proposal’ but instead presenting senior managers with options for consideration a setting is more likely to emerge in which the VPs presenting our proposal can get into a negotiation with senior management concerning the meaning of our new strategy. In light of Jackall’s description of such processes, I find this more likely to provide a somewhat more detailed understanding, than if we wait for some decision to be passed down the chain of command. I also find this to be the humbler approach and, since I have gleaned from gossip around the coffee maker (Danish equivalent of the water cooler effect) that other business units perceive our department as somewhat arrogant and presumptuous, I find this to be an expedient approach at this time of organisational turmoil. Jackall describes how when negotiating especially ‘gut decisions’ that ‘involve big money, public exposure, or significant effects on one’s organization ... people look up and look around. They rely on others, not because of inexperience, but because of fear of failure’ (2010:82). I find the overall dynamic that is going on in the room to be influenced by our knowledge that important themes are being discussed in senior management circles at a tier above us, so to speak, while realizing that we only have very limited detailed knowledge about the meaning of these themes to senior managers. The dynamics

between senior management and VPs, both those VPs at the meeting and other similar circles of VPs in other departments, I find to be described well by analogy by Elias as multi-tier games:

From a group in which every individual plays together on the same level [a game] may turn into a 'two-level' or 'two-tier' group of players. All players remain interdependent, but they no longer all play directly with each other. This function is taken over by the special functionaries who coordinate the game—representatives, delegates, leaders ... form a second, smaller group, a second-tier group as one might say... At least three, if not four, different balances of power may be distinguished in a two-tier game. They interlock like cogwheels, and so people who are enemies on one level may be allies on another. First there is the power balance within the small group at the upper level, secondly the power balance between players at the first level and players at the second, thirdly the power balance between the groups at the lower level and ... the power balance within each of these lower-level groups (Elias, 1978:86-88).

I find that Elias' description plausibly summarizes the mechanisms of the 'games' I find going on in the meeting where jockeying for power, emphasizing one's own areas of special interest, and attempting to influence corporate strategy are all ongoing all the time and all related to other power struggles ongoing in relationships with other people who, although they are not physically present in the meeting, still influence matters via the interdependence inherent in relationships between the people present and the people absent. Thus, I also find that all of us together form the organisation we are part of and that none of us can step out of this organisation to observe it from the outside and thus take an objective stance towards it. We can only ever participate. The games within games that thus emerges I find to be sharply in contrast to the somewhat naïve and ideal rational organisation that I find to be taken for granted in the TOGAF method.

Dealing with the dominantly powerful

Narrative

I had put together a proposal and had Hanne comment on it. We then sent the proposal to the group of VPs including one VP, Mads, who did not attend the first meeting, but who is also a stakeholder in the subject area. The following day, Mads sent us a somewhat terse mail informing us that he would attend our next meeting, but that he has a different view on the matter and a different proposal. He did not include a proposal in his mail, though. I found this to be a somewhat annoying power play and discussed it with Hanne. Hanne also seemed annoyed and subsequently asked him if he could share his views, and he sent his proposal to the group of VPs and me. I found it to differ indeed from our proposal in a number of ways. He proposed a specific but overall IT solution, rather than giving options, and the IT solution he proposed was based to some extent on views and ideas at odds with what the group had so far been discussing.

We all meet at the end of the week. I spot Peter waiting outside the meeting room 10 minutes before the meeting is scheduled to begin. I quickly grab my laptop and papers and go to the meeting room hoping that we might have a chat before the meeting starts. He also enters the room and asks me frankly if I can explain what the proposal from Mads means. I reply that I understand why he is asking since it is certainly based on a somewhat different view of what we have done together at our last meeting, and from what I have prepared for this meeting. However, I also explain how I could see this proposal as a description of one scenario that might fit into a set of scenarios along the lines of what we previously outlined together. I am certain Peter has his own opinion on the matter, but he seems pleased while listening to my take on it, and the other participants arrive before we can get into more detail.

As the meeting progresses, I feel again pushed in different directions by the ideas of various VPs. Mads suggests that we express what we propose more clearly and thus in more detail and that we should focus on *the* best option to pursue. Hanne voices support for our agreed idea to describe only what the possible scenarios are and then ask business unit managers to choose which of these appeals to them more. As we begin to discuss the actual scenarios, I feel that individual scenarios are increasingly being questioned, most forcefully by Mads, and that the theme of the conversation is shifting towards whether one or the other scenario is best for our company. I find that this is counterproductive for developing a broad set of credible scenarios and, at one point in the discussion, I feel that almost all scenarios but one have been rejected as being sub-optimal. This would effectively change what we are doing from attempting to invite senior management to discuss with us various options, into proposing an IT solution that we in this group find to be optimal according to some elusive goal.

I therefore find myself compelled to answer when I perceive Mads attempting to discredit one of the last remaining scenarios by asking rhetorically with what I perceive to be contempt in his voice, 'Who amongst our customers would want something like *that*?' My answer that 'as a customer, I would certainly love exactly that!' seems to take both Mads and the other VPs by surprise. I am aware in the situation, that I have not given this answer because I feel strongly that as a customer what was particularly described was, in fact, a dream solution for me, but I choose to take a stand and defend the scenario as a meaningful option to be discussed and considered. I find this option to be at least feasible and that it might be viable since some customers might indeed accept it. I feel that it is only fair to present this as a scenario to business managers as one among several options from which to choose so that they get a chance to consider for themselves whether they find this to be what customers might desire. I do not find that the group present should have a monopoly in making this judgement call. Consequently, I find that we should not be the ones to reject it. My stand is met with some raised eyebrows, but also, luckily, with amused curiosity rather than outright rejection. I try to disarm the situation by using humour in playing into the amusement I sense and we discuss further if customers would really accept something along those lines. I give it my best to try to visualise

minor adjustments to this scenario, as it was originally described, that I find would make it more meaningful. As the meeting progresses, I feel that acceptance grows of this scenario being one among several to propose for consideration. Likewise, I feel growing support for presenting several options for consideration by senior managers and not just one IT solution. We discuss two more scenarios and, as the meeting is about to end, I am again tasked with describing what we have come up with and distributing this before our next meeting.

Since power figurations are relational, it matters greatly who participates in conversations

Reflecting on this narrative, I am aware that I engaged in political manoeuvres when I chose to arrive early in order to get into one-on-one conversations with an individual member of the group. Peter's invitation to present him with my interpretation of Mads's suggestion I find to be both an opportunity for me to influence Peter's stance towards this suggestion and also a power move. Since I am the one talking and thus sharing information, and since having information that others might depend on might increase the dependence upon you and thus shift the power differential in your favour, this move could strengthen Peter's power in the group. However, I find that I have more to gain than to lose from sharing my views with Peter, and therefore happily accept the invitation.

In communicative processes, we continuously make judgements about how to act

The move I made during the meeting when I spoke in support of a specific scenario, I find, in reflection, open to a number of interpretations. My actions can be seen as a straightforward, rational argument for the scenario itself or as a manipulative move to 'save the idea of presenting scenarios' by saving an individual scenario lest all but one should fall. The way I go about it in articulating that I am a customer and that, *as a customer*, I find the scenario desirable can be seen as an attempt to change the power figuration itself to increase my chances of swaying the decision in my favour. In reflections on the previous narrative episode, I explain above how I find power figurations to be relational. By drawing attention to my being also a customer, I can be seen to attempt to change the nature of our relationships from being between me as a subordinate and the others as a group of VPs into one of me as the customer and the others as the business. Should I succeed in getting the others to feel like dealing with a customer, they might be ever so slightly influenced by norms around 'the customer being always right'. My move could thus be interpreted as a manipulative political ploy. My use of humour can be seen as an attempt to cover up what might have been considered (by some at least) a 'rupture' of the 'public transcript' (Scott, 1990) as I chose to counter what I perceived to be the attempt of a superior to remove a scenario from our proposal. Scott describes how the power of social forms embodying etiquette and politeness requires us often to sacrifice candour for smooth relations with our acquaintances and defines the concept 'public transcript' as a shorthand way of describing the open interaction between subordinates and those who dominate which would also include non-speech acts such as gestures and expressions. Thus, what is said during the meeting described above could be perceived as an enactment of the public transcript, whereas what I might talk to my wife about when I get

home from work would then be the ‘hidden transcript’, which is used to characterize discourse that takes place ‘offstage’, beyond direct observation by powerholders and is thus derivative in the sense that it consists of those offstage speeches, gestures, and practices that confirm, contradict, or inflect what appears in the ‘public transcript’. I find it important to note, that Scott explains that ‘power relations are not ... so straightforward that we can call what is said in power-laden contexts false and what is said offstage true’ (ibid:1-5). Power dynamics, however, enable and constrain what it is prudent to say both for subordinates and for the power holders. Mads’s move to discredit some of the scenarios under consideration, and potentially if he had not been challenged perhaps all but one of them, can also be interpreted in various ways. Perhaps he accepted the proposal to present several scenarios only because he found it against his style to counter his fellow VPs publicly. Perhaps he was adroitly making moves to arrive at a preferred situation of having only one scenario to present. Jackall describes how

at any given moment in most major corporations, one can find a vast array of vocabularies of motive and accounts to explain, or excuse and justify, expedient action... Moreover, the crucial premium in the corporation on style includes an expectation of a certain finesse in handling people, a “sensitivity to others,” as it is called (2010:142).

I find this to be a plausible possibility, but not a certainty. Mads could just as well have genuinely accepted the idea of presenting multiple scenarios but simply have found himself to dislike some of the specific scenarios that we had described.

I am uncertain about what is going on; it seems ambiguous in the situation. Nevertheless, I have to participate somehow, and even inaction is a consequential act. I find, therefore, that I have to make a judgement call as to how to proceed. Having to make such calls is a theme that emerged even more strongly for me at a later meeting, which I turn to now.

Insisting on thought and judgement calls

Narrative

After several more meetings in the group and some meetings with our COO and provisional CIO, we seem to agree that we are getting close to having produced some scenarios with which we feel comfortable and that we find to describe quite well some options that senior management has under consideration. I, however, fear that we have not adequately described the potential consequences of one of these options.

The option in question is whether to continue to have two different portals for mortgage lending, one used by our branches and the other used by partner banks, or whether to attempt to save money by discarding one of these and let both us and our partner banks use the same portal. We agree that Nykredit will save money by doing so only if we do not complicate the one portal by introducing two variants of the process it supports and that our branches would have to use the portal currently used by partner banks (rather than having them

use our portal). I perceive the general opinion in the room to be that this should be unproblematic. However, I fear that since the business model of partner banks is different from ours, having us use the same portal could force us to change our business model to become more like theirs. I would not have any objections if we deliberately sought to change our business model to resemble the business model of our partner banks more. I fear, however, that if this is a side effect of a decision about IT that no one is aware of, then no one will be aware of—or manage—the necessary business changes. Therefore, I find that we should either cooperate with business experts to assess and describe better the implications of this proposal or indicate more clearly in our presentation to senior management that there may be important business side effects if we opt to do this. In earlier conversations, I have gotten the feeling that while some of the VPs at least can see my point and agree with me that this is not necessarily unproblematic. In this meeting, however, they appear reluctant to take action as long as we are dealing with uncertainties and risks rather than certainties and well-defined consequences. I am worried that we in IT might (again) be seen by other business managers to manipulate events and have too much influence if we underreport consequences and risks of certain potential scenarios. Thus, I find myself in one of our meetings debating this issue once more.

Mads asserts that, after all, we are already a bank—mortgage is just one of the products we sell in addition to whatever banking business we provide. Therefore, he does not consider it necessary to include a slide in our presentation that describes the potential changes in our business model, since this is not a significant issue. I reply that the mortgage process and supporting processes such as profit and loss accounting of our branches, being branches of a mortgage company with a bank subsidiary, have both the property and collateral as well as the customer as central entities. This makes them significantly different from (and more complex than) the distribution processes of a partner bank, who is not producing mortgages but just reselling them.

Consequently, I find that we would have to accept a simplification of the processes in our branches, which would effectively become resellers for our mortgage company if they were to adopt the same portal as our partner banks. I would just like to make sure that we make this premise for the profitability of this option abundantly clear to senior management.

With a reference to one of our corporate values (to have the ‘customer in focus’), Mads retorts that, like partner banks, we also have the customer in focus, and everything we do both according to our current corporate strategy and any prior strategy has been with the customer in focus. He makes it clear that he resents my attempt to insinuate that the customer is not in focus in Nykredit. I try again to describe some of the differences in our process and the processes in partner banks, but this only seems to anger Mads more. I get the feeling that he is telling me off when he then says that I need not lecture him about our mortgage business. I begin to feel that this is not a conversation in which we explore potential issues, but is evolving into something of a dogfight. Furthermore, I am very aware that none of the others seems inclined to involve themselves in this debate.

Hanne appears to attempt to steer us away from the confrontation by neutrally claiming that, be that as it may, we cannot present something to the board of directors that we cannot fully explain. Sensing that the mood in the room seems to be that we should therefore not mention anything at all, I try one final time to ask whether our inability to explain the issue is not in itself a warrant for proposing an analysis of potential implications at least. Hannes makes a point of stating—in a tone that bears no objections—that we are not at this time ready to bring this up in a discussion with the board of directors. The meeting ends with a decision not to mention this in our presentation.

Later, when the meeting has ended, I find myself alone with Hanne, and she remarks that now she has also experienced a fight at a manager's meeting. I am unsure what she is trying to say—if anything—with this remark. I am also unsure if she is happy, indifferent, or angry with me for not biting my tongue like everyone else but having to pick an argument with Mads. I find myself quite happy, however, with my having spoken my convictions regardless of what Hanne's sentiments might be, and despite being sure that my relationship with Mads has probably cooled.

In the following process, we get closer to something our COO feels comfortable presenting to the rest of the board of directors. I attend several meetings where she is present and voices her opinions. I find that on some issues, she has markedly different opinions than the VPs. She seems to evaluate our past performance less rosily than the VPs and finds it important that we come across with some self-awareness and appreciation for the concerns of other business units concerning IT-related issues when we present our input to the board of directors. She also seems keen to spell out all potential consequences of making the different optional choices that we present. In this process, I manage to mention to her my concerns regarding the potential impact on the mortgage business model of our branches if we opt to use the same portal and processes used by partner banks. She also does not want to explain issues to the rest of the board of directors that are not clarified, but neither does she want to proceed unaware of potential consequences of the decisions made. I write down my thoughts in a brief and mail it to her, hoping that she will find business experts in the various business units reporting to her who can shed some more light on these issues. There are of course many other concerns that we need to investigate, evaluate, and present. The strategic changes on which we are embarking could significantly change our working relationships with customers, partner banks, the data centres of these partner banks, and other important parties. As we get closer and closer to a final presentation, it is striking to me how limited the amount of information that can be 'carried up the chain of command' in such a fashion truly is.

Making continuous skilful judgements on how to act is a demanding challenge

In a study conducted by Samra-Fredericks (2003:168), she observes and records the actual conversations of strategists at work and concludes that 'the complexities, uncertainties, and ambiguities with which [strategists] deal on a daily basis demands... skilled "improvisation"'. I find indeed that I have had to

improvise a lot during the meeting, as what transpired was complex, uncertain, and ambiguous. Samra-Fredricks focuses on some of the key abilities that appear to influence the strategy that emerges. These include the strategists' 'ability to: speak forms of knowledge, mitigate and observe the protocols of human interaction (the moral order), question and query, display appropriate emotion, deploy metaphors and finally, put history "to work"' (ibid:168). All of these abilities are utilized in unrehearsed conversations within a timespan sometimes of mere seconds. I find that I can influence only what emerges in such a setting, where other strategists skilfully utilize such abilities, to the extent that I can follow and match the skill with which they do so—which resonates with what Samra-Fredricks finds. In the situation, I am aware that I need to tread carefully and tactfully to avoid being perceived as overly negative or unconstructive. Jackall (2010: 59) describes how 'dissent on points of demonstrable fact is acceptable provided that one corrects others, even superiors, tactfully' but that 'when interpretive judgements or plain desires are involved... a new dynamic takes over' and one's objections may in these situations be perceived as 'downbeat negativism' or even 'disloyalty'. Scott (1990:56) explains why dissent amongst the superiors may be perceived as problematic since 'if the dominant are at odds with one another in any substantial way, they are, to that degree, weakened, and subordinates may be able to exploit the divisions and renegotiate the terms of subordination. An effective facade of cohesion thus augments the apparent power of elites'. I am aware that my insisting on taking some action at least to propose an analysis is a lot to ask, and that I am not helping the VPs 'feel comfortable', as Jackall puts it.

In this meeting, I find that the question for me becomes how far I am willing to go to insist on stating my professional concerns and ensure that I live up to my official responsibility for bringing to the attention of management any side effects of, or conflicts between, various change initiatives. Later, having taken a stand and spoken up, the question becomes whether and when I should relent in order to preserve my relationships with the VPs and ensure that I do not permanently lose influence and thus the ability to react when next I find us facing similar troublesome issues. I find these to be 'impossible' questions that I cannot answer with certainty, yet I have to act in the moment without (much) hesitation, which I find to require practical judgement influenced, as described earlier, by power figurations and situational morality.

Expertly exercising practical judgement requires knowledge of a particular kind

Stacey compares various ways of knowing and refers to Dreyfus and Dreyfus's (1986:16-51) model of stages of development of expertise—from novice to advanced beginner, to competent practitioner, to proficient, and finally to expert. According to this model, novices and beginners adhere rigidly to rules and plans and show little or no sensitivity to context. However, when one reaches capacities of proficiency and expertise, one must exercise discretionary 'judgements based upon (their) prior concrete experiences in a manner that defies explanation' (ibid:36). I do not find my empirical material sufficient to argue either for or against the model of Dreyfus and Dreyfus as such, but wish only to draw attention to how different the usefulness of

rules and plans may appear to the quite inexperienced and novice and the quite experienced and expert. Stacey describes how

The exercise of practical judgement is highly context-related; it is exercised in highly uncertain and unpredictable, unique situations. It cannot, therefore, be generalized or dealt with in the manner of second-order abstractions. The exercise of practical judgement calls for a wider awareness of the group, organizational, and social patterns within which some issue of importance is being dealt with. This requires a sensitive awareness of more than the focal points in a situation, namely, awareness of what is going on at the margins of what is being taken as the focus. Practical judgement is the experience-based ability to notice more of what is going on and intuit what is most important about a situation. It is the ability to cope with ambiguity and uncertainty, as well as the anxiety this generates... Practical judgement is ... social processes. Interdependent individuals can only develop and sustain the skills of practical judgement through participation with each other (2012:108-109).

This description of practical judgement reflects well how I felt I had to navigate. I could not take into consideration only what Jackall (2010:118) describes as the 'rational logic' that told me this potential side effect was important. I also had to consider 'institutional logic,' by which Jackall means 'the complicated, experimentally constructed, and therefore contingent set of rules, premiums, and sanctions that men and women in a particular context create and re-create in such a way that their behaviour and accompanying perspectives are to some extent regularized and predictable'. I was also aware to some extent of the multi-tier game between VPs, VPs and senior managers, and the circle of senior managers. Considering the multiplicity of these highly uncertain and unpredictable aspects of the context in which I find myself to navigate as an enterprise architect, I find context-free rules, simplified models, and second-order abstractions to be of little help as aids to the exercise of practical judgement. I find myself agreeing with Stacey (2012:58) when he says that 'insisting that rules be followed amounts to the destruction of proficiency and expertise'.

Popular certifications in my field could hamper development of proficiency and expertise

When I then look at what are the most widespread ways of acquiring knowledge and skills within my field, I see general tendencies towards applying with little reflection simplifying frameworks and context-free or simplified prescriptive rules described in methods such as TOGAF. I even see a widespread drive towards becoming certified practitioners of such methods. The online Directory of Certified People of The Open Group states that more than 35,000 people have to date (2014) been certified in this one method and framework. Certification validates that the person understands and can practice enterprise architecture (exactly) as defined in TOGAF. I perceive this as a form of 'isomorphism' common to professions, which

can create ‘a pool of almost interchangeable individuals who occupy similar positions across a range of organizations’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). On the one hand, I can see why a relatively new profession would seek credibility and why individual practitioners, especially those new to the field, would seek acceptance by potential future employers by mimicking those who seem more successful than themselves. I fear, however, that if—with the limits described—professionals follow these methods too strictly, they will be limited in their ability to learn and grow more proficient and expert as described by Dreyfus and Dreyfus.

Epilogue

Sometime after our COO and the VPs had their meeting with the board of directors, information about what was decided began to trickle down the chain of command. It seems that the decision followed the lines of one of our scenarios to some extent, but with some adjustments. It does not appear to have been decided yet whether our branches should use the same portal for mortgages as partner banks. For now, an analysis of consequences has been initiated. I do not know what influence my objections and my brief had if any. I do not feel a strong desire to know. For me, it suffices that I have done what I found to be in my power to speak up about, according to the best of my judgement.

Questioning review of key perspectives of the program and its method

I attempt to develop an understanding through reflective and reflexive analysis

I have participated in a number of processes involving strategic reorientation of Nykredit and other companies before that, and I find the process described in my narratives above to be in no way exceptional or uncharacteristic of such events. In ‘at-home ethnography’ which ‘concentrates on exploring the richness of one or a few situations and then relies on one’s general knowledge for evaluating what is fairly typical’, any claim to generalizability is related to our ability to be ‘able to refer to at least a few other instances in which the same theme or process is present, thereby indicating that the focused situation is of some relevance for illuminating broader chunks of the organizational context in which the focal situation is played out’ (Alvesson, 2009:165-166). By their very nature, my narratives describe only one specific series of meetings, but I find what goes on during these meetings to be similar in nature to what I have experienced in many other situations, and thus to be generalizable to some extent. I also find what I experience to resonate with experience related by other authors in the field, which I find to add to the credibility of assuming some degree of generalizability.

I use a method termed ‘abduction’ by Alvesson and Sköldbberg, who describe it as an approach where

an (often surprising) single case is interpreted from a hypothetic overarching pattern, which, if it were true, explains the case in question... The method has some characteristics of both induction and deduction, but ... adds new, specific elements.

During the process, the empirical area of application is successively developed, and the

theory (the proposed over-arching pattern) is also adjusted and refined. In its focus on underlying patterns, abduction also differs advantageously from the other two, shallower models of explanation. The difference is ... that it includes *understanding* as well (2009:4).

Since I am seeking understanding rather than an applicable model, I find this approach fitting to my purpose. With my abductive narrative approach, I seek nuances in my description of what I find to be going on. In a further reflexive turn of considering the meaning of each of the possible interpretations of experience given above and all of the interpretations combined, I find that I am moving away from seeking a root cause for some effect like my taking the stances and making the moves that I do in situations that emerge. Now, I find that all of these interpretations add to the meaning of what happened as I find that all of them hold some shard of the meaning of the experiences. I also find that there are likely to be many more shards that could be added if I reflected further on what emerged in these settings. If I were asked to explain what happened, I would find myself compelled to give a plausible socially accepted reason for my actions, which would not come close to describing the full meaning. Thus, I find in reflection that if someone were to interview me, to get my account of what took place at these meetings, something with less nuance and depth would emerge. In my thesis for my diploma from CBS (Brahm, 2007) that I mentioned in my P1, I transcribed a number of interviews. Reflecting on the difference between those and the reflective narratives I now write, I find that in my narratives I am able to explore in much more detail and with much more nuance what I find to be actually going on in these work settings than I would have been able to do using interviews.

What I am trying to contribute to the ongoing discussion is an 'evocative illustrative example' of a process in real life (Learmonth & Humphreys, 2012: 104) that I find to be fairly representative of any such processes in similar circumstances. I do this in the hope that I will evoke the reflexivity of the reader about his or her similar experiences potentially at odds with dominant methods. I find, however, that I am attempting more than the provoking of reflexivity from the reader. I am attempting to alternate between evocative narratives and reflexive analysis of my experience in light of various theoretical concepts and empirical studies of others, to illustrate an interpretation of my experience that represents a contrast to the dominant methods of my field, not an alternative that 'can be followed'. My aim is to contribute to the *understanding* of what is happening in practice *in general*, not only to illustrate that sometimes what happens in a particular situation is not what one might expect according to dominant methods. What has been emerging for me throughout this project—as I have pondered alternative understandings of what seems to be going on in my field contrary to orthodox theories—is an idea that perhaps there could also be alternative ways to develop knowledge and understanding of my field beyond the level of the competent practitioners. It seems that expert knowledge requires something beyond what TOGAF or other frameworks or methods based on the same theories and taken-for-granted assumptions can provide.

Through my narrative approach, I am not trying to argue entirely against using methods such as TOGAF and replacing them with some alternative of my devising. I find that I do not have the empirical foundation necessary to make any claim on a different prescriptive method. Indeed, I find that simplified models and methods may be useful to some extent, especially for those individuals who are novices, beginners, or even competent practitioners, according to Dreyfus and Dreyfus's categorization of levels of knowledge.

I challenge taken-for-granted assumptions—both my own and those that dominate my field

There are of course taken-for-granted assumptions underlying any theory and, as observed by many others, 'we never see single sense-data, but always *interpreted* data' and 'seeing is inseparable from the perspective, it is *perspectival*' (Alvesson & Sköldböck, 2009:6). I therefore find myself striving to escape my own blind spots that stem from being 'native' to the culture and having been exposed to taken-for-granted mind sets of my organisation for a prolonged period. Alvesson describes 'at-home ethnography' as 'more of a struggle to 'break out' from the taken-for-grantedness of a particular framework that is already quite familiar' and a 'struggle with the dilemma of closeness/distance, balancing the two and knowing where to draw the line' (Alvesson, 2009: 162). My primary means of attempting such a 'breaking out' is to alternate, as mentioned, between narrative and reflexive analysis. The subject of my reflexive analysis is more than just my interactions with others and the events that unfold, it is as much myself, my inner dialogues, my thought processes, and ways of interpreting and reasoning and thus, hopefully, a glimpse of my own taken-for-granted concepts. I find this reflexivity to entail 'self-conscious introspection guided by a desire to better understand both self and others through examining one's actions and perceptions in reference to and dialogue with those of others' (Anderson, 2006: 382). In a further reflexive turn, I find that these taken-for-granted belief systems that have been forming throughout my life are indeed being challenged and revisited. They are challenged not only through my private, silent reflexivity concerning my reflective narratives; they are challenged even more when I meet with my fellow researchers and faculty on residential units of the program, and when I am challenged by my learning set with comments on my work. Through collective reflective, and reflexive participation in the programme itself, I find, indeed, that I have become able to change my understanding of certain phenomena and even change to some extent some of my belief systems and taken-for-granted modes of thinking and thus, to some extent, to change myself. Reflecting on the nature of conversations with my learning set and the wider circle of researchers and staff at Hertfordshire University, I am struck by how unique this mode of learning is. I find the reflections and reflexivity inherent in the program to be a critical part of the method we employ.

Process reduced language idealises stable states over continuously emerging processes

In my continued reflexivity on my practice, I find myself contemplating the connection between the use of a certain language, thinking certain thoughts, and doing certain things. I mentioned already how Elias deliberately chose to use the word *figuration* over *configuration* to convey perpetual movement and shifts in

the power dynamics of relationships. Elias describes an inclination in society to use language that hides processual aspects of phenomenon:

We say, 'The wind is blowing,' as if the wind were actually a thing at rest which, at a given point in time, begins to move and blow. We speak as if the wind were separate from its blowing, as if a wind could exist which did not blow. This reduction of process to static conditions, ... we shall call 'process-reduction' for short (Elias, 1978:112).

The inclination towards process-reduction Elias explains as rooted in placing higher value on the changeless than on the changeable (ibid: 148-149). In the meetings, I describe at the beginning of this project, I experience this as an inclination towards describing a 'current state' (of affairs) and a 'desired state'. Even though I often hear phrases akin to 'the only constant is change,' I do not remember ever hearing my peers question the meaning of what reaching 'a state' would imply if we acknowledge that change is perpetually ongoing. It is hard even to hold on to the idea that if we do not consciously do anything to provoke intentional change, things will inevitably change anyway and, therefore, the 'current state' might be more like a 'current trajectory'. I find it even harder to figure out what the 'desired state' might mean. I draw attention to this way of speaking because I think it reflects a way of understanding that is so deeply taken for granted that it is difficult to discuss. I use process-reduced language myself partly as I feel compelled to adapt to the language of the 'public transcript' (Scott, 1990) and partly because it is convenient to work with simplifications—it requires less explanation. Elias describes how sociologists of the nineteenth-century obsessed with the problem of a new and better social order yet to come. 'Pursued to their logical conclusion, these ideas about change led to the idea of society in its ultimate immutable state; an idea of the ideal realized which was the final yardstick or point of reference' (Elias, 1978:151). I find this to resonate to an uncanny degree with the still predominant use of language in my field, and I find the use of language to be important, as limits to which thoughts we are able to express using language also to some extent constitute limits to what we can ourselves think in terms of silent inner conversations. Therefore, as Elias (ibid:20) points out, 'certain social transformations can only be achieved, if at all, by long and sustained development spanning several generations. This reorientation of speech and thought is one of them'.

[A logical means for securing the desired future state seems to be predictable change](#)

I will now look again at the overall development of methods in my field of enterprise architecture in light of these reflections on what development entails and requires. One of the first tools within the enterprise architecture field was a framework defined by John Zachman originally used to describe an information system and later expanded to describe an enterprise and thus (hopefully) understand it sufficiently to change it into whatever one desired it to become (Zachman, 1987; Sowa & Zachman, 1992). In a conversation with Scott Bernard, who was at the time editor of the Journal of enterprise architecture, John Zachman clarified that 'the Zachman Framework is a schema, not a method, and it does not imply anything about how you do

EA' (Bernard, 2005). Zachman went on to explain: 'The framework is like a Periodic Table, it deals with the elementary composition of descriptive representations. In any science, you have to discover the elementary structure before anything becomes predictable and repeatable' (ibid). I find it interesting that Zachman uses the periodic table, a schema from the natural sciences, to explain by analogy what the Zachman Framework is. I also notice that Zachman seems not to question whether predictability and repeatability necessarily have to be our goal. Since the framework itself, as Zachman explains, does not 'imply anything about how you do EA'. Enterprise architects have had to look elsewhere for a process for filling out the Framework and producing predictable change.

Dominant methods for achieving predictable change may be empirically unsubstantiated

TOGAF is inspired by the Zachman Framework and prescribes describing the current state (termed 'baseline architecture') and the desired future state (termed 'target architecture') of the enterprise, and has prescriptions for migrating from one to the other (Open Group, 2013:69-78). A very influential idea in my field has been the overall generic eight-step transformation process defined by John P. Kotter (1995). The methods we commonly use in my field to achieve movement in an organisational setting, such as TOGAF, closely resemble the ideal model for transformation described by Kotter. Inspired by Kotter and similar ideas, we seem to believe that we can observe the enterprise as an object or system as if from the outside, and can afford to take our time in observing and analysing the initial *configuration* of this system, referred to using process-reduced language as the 'baseline state,' since we will have to 'establish a sense of urgency' before any transformation begins. We also strive to 'create a vision' of the desired future or 'target state,' believing that once this state is achieved we can make the enterprise stop any further movement by 'institutionalizing new approaches'. Once these two states are known, we seem to believe that we need to 'form a powerful guiding coalition' that can then apply external force to 'change systems, structure, and politics that don't fit the vision'. If we 'declare victory too soon' and remove this external force, Kotter warns that the transformation is 'fragile and subject to regression'.

Looking anew at the article in which Kotter describes his findings, I find him mentioning having 'watched more than 100 companies try to remake themselves into significantly better competitors,' and he mentions some companies as examples of organisations. He also mentions that only a few of these corporate change efforts have been very successful, a few utter failures, and most fall somewhere in between. Using such empirical material as a basis for formulating a prescriptive development model seems in reflection to be problematic. Elias (1978:160) describes how empirical study will show that through development a figuration (A) changes into another figuration (B). When 'looking into the future, from whatever point in the figuration flow, we are usually able to establish only that the figuration at B is one possible transformation of A ... From the viewpoint of the earlier figuration, the latter is—in most if not in all cases—only one of several possibilities for change. From the viewpoint of the later figuration, the earlier one is usually a

necessary condition for the formation of the later'. While I do not try to refute that Kotter's empirical material does indeed illustrate how some characteristics of some prior figuration was a *necessary precondition* of some later figuration, I find it problematic to use this as proof that, if certain conditions are established, then this will inevitably *lead to* a particular change into a desired figuration. Furthermore, I find it problematic to assume that, if we should reach this figuration, we can then arrest the movement of the organisation by 'institutionalizing new approaches'. I realize that I have here only argued against assumptions informing one among many methods for achieving predictable change. In P1, I described experiencing other methods that I find in reflection to be based on similar assumptions and to have similar flaws. My goal, however, has been only to demonstrate that alternative understandings exist and challenge that the dominant methods and their underlying assumptions are entirely empirically substantiated.

Uncertainty and ambiguity inherent in enterprises seem to call for a different approach

Kotter's observed organisations are actual companies, and I find companies partake in business transactions that are processes emerging in relationships between them and their customers and suppliers and more. I find the emerging processes to be influenced by movements of customers and suppliers, but also by competitors and regulating authorities, as described by Graves (2012) and Potts (2008, 2010) referred to in my P1. The enterprise as a figuration, or game, or shared story is a figuration in which employees and managers of the company play a part, but also where customers, competitors, and legislators make moves that influence the potential commercial success of the company. Such a figuration I find to resemble the game figurations Elias (1978) describes where the chances of one player being able to force other players to make the moves that seem desirable to him are extremely slight—a very complex relational figuration where uncertainty and ambiguity seem inherent. When having to make decisions in uncertain and ambiguous situations with little or no predictability, I find that I have to depend on practical judgement and political skill and that I cannot rely on simplified models and rules.

Therefore, I begin to think that reflection and reflexivity, as I have experienced these concepts as part of my research method, might be useful in my everyday job as a means to learn on a deeper level what is going on in these relationships, that challenge and potentially change my own hitherto taken-for-granted assumptions and practices.

Reflexive practice involves noticing and thinking about participation with others in the accomplishment of joint tasks... The capacity for practical judgement in organizations can be sustained and developed by the 'technique' of reflexive inquiry into the narrative of what we are doing together in ambiguous and uncertain situation (Stacey, 2012:112).

I am not saying, however, that by 'applying' reflexivity I can ensure a positive outcome with certainty. Far from it. As also noted by Stacey, 'expert reflexive inquirers have a greater capacity to understand and

respond to others, and they might use this understanding for the collective good or they could just as easily use their enhanced understanding in their own interests; they may become expert manipulators of others' (ibid:113). It could even be that *no* deeper knowledge emerges regardless of the amount of reflectivity and reflexivity. I find, however, that my experience of reflecting and working reflexively with my experience holds a great *potential* for learning and a potential for progressing *beyond* the level of proficient practitioner.

Concluding thoughts and a look ahead

During my struggles with attempting to understand what it is we do when we strategize about the architecture and development of the enterprise we participate in, I have found the theory of Complex Responsive Processes of Relating to be a useful theory of social action. I can see that systems theory can be helpful in understanding certain phenomena in natural sciences such as physics and biology, but it has not been helpful in my making meaning out of the empirical material available to me concerning social action and hence organising. Looking back, I find, as my career progressed, that I reached a level of competence where the simplifications and context-free rules of TOGAF and similar methods simply were not helpful to me anymore as described in P1. I began to seek a deeper understanding of what actually appears to be going on and investigated the complex relational mechanisms at play in organisational change processes. This journey is leading me to believe that insisting that such simplifications and rules be assumed to represent actual reality and must be followed amounts to the destruction of proficiency and expertise as described above. Therefore, I find that for the development of knowledge and skill beyond the level of proficient practitioner, enterprise architects must find new ways of learning—ways that go beyond what TOGAF and similar methods can provide. To be influential in a corporate environment where other influential people engage skilfully in improvised political plays and manoeuvres, I find that a high level of practical wisdom and judgment and political adroitness is required. Reflection and reflexivity concerning our experience appear to me to be one potentially helpful practice to incorporate into our professional lives in order to begin to develop our methods beyond what to me appears to have moved very little ahead from the starting point of the Zachman Framework of the 1990s.

To further my understanding of how we can work with changes in an enterprise, I find that I now have to turn to taking a closer look at what an enterprise is. In the dominant methods of my field, an enterprise is perceived as a system (Open Group, 2013:373-375). In Complex Responsive Processes of Relating, organisation is perceived as patterns of interaction between people (Stacey, 2012:9-22). Elias describes how the lengthening chains of human interdependence as our civilization evolved also came to include material objects with social significance such as money (1991:133). Bruno Latour claims that taking for granted which actors (e.g. human) should be included in the social and which actors (e.g. non-human) should be excluded confuses what should be explained with the explanation (2005:8,63-86). In P3, I would like to investigate these different ideas about how actors work together, and what this might imply for what an

enterprise is and how it changes over time. My hope is that if I develop an understanding of this, it might help me to understand better my possibilities for making meaningful contributions to the changes of an enterprise.

P3: The Enterprise of Digital Banking

Negotiating understanding and learning in social circles

August 2015

*They have chosen cunning instead of belief. Their prison is only in their minds, yet they are in that prison; and so afraid of being taken in that they cannot be taken out. —C.S. Lewis, **The Last Battle***

The Enterprise of Digital Banking

Between P2 and P3, I accepted an opportunity as enterprise architect for the Digital Banking unit of Nordea (the largest Nordic bank). Thus, the enterprise I am ‘architecting’ in my new job is the banking businesses Nordea is engaging in with customers. The profit and loss business unit Digital Banking brings to market and operates digital solutions, allowing Nordea to engage in banking businesses with customers through digital touch points, earning profits on business conducted through these digital touch points. A digital touch point is an IT/IS solution through which a customer can interact with the bank, including entering into legally binding business deals. My overarching objective is to architect digital touch points that allow customers of the bank to conduct business with the bank in a manner at least as satisfying for the customer as when conducting business physically.

In this project, therefore, I will investigate further what architecting enterprise means when understood as ‘ways of doing business’ that we hope will emerge, for example, when our customers interact with new and differently architected digital solutions provided by us. Digital Banking in Nordea has chosen to adopt new methods for producing such digital solutions. In this project, I will also investigate how such new ideas about how to conduct our work is taken up by my colleagues and me, and how changes to our ways of working occur. I will give an account of the interplay between how my colleagues and I change our ways of working and how we influence changes in our customers’ ways of working with us as a bank.

Scoping and Mapping Customer Journeys

Narrative—Agreeing initially on terminology and approach

Part of my new job is to participate in what we call a ‘delivery stream’ consisting of experts in various fields working from various offices but also sometimes meeting physically. The delivery stream aims at changing the ways corporate customers manage their finances, including how they engage with the bank through digital touch points. This entails delivering a new IT/IS solution. We want to break down the task of building the solution into chunks, called features, which a few people can build in a few weeks. Given the overall ambition, a lot of features needs to be built. To ensure that they will eventually fit together, we decide that we need to arrive at an adequate shared understanding of what we are going to build.

Experiencing that we sometimes mean different things with the same term, we decided to discuss common terminology to avoid misunderstandings. At a meeting in Stockholm, I was asked to present the terminology we should use when describing what we aim to bring to market. Going through my presentation, I attempt to make it a conversation more than a monologue, partly to hear what sense other team members make of what I present and partly as an invitation to reflect on what it means to agree on a terminology. To set the scene, I quote Kierkegaard on having to find people where they are if we are to attempt to help them. I use this quote as the starting point for discussing the difference between personae and roles. A persona is a particular make-believe individual moulded to represent actual target customers and describes both emotional and functional aspects of the person, whereas roles are abstract categories of people described typically only with responsibilities and accountabilities. I describe how personae are used in design work to establish a connection to our target customers that is more intimate than usual to be better able to understand how customers undertake what they do to fulfil their needs and wants—commonly referred to as customer journeys. My presentation prompts Mack from Digital Sales and Marketing to state that he has never before heard IT people quote Kierkegaard, but what really surprised him was that it made perfect sense. The mood is very positive and light hearted. I sense some raised eyebrows and in general feel that concepts like emotions, personae, and customer journeys are unfamiliar to my colleagues. Sarah exclaims that it is just so great to attempt for once to look at banking more from the perspective of customers and less like we always seem to do from the perspective of the bank! Everyone seems to agree, and we decide to describe a few select personae³ representative of Nordea's corporate customers and to describe some customer journeys they undertake in managing their company finances. As input, we decide to get to know our customers and other stakeholders better by analysing customer satisfaction surveys, gathering information from prior projects, and mapping out our stakeholders within the bank.

Narrative—Mapping customer journeys for select personae

With some help from an external consulting company, we get a scope and budget approved by management and we then engage with another consulting and design studio to help us understand better what customers might need from us. This stage includes some design sessions where we express what we aim for in various ways. We bring together a score of people including front-office employees who talk regularly with the customers to whom we aim to deliver, business experts from various business lines, design experts, and experts in delivery of IT/IS solutions. In smaller groups, we draw animals that should represent the state of what we provide today (for example an elephant in a room is drawn) and the state of what we hope to provide in the future (for example, a soaring eagle is drawn). We write imagined letters to brag to our moms

³ One personae for example is Eva, who is married to Oluf, the owner of an industrial machinery repair company in Kiruna. Oluf handles the business and Eva handles the finances and is thus the user of digital touch points when engaging with Nordea. Eva is very meticulous and structured and strives to keep her books always in pristine order.

about the praise we have gotten after providing better solutions to customers in a couple of years' time. Eventually, we also begin to map out more usual processual models.

All the artefacts we produce we hang on the walls so that as the days go by more and more stuff covers the walls, and our progress is highly visible and tangible. After two days of various sessions where we have described in more and more detail how we expect corporate customers to manage certain aspects of their businesses and financials, we have a plenary session on the third day where the aim is to map out the first actual customer journey. We gather around a three-meter-long paper banner where Peter from the design studio instructs us to map out the 'Order to Cash' journey: what we believe are our customers' needs, which actions they perform to fulfil their needs, what emotions are evoked by performing these actions, and which opportunities we see for Nordea to contribute with something valuable for customers. He instructs us to reuse items from our previous exercises where we have mapped out how we expect each of our chosen three personae to manage orders from their customers, perform invoicing, and manage payments. Each persona is different from the others and, in our previous work, we have produced descriptions of different tasks, different things that we expect them to find cumbersome or even painful and they have different degrees of specialisation of their employees. Now, we attempt to bring it all together and map out a more generic 'order to cash' journey that encompasses all of the things all of these personae need to manage their respective 'order to cash' activities. We also attempt to spot opportunities for Nordea to provide better service to customers to help them manage their businesses and financials. In populating the new journey map, Peter encourages us to cannibalise Post-its from already created artefacts that have by now been photo-documented. As we start to do so, the work seems surprisingly conflict free. The exercise quickly evolves into a stream of people fetching Post-its and finding a suitable spot to add them on the banner. Thematic clusters of Post-its emerge in a few places on the large banner, and we label these 'getting an overview', 'planning the day', 'checking payments', 'making deals'. We discuss how some personae will do these things differently, but agree that the needs are similar, and the themes are common although the how of doing it will vary quite a lot. Peter instructs us also to add new Post-its and some of us begin to do so. A few discussions such as 'which of these comes first?' or 'do we need a label for these?' occur, but, all in all, the journey map seems to emerge without any substantial disagreements about what the actual journeys of customers will be. The only argument that does take a while to settle occurs when Marcus and Sarah seem to disagree on whether or not a certain activity belongs to this journey or some other journey. To me, there is no objective right and wrong answer to how to punctuate process and, through discussion, we collectively conclude that this is more of an arbitrary choice than a conflict as such. I mention it mainly to illustrate how little actual conflict we experience since this was the most dramatic argument of the day. I consider whether we have become so aligned that we think alike, or whether something about the facilitated way we work ourselves from more particular descriptions to more abstract descriptions limits disagreement. The funny thing is that I feel more energetic and upbeat than I have felt in a long time, which my colleague Theo also

remarks on. By combining what we know about what customers think about current services and our collective imaginations about what they might think about what we could provide, I hope we have achieved something that could dramatically improve customer satisfaction—if we become able to execute on it.

Narrative—Reviewing our blueprints of customer journeys

Over the next few weeks, we meet, review, and discuss what we have achieved. I try to articulate a couple of times that we appear to have skipped the aspect of coordination and decision-making between individual employees of corporate customers. We discussed during the design workshop, for example, how a user who can make proposals for deals, but cannot sign them, should be able to hand over the signing to another user, or how a user might need someone else to co-sign an agreement. This is taken up only half-heartedly by other team members and consultants from the design bureau. At one particular review meeting, I attempt yet again to raise this issue as an invitation to the others to chip in how they think we could deal with this aspect. None of my colleagues from Nordea say anything, but it feels as if almost all consultants take turns in rejecting my invitation to investigate this aspect. Each gives their own reason, such as this aspect being too complicated and thus threatening the simplicity of our design or it being too late in the process to address such a complicated issue. The last remark stings since, in attempting to raise the issue before, one response was that we would deal with this later. I react emotionally to feeling not heard, but sensing that the structure of this conversation is moving towards a verbal fight, almost, between the entire design bureau and me, I attempt to change tack. I ask my colleague Morgan directly what he thinks, since he has expressed earlier how important this aspect is. He does express guarded support for my views, but also diplomatically emphasises that we are at a late stage in mapping journeys and need to heed the experience of the designers regarding what we can cope with for now. Realising that I can muster no strong coalition here and now, I forego attempting to influence the design bureau, hoping for better opportunities later for dealing more constructively with this aspect.

Narrative—Negotiating the meaning of staying loyal to our customer journeys

When I return sometime later from a weeklong vacation, Ken informs me that the team has taken some bold decisions in my absence. Before my vacation, we were giving shape to features for ‘getting an overview of liquidity’, but now the team has decided to start instead with features for ‘making payments’. This implies that we are in a hurry to write specifications for these features for execution teams. I think we have sufficient time and am therefore not worried over this. Later, however, I discover that to save time, we seem to reuse specifications of features written in a delivery stream aiming at fulfilling the needs of household customers. I mention to Sarah and John that although these features deal with ‘making payments’, and both households and corporates make payments, the way our customer journey maps describe that corporates with many employees do this differs from how these specifications describe it. Sarah says that she is so happy to hear me say this, for it has been troubling her as well, and John also expresses support. Theo has the final say

about what we build in this version of the solution. I raise this issue with him as well but realise that I cannot convince him that we must specify requirements from the outset of our customer journeys if we want the solution to reflect these. I seem, in fact, to annoy him quite a bit. At a later meeting in Stockholm, however, our customer/user experience specialist Liza demonstrates sketches of what the user interface might look like. Here I can use her tangible illustrations to draw attention to how the steps supported in this solution, should we build it, differ from what is described in our customer journeys we put together on the away-days. Therefore, we should modify the requirements if the customer journeys represent a decision about what to attempt to support, towards which we want to stay loyal. We decide to perform such modifications through a couple of workshops, and I feel that the continued use of sketches to tangibly demonstrate what our requirement specifications mean helps us to agree on what to specify.

Reflections—what is required to change our ways together into something as yet unknown?

Reflecting on this narrative, what immediately strikes me is how similar this experience of designing something differently feels to my experiences described in P1 about attempting again and again throughout my career to adopt new ways of designing something without it making any significant difference. I begin to wonder whether our new desired ways of working are significantly different from the ways of working we aim to abandon. If they are not, if the underlying ideas are very similar, why then does the new way of working seem so alluring to us that it gets taken up as something desirable at all levels of the organisation? If the new ways of working entail significantly different ideas, what does it then take for us in this group to achieve a significant change in our everyday behaviour and thus in the outcomes we produce?

Is the lack of conflict and reflection I sense during the workshop conducive of further change, or does it tend to limit how much of a difference working differently makes? Is the reaction I feel when speaking up during a review a reaction against the threat of disrupting the feeling of harmony and agreement, or just a ‘matter of fact’ reaction against an untimely task? Is it conducive or dampening for change? Are my reservations concerning reusing feature specifications from a different context a threat towards privileging of action, or merely a threat towards meeting a perceived deadline? Is there something that causes people to snap back into their default positions and routine behaviour even after having begun working in different ways?

These reflections lead me to want to investigate further how we establish a shared understanding of an idea or a concept that is new to us to some extent, and what is required for us to adopt a new way of acting. I am also curious about to what extent a shared understanding is really shared and the same, when we say that we agree on something. What is required for someone to gain a new understanding and begin to do different things or do things differently? Since we cooperate with others, some of whom are employees of the same company as me and some of whom are not, I furthermore begin to wonder what is required for us to change our ways of doing something together. In a further reflexive turn, I begin to wonder whether I have fully

grasped what implications it must have to perceive acts as fundamentally social. What must learning be for it to have an impact on social acts, and not only on the thoughts and frustration levels of an individual?

Language develops continuously in social circles in which that language is needed to communicate

Personae and customer journey maps are abstract and somewhat vague concepts, that is, concepts at ‘a high level of synthesis’ (Elias, 1991:160). They are used differently by different people both within and outside Nordea. Gartner (2015:1) defines journey maps as a ‘common approach used in people-centric design processes’ to ‘highlight the gaps between an audience’s (customer, employee, partner) expectations and perceptions of the actual experience at key steps along the journey’. This suggests that an audience has shared expectations and perceptions. The article further promises ‘reduction of complexity while preserving details that are linked to diagnostic deliverables’ and that journey maps can ensure ‘that the desired experience is met’. This indicates that the authors perceive experiences to be predictable and controllable. Milan Guenther (2013:115-116), a designer, writes that ‘experiences are highly subjective impressions, so that their nature, duration, and perceived quality vary from case to case, as does their individual relevance and impact in the enterprise’. Guenther acknowledges to a much higher degree than Gartner the uncertainty concerning what experience will emerge when the result of a design is put to actual use. He does not assume shared expectations and perceptions in an audience. Rather than losing oneself in ‘product features together with technical considerations’, he advocates for ‘deeply exploring and analysing’ the ‘target experience’.

The traditional view on process in the bank is heavily influenced by sources such as TOGAF, which describes process modelling as a disaggregating method where ‘the breakdown of a function or business service’ allows ‘the elements of the business process to be identified’ and permit ‘the identification of lower-level business services or functions’ (Open Group, 2013:86). Both Gartner and Open Group assume that processes emerge predictably and homogeneously. The scope of processes that Open Group takes for granted encompasses processes in which the organisation itself plays a role directly. Guenther (2013:115) sees the relevant scope from the point of view of the customer. He writes that ‘regardless how well established and intense an enterprise’s relationship to a person might be, its appearance will only play a limited role in that person’s experience’. For example, we know that some corporate customers are strategically multi-banked, that is, deliberately do banking business with several banks. However, the customer journeys we have mapped out do not reflect customers coordinating their banking between multiple banks. I agree with Guenther that different customers have different expectations and different perceptions. In our modelling, we have glossed over nuances and reduced what initial richness our models contained concerning these differences and created quite ‘thin simplifications’ (Scott, 1998). I disagree with Gartner and TOGAF that simplifying and abstracting to this extent is helpful and necessary, but I am aware that TOGAF is Nordea’s official standard for enterprise architecture and Nordea is a client of Gartner. When I am invited to introduce terms in the above narrative, I try, therefore, to kindle an interest in wanting to deeply explore these nuanced

and multi-faceted personae and the journeys they follow to fulfil their needs and wants, instead of just stating definitions and showcasing templates for describing and mapping these. In choosing this approach, I am influenced by experiences lived out in social circles as accounted for in P1 which formed my social self, more than by TOGAF, the official Nordea architectural framework and method. It strikes me as somewhat frightening how much the journey maps we later produce visually resemble anyway the process models produced when following TOGAF.

The question that therefore arises for me is how we become able to communicate the subtle differences of using these tangible artefacts in less tangible but more significantly different actions. When I first introduced journey mapping to my new colleagues, I got the impression that they found it difficult to distinguish the nuances that differentiate this concept from other processual concepts. Working with the design bureau, we often appear to me to talk in ways reflecting Gartner's definitions of experiences as predictable and controllable and more rarely acknowledge like Gunther that experiences are unpredictable and have a high degree of variation from customer to customer.

Individuals frequent many social circles in which language and understanding develops differently

Reflecting further on how we seem to understand these concepts somewhat differently, I become increasingly aware of just how many specialists with different specialisations comprise our group, and with just how many other groups outside this particular group some of us share partial understandings. It is characteristic of today's society that we have a high degree of 'division of functions' (Elias, 1991:138) or 'division of labour into distinct tasks, and ... coordination among these tasks' (Mintzberg, 1983:3). The effect this has on language is often glossed over, and so are the consequences of this for our ability to coordinate. Bourdieu (1977:214) provides a definition of habitus as a system of dispositions, a way of being, a habitual state (especially of the body) and, in particular, a predisposition, tendency, propensity, or inclination. I would like in P4 or my synopsis to compare and contrast my findings with Bourdieu's *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, but have not found the room to do so in this project.

Elias (1991: 182-183) claims that our habitus emerges in social circles which are multiple. Elias describes how habitus arises in interlocking planes of one's society and, as such, has 'many layers' which are 'interwoven in the social habitus of a person'. The profession of each of our many specialists represents such planes of coexistence which are generative of layers of social habitus and many more planes of existence contribute to habitus. For example, members of the group have other assignments also for Nordea, and in these other settings our language, thinking, and understanding further evolve in our dealings with other people, which could potentially make these less shared within our particular group.

The meaning of symbols is linked to the real world and to our experiences of that world

Mead (1934:95) holds that our gestures are linked to the real-world phenomena that call out a particular act, and we can help each other learn by drawing attention to particular phenomena or aspects of phenomena. ‘One can say to a person “Look at this, just see this thing” and he can fasten his attention on the specific object. He can direct attention and so isolate the particular response that answers to it. That is the way in which we break up our complex activities and thereby make learning possible’. As I mentioned in P2, Mead sees meaning as emerging through responses of others to our gestures, but he furthermore explains how meaning is also linked to real objects:

[The] triadic relation between gesture, adjustive response, and resultant of the social act which the gesture initiates is the basis of meaning; for the existence of meaning depends upon the fact that the adjustive response of the second organism is directed toward the resultant of the given social act as initiated and indicated by the gesture of the first organism. The basis of meaning is thus objectively there in social conduct, or in nature in its relation to such conduct (ibid:80).

The basis for establishing a shared understanding is to have shared experiences through acting together towards the real-world phenomena, of which we then go on to establish a shared understanding. Such an act can be to have a conversation like the meeting where I introduce the concepts of personae and customer journey, but actually working with these concepts established a deeper understanding influenced by the understandings of many others. In this way, the understanding that we end up sharing can be said to be negotiated through a common social practice but also through a common, shared, real world. In my later conflict with Theo, I point to real-world phenomena, the sketches Liza has prepared, which help me explain where I fear that we are abandoning an earlier decision represented by the map of a customer journey. For a group to develop a shared understanding then, the group members must recognise the same phenomena and aspects of phenomena and attach to these the same terms so that they develop together a ‘universe of discourse... as the context in terms of which... significant gestures or symbols do in fact have significance’ (ibid:84-89). Tangible artefacts aid the recognition of phenomena, whereas less tangible, more abstract concepts are more difficult to grasp. Being able to point to some physical aspect of a phenomenon helps address this aspect in isolation of other aspects. Although our maps and sketches are ‘thin simplifications’ representing quite generic knowledge (Scott, 1998), they are useful for our becoming able to have deeper reflective conversations where we negotiate meaning and establish a shared understanding of some phenomena. While acting out the mapping of journeys under the supervision of our design bureau, and later modifying requirements by altering a sketched-out interaction flow, we are not only ‘learning by doing’ but, more importantly, ‘learning together by doing together’.

Prejudice and delayed action enable deliberate questioning and reflectivity

Having begun to perceive learning as something that must be done together in the groups in which the shared understanding and language are to be used to coordinate further collaboration, I begin to wonder if and to what extent what we learn is pre-given and 'just' something we discover, or to which extent we make conscious moral choices about how we want to understand something. Hans-Georg Gadamer contemplates in *Truth and Method* (1975:280-283) what the conditions are under which understanding takes place and, in particular, what role prejudices and questions play in establishing an understanding. Gadamer holds that as a reaction to the traditions of scripture we established during the Enlightenment 'a prejudice against prejudice itself, which denies tradition its power,' which is problematic for understanding how understanding and learning come about, since 'all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice'. With prejudice, Gadamer simply means an a priori judgement or expectation that can be justifiably based on experience or not. When attempting to ascertain the meaning of something, 'fore-projection is capable of projecting before itself a new projection of meaning; rival projects can emerge side by side until it becomes clearer what the unity of meaning is; interpretation begins with fore-conceptions that are replaced by more suitable ones'. For us to seek to understand something or understand it better, we must thus have some pre-established or traditional understanding—some expectation. Curiosity towards something unexpected is then born out of a mismatch between expectations and experiences. Achieving movement of thought and understanding seems, however, to be difficult. Especially when influenced by fundamental taken-for-granted assumptions, it seems to be difficult to 'remain open to the meaning of the other person or text'. Therefore, to increase our capacity to understand, Gadamer urges reflection upon whether our prejudices are still valid:

Foregrounding a prejudice clearly requires suspending its validity for us. For as long as our mind is influenced by a prejudice, we do not consider it a judgement. How then can we foreground it? It is impossible to make ourselves aware of a prejudice while it is constantly operating unnoticed... Suspension of judgements... has the logical structure of a *question*. The essence of the *question* is to open up possibilities and keep them open... our prejudice is properly brought into play by being put at risk. Only by being given full play is it able to experience the other's claim to truth and make it possible for him to have full play himself (ibid:310).

I agree that foregrounding is essential for achieving movement of thought and for learning to question reflectively our prejudices, including taken-for-granted assumptions. In the narrated episode where we begin mapping customer journeys, questioning what we do is difficult. We would have to take the time required to reflect together on what our experiences mean and whether this meaning might to some extent be surprising and generative of questions with regards to our expectations and prejudices. The facilitation conducted by design bureau consultants does not in any significant way promote reflectivity. For example, in the situation where a stream of people moves Post-its to the banner where the customer journey emerges, we categorise

and, without any questioning that I noticed, remove distinctions between the approach of different personae towards these journeys, which could be seen as turning simplifications into even more abstract and thinner simplifications, rather than holding on to richness and an empathic connection to customer's distinct lives. Reflecting on it now, I am saddened by how much detail and richness we lost. At the same time, I do not see where in the facilitated process it would have been opportune for me to question this approach, however, especially without coming off as unnecessarily critical and negative, which I feel is problematic in our organisational culture. I begin to wonder what is required to achieve the degree of reflectively questioning our prejudices necessary for new understandings and significant changes to emerge.

Mead (1934:98-99) claims that we can hold several 'alternative responses' in our mind, which makes possible 'intelligent or reflective choice'. However, 'if our world were right on top of us, in contact with us, we would have no time for deliberation... The process of intelligent conduct is essentially a process of selection from among various alternatives; intelligence is largely a matter of selectivity. Delayed reaction is necessary to intelligent conduct'. I have often found myself struggling with achieving deliberation and true reflection upon my taken-for-granted assumptions simply due to the hastiness and lack of depth of my thinking since I often feel that I am in a hurry to reach some preconceived goal. It resonates with me deeply that I must exploit delayed reaction better to achieve more intelligent conduct, more deliberate selectiveness. One of the professors at the programme for which I am writing this text recently counselled me to 'slow down my thinking', and I take this advice to relate exactly to this problem of achieving sufficient delay of reaction to obtain time to conduct deep reflection of taken-for-granted assumptions. At work, we constantly push ourselves and each other to 'perform' and 'deliver tangible outputs'. Thus, slowing down our thinking and reflecting together appears to me to be a somewhat dangerous idea to surface. I would like to return to this problem later. Before that, I would like to return to my prior question of ethics—of how we decide selectively between the various alternatives which delayed reaction allows us to consider.

Conflicts can be taken as an invitation to investigate and refine our prejudices

I refer in P2 to a model of stages of development of expertise described by Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986) and the distinctions that Stacey (2012) makes between situations that call for 'the exercise of practical judgement' and situations that can be dealt with meaningfully through application of 'rules' and 'second-order abstractions'. As noted in P2, I agree with Stacey (2012:58) when he says that 'insisting that rules be followed amounts to the destruction of proficiency and expertise'. To follow up on this argument, I turn again to Gadamer who refers to the critique in Aristotelian ethics of 'the Platonic idea of the good as an empty generality' with which Aristotle demonstrates that 'the equation of virtue and knowledge, *arete* and *logos*... is an exaggeration'. Gadamer (1975:322-323) claims that for Aristotle the 'basis of moral knowledge' is striving based on practice and ethos. When one looks at moral knowledge, Gadamer (ibid: 328) observes how Aristotle shows that 'every law is in a necessary tension with concrete action, in that it is

general and hence cannot contain practical reality in its full concreteness'. Related hereto, Gadamer (ibid: 331) concludes, 'Moral knowledge can never be knowable in advance like knowledge that can be taught. The relation between means and ends here is not such that one can know the right means in advance, and that is because the right end is not a mere object of knowledge either. There can be no anterior certainty concerning what the good life is directed toward as a whole'. Rather than a model of stages like the model Dreyfus and Dreyfus establish, which can itself be criticised for being overly rigid and simple, Gadamer looks deeper into how knowledge emerges. Gadamer shows that although a craft (techne) can be taught, moral knowledge (phronesis) can be acquired only through practice and cannot be taught or expressed in generally applicable rules.

Relating these insights to my narrative above, the meaning of what will emerge when customers eventually exploit the tools that Nordea offers will be influenced by the customer's intentions as well as many other factors and will, in essence, be somewhat unpredictable. To make decisions about what to strive to bring to market thus requires practical knowledge that cannot be taught but must be learned through practice. Since many specialist skills are required to build the tool we want to bring to market, we must conduct this learning through practice together. Ethical judgements surface in action, for example, in the narrative when I decide to speak up at a meeting at the design bureau upon realising that aspects that I think are important have been left out of our journey maps. I carry prejudice into the situation concerning journey maps being second-order abstractions that present gross simplifications and, as such, ignore many aspects of customer experiences. I make a practical judgement in the situation, however, that I think this particular aspect is more dangerous to ignore than others, again based on prejudice, and sufficiently useful to include to warrant the effort, again based on prejudice. Many more practical judgements are of course made all the time, including my eventual judgement not to pursue this further at this opportunity. I want to draw attention only to a few so as to use these as examples of that for which I am arguing. The interesting phenomenon is not who is right or who is wrong. Indeed, no universal judgement can be stated as a rule concerning what is right. What interests me is how we as a group influence each other and are influenced by each other in this process of negotiation. I also realise that it has taken me many years in this profession (as described in P1) to accumulate the experiences and prejudice that lead me to make these particular practical judgements, and I shared only a little of this experience with this particular group of people. Other group members have similarly acquired substantial experience that I have not shared and have similarly made practical judgements. In this situation, we are debating something that it is not possible to come to a universal conclusion about, but we can and do negotiate some socially shared understanding. The conflict can be seen as an invitation to reflect together, which I mentioned earlier is hard to achieve. This holds at least a possibility of movement of thought and understanding, which makes it in my opinion worthwhile to take some social risks to attempt. With the next narrative, I would like to investigate a little further how our conflicts as we work together get us into discussions in which we reflect and make practical judgements together.

Delegating building to execution teams

Narrative—Negotiating further what requirements to specify and how to specify them

Through some workshops we continue to add detail and nuance to requirement specifications for features of the solution, attempting to ensure that execution teams who will later build it can deduct from these what we want them to build. I feel that slowly specifications and sketches begin to express what we envisioned when we mapped out customer journeys.

Ken challenges whether all the sections of our feature specifications are necessary, which I take to mean that he is not certain that all sections of the descriptions will be useful or meaningful to those for whom we write them. Our requirements manager Maya replies by explaining the purpose of each section as that purpose is defined in our chosen method. I am not sure Ken perceives a definition from a method as proof that the descriptions will be useful and meaningful for the audience for whom we write them. I wonder how much experience Maya, or any of us, actually have with what other specialists use these descriptions for in later steps in the process, and whether our degree of specialisation impedes our ability to judge the value of what we produce for other specialists working downstream in our action chains.

In a later conversation, John and I take up this issue again in relation to a particular section describing how the new solution differs from the existing (as-is) solution. We challenge that an as-is solution exists and thus that it is meaningful to write something in this section. If anything, part of the problem we attempt to solve by creating a new comprehensive solution is that each of our many different existing solutions supports only fragments of these journeys in isolation. They fit and work poorly together. Maya seems unable or unwilling even to engage with us in a discussion since we are at this time very close to a deadline. I realise that she already has put some effort into writing something in this section for other features, and that it will probably require more effort than it saves to stop doing that. Consequently, I leave it be. Then John discovers that we label as ‘delighter’ anything our envisioned solution does, which this so-called ‘as-is’ solution does not do. The detail he picks up on is that we envision that customers can rearrange the order in which bank accounts are listed and this is ‘a delighter’. I am mildly amused at this language usage, but not surprised since euphemisms and positive exaggerations are common in the circles I frequent in the organisation. John, however, protests quite outspokenly. Maya again has to draw on a definition of ‘a delighter’ from the method to definitively claim that she has used it correctly. I try to put some perspective on the issue by pointing to our ambition of making it simple for corporate customers to ensure that the sales and expenses they book are reflected in banking transactions and, given that none of our current solutions in this segment meet that need, this does appear to be a strange detail to label ‘a delighter’. By now, however, Maya seems only to be stressed that we are so unhelpful, and we probably also appear insensitive.

Reflections—how we sometimes mobilise resistance or let ourselves be influenced?

In both narratives in this project, we negotiate meaning and attempt to influence each other. In a review situation in the first narrative, I attempt to influence our design bureau and my colleagues to reflect deeply on the way in which we have dealt, or have not dealt, with a certain aspect. The theme of the responses I receive however is resistance against this influence. In this second narrative, I also encounter resistance when attempting to take up certain issues and I make a judgement not to pursue the matter. In contrast hereto, I become more influential in a later situation in the first narrative where we negotiate which requirements to describe and how. In that situation, more of Liza's sketches and my gestures are accepted as an invitation to reflect deeply on how what we are doing relates to our customer journeys. Through reflecting in conversations, we change to some extent our thinking and acting so that the resultant requirement specifications turn out differently from how they might otherwise have turned out. I cannot know if that is really for the better, but I trust in myself sufficiently to seek to influence matters. Of course, the others are also influential, and we all influence and are being influenced simultaneously by the thoughts of the others with whom we negotiate. More generally, where there is power and potential influence, there is always the possibility of resistance (Scott, 1990; Foucault, 1982), but significant resistance does not occur always. In fact, Elias mentions 'self-control' and 'the fear of others' (Elias, 1991:136-137) as important to the civilising process and as being the norm rather than the extreme, and Foucault describes how we become, as a rule, 'disciplined' through the exercise of 'disciplining power' (Downing, 2008). Therefore, the question arises for me how we arrive at a practical judgement concerning what stance to take towards a potential influence such as an idea: attempt to resist it and hold on to our own prior ideas or prejudices, or attempt to accept it and reconcile it with our own prior ideas or prejudices.

When we change our ways of working, we change shared norms and values and thus culture

To consider changes as a group, we must recognise a difference between expectations (prejudice) and experiences. Someone can draw attention to such a difference and, if that difference is recognised and acknowledged, a conflict at least initially erupts, although that can happen quietly and in a civilised way. A conflict nevertheless arises between people's prejudice and their experiences or observations made by someone else. When we react to such a conflict as a group, the reaction takes on the character of negotiation in which power differentials between the negotiating people are never equally distributed (Elias, 1978:74-78). How we negotiate is described by Elias as being analogous to games played out in our habitus on several related tiers (ibid: 81-88). It would seem that what we negotiate is if, and then how, we should together attempt to reconcile the different idea with existing ideas, or in other words, if and how we should allow ourselves to change by learning from this. Making a change that affects our ways of working thus entails changing what we share that has governed our cooperative behaviour so far. What has been the normal thing to do—our norms—and what have been the standards by which we make value judgements—our values. This requires us to negotiate a shared understanding of how binding new norms and values

should be for our future conduct, such as negotiating what we can and cannot do when ‘specifying requirements’ if we agree to ‘be loyal to our customer journey maps’. We thus negotiate aspects of habitus or organisational culture. To summarise I claim that organisational culture changes through our negotiations of norms and values—our ways of working together—in this social circle. I believe that this change could not have been managed or implemented by someone outside this social circle.

Our negotiations resemble what Gadamer (1975:338) points to with regards to legal hermeneutics, which is that ‘the need to understand and interpret arises only when something is enacted in such a way that it is, as enacted, irrevocable and binding’, except in that what I experience in the narrative as the mechanism that makes what is enacted irrevocable and binding is not a written law, but what is commonly referred to as ‘the unwritten laws’ or the norms and values shared by the members of this particular group. I do not perceive these particular norms and values to be shared across all of Nordea. Even other delivery streams within the same business unit work according to somewhat different ways of working governed by somewhat different norms and values negotiated between the people who comprise those delivery streams. Staying loyal to customer journeys is negotiated to imply that we cannot ‘cut corners’ by implementing requirements specified in another delivery stream that did not work from an outset in our customer journeys. I think Theo initially finds my protests somewhat exaggerated since these requirements specify how to handle payments, and we need to handle payments, so there is a match. Only when Liza has drawn sketches do we recognise together a difference between the interaction drawn and the interaction described in our journey maps, and only through this recognition do we arrive at a new understanding of what it means to remain loyal to our journey maps.

We take for granted that we can think and plan out complicated chains of action ahead of acting Griffin (2002:119-120) references orthodox ways of perceiving culture and values as defined by a leader for the whole system, where the whole system is the organisation. Griffin draws attention to the apparent lack of perceived ‘paradox in thinking that a system that is supposed to be autonomous is nevertheless thought to be controlled by an individual’. Griffin points out that

this theory of culture and leadership has ethical implications that are not usually made explicit... Ethical behaviour is understood to be determined by the reasoning individual who tests proposed actions against universal ethical imperatives, which are not affected by natural or social contingencies... Organisations too are required to test their actions against ethical universals. Nowadays, then, ethics as it relates to organisations amounts to thought, that is, ‘scientifically’ testing actions against hypothetical universal principles, *apart* from the *action* that follows it. It is important to note that this dominating view of ethics removes the consideration of ethics from the ordinary everyday interactions of people constituting an organisation because the ethical universals are not dependent in any way on the social or natural worlds.

In my research question in P1, I mention a pattern of splitting in the polarisation of ‘IT’ as something apart from ‘the business,’ which I find troubling. What Griffin draws attention to here is an even more disconcerting splitting between ‘thinking’ as something apart from ‘action’ and ethical universals as unaffected by natural or social contingencies. This pattern of splitting is mirrored completely in the dominant methods in my field such as the plan-build-run approach, which is based on the idea that judgement on what it is right to build can be made entirely ahead of building and using something. In TOGAF, ‘the architect is developing a snapshot of the enterprise’s decisions and their implications at particular points in time’ (Open Group, 2013:46), and then this snapshot is used later for guiding development of solutions supporting what has been decided. In contrast, I argue in this project that we actually negotiate language, meaning, values, and norms in social circles that form interwoven planes of habitus. I am curious as to whether this splitting of thought from action is a pattern also present in the ways of working we are trying to adopt. I furthermore wonder what it will take to learn together to practice new norms and values not based on this very fundamental taken-for-granted pattern of splitting. Although we claim to be trying to move away from the plan-build-run approach, I still see this pattern of splitting in the way the new approach is taken up by us, perhaps unintentionally and unconsciously. For example, our customer journeys are frequently taken up in conversations as if they represented what all our customers are eventually bound to be doing with our solution, rather than a generalisation of our hopes and dreams for what might become possible at least for some of our customers when using our new solution. This makes me wonder what would be required for us to accept uncertainty more thoroughly and experiment with the ways of working that seem to be implied in descriptions of the alternative build-test-learn approach.

Tools and techniques enable us to perform the actions of a craft more efficiently

Eric Ries (2011) provides a pragmatic description of the build-test-learn approach that we claim to strive to adopt in Nordea. What I want to draw attention to however, are difficulties which Ries experienced when attempting to adopt this approach in his organisation. He initially ‘struggled to explain the practices to new employees, investors, and the founders of other companies. We lacked a common language for describing them and concrete principles for understanding them’ (ibid: 6). I recognise Ries’s trouble in developing a new common language with which to describe practices. In addition to lacking a language, we also seem to me to be missing, in the situations I have narrated, knowledge of how actually to do things according to the desired new ways of working. Some such knowledge could be taught if we had a teacher, since some of it is what Aristotle calls ‘techne’. However, we have no skilled teacher to learn from in our everyday struggles. We are so used to using all sorts of helpful artefacts, tools, and techniques whose function for us we take for granted. For example, when we begin to specify requirements, we seem to take for granted that requirements must be specified by filling out a template with certain sections. Both Ken and I challenge whether all of these sections are relevant, and I feel that we meet resistance not towards the particular inquiry, but towards questioning the wisdom of using our tools and techniques as they are. Many of my colleagues seem highly

uncomfortable even thinking about having to act ‘on their own’ without the aid of pre-existing tools and techniques.

Attempting to understand what goes on in a somewhat broader picture, the action we perform together is linked together in what Elias (1991:16; 44) calls ‘action chains’ in which we have function for one another in that we cannot produce what we produce without the cooperation and contribution of all the ‘specialised functions’ that the total work has been divided into. Perceiving what we do together to form action chains adds to my emerging understanding of why changing our ways of working must be a social process of learning together, since we all depend on the function others provide for us through their current ways of working both upstream and downstream in this action chain. In addition to *division* of functions, we seem in society also to be to some extent *standardising* certain functions and even *automating* certain functions through the use of mechanisms and other material artefacts. How a situation is affected by exchanging some function performed by a human with some functioning mechanism is described by Bruno Latour (1988:305-309) as a ‘translation’ of a ‘script’, meaning that action which is hitherto ‘played’ out ‘by human or nonhuman actors’ is translated ‘from one repertoire to a more durable one’ which he calls ‘transcription’. Latour calls ‘prescription’ what the script ‘presupposes from its transcribed actors and authors’. Latour describes a way of dividing function not between human actors, who can then coordinate their specialised functions, but between human users and mechanisms that become ‘lieutenants’ in that ‘they hold the places and the roles delegated to them’. When a customer uses tools we provide to do business with us, the tool can thus be said to act on behalf of Nordea in conducting business transactions with the customer, analogous to how a clerk in a branch might work on behalf of Nordea in conducting business with the customer, had the customer visited a branch rather than used a net bank tool. When we fill in a template to specify a requirement, the document we create can be thought of as mediating between us and the execution team, who later has to write a computer program according to this specification. In the situations I narrate, we use what has been transcribed into tools, and the use of tools has function for us in that tools allow us to perform some action more effectively, provided that we use the tool according to prescription. This assumes that the tool-maker has anticipated correctly the script to transcribe, which is then played out later. I begin to see how different the ambition is when attempting to create ‘tools of the trade’ that encompass only technical knowledge (*techne*), compared to attempting to create tools that support entire business transactions, including making suggestions that require to some extent practical knowledge (*phronesis*). I wonder if we are simply too ambitious sometimes concerning what we attempt to include in transcription. Even tools encompassing only technical knowledge can have valued function for us, such as meeting without traveling by using an online meeting system, sharing documents using our intranet, and using clocks to coordinate when to meet.

We destroy value when we do something so differently that we cannot reuse tools and techniques. Humans have needs and wants, mechanisms do not. Since we humans desire to have our needs and wants fulfilled, we form intentions and deliberations regarding how to achieve fulfilment of these. We may not be entirely aware of this, but it influences our behaviour nonetheless. Mechanisms have no such influence on their behaviour; they relentlessly act out previously scripted action without any self-awareness. Therefore, I will shortly call human actors *intentional* human actors and non-human actors I will call *mechanical* non-human actors to indicate the above difference. In contrast to mechanical non-human actors, Elias (1978:74-78) describes that people who have function for each other have the option to provide or withhold the function they can provide for another. This leads to a power figuration. Process which emerges from relationships between people who have function for each other is simultaneously enabled and constrained through this power figuration in that when we value the function others have for us we must take the function they have for us into consideration when choosing how to act and act in a socially acceptable way to minimise the risk of losing the function that we value. Tools cannot choose to withhold or provide the function they have for us since, as opposed to us, they have no intentionality of their own. What emerges when we use tools is therefore different from what emerges in interactions between people. When I compare Elias (1978, 1991) describing the *source* of power being an individual's power to deliberately or unconsciously withhold or provide function, I perceive in reflection the focus of Elias to be different than the focus of Foucault (1980; in Downing, 2008), who describes the *effect* of powerful influences as disciplining in that we can choose to resist, but often we chose not to. In my working practice, we often refrain from resisting the influence exerted by the existence of tools and techniques, perhaps because complying is easier. If we can resist influences towards change, then we need not spend time, effort, and money both learning new techniques and transcribing or acquiring new tools for performing our crafts. In a further reflexive movement of thought, I begin to perceive the existence of tools and techniques as exerting a subtler disciplining influence even more difficult to become aware of than the potential withholding of function that Elias describes, since the source is not the tools and techniques themselves but our own lack of a desire to do without them or replace them.

Earlier in the project, I noticed how constantly pushing ourselves to perform made it difficult to achieve a slowing down of our acting, including thinking, sufficient for us to reflect and learn. In light of the above insights, I return to contemplate further on why it is more difficult to influence a document such as the blueprint of customer journeys we review in the first narrative than to influence a 'live' conversation such as mapping customer journeys in the first place. Once we have written down results of negotiations, these ceases being bodily gestures as such. If something is verbally agreed only between persons and they reiterate with bodily gestures what they have agreed, the reiteration is another gesture/response interaction where the power differentials of the moment of reiteration influence what emerges. However, when something is written down and then later re-read, the written words are not gesturing, not bodily influenced by power

dynamics at the moment of reading; Rather, there is a fairly static symbolic representation of an earlier gesturing. Of course, text can be interpreted, re-interpreted, and even re-written. The act of re-reading, however, is not in itself also an act of re-writing, whereas an act of verbally reiterating an earlier agreement is always a re-enactment. Thus, transcription into written form lends text some more durability in that what has been written down can change only through re-writing it, which requires at least some effort, similar to how what has been transcribed into mechanisms can be changed only through transcribing new scripts into those mechanisms. Where material objects are used, they influence what emerges in local interactions in that action becomes less fluid and spontaneous since a part of the action is conducted in an a priori scripted way. Had the others at the review I describe in my narrative, for example, accepted my invitation to deal differently with the cooperation and decision making of employees of corporate customers, this could have led to an amount of work that could have been difficult to contain. Thus, none of us was wrong as such. All of us brought valid experiences and judgements into play in the negotiation of meaning.

Returning to the tools that we strive in my job to bring to market, the function these could provide depends on how customers will attempt to use them. Their potential function can be lost if not used according to prescription or if used for a purpose for which no corresponding action was transcribed into the tool. What emerges is unpredictable in that users, not mechanisms, can intentionally or inadvertently do something unanticipated. Toolmakers are often surprised by the multitude of ways users choose to use or attempt to use provided tools. This influences why we desire to become better at testing what happens when customers use what we build. However, our own attempts to change our ways are similarly affected by tool use since the current ways of working are to some extent transcribed into material objects that can change only through a new process of transcription. How much value is lost if we cannot continue to use current tools and techniques is difficult to estimate, but it appears to me to be significant.

To decide what to build, we attempt to predict what will emerge when we use what we have built

In a discussion with Jean-Pierre Barou and Michelle Perrot, Michel Foucault (1980:158-159) is asked whether he finds disciplinary power to be wilfully exercised or initiated by someone or some coalition mindful of what they established. Foucault explains that this is not how he understands such power mechanisms come into being. Using division of labour as one example, Foucault explains how the 'separation of tasks' required 'a new distribution of power on the plane of the management of the forces of production' and how, in another example of organisation of the modern army, 'new types of armament, new forms of recruitment were not sufficient: it was necessary to have at the same time this new distribution of power known as discipline, with its structures and hierarchies, its inspections, exercises, and methods of training and conditioning'. Foucault explains that the mechanism of power required for this organisation to function emerged over time 'from the starting point of local conditions and particular needs' and 'took shape in piecemeal fashion, prior to any class strategy designed to weld them into vast, coherent ensembles'. He

draws attention to the lack of homogeneity of the ensembles that consist ‘of a complex play of supports in mutual engagement, different mechanisms of power which retain all their specific character’. This way of understanding power and the emergence of the complex mechanisms through which it is exercised explains well many of the observations I made in P2 concerning standardisation, training, and certification within my field. Furthermore, the way we organise work in Nordea is divided among a large number of specialists and the coordination of that work relies similarly on at least some measure of discipline, with its structures and hierarchies, its inspections, exercises, and methods of training and conditioning. My colleagues and I frequently discuss how to agree upon what we call ‘roles and responsibilities’, ‘terminology’, ‘tools and techniques’, and ‘ways of working’ and in this way, we discipline ourselves and each other.

Reflecting further on how the tool we aim to build will affect the users who will eventually use it, I turn again to Milan Guenther (2013: 278) who describes how we attempt to design the interactions that will emerge between users and the tools into which we transcribe a script. ‘Learning about the interactions people are engaged in enables designers to consider how the results they produce will be used and to base their design on actual usage patterns. To best support interactions, the design of any tools and systems needs to be based on a solid definition of the dialogue envisioned’. In Nordea, I experience that we attempt to design an interaction before we can perform the action of that interaction itself, thus requiring a process to design a process in a way that resembles what Guenther describes. In doing so, we must make ethical judgement calls about what we find to be good or desirable interaction and what we find to be bad or undesirable interaction ahead of the interaction itself, in a manner resembling to me the split I refer to above, which Griffin (2002) draws attention to between ‘testing action against hypothetical universal principles, *apart* from the *action* that follows it’. The question that arises for me is whether we can do what we do differently and avoid this split in yet another form.

I return therefore to the approach described by Eric Ries (2011), which is, at its core, based on a desire to take as quickly as possible something to the users with which they can interact in a manner sufficiently like the way in which they will eventually interact with the final product. If this can be done, we could become able to experience interaction that emerges when users use the product, and the function users perceive the product actually to provide. What Ries (*ibid*: 76-77) calls ‘the minimum viable product (MVP)’ is exactly ‘that version of the product that enables a full turn of the Build-Measure-Learn loop with a minimum amount of effort and the least amount of development time’. In my further research, I would like to explore what Ries describes here as ‘the Build-Measure-Learn loop’. It is an approach to improve the product continuously and incrementally learn from how users use the product in a manner that resonates with ‘the Mangle of Practice’ described by Andrew Pickering (1993). Pickering attempts to ‘follow the spirit rather than the letter of the actor-network approach, at least as it is presently articulated by Callon and Latour (1992)’, since Pickering claims that Callon and Latour impose a symmetry that Pickering does not entirely

recognise since Pickering sketches ‘out an analysis of human intentionality that has no material counterpart’ (1993: 562-567). Latour seems not to recognise in his own work to have established such a symmetry since he later writes that ‘ANT is not, I repeat is not, the establishment of some absurd “symmetry between humans and non-humans”. To be symmetric, for us, simply means not to impose a priori some spurious asymmetry among human intentional action and a material world of causal relations’ (Latour, 2005). I take this to mean that Latour and other authors who contribute to Actor Network Theory see material objects as being able to act in local interactions, not intentionally but in a mechanical way. Thus, local interaction is, according to Latour, action played out between actors who can be either human or non-human. Since I have also drawn on Latour, and also do not perceive intentional human action as symmetric to scripted mechanical action, I would like to investigate further the implications of our combining scripted mechanical and intentional human action into action chains.

Concluding thoughts and a look ahead

After P2, I decided to explore different ideas about how actors work together and what this might imply for what an enterprise is and how it changes over time. In reflection, I have inquired into how we organise organisational changes in which many specialists must cooperate to build new IT/IS tools, which we hope will become useful in the changed organisation. Early in my career, such organisational changes often aimed to optimise the operations of the company I worked for and thus it seemed that the enterprise we worked with was that company. Orthodox authorities within enterprise architecture such as Open Group indeed claim that the enterprise is the company. In this project, however, I describe how we build tools that will be used by customers. More generally, the bank operates numerous solutions with which numerous business partners and customers interact. Therefore, I claim that the enterprise is the organising of how we do business with others, which includes these others and the figuration of relationships we share.

My provisional argument is that the organisational changes we desire, including establishing the required tools, depend on the cooperation of a large number of highly specialised people. These people have developed their ways of working and the language they use to coordinate and cooperate in different social circles and, as a starting point, they are different. This impedes the necessary collaboration. An aspect of organisational change thus is to establish a sufficiently shared understanding of what we aim to do and how. This entails a learning process through which we work with organisational culture or, in other words, with norms (what it is normal to do, i.e., our ways of working) and values (how we make value judgement, i.e., what it is correct to do). We cannot find a way to divide the work amongst us without abstractions and simplifications, yet those very abstractions and simplifications may cover over what is most important in what we aim to achieve. We attempt to think ourselves into an understanding of future interactions using these abstract simplifications of what will emerge when an IT solution is used. I wonder if it would be possible and preferable to act our way into understanding what emerges by letting it emerge in the real world

with the real users and then reflecting on conflicts between our expectations and our experiences in an attempt to allow for reflexive movement of our thinking. One challenge is, of course, to arrive quickly at a usable IT solution or some other material object that the users can use to almost the same effect. This challenge is what Eric Ries and others who share his ideas seem to address with their concept of 'Minimal Viable Product'.

I have found power and disciplining as well as our artful resistance or surrendering to powerful influences to be important aspects of organisational changes, and would like to explore these concepts further. My claim is that materiality has a disciplining influence only insofar that we humans chose to discipline ourselves (self-discipline) and each other, for example, into retaining established material objects such as tools that make life easier to live. The effort required for people to learn and unlearn in situations where their actions do not rely on tools is different from the effort required to re-transcribe scripted action into material objects. Deciding on the script to transcribe into a non-human actor is at the heart of what my colleagues and I are engaged in doing together when we attempt to decide what to build. Today we often transcribe scripted-action into IT/IS, but it could potentially take any material form.

Reflecting further on how we attempt to change our ways of working and why we experience that as difficult, I now begin to think that, in part, it feels difficult to achieve change because I have expectations that it 'ought' to be easier than it is, which, however, is an unjustified prejudice. Since changes to figurations of power differentials are as much a destruction of prior figurations, influences, and status as it is a creation of a new figuration, and since there is always a measure of uncertainty about what will emerge from such changes, it is not necessarily irrational and certainly not, as such, wrong to strive to preserve existing figurations. This, however, can be interpreted negatively as resistance to change. Furthermore, transcribed material objects may lose value as a result of changes, which adds potential value destruction to the potential destruction of power, influence, and status. Even if all of us miraculously shared completely our understanding of new ideas, it is unlikely that we would all deliberately forego any resistance to the influences towards changing our ways of working. On the contrary, it is overwhelmingly likely that countless compromises would have to be made to allow us to retain and reuse certain material objects and standardised or just traditional ways of behaviour, which would impede changes.

In a further reflexive turn, I begin to see my appetite for any change as perhaps somewhat reckless. I have never feared change but have rather feared the status quo. This may relate to some childhood experiences I alluded to in P1, which led me to perceive unconsciously any change as superior to the status quo regardless of uncertainty. Given my unwillingness to disclose my personal history, I may even have perceived deepening relationships as a threat to keeping my personal history undisclosed. This in turn may have reduced my reluctance towards shaking things up or in other words destroying old relationships and creating new. Reflecting on my recent past, I begin to see indications that this pattern may be something I can learn to

break, but I do feel within me a resistance to changing this pattern not unlike the resistance to change I experience others to exhibit. I have realised before that I probably expect people to be in general more willing to change than they are. Throughout this project, I have gained more insight into legitimate potential reasons why this might be—accepting, for example, that changes in organisations can lead to stressful, monotonous lives. It is new for me, however, to have linked my own eagerness to change to my history. Upon reflection, this adds to my understanding of the attitudes of others as well as opening up possibilities for reconsidering if I could perhaps benefit from being less eager to change, or at least allow certain positive elements of figurations vis-à-vis relationships to endure and deepen. It gives me a measure of hope to realise that I am today less reluctant to disclose my personal history than I have been before, and my wife and friends do occasionally remark that something definitely seems to be changing in a positive way. Lessening my eagerness for change could perhaps be a positive change.

P4: Evolving the Enterprise

Shaping identities through everyday conflicting, negotiating and politicking

March 2016

There can be only one permanent revolution—a moral one; the regeneration of the inner man.

How is this revolution to take place? Nobody knows how it will take place in humanity, but every man feels it clearly in himself. And yet in our world everybody thinks of changing humanity, and nobody thinks of changing himself. —Jakub Nikolayevitch Tolstoy

During the financial crisis, banks lost trust from customers. In 2015, the financial industry is still reported to rank last in customer trust while the tech-industry ranks first⁴. Other industries have undergone dramatic change; for example, the music industry as customers began to buy music online or subscribe to music streaming rather than buying CDs in stores. Similar changes occur in other industries referred to generally as “disruption” or “digitalisation”. According to Nordea’s Annual Report (2014:2), ‘Nordea has the leading Nordic platform’ and ‘global capabilities on par with international peers’. In Nordea, however, I sense a strong belief that banking is about to be disrupted. From 2010 to 2014, the number of transactions conducted in branches fell from 8 to 3 million while transactions via mobile devices rose from 0 to 17 million (ibid:4).

Nordea was formed as one of many mergers of local banks at the turn of the century. At the time, we did not merge IT solutions or align processes across the countries. A multitude of line units earn good money and have been reluctant to change their individually successful ways of working. I was recruited to a newly formed profit-and-loss business unit charged with fulfilling a new corporate strategy of becoming the leading digital relationship bank in the Nordic region. Although we have net banks and other digital services, these are more than a decade old. A decade is a long time in the digital landscape, and today our customers can currently only access (not buy) our full range of financial services digitally. Digital Banking is the name of this business unit now attempting to disrupt ourselves before competitors do so.

In other disrupted industries, rarely were the leaders before the disruption also leaders afterwards. I feel an undercurrent of humility and even fear in colleagues and myself, since even though Nordea has so far been a successful brick-and-mortar bank, our future success as a digital bank is not guaranteed. My role in this is different from my role in my prior job, and not quite what I had expected given my title as Chief Enterprise Architect. This title generally seems to be taken to mean ‘very experienced architect of IT’ and not ‘architect of enterprise’. That does not suit my desires nor match my competencies. Colleagues seem to recognise this by calling me often ‘a very unusual architect’. I find myself engaging day-to-day in what I experience as

⁴ Source: ‘Trust Across Industries - 2015 Edelman Trust Barometer’, n. d.

conflicts, negotiations and politicking about both what it means to be a leading digital bank, how we should seek to change our ways of working, and which role I and others should play in all of this.

My goal in this project is to understand better how this day-to-day conflicting, negotiating, and politicking is conducted, how this compares and contrasts with our officially chosen framework and method for enterprise architecture known as TOGAF⁵, and what I might do differently to improve how I engage in all of this.

What does ‘Good luck with that!’ actually mean?

Narrative

It was an autumn day of many shades of grey and gloom. I was traveling to the hotel in Copenhagen where all the teams working on new solutions for Nordea’s Digital Banking unit were gathering for the fifth time. The gloom outside felt like a reflection of my worries about what mood the teams would be in as we had had to make further changes which the teams could not be happy about—changes which could lead to further loss of momentum. Since our last meeting, I had started working together with 80 other people from 17 different business units on revising our ‘Target Picture’, that is, description of solutions that Digital Banking should introduce to the market. This work had introduced some uncertainty about what targets our teams now had to meet. As a result, we had chosen to suspend work on solutions for households and get all the teams to focus instead on solutions for corporates, about which we felt more certain. Being the lead architect for solutions for corporates, this should probably have made me happy. What worried me was how the teams were responding to these changes. They were not the first changes since we started our development programme a little more than a year ago. Would the continuing changes and uncertainty get in the way of productive collaboration?

Some of my anxiety was also related to the requirement specification in my bag, and my uncertainty about what implementing it might show. Our plan was to launch the new solutions and new ways of doing banking digitally in the Swedish market first, and then soon afterwards in Finland, Denmark, and Norway. Thus, we ought, in my opinion, to be building a solution that catered structurally to the differences in doing banking across these countries. What we were doing, however, was initially to build a solution that would work only in Sweden. We then wanted to expand that solution to support how banking is done in the other countries, *hopefully* without too much rework. My sombre experience from earlier jobs was that such changes often amounted to pretty much starting over again. Of this, however, I had failed to convince other leading members of our development programme. Leading up to this event, I had therefore solicited help from some of the brightest and most enterprising Software Architects in one of the teams. Together we had specified how to change one little feature of the solution to support two countries. If the assumption held that it

⁵ The Open Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF) and Architecture Development Method (ADM) are prescriptive descriptions for practicing enterprise architecture from a standards organisation (Open Group) with more than 500 members including for example IBM, HP, and Philips. I refer in my projects to both framework and method as TOGAF.

required little rework to do that, this should not take long to implement. However, if what I feared was true, it could take a substantial amount of time to implement. Should that turn out to be the case, I only prayed that to ‘shoot the messenger’ was not common practice in this organisation, which I had joined fairly recently.

Arriving at the hotel, I was met with what appeared to be a familiar buzz of 100+ people negotiating what to do and how to do it in the next episode of development. The mood was far less subdued than I had feared. The session began with some goal-setting presentations conducted by various managers of the initiative. My fellow lead architect and I also gave a presentation. As I took the stage, I could feel how much was at stake for me. I did not want to be seen as the one ‘crying wolf’ for no apparent good reason. That would probably damage my reputation and eliminate any chance of having a career in this company. If danger loomed, and I was the only one aware of it, I also did not want to abandon all these people to their fates without at least making my best effort to convey what I found to be the imminent danger we were facing. I had very few slides and those were all centred on conveying how little time we had available for rework between the planned launches in Sweden and Finland—and what kind of work we had to get done in between. I presented my prepared feature and explained that—to assess whether this was even feasible—it was important that one of the teams would now choose to start working on this particular feature.

Leaving the stage, I noticed nods of approval from a few of the managers and an encouraging smile from one of the software architects who had helped prepare the feature. As the day progressed, however, and as teams started to select the different features that they wanted to work on, I noticed that ‘my feature’ had not been selected. My worry that perhaps others did not agree with this being urgent work was rekindled. It is the product owners and not the software architects who have formal responsibility for deciding which features a team selects. I walked over to the team which had helped me and which seemed to me to be ideal for the job. The product owner of this team looked up as I approached. I launched right into the reason for my coming over to their table. I tried to convey how important it was to me that a team such as hers would select this feature. She straightened and looked me square in face and simply said: ‘Good luck with that!’

Questions arising from the narrative

So, what did that sentence mean? I do not think that there is a simple and clear-cut answer to that question. It may have meant ‘over my dead body’, and since her team did not select that feature—no team did actually—that was likely at least a part of what it meant. I think, however, that considering the history of the programme and the teams, it could equally have meant to some extent ‘I hope you are not seriously demanding that of my team, after all that we have been through’. It could, of course, have been meant literally that she was hoping that the feature got selected and that we were lucky with the implementation of it—but I doubt this. So, how do we as persons respond to gestures generally, when we are in doubt of their exact meaning? How could I respond ethically in this particular situation of not knowing something while knowing other things, knowing, for example, that in earlier projects where I had participated in dealing with

multiple countries it had proven to be an extremely complicated and time-consuming task? What role does the history I mention play in determining how it is ethical to respond?

I would also like to inquire a bit more broadly into my relating with the larger circle of people assembled in the hotel. In contrast to what is assumed in orthodox literature about enterprise architecture (Open Group, 2013), I argued in P3 that it is *not* possible to achieve a shared and complete understanding as a basis for collaboration. How is it then that we seem able to collaborate? I become curious about what alternative perspectives on shared or not-shared understanding could contribute to my provisional argument.

Decisions with consequences for people are never only technical but always also political

Decisions have consequences. Some of these consequences can be deduced for some decisions with knowledge of a technical and scientific nature. However, applying science to judging whether such consequences are acceptable for people whose lives are influenced by what is decided can never be based purely on technical knowledge (Dreyfuss & Dreyfuss, 1986:197-201). In P3, I argue, drawing on Gadamer and Mead, that prejudice and delayed action enables deliberate questioning and reflectivity. Faced with a ‘Good luck with that!’, which I did not fully understand, I faltered slightly, and an opportunity arose to make a deliberate decision about what to do next. Should I question the product owner in front of her team about what she meant? Would that action be ethical in and of itself, and—equally important—would I, as the person I am, be able to do that in an ethical manner *in situ*? I have a history of being perceived in confrontations as more stern and pushy than I intend to be, so I was reluctant to confront her in a manner that would be unproductive. So, what to do then? Assume that she meant ‘no way!’ and act upon that?

Reflecting on how I might have acted if this had happened years ago, that is, my habitual behaviour before I began my first project of this thesis, the then-me would probably have tried immediately to provide factual reasons for why her team was the right team to select the feature, and why it was important to do so now. Faced with continued resistance, I would probably have become agitated and tried again in a more assertive fashion. In other words, my inclination or immediate ‘tendency to act’ was to use what I found to be convincing rational arguments to sway the other to comply with my intentions—and my intention was to have the feature selected by this team. Somehow, that did not feel right in the situation. I did not have time at the moment to think all of the reflective thoughts that I have tried to convey here, but must have found a way to resist my habitual way of acting. Instead, I graciously (I hope) accepted her remark at face value, and left it at that. I am unsure how my act came across and what meaning emerged for the others in this situation, but I walked away, and the feature was not selected by any team at that occasion.

The question then arises what kind of decision was made here, and how it was made. If the decision was about whether or not to demand that this team implement this feature now, then there are some consequences of this decision I can infer with sufficient predictability for me to act upon it, and other consequences that are

too unpredictable for me to take them into account. For example, it is predictable that the people who spend time and effort working on this feature, cannot spend the same time and effort on other features. This means that insisting on having them work on this feature will certainly have consequences on what else the team can manage in the next episode of development. It is more difficult to predict what effect it would have on the product owner and my relationship with her if I forced or persuaded her to select the feature. As a consequence, they would have had to work under uncertain and probably anxiety-provoking circumstances with clarifying and implementing something apparently outside their comfort zone. Would they resent being compelled to do this? Would that affect the outcome? Would blame gossiping (Elias & Scotson, 1965) emerge about me turning to micromanagement and preventing the team from doing other important tasks by forcing them to prioritise this? Would that affect the other teams as well? If it would, how bad would it get? In the words of Stacey (2012: 50) ‘the outcomes of human interactions are ... a paradox of predictability and unpredictability at the same time’. Some consequences are predictable and others unpredictable rendering the entire unfolding of the situation predictably unpredictable. I have, in other words, in this situation ‘warranted assertability’ (Dewey, 1938), which is more than idle speculation or belief, but less than complete determinacy.

My provisional argument is that people have different needs and intentions. It is not just a technical matter to take all these into account in making such a judgement. That judgement requires a sense of what each member of the organisation values—a sense of their identities and sentiments. This argument is in opposition to views expressed by Collins and Evans (2002) who posit that we can make a distinction between technical decisions and political decisions, that is, that it is the decision itself that is either technical or political. Based on this, they argue that certain expertise should be privileged when making what they call technical decisions. I disagree. Collins and Evans (2002) draw on a study conducted by Brian Wynne (1989) concerning relationships between scientists and sheep farmers after the radioactive fallout from the Chernobyl disaster contaminated the Cumbrian fells. Collins and Evans (2002:255-256) find that the farmers had knowledge that was important for best resolving how to deal with the situation, but that scientists working in the field ‘were reluctant to take advice from the farmers’. They conclude that ‘to produce the optimum outcome, the scientists needed to have the *interactional expertise* to absorb the expertise of the farmers’ where they define interactional expertise as expertise to interact interestingly with members of a core group of experts within a field of expertise. What I dispute is that a single ‘optimum outcome’ can be objectively defined in such a situation. There are many involved parties with different intentions, values, and norms at play. In a later article, Wynne (2008:22-23) objects to how Collins and Evans seemingly take for granted that what is at stake is recognition or misrecognition of certain knowledge only. Wynne rather sees ‘divergences of an ontological kind—about meanings, concerns, relationships, and forms of life’ to be at least equally at stake. Wynne’s position appears more similar to my own where I, drawing on Elias (1978, 1991), see the involved parties to form a figuration of interdependence where power is never equally

distributed and where we cannot separate concerns since any leverage obtained for any reason can be used to further one's interests in other areas.

Drawing on Austrian sociologist and statesman Albert Schäffle, Karl Mannheim (1936:112-113) distinguishes between the routine affairs of state, that which has already become, which he calls administration, and then the rest, that which is in the process of becoming, which he calls politics. This distinction between administration and politics seems to some extent similar to the distinction made by Collins and Evan between technical and political decisions. He draws different conclusions though.

[Concerning administration] it appears... that clear-cut and readily objectifiable knowledge is possible in so far as it is a question of grasping ... settled and routinised components of social life. There does not seem to be any obstacle to the formulation of laws in this domain, since the objects of attention themselves obey a recurrent rhythm of regular sequence.

When, however, we enter the realm of politics, in which everything is in process of becoming and where the collective element in us, as knowing subjects, helps to shape the process of becoming, where thought is not contemplation from the point of view of a spectator, but rather the active participation and reshaping of the process itself, a new type of knowledge seems to emerge, namely, that in which decision and standpoint are inseparably bound up together. In these realms, there is no such thing as purely theoretical outlook on the part of the observer. It is precisely the purposes that a man has that give him his vision, even though his interests throw only a partial and practical illumination on that segment of the total reality in which he himself is enmeshed, and towards which he is oriented by virtue of his essential social purpose (ibid:170).

What I take politicking to mean in this project is exactly such power plays into a not yet fully formed situation. Politicking is, in other words, not reserved for domains such as parliament or upper management. All of us who conflict and negotiate with each other about how what is in a 'process of becoming' should be formed are engaging in this kind of everyday politicking. Where Collins and Evans appear to me to be arguing for the privileging of a certain type of knowledge of a natural scientific nature regardless of the specifics of a situation, Mannheim instead appears to distinguish between types of situations. Finding ourselves in a situation that is not already entirely formed, but is forming and being formed by us in an emerging power figuration, a different kind of knowledge seems to become important. In this field of knowledge, each of us can only ever possess partial and practical knowledge. This has implications for how we make ethical judgements in not yet fully formed situations such as the one I find myself in faced with the uncertainty of what 'Good luck with that!' actually means.

My provisional argument must, therefore, entail that one cannot speak in the situation narrated, or in any other situation where multiple parties with multiple interests are involved, about a purely technical decision.

Decisions always also have a political dimension when multiple parties are affected. The political dimension has to do with the inherent uncertainty when things are forming and when the forming has consequences for many people. We each have partial knowledge and different experiential history. We have, therefore, no way of knowing entirely what consequences our acts may have for other people. This has implications for how we make ethical judgements, which I would like to inquire into further.

Lengthening actions chains span groups that think and understand things differently

Karl Mannheim supervised Norbert Elias' Ph.D., and I see a clear connection between the processual view of politics in the forming, which I have just referred to, and the views of Elias that I have described previously in P2 and P3. Drawing on Elias (1978, 1991), I describe in P2 how functional interdependency between people leads to enabling and constraining power figurations and elaborate in P3 on how division of function leads to lengthening action chains and specialisation, which in turn leads to interdependencies between people with different expertise, language, and habitus. This presents challenges for coordination and collaboration as well as opportunities for collaborating to fulfil needs, which each of us cannot fulfil on our own. I would now like to inquire further into the nature of some of these challenges.

In the narrated experience, we bring together a somewhat higher number of people than usual with diverse backgrounds. As an enterprise architect, I have engaged in many changes in organisations with consequences for numerous people. I frequently work with stakeholders in various departments with somewhat different views, goals, and ways of working. Having worked with many parts of the business has given me a fairly good overview of what it is each and every one is contributing. Elias (1991:133) describes how 'increasing division of functions' and longer 'chains of actions' made it harder to 'gain an overall view' and 'distinguish what was the means and what the end'. As an example of this, I narrated in a previous work from my Business School Diploma (Brahm, 2007:xix-xxv) how members from a sales unit and a member of the credit unit seemed not to understand each other. This led to conflicts and challenges for collaborating. In that situation, I attempted to help a project leader get to a sufficient degree of understanding shared between all of the involved so as to allow them to move on together. After the episodes I narrate in my diploma thesis, however, some setbacks occurred, and even years later nothing much had come of the initiative. As a generalist who has worked for two decades with changes to doing business as such, I have encountered numerous such challenges as I also indicate in P1.

Now, I begin to question whether it is possible for all of us to arrive in a relatively short time span at an understanding that is really shared, or whether we are to some extent members of what physician and biologist Ludwick Fleck (1935) calls different 'thought collectives'. Similar to how Elias (as quoted above) experiences lengthening action-chains, Fleck experiences scientists to be 'moving away from the world of everyday experiences' and 'entering more deeply into that of scientific specialisation' (ibid:82). Fleck finds that 'after much experience, perhaps with preliminary training', experts of a certain field acquire the 'ability

directly to perceive meaning, form, and self-contained unity’, and this ‘readiness for directed perception... is the main constituent of’ what Fleck terms a ‘thought style’ (ibid:92). A ‘thought style may also be accompanied by a technical and literary style characteristic of the system of knowledge’ (ibid: 99).

My provisional argument must thus entail that groups of experts in organisations similarly form thought collectives with, for example, their own jargon. It is not, however, the inability to comprehend a special jargon that makes it difficult for non-members of a thought collective to directly comprehend thoughts from a given thought style. We all have a thought style, but we may be unaware of what characterises our own thought style and how it is different from the thought styles of others. We also have experienced different situations in the past, and have thus accumulated different practical knowledge. Even so, we sometimes do seem to use that to our advantage and arrive at synergies, but then at other times the differences seem to create problems for our collaboration. I have still not quite made sense of how I came to know what response to make in the previously narrated situation, and I will thus return to experience to attempt to find more insights into what it is that makes a difference in what emerges from having different and partial understandings.

Who are ‘we’ becoming as we replace the brick-and-mortar of banks with digital solutions?

Narrative

Symbolically, we used an abandoned floor of a scaled down physical branch to set up an open office space that could accommodate collocating 80 experts from all over the organisation including some external partners. There were remarks of this being what the buzz of Silicon Valley start-ups must feel like and a lot of laughter and high spirits as we struggled for eight hectic weeks to revise together the ‘Target Picture’ for our initiative. After the eight weeks, most would return to their respective units and daily work. Only a few would stay on to plan adjustments to our initiative before the next episode of development. While it lasted, we got very close. We were divided into smaller teams, and I mainly worked with a team tasked with figuring out how we could better help corporate customers manage their liquidity. In this smaller team, we soon established routines such as mid-day coffee breaks where we would go to a nearby coffee shop to get some decent coffee as well as a breath of fresh air, before getting into the fray of it again in the afternoon. Colocation worked wonders for the job, but of course part of the price was that many of my colleagues were commuting from the other Nordic countries. They lived at a hotel throughout the week away from family and friends.

The objective of the work itself was at the same time quite clear and quite difficult to grasp. We were asked to describe concretely what kind of digital solutions we could supply, which would make it easier for corporates to manage their liquidity, consuming our financial services for liquidity management in the process. Most of the team members had never worked the way that we were supposed to work here. There were many indications of anxiety such as frequent checking of method descriptions, asking around for

confirmation, and attempts to have a discussion about what we were concretely supposed to do rather than just getting on with it. Before this revision process kicked off, I had heard some grumbling in the development programme about whether this was really necessary, since we had done something quite similar just the year before when mapping out customer journeys. We had even made one for liquidity management. Nothing much had changed since then. As the work with these experts began to pick up, however, a lot of new questions and challenges surfaced. How would corporates figure out when it was the right time to exploit a given financial service? Would our colleagues in support be able to help them if they contacted us through digital means? New questions, new challenges, and new ideas arose. My new colleagues had experience working on related challenges in their respective units, and they raised various ideas about how to tackle some of these. Having joined the company only a year earlier, it was a great opportunity for getting to know more people and growing my 'personal network'. Since Digital Banking as a unit was formed at the same time that I joined the company, it felt to me that Digital Banking was itself becoming recognised more widely in Nordea through the many ties that each of us made and strengthened during this joint venture. In one conversation with an architect from a particular unit with which we had struggled a bit to find common grounds, I was told quite frankly that he had been mighty sceptical towards what we had attempted to do when he joined. Now, however, he had changed his view entirely and he wanted us to work towards even closer cooperation.

We were under all kinds of pressure though, and so, of course, it was not blissful all of the time. One particular encounter seems important to bring up. The experts and I were engaged in an animated debate about how differently we would have to do business if the customers had to become able to play into this without the normal physical meeting of banking expert and corporate client. Suddenly, Aatto, a Finn, spoke up with emotion that I perceived as frustration. He addressed me directly saying something to the effect that we had been doing banking at Nordea for the last 160 years, and that was what we were experts in and good at. Now we seemed to be attempting to define something much bigger. As he spoke, he drew on the whiteboard some circles inside each other. He highlighted the most core one while explaining that this, banking, this small thing in the centre, was actually the only thing we really knew something about. He found that we were not the right people to try to unravel how to do other people's business. I was a bit taken aback and found him to be challenging the validity of many of the things we had been doing the last year, as well as challenging me as a different kind of expert. Before I answered, I managed to briefly think that the last thing I wanted to do was to polarise the situation further by contributing to a 'you and us' feeling by replying harshly. What I therefore attempted to do was to reply in a matter-of-fact way. I said that we in the banking sector had lost the trust of customers in the wake of the financial crisis. I tried to explain that we were perceived as greedy, and customers were reluctant to buy our services, which was why it was so important to find ways of showing the customers, not just telling them, that what we offer could actually strengthen their business financially. I could feel as I spoke that I did not manage to keep my own feelings of

resentment at bay very well, and I was unsure how Aatto received what I was trying to say. I carried on anyway while also desperately trying to slow down my speech a bit, to lower the intensity with which I was coming across, to smile disarmingly, and to attempt to appear less self-righteous in explaining how one difference between physical banking and digital banking was, that in the digital touchpoints we had no human relationship manager with intuition who could inquire into what the customer was struggling with and then show them how we could help. This was why we *had* to find different ways of achieving something similar. I had suggested that we should integrate our own systems with those of the customer's as a means towards that end. Tolvi, another always very polite and kind Finn, chimed in. Tolvi explained that we were *not* just greedy, and our services *are* in fact helpful to many customers. With mounting dread, I heard Tolvi explain that we must not begin to doubt that what we offer has value. Tolvi agreed with Aatto that we were not the right people to attempt to do more than simply present our services to the customer and let the customer choose—or allow the customer easy access to employees who could then explain why our services are useful.

In our Nordic organisation, Finns are widely regarded as the calmest among us. I saw them as people you cannot easily shake up. It added to my unease that it was two Finns who now opposed me, and, for a second, I was at a complete loss for what to say or do. I sensed that both Tolvi and Aatto perceived what I said to indicate that *I*, not just customers, perceived bankers to be greedy and our services to serve us rather than customers. That was not what I had been trying to say, but I realised with chagrin that it was what had come across. Worse still, I did not want to win the argument if that meant that the experts, who were key players on whom I depended, would then feel that they had lost an argument, lost face, and thus would lose motivation. However, I also did not want to give up the whole idea behind this work, so I struggled to find a way out of a win/lose-argument. I was relieved when Sobeska from our strategy unit intervened in a calmer tone and explained how we had flown in as many experts as we had been able to free up from other work, how we were in dialogue with even more experts including some from outside Nordea, and how we were still very humble and aware that what we produced were hypotheses about what might work for customers. I added that a parallel activity ongoing at that time was testing and validating some of these hypotheses in an initiative where we had provided half a score of customers with a vendor solution in this area to see if they found it helpful. We found ways to continue to talk about our limitations, but also hold on to the necessity of finding ways to do something that is 'good enough for now' to be able to move on and then later seek further clarification. In the following weeks, we managed together to produce solution descriptions that added a lot of new ideas and also added nuance to the journey maps we had produced the year before.

Questions arising from the narrative

Many questions arise for me when reflecting upon this encounter. Although I had discussed with close colleagues our customers' loss of trust after the financial crisis, it seems on reflection thoughtless that I

apparently just assumed that I could discuss this in a calm, matter-of-fact way with people I had only recently met and about whom I knew little. I know that the financial crisis has been traumatic also to many 'ordinary' bankers, and I knew nothing of how these colleagues had experienced it.

Initially, Aatto addressed me, so what was it that made, or allowed, Tolvi and Sobeska to speak into the conflict? What did they contribute? Was that important, or would Aatto and I have continued in the same manner if the others had not intervened?

I further begin to question where facts end and fiction starts. Was I so set on persuading that anything supporting my view would have felt to me to be factual? The 'fact' that we now needed to 'show' rather than 'tell' customers what they would gain from consuming certain financial services, for example, seems on reflection not to be quite objectively factual. It could just be a conviction of mine.

In pondering this, it is becoming clear to me that I had many intentions, some of which were related to feeling obligations towards people not directly present, such as the other managers of the programme and our business unit. Before this encounter, I had met many people and made many commitments. At some later time, I would meet these other people again and have to explain what I had achieved with this group of experts. Reflecting on my anticipation of the reactions of these people, including a good number of managers, to whatever I could return with, their anticipated reactions seem to have been almost 'real' gestures made into the conversation although these people were not physically present. At some later time, we would have to deliver a solution to the wider organisation and our customers. Becoming the leading digital bank in the Nordic region is an explicit goal of our corporate strategy. As mentioned in the introduction, this goal is taken up as an almost life-or-death matter in the bank. As lead architect, I could not help but feel some weighty pressure on my shoulders from the risk of potentially disappointing our customers and the entire organisation if we did not find a good enough way to do business digitally. I take it that the others must have had similar backgrounds with people from their respective business units and wider circles.

My history with Nordea comprises not only actions that I have been involved in since I joined Nordea, but also anecdotal stories shared with me by my colleagues. One such story stands out as particularly important and relevant to what we are now attempting. In hushed voices, people have on occasions shared organisational gossip with me about a previous initiative called NTP—the Nordea Transformation Programme. NTP had been going on for a number of years involving a great many people and costing a significant amount of money. It had apparently mostly produced paper with models and caused little actual change. Management had finally lost patience and shut the programme down. What seems to be the lesson learned by most of the few people who dared to share anecdotes from this programme with me is never to do it again. What 'it' is that we should never do again is vague, but seems to have to do with the scale, the ambition, and the approach to start out by modelling in detail what to achieve before actually getting going.

The reason I bring this up here is that this history and other bits of history like it are apparently important to us even today. Similar to how other people from our other circles almost gesture into our conversations, even when they are not present, it appears that the ‘ghosts of the past’ similarly almost gesture into our conversations. They make us reluctant to do certain things and inclined to do others.

A theme here then seems to be ‘who’ is doing the relating in human relating and ‘how’ is relating done. In other words, is the situation only between Aatto, Tolvi, Sobeska, and me, or is the relating also with others, such as people towards whom we have made commitments? How is the present situation related to our history and what influence does the history have over the present? Taking it a step further, a question arises of how one can judge what it would be ethical to do in such situations. I am proud that as a team we found a way to move on together, but I am perplexed about how it happened.

Recognition of self in relation to others is an important aspect of identity

The conflict with Aatto, Tolvi, and Sobeska seems to arise because we begin to change how we engage with and do business with our customers. If ‘we’ act differently, and others recognise this change, then ‘we’ could be seen to become a different ‘we’. We negotiate what Elias (1991:184) calls we-identity. Elias discusses the shifting balance between we-identities and I-identities and gives as an example the widely-used convention of naming people with an individual surname and a family name, which shows that ‘each individual person emerges from a group of other people whose names he bears in combination with the individualising forename. There is no I-identity without we-identity. Only the weighting of the I-we balance, the pattern of the I-we relation, are variable’. Elias describes how we negotiate we-identities in any grouping from tribes to nations and also in organisations as ‘identifying development processes’.

Like any other significant change, this entails shifts in the current power-figuration (Elias, 1978:71-103). Any significant change leads to the simultaneous destruction of the prior power-figuration and emergence of a new power-figuration. Figurations are always in flux. Even though the outcome is difficult to predict, Aatto, Tolvi, Sobeska, and I may prefer some we-identities over others, for example, if it entails a promising position in the fluctuating power-figuration for ourselves or our groups. I am not claiming that the outcome is predictable to us. I do, however, experience us to be aware that these changes are significant both for Nordea as a company, for each of us as individuals, and for the groups that we belong to within or outside the company. The significance is tied to the emerging new power-figuration and potential shifts in the relative position in the figuration of individuals and groupings. I sense clearly during the encounter that much is at stake for many. This also helps me to accept and forgive myself for not managing to keep my emotions in check better.

This conflict is an example of a local interaction which reflects an ongoing global patterning in that ‘we’ as a company consisting of people were engaging in similar conflicts and negotiations in many circles throughout

the entire period from which I provide my narrative. Some conflicts in local interactions may lead to one outcome, and other conflicts may lead to another. How the sum of these particular negotiations will eventually affect how we as a company act, and how that will be recognised— that is our emerging ‘we-identity’ —seems entirely impossible to predict at this time. Even though the general executive management team has made public within the company certain decisions, such as that we want to become a leading digital bank, we still negotiate how to interpret these decisions and how to act on our interpretation in our daily work. Furthermore, it is uncertain how others will recognise what we are becoming. Thus, decisions appear to me in practice to be much less clearly and universally understood than how I perceive the orthodox literature in my field to describe them when it is, for example, claimed that ‘a key aspect of [governance] is ensuring compliance with the defined architecture(s)’ (Open Group, 2013:150).

I experience that different we-identities are at play, such as the identity of a company, a business unit, and a team and even the groupings themselves and belongings to groups are in flux all the time. Inviting members of 17 other business units into the revision of the ‘Target Picture’ for Digital Banking can be seen as a very strong ‘play’ in ‘the game’ to influence the emerging we-identities (Elias, 1978:81-88). Seeing organising as process, as figurations of relationships always in flux, means not seeing a boundary as such between ‘them’ and ‘us’, but, instead, seeing stronger or weaker ties of belonging. We negotiate memberships of groupings all the time, and could decide to collaborate or compete—or both—with members of different units, or even different companies. In this view, it is not clear that one party is reacting to the initiative of another, but it seems that we mutually influence each other and that none of us are in control of the overall changes (Elias, 1978, 1991).

Reflecting further on our different particular backgrounds and belongings to other groupings, Aatto appears to me to be an experienced and influential member of the Markets business unit, and Markets has historically been known to make a lot of money for the bank. For good reasons, members of Markets seem to enjoy good bonuses and other benefits. Sobeska is a talented young woman from a newly merged Nordic strategy unit. The strategy unit is a cost centre which means that they do not earn profit from sales directly. The business units supported by this strategy unit and providing this strategy unit with funding are divided into profit and loss country units. The strategy unit, as such, and also the relatively young Sobeska appear to me to be under a lot of pressure to prove themselves useful. Similarly, I am a member of a newly formed Nordic Digital Banking unit, which is a profit and loss unit that will earn profit from digital sales. Before we can make a profit on digital sales, however, we need to change how we conduct certain business transactions so that they become digital. If that is achieved, profit earned from digital business transactions will from the outset belong to our unit. For the time being, our initiatives are funded by other units.

The information presented here provides a partial understanding of the particular figuration I mention above. In the current figuration, I would interpret Markets for example to be more established and have more

cohesion and integration (Elias & Scotson, 1965) than Digital Banking, and I would interpret the intended shift towards doing more business digitally, and thus having Digital Banking as a unit earning increasing profits on some of our business transaction, to be a shift also in the power figuration. I have a deeper understanding of the figuration than I can present here, but still of course only a partial understanding. I draw attention to it in order to illustrate that each of us is aware to some extent of the situation or figuration as seen from the viewpoint not only of ourselves, but also of some of the other participants. This awareness of how others may perceive the figuration is an example of what George Herbert Mead (1934) describes as taking the role or attitude of the other. This ability we as humans have to take the attitude of the other allows us to reflect on what voices the others are listening to, what commitments they have made in their other groupings (Elias, 1978:86-88), and how relationships with powerful others enable and constrain them as particular individuals in their particular position in the current power figuration (ibid:130). In P3, I argue, drawing on Mead (1934:98-99), that ‘delayed reaction is necessary to intelligent conduct’ and, drawing on Hans Georg Gadamer (1975:310), that ‘foregrounding a prejudice’ via questioning puts our prejudice at risk and opens up possibilities for reconciling ourselves with the claim to truth of others. In the current narrative, I find myself attempting to take the attitude of the other in reflecting on their claim to truth as seen from their position in the figuration, that is, of course, to the extent that I am aware of the figuration and their position in it. As this happens while events occur, I do not have much time to think about what promises and threats potential changes to this figuration may seem to hold for the others and those they relate to, such as, for example, the potential threat of altering monopolisation of power and group stigmatisation (Elias & Scotson, 1965) if Digital Banking becomes as a consequence of what we set into motion the dominant group in the bank at some point in the future. In attempting to consider this to some extent in situ, I feel that a measure of detachment from my own involvement in the action is necessary, which in turn allows me to be more closely involved with the others (Elias, 1978:153-154) insofar as I can utilise this detachment to become more aware of the enabling and constraining effect of positions of others in the figuration we find ourselves in, and allow that to inform my practical judgement. This resonates with how I find Gary Cook (1993) to interpret Mead’s functionalist moral psychology. Mead (1908:313) writes that ‘the situation rises up in accusation of the moral personality which is unequal to it, and the personality rises to the situation only by a process which reconstructs the situation as profoundly as it reconstructs the self’. Gary Cook (1993:120) interprets this to mean, that ‘moral advance does not consist of a closer and closer approximation to a fixed ideal of conduct; rather, it involves a dialectical process in which creative selves repeatedly devise new moral synthesis in the face of recurring moral conflicts’. I take this to mean that ethical conduct is not found by becoming increasingly better at living up to predefined moral standards and prescriptions, but rather by inquiring into emerging moral questions about what would be a ‘good enough’ response in a particular situation. Such a moral question also emerges in the situation in the first narrative. It appears generalisable that we continue to find ourselves confronted with ethical judgements about how to conduct ourselves appropriately in situations

such as this. As a young and inexperienced enterprise architect, I drew mostly on my formal training, and in P1 I describe how this led to several frustrating and puzzling situations. Over the years, as I have gained more experience, I have encountered several situations that have led me to abandon prescribed 'best practice' and these experiences contribute to what Mead calls the reconstruction of my self. In the first narrative, I decide not simply to 'confirm scope and priorities for deployment with development management' and then 'identify deployment resources and skills' as prescribed by TOGAF (Open Group, 2013:152), but rather also to take into consideration, for example, the state that I think the team may be in after the many recent changes, and the effect it might have on morale of the larger programme if coercive force was used to resolve the issue. As a person and an enterprise architect, I have faced moral questions like this in many situations. Sometimes, I have found in these situations that prescriptions from methods such as TOGAF and current 'best practice' were not adequate to resolve the issue at hand. When making ethical judgments, I sometimes get it wrong, it is not an infallible process, but I have the ability to test solutions in my conduct (Mead, 1923:247). In the conflict with Aatto, Tolvi, and Sobeska, I feel that my increased awareness of the situation that each of us are in helps me to accept gestures that can be interpreted as power plays intended (maybe unconsciously) to maintain the current power figuration, which alternatively can be seen as fair and good enough gestures. My former self may have interpreted the same gestures as unreasonable selfish gestures of 'resistance to change' as described in P3. Thus, my changing awareness has led also to some extent to a changing or reconstructed self.

I find that this explanation augments what I wrote in P2 drawing on Dreyfuss & Dreyfuss (1986) and Stacey (2012) about expertise. Stacey (ibid:58) claims that 'those who reach capacities of proficiency and expertise do not rely on rules at all, and insisting that rules be followed amounts to the destruction of proficiency and expertise', which means to me that to advance beyond a certain degree of proficiency towards true expertise, one must work with awareness of the context, of the particular figuration of the given situation, and begin to trust oneself to make correct moral judgements in situ, since prescriptions and rules can simply never cover all eventualities.

My provisional argument must thus entail that belonging to groupings is constantly being negotiated. In the figuration of relationships between individuals and groupings, power is not equally distributed, and the figuration is in constant flux. Among what we negotiate are we-identities. An important element of recognition of self is recognition of self in relation to others. Thus, there is no I-identity without we-identity. In this continuous process of organising, we are frequently confronted with ethical judgements about how to conduct ourselves appropriately. To find an ethical way to conduct ourselves we can take the attitude of the other and become more aware of the situation/figuration and how it enables and constrains us and others. An important element of expertise is awareness of what it is that is particular to a situation, which may paradoxically require more detachment and more involvement. Such an awareness can be used to make

moral judgments that require both reconstruction of the situation and of the self. Such judgements cannot be reduced to context-free rules.

Differences in understandings may sometimes be more generative than shared understanding

Returning to reflect further on how the conflict with Aatto played out, I perceive the argument each of us attempted to make to contain elements of rational argumentation, or at least something that can be called rationalisation. Aatto claimed that we had done ‘banking’ for 160 years, and that is all we know. There is some merit to this point as we are certainly including something in the scope that is not the core area of expertise of Aatto’s unit. However, ‘banking’ has evolved during these 160 years. For most of last century, the laws of many countries separated investment banking from retail banking, for example, so at that time it would not have been possible to include Aatto’s area of expertise in the scope of retail banking either.

In response, I did not attempt to argue against (falsify) his claims. Without knowing at the time how others would respond, I made a spur-of-the-moment decision to attempt to describe why I found it important, perhaps even necessary, for us to look beyond normal ‘banking’ for something useful for doing business digitally. Although I did not, as such, attempt to falsify Aatto’s claim, I also did not acknowledge his claim as ‘true’. Instead, I made a counter argument, hoping that my argument would be perceived as superior and that it would be sufficient to persuade the others to do what I wanted them to do. When my gesture did not appear to be enough to convince Aatto, and when Tolvi also protested, it could be interpreted negatively as ‘resistance to change’ or positively as sound reluctance to accept figurational consequences of changes that could have negative effects for Aatto, Tolvi, and their closest colleagues. In other words, Aatto and Tolvi may have sensed a we-identity forming in which they could not recognise themselves, or in which they did not want to belong. I accept now that both in the here and now these experts have a right to feel outside their comfort zone, and to resist more generally changes that could lead to their area of expertise becoming less central for the bank. I, however, also trusted my own sense that this was necessary for me to live up to the many commitments I had made earlier to various managers, and it felt like doing right by our customers and wider circles. Thus, I felt it warranted for me to exert what influence I could, and resist the resistance of the others, as long as I did it in a socially acceptable way. Like everyone else, I put my intentions at risk by contributing my own argument, trusting that something useful would emerge. In doing so, I drew on my experience and *habitus*, which, upon reflection, appear to have been to rationalise what I believed we needed to do together. Sobeska intervened and explained her view on how we could continue to collaborate. In this situation, she was able to contribute something that I had not been able to contribute. Similarly, Aatto may have felt that Tolvi contributed something that Aatto may not have been able to contribute.

Drawing on Karl Mannheim, I argued earlier that we each have partial knowledge and different experiential history. In this situation, our different contributions based on our different partial knowledge combined into something neither of us could have arrived at alone. As mentioned above, Collins and Evans (2002:254)

define interactional expertise as ‘enough expertise to interact interestingly with participants and carry out sociological analysis’. Although I have argued against some of their conclusions, I find their distinction between expertise concerning given subject matters and expertise in how to interact meaningfully to be useful. Reflecting further on the conflict and the mood in the room at the time, and more generally in the wider group of people working in this initiative, it appears to me that there was a lot of anxiety. This anxiety could plausibly be related to not knowing concretely what doing banking digitally means: What will become different? How will my role and my status change? Many questions could not be answered at the time. Aatto challenged us on attempting to work with something that was not what he knew or wanted banking to be. This was, of course, true since one of the things we did know unequivocally was that banking digitally could not be the same as banking physically—otherwise, why go through this much trouble? What I experience to have happened then is that the changes we were contemplating and conducting in how we do business were mirrored in simultaneous changes in the power figuration which we were not consciously aware of most of the time. We tend to locate power in individuals, which makes us less aware of how we are simultaneously formed by and forming what is emerging (Elias, 1978:93-94). This lack of awareness of what is happening can lead to further anxiety. Ralph Stacey and Chris Mowles (2016:357) describe that too much anxiety is difficult for humans to cope with and can lead to fight or flight tendencies. They elaborate that

When the quality of relating is characterised by trust, conversation can take more fluid forms... The dynamics of more fluid, spontaneous conversation rely on enough trust and ability to live with anxiety, as well as power relations that are both co-operative and competitive at the same time and rhetorical conversational practices that do not block exploration.

One way to interpret what happened then in this exchange where a conflict led to confrontation that for the people involved (including usually very stoic Finns) was more forceful and probably more unpleasant than what usually happens, is that anxiety accumulated to the point where it became a matter of fight or flight. I know that I at least felt a lot of unease in the situation, and I can only imagine that the others did too. I am not arguing that ‘something went wrong’. On the contrary, I find that upon further reflection what emerged was probably ‘good enough’ considering the situation in which we all found ourselves. More generally, I find that ‘interactional expertise’ implies that we work with how we work together, with our tolerance and inclusiveness of views and expertise that differs from our own, and with our working relationships. It is this—more than agreement on the subject matters we discuss—that allowed us to move on together. To become able to collaborate, I experience that we must trust others to know enough about things we do not know, for us to be able to find together a suitable course of action.

I referred earlier to the distinction Mannheim makes between situations that are characterised by ‘routine affairs ... that which has already become’ which he calls administration, and then situations ‘in the process of becoming’ which he calls politics. Mannheim (1936:113) elaborates on this dichotomy as a distinction

between what he calls the ‘rationalised’ ‘sphere consisting of settled and routinized procedures in dealing with situations that recur in an orderly fashion, and the ‘irrational’ by which it is surrounded’ and remarks that there is a clear ‘tendency to include as much as possible in the realm of the rational and to bring it under administrative control—and, on the other hand, to reduce the ‘irrational’ element to the vanishing point’.

I interpret Mannheim’s concept of politics to apply to what we experience in organisations as, for example, innovation and development, and administration to apply to what we experience as standardised production. However, the characteristics of administration that Mannheim draws our attention to are those of ‘rationalised structures’ which, reflecting on my narratives in P3 and this project, I see examples of also sometimes when we work with innovation and development. The tendency Mannheim mentions of modern culture ‘to include as much as possible in the realm of the rational’ seems to me to resonate with my critique in P2 and P3 of the orthodox methods in my field, and can be seen as something that potentially could impede building trusting relationships. The question, therefore, arises of what we are doing differently from that prescribed by these methods or what we do in addition to that—at least sometimes.

To elaborate on my provisional argument, we bring into our relating different thought styles, experiential history, and accumulated practical knowledge. This allows us to contribute to conversational processes of relating what other participants could not contribute on their own, and others contribute what we could not have. For this to work, we must trust that others know something that we do not know, and can contribute something that is meaningful—even though we may not fully understand it ourselves. For us to take the risk of contributing to what is emerging, we must trust that others have this same trust in us. It may help to work explicitly on establishing trusting relationships, and to acknowledge interactional expertise as an important expertise in itself. I have experienced other situations where nothing much emerged, so I do not argue that this is guaranteed to happen, and I would like to inquire further into what it takes for this to occur.

It is useful to be aware of movements that can make a difference if recognised and responded to

In P2, I describe my participation in developing a new strategy for IT for my former employer and argue how this strategising can be understood as complex and responsive communicative processes of relating where power is never equally distributed in relationships, and where the figuration of relationships is always in flux. I experience our strategising in the situations I narrate in P2 as a power game, where we each expend the majority of our energy in seeking ethical ways to represent our predetermined views and ideas as strongly as possible, rather than expending the majority of our energy in listening to the viewpoints of the others and attempting to understand how their ideas could be combined with our own to make up something novel. In P3 and in this project, I describe experiences of seeking understanding that none of us has to begin with, for example, understanding of what it means for our customers and us as a bank to do banking digitally. In this situation, it appears imperative to find ways to move on together without fully knowing ahead of acting what doing banking digitally will come to mean in everyday acts. This prompts us to improvise.

Taking a step back and looking at the entire ‘Target Picture’ exercise from which I have narrated only short episodes, I experience that bringing together participants from 17 different business units with quite different partial knowledge does lead to synergies and to ideas and understandings emerging that none of us could have arrived at on our own. I also sense a much broader commitment to this ‘Target Picture’ in the wider organisation than to anything we had produced before, in part because the participants in the ‘Target Picture exercise’ returned to their respective business units after the exercise with a much clearer picture in their minds of our ambition than we could have given them through our normal communication efforts via intranet or unit meetings, for example. This increased awareness and commitment in the wider organisation can be seen as global patterning, which, according to Ralph Stacey, is directly related to local patterning:

The coherent patterns that are being produced in such interaction are not ‘wholes’ outside the interaction but the coherent patterns of the interaction itself, of the process itself. Nothing is being produced above, below, behind, or in front of the patterns of interaction, of the process. Patterns of interaction simply produce further patterns of interaction, individually and population-wide. What are becoming are the individual and collective identities of the persons interacting... Strategies of organisations seen as population-wide patterns that emerge in the interplay of local responsive interaction (Stacey, 2011: 321; 330).

I take this to mean that the increase in awareness and commitment I experience is simply the coherent interplay of myriad local interactions including the few which I have been able to narrate in this project and P3. The coherent pattern does not follow a blueprint or plan, but emerges in a way that even the most powerful individual cannot control, but which all participants influence (ibid). To understand what happens in the global patterning, I become interested in inquiring further into what actually happened in local patterning. In other words, I would like to take a closer look at how what you could call ‘synergy’ is acted out in local interactions, understood as the ability to generate together something beyond that which each participant is capable of generating on their own.

Chris Mowles (2008:11-12) describes how in workshops and similar circles, ‘[t]he enlarged sense of self and the sense of group purpose arise simultaneously: The individual and the collective are different expressions of the same thing. It can feel like an island of certainty in a sea of unpredictability, and it assumes a realisable future’. Referring to Arendt, Mowles however also reminds us that ‘this collective purpose ... is limited, partial, and temporary: It lasts only as long as people come together to renew their purpose’. In the discussion with Aatto, Tolvi, and Sobeska, what we are negotiating is both the concrete definitions we are working towards producing, but also what Mowles calls ‘sense of self’ and ‘group’, similar to what Stacey calls ‘individual and collective identities’, similar again to what Elias describes above as I-identities and we-identities. Since the reason for going digital is to help people who are doing banking, and since some of those who negotiate will participate in doing banking differently, we are negotiating our own emerging individual

and group identities. This is why so much is at stake for us and why it cannot be anything but personal as well as professional at the same time. What I find to happen, when Aatto and I are locked in conflicting views that cannot be immediately resolved, is that my pause allowed Sobeska to speak into this conflict with a new voice. My pause can be seen as an ‘opening’ that allowed Sobeska to contribute something I was not able to contribute in the situation. In his Ph.D., Henry Larsen (2005:36) discusses openings in conversations and what can come of them. Larsen provides an example of a conversation with another where something becomes ‘possible because together we ran a risk of some spontaneity, so opening the possibility of an outcome that none of us could have predicted’. Since communicative action contains recognisable patterns, what we recognise must be to some extent repetitious. But since something unexpected can emerge, there is also the potential for something different to occur. Larsen introduces ‘the notion of ‘openings’; moments of attention to incomplete change and [Larsen] became aware of such moments as the emergent and the unpredictable’. Later, Larsen ‘abandoned the term ‘openings’ because it tempts us to think of literally opening a door to glimpse something already existing, a way of thinking in which the temporal and paradoxical nature of this seems to become less obvious’ (ibid:142). I want to draw attention to the fact that I do not see the word to imply that the change is already there to be discovered, but take it to mean, as Larsen describes, ‘moments of attention to incomplete change’. You could say that it is awareness of a movement that could make a difference if it is recognised and responded to as different. Thus, nothing may come of it, if not both recognised and responded to, but something might. Similarly, an invitation can be seen as taking the risk of presenting an opening to another in a relationship (ibid).

In the first narrative, I consciously take a risk and invite the product owner to play into what is emerging. She responds differently than I had anticipated, but still something emerges of course. In the second narrative, an opening presents itself without me consciously giving an invitation. Sobeska recognises the opening and acts into what is emerging, and something comes of it that would probably not have emerged if I had been alone with Aatto in the situation. I find that not choosing a word with which to describe this phenomenon is not useful, so I accept the risk of being understood differently than intended and call this ‘an opening’. In light of what I wrote in the previous section about anxiety and trust, this leads me to perceive working with the quality of relating to be an important aspect of arriving at good enough holding of anxiety and sufficiently trusting relationships to be able together to provide and protect sufficient openings and invitations to allow others to contribute what we ourselves cannot. This seems particularly important in situations where we want to innovate and negotiate what is becoming, but perhaps less important in situations where we want to standardise production or administrate in more settled situations. In a further reflexive turn, I must also admit that contributing myself while also providing openings and invitations for others has been a weakness for me personally throughout my career. I have had a tendency of either getting caught up in my ideas and leaving no openings for others or passively waiting for others to provide solutions without my contribution. This is an aspect of my self, however, that I find to have been reconstructed in

Mead's terms, or just to have changed significantly as a consequence of beginning to perceive differently what actually happens and what is important. For example, I no longer believe that it is possible, nor useful, to separate the personal from the professional. Perhaps this is making me a bit more emotional at work, but I hope that it also allows me to relate to others more intimately and empathically, which in turn hopefully allows me to make more ethical and socially acceptable choices. I do sense an improvement in my ability to arrive together with others at a 'good enough' quality of relating.

My provisional argument is then that the quality of human relating can enable or constrain what is likely to emerge in social circles. With 'good enough' quality of relating, something has the potential to emerge which requires a combination of our different partial knowledge, thought styles, and experiential history, which could not emerge from any of the participating individuals alone. I have not produced a prescriptive method for bringing about a quality of relating that is 'good enough' to achieve this, but I observe that it entails 'good enough' holding of anxiety, and a willingness from all participants to help create the openings that others need to contribute what only they can contribute. It is useful to become more aware of openings, and to protect them; in other words, to pay more attention to differences that could lead to different contributions if they are recognised and responded to as different.

If every participating individual obsesses on getting their statements stated, much like what I experienced in some of the conversations narrated in P2, it is unlikely that openings with sufficient openness will be produced to enable others to contribute. With such a quality of relating it is even more unlikely that we will pick up something from what others are contributing, which we could not have contributed ourselves, and make something of that which is different. On the other hand, there must be a limit to how many people can have a conversation with this quality of relating at least all together at once. So, I am still uncertain if this idea 'scales' to the size of what we in Nordea want to do in the programme I have narrated experiences from in this project. Before continuing this inquiry, I would, therefore, like to provide a few more observations of and reflections on how we make ethical judgements and how this seems to affect global patterning in the wider organisation.

[How do we all manage to collaborate? Even 'with blood on our hands'...](#)

Narrative

Following my gloomy experience in the hotel where I failed to solicit help from any team in working with the support of two countries simultaneously, I began experimenting with different ways to deal with it. In parallel with revising the 'Target Picture', teams had continued to develop software. At intervals, they would demonstrate the software that they had produced to the entire programme, including managers. At one such occasion, a team showed how a phone number was displayed to let the customer know how to contact us if the need for support arose. I asked if the software determined which country the customer was from, and thus which phone number to display. It did not. On another occasion, a team demonstrated how a calendar helped

the customer to avoid trying to make payments on bank holidays. I asked if both Swedish and Finnish bank holidays were considered. They were not. I sort of knew that already, but felt that I had to ask to allow others to hear this from the teams themselves.

My fellow architects and I sought help with a particularly difficult issue from two architects from another business unit. Those two architects both happened to be Finns. They readily agreed to come to Copenhagen to help us out. We spent some time together discussing what we wanted to do, and how, and when. As it dawned upon them what our ambitions were, and in what timeframe we had to achieve them, they simply burst into laughter. Not just a quick little laugh either. It took quite some time before they had regained their normal stoic Finnish composure and we could continue the work. They were really helpful and supportive, but it got to me that they would react so strongly. When I later recounted this experience to various managers of the programme, I could see that it also got to them. It did so in a different way than when I tried to explain what the difference was between what we had been building so far, and what we still needed to build before we could launch. The image of normally stoic Finnish architects in tears from laughter proved helpful in a very unexpected way in conversations with non-experts and experts from other fields.

In a meeting preparing for how to kick off the development work remaining after revising the ‘Target Picture’, I met with managers and product owners. We needed to agree which features teams should prepare for the next episode of development. The meeting was held in Stockholm, which was bitterly cold but nicely decorated for Christmas. Theo oversaw organising the meeting. On the morning of the meeting, I therefore finalised my presentation at the hotel, and sent it to Theo asking for a timeslot to present it. Arriving an hour or so later at the office, I saw and greeted Theo, who told me that he had already added my presentation to the agenda. As the meeting progressed, managers responsible for different aspects of the initiative each gave their pitch. Theo presented some slides showing with different colours how much work was already done and how much was left to be done. Our project leader asked if ‘done’ here really meant not having to revisit and change the software before we launched the solution to customers. Here I took the opportunity to assert that even the software that was ‘coloured done’ did not deal with multiple countries for example. In the meantime, we had decided to launch in both Sweden and Finland simultaneously, and thus this software had to be rewritten before launch. The product owner of the team in question confirmed this. Another product owner seemed to get agitated (probably nervous) and asked what teams were supposed to do now, since this sounded like a lot of rework. I suggested waiting until after my presentation to determine what to do since my presentation described some possibilities. The overall manager, Ken, then showed them a film that had been created by a design bureau during the revision of our ‘Target Picture’. This film showed how users would come to interact with us digitally through the solution we were building. It flaunted a plethora of features that we had not done yet and ended like a commercial with a text and voice over promising boldly: ‘Available in the Nordic region late 2016’.

All the most senior managers in the bank had seen this film. Ken shared how it had kindled expectations and helped us secure much needed funding for the year to come. The product owners appeared to me to become very quiet after seeing this film. I was afraid that they were losing faith in the feasibility of the whole initiative. I pressed on and took the stage to show them my presentation. Here, I claimed that we were missing only a handful of major fundamental modifications to the software for it to become easier to expand with support for what we had just seen in the film. I was aware that right then and there I was understating somewhat the risks and challenges ahead. I was aware that this was not my usual behaviour, but it felt warranted to work on establishing some amount of confidence in this group just then. One product owner questioned if we had enough knowledge to build what we had just seen in the film. I responded that we had more knowledge after having revised the ‘Target Picture’ than we had ever had before in this programme. We had at the time been working for a year and had most of another year left before we needed to launch. Around 80 experts from 17 different business units had collaborated on revising the ‘Target Picture’. Even more importantly (to me at least), they had all pledged their support for realising it. We knew of course that there was more to know, which was why each team had been assigned people with product, architectural and design expertise. I stressed that they—in the teams—had to collaborate to figure out the details of how to do this. None of us would be able to do it alone.

A few weeks later, 24 teams met up in a snow-storm in Helsinki to plan the next episode of development. Even the weather seemed unable to douse the excited atmosphere, even of those Indian colleagues who had never seen weather like this before. The teams had prepared several features that dealt with supporting both Sweden and Finland, and they seemed to engage enthusiastically in figuring out how to get it done.



Illustration—24 teams met up in Helsinki to put together a plan for the next episode of development.

The country-head for Finland came by to wish us good luck, but also to stress that a lot of sacrifices had had to be made to fund our many teams. He had an important plea for us: ‘Please, please, please deliver!’ Other managers contributed to this plea. Now, we needed to ‘execute, execute, execute’. One particular comment

stuck with me, and I heard it taken up by several participants later. With the sacrifices that had had to be made elsewhere to free up funding for this programme, ‘we have blood on our hands’.

Questions arising from the narrative

In this project, I have explored how human relating allows the emergence of something from several partial understandings, which could not emerge from a single partial understanding alone. This last narrative causes me to wonder how the quality of our relating influences what emerges, and what this then means for how we can make ethical judgments about how to act in situ.

More specifically, I become interested in inquiring further into what could have contributed to making a difference between the gloomy Copenhagen session, where no team chose to work on the feature I had prepared, and the Helsinki one, where several teams had prepared several similar features themselves. Among the members of the programme management team; I felt increasing agreement that these issues had to be addressed now, and we had also received an official decision to do so. I wonder how that came about, though, since we had as a group had a fairly different view only a few months earlier. Had my own conduct in the period been ethical? Reflecting on the period, I seem to have done a lot of what I would call lobbying, rather than making a rational argument in formal decision forums. That is not really what orthodox methods and frameworks such as TOGAF prescribe. Had I influenced matters? Is this an acceptable way to go about my work? I grow interested in inquiring into whether there might be something in this experience which could be helpful to enterprise architects more generally. How does this experience and what I make of it compare and contrast with what contemporary authors write about enterprise architecture?

In P3, I inquired into how to arrive at a shared understanding and conclude that we do not arrive at a fully shared understanding or agreement. In this new narrative, we seem far from having what would, according to TOGAF, be seen as a shared or aligned understanding—neither across business units nor in the group managing the initiative. In a recent article, Bernus and other scholars within the enterprise architecture field (Bernus et al., 2015) question how enterprise architecture can have relevance for management of complex organisations. The authors explore possibilities for changing the current practice in the field, but in my view, they do not seriously question the fundamental taken-for-granted assumptions upon which the current practice is based. They acknowledge that with increasing scale and non-linear complexity a system cannot be completely modelled and controlled, and is perhaps not entirely observable and identifiable (ibid:3-4). They mention that ‘an interdisciplinary theory of change systems is needed, enabling management and control methods that accommodate the partial unpredictability of the change system’ (ibid:4), but then go on to prescribe different methods for reducing complexity and obtaining more control that does not deviate significantly from other orthodox literature. In drawing conclusions from this project, I would like to take up some of the questions they raise and investigate different views. It appears to me that the question of how to interpret and thus understand situations and options are among the subjects of day-to-day conflicting,

negotiating, and politicking, where a degree of shared understanding seems to be needed to find ways to collaborate, but where a degree of different partial understandings also seems important for being able to arrive at something novel. We actually seem able to collaborate to a significant extent without what Bernus et al. describes as ‘a coherent multi-aspect model of the enterprise’ (ibid:2). I will thus further investigate different views on how one can influence change processes and to what extent one can be in control of what it will be that emerges.

Ideals of control in orthodox methods hinges on making illegitimate people’s intentionality

In the three narratives in this project, I have shown how I have anticipations going into situations some of which turn out to be justified and others not. How situations unfold is somewhat predictable and somewhat unpredictable—you could even say predictably unpredictable. I cannot predict ahead of acting, for example, what will be the most fruitful way of transforming Nordea into a digital relationship bank, because I cannot predict how others in the organisation will respond to my actions, and because we as a group cannot predict how customers will respond, how our bank and non-bank competitors will respond, or how regulatory authorities will respond, to name but a few other stakeholders in the enterprise I am hired to ‘architect’.

Bernus et al. (ibid) contemplate whether it is indeed possible to model correctly enough aspects of an enterprise with enough detail to become able to use it to infer the effect of introducing any given cause, and thus become able to predict which line of action is optimal. They note that since ‘the enterprise and its environment includes humans, other living entities, and technology’ it is ‘a complex socio-technical-ecological system of systems’ and thus any model of the system will describe ‘only a partial or limited view of the interactions within the enterprise and with its environment’ (ibid:2). Even so, they conclude that enterprise architecture

must evolve to be able to represent, analyse and provide decision support for strategy making, planning, design and orchestration of changes... [The] quest for a fully integrated holistic view [of the enterprise] is ... fundamental to the purpose of the [enterprise architecture] discipline, and critical if our successful [enterprise architecture] practice model is to gain acceptance as relevant and valuable in the boardroom (ibid:4).

TOGAF has undergone changes similar to those of the general enterprise architecture profession. I refer in my projects to TOGAF version 9.1.

TOGAF has a solid history in IT architecture, considering the ways in which IT can support enterprise change. However, as TOGAF has grown in depth and maturity it has become a framework for managing the entire spectrum of change required to transform an enterprise towards a target operating model (Open Group, 2013:37).

The way Open Group works toward standardising the practice of enterprise architecture and certifying members of the profession seem similar to me to what James Scott (1998) calls ‘high-modernist’ ideology. Scott investigates a number of ‘large-scale schemes’ intended to ‘improve the human condition’, such as ‘collectivisation in Russia, the building of Brasília, compulsory *ujamaa* villages in Tanzania, and others—and uncovers conditions common to all such planning disasters’. Scott (ibid: 304-305) gives an example of ‘high-modernist’ ideology from modern agriculture which he finds to entail ‘uncritical, and hence unscientific, trust in the artefacts and techniques of what became codified as scientific agriculture’ followed by ‘an often explicit contempt for the practices of actual cultivators and what might be learned from them’. Scott attributes failures in these initiatives to a large extent to the loss of practical knowledge caused by this ideology’s dismissal of ‘knowledge that arrives in any form other than through the techniques and instruments of formal scientific procedure’. The privileging of certain knowledge by high-modernist ideology resonates with the claim of Collins & Evans, which I contested above, that certain expertise should be privileged when making what they call technical decisions. Bernus et al. (2015:6-8) seem stuck in a similar way of thinking. They accept that certain assumptions do not scale with system size, time horizon, and system scope such as being able to identify all of the system, model all relevant aspects, and ultimately based on observations of (or experimentation with) the system being able to build a model that allows the system to be controlled so as to assume a desired state and/or produce a desired output. They therefore look for a solution that ‘must demonstrate (i) how to understand and live with complexity, and/or (ii) how to reduce system complexity or otherwise resolve the issues created by it’. Even when they seem to accept complexity, and with it uncertainty, they still seek predictability and hope for a solution where scenarios can be analysed and where actions can be taken that at least cannot lead to an entirely unsatisfactory outcome.

The scientific basis for this is also taken up by Karl Mannheim, whom I quoted earlier. Mannheim (1936:166) finds that ‘the model of modern mathematical-natural science cannot be regarded as appropriate to knowledge as a whole’. He goes on to elaborate that:

Only that kind of knowledge was wanted which was free from all the influences of the subject’s *Weltanschauung*. What was not noticed was that the world of the purely quantifiable and analysable was itself only discoverable on the basis of a definite *Weltanschauung*. Similarly, it was not noticed that a *Weltanschauung* is not of necessity a source of error, but often gives access to spheres of knowledge otherwise closed.

Most important, however, was the attempt to eliminate the interests and values which constitute the human element in man... even from politics to reduce political discussion to a kind of general and universal consciousness which is determined by ‘natural law’ (ibid:168).

Mannheim's view that it is impossible not to have a *Weltanschauung* appears to me to resonate with Gadamer's (1975) view, which I wrote about in P3, that it is impossible not to have prejudice, and also with Fleck's (1935) idea that we form thought collectives with different thought styles mentioned above.

Mannheim's view leads me to add to my provisional argument that one of the crucial aspects glossed over when following an orthodox approach is the web of legitimate intentionality, which is made illegitimate by assuming full agreement with a disembodied 'organisation' as an entity having its own interests. The web of intentionality stems from the needs and wants of the people who are collaborating and organising what we call the enterprise. As mentioned above, I see these not as selfish but as social in that I have, for example, made commitments to others in the organisation which I need or want to be perceived as having honoured. I therefore become interested in inquiring further into what it would mean to make illegitimate the web of intentionality and how this is acted out in practice.

In this critique, I am aware that I take the formal written definitions of TOGAF at face value, and I am aware that some experienced practitioners interpret the views and prescriptive methods of TOGAF and similar EA frameworks and methods more nuanced. As described throughout my projects, I have, however, also often experienced that the fundamental taken-for-granted assumptions underlying these views and prescriptive methods are widely accepted. Therefore, I feel that it is appropriate and necessary for me to address them as they are stated, interpret what I take them to mean, and draw attention to where I agree and disagree.

Overreliance on orthodox methods and frameworks can lead to efficiency but loss of innovation

I argue above that human relating makes it possible for something to emerge in social circles, that—given our different thought styles, partial understandings, different experiential history, and more—could not emerge from each of the participating individuals alone. I discuss the quality of relating necessary to create openings for others into which they can contribute what we cannot, and allow others to create similar openings for us. Reflecting then on the last narrative, the quality of relating when members of the management team address the wider group appears to be different. The communication appears to be more unidirectional. Although there are questions raised and answers given, I do not feel that a lot emerges that is genuinely novel. That does not necessarily mean that what transpires is not useful. We seem to be in the last narrative transitioning from wanting to innovate towards wanting to execute, and it could be perceived to be more functional in this situation to have less reflectivity and reflexivity and more compliance with decisions already made. I wonder, however, if the lack of predictability I just discussed in the previous section would mean that there are risks to this approach.

In a recent journal article, Alvesson and Spicer (2012:1201) define functional stupidity as 'inability and/or unwillingness to use cognitive and reflective capacities in anything other than narrow and circumspect ways.'

It involves a lack of reflexivity, a disinclination to require or provide justification, and avoidance of substantive reasoning'. They elaborate on the concept:

... stupidity management involves a wide range of actors seeking to restrict and distort communicative action through the exercise of power. This can occur through direct interventions, agenda setting, propagating broader ideological beliefs, and creating subject positions... These processes of stupidity management are not mutually exclusive: they may work in tandem... The contradiction in the term ... points to the internal tension in the concept. Functionality indicates the potential benefits. Stupidity draws attention to the risks and problems involved... We see functional stupidity being created not through intellectual deficits but through political expediency and the operation of power. To put it another way, organizational members become functionally stupid through a series of cultural and institutional beliefs and arrangements salient in an economy of persuasion, and framing reinforced by managerial (and self-managerial) interventions (such as encouraging a narrow action orientation, the celebration of leadership, attachment to structure, a strong belief in institutions) which discourage reflexivity, substantive reasoning, and justification (ibid:1207; 1213-1214).

When, for example, the gathered teams are begged to 'please, please, please deliver', and to 'execute, execute, execute', this can be seen as a power play intended to clamp down probing and difficult questions. This *can* lead to desired outcomes. 'By refraining from asking difficult and probing questions, [organisations] can create a sense of purposefulness and certainty around the organisations' activities, despite the questionable basis of many of them' (ibid:1210). This sense of purposefulness can help individuals let go of their own uncertainty and insecurity and thus become more effective at what they are asked to do, and can give them a sense of being protected since they are not the ones 'calling the shots'. 'This sense of protection and security comes from the individual being able to avoid demanding thinking, concerns about their sense of self, and the risk of disapproval from authorities and peers. People do not insist too much on thinking for themselves, but assume that management knows best and/or that fashion or tradition represents superior knowledge' (ibid: 1208).

For me, who is seen as one of the leading actors, being as I am officially responsible for making architectural decisions, this means that I must factor into my ethical judgements that team members are as described above inclined to 'assume that I know best' or that 'what we usually do is superior'. When I chose to underplay uncertainty in the meeting I just narrated from, I am aware that I take a risk and take on some responsibility for the wellbeing of the team members. When I, in the first narrative, chose not to push the product owner into taking on implementing the feature I had brought to the meeting, it felt right, partly because I found the alternative to be a form of disciplining that seemed unethical in the situation. Not only was I afraid that they would do a bad job of it, if persuaded or coerced into selecting the feature. I also feared

that I would contribute to a longer term and deeper sense of distrust in the managers of the initiative. '[Functional stupidity] can also have negative consequences [which] can occur when a large dissonance appears between official sponsored discourse... and the lived realities of the individuals, and the organisations as a whole' (ibid:1210). Since the product owner was formally responsible for deciding what the team selected, a forceful intervention from me could have contributed to such dissonance developing not only in this team but also in the wider organisation.

Reflecting further upon the cybernetic roots of enterprise architecture, I begin to see this tendency to idealise alignment, combined with the tendency I describe in P2 to use process-reduced language and to idealise stability over change, to collude towards letting organisations appear more controllable than they actually are. Enterprise architecture evolved from management, architecture, and engineering of software and information systems in the early 1960's and adopted disciplines from these roots such as mathematics and cybernetics (Bernus et al., 2015:1; Coplien, 1999:40-41). Green & Welch (1988:289) define cybernetics as 'a process in which a feedback loop is represented by using standards of performance, measuring system performance, comparing that performance to standards, feeding back information about unwanted variances in the system, and modifying the system's comportment' which is 'the basis of control in any system and, thus, the foundation on which any definition of organisational control must rest'. Enterprise architecture is thus ultimately intended to be a means to ensure organisational control. Further, it can be seen that 'standards' are required to exist so that performance can be measured against these and the enterprise seen as a system then in a 'state' of either performing to these standards or not. If the system is found not to perform, corrective action must be taken to alter the systems behaviour to meet the defined standards for performance. This way of thinking relies on the ability of the enterprise architect to predict the effect caused by a given change in the systems behaviour and on a high degree of agreement between those in charge, that is, on standards of performance, how to measure performance, and so on. The assumed degree of predictability and agreement seems problematic in light of my narrated experience and above analysis.

Drawing on Latour, I describe in P3 how in IT we transcribe scripted action into material objects so that others can later use the object to the extent that we have predicted the needs of those users and have transcribed relevant responses to stimuli into the object. In this fairly mechanical process of transcribing scripted action, there is a high demand for precision and alignment of elements. Since objects with transcribed scripted action have no intentionality of their own and no capacity of reasoning, intuition, and spontaneity, they cannot respond reasonably to unexpected stimuli—something at which human actors excel. Enterprise architecture, with its roots in this somewhat mechanical setting, and managerialism more broadly at least to the extent that it also draws on cybernetics, assumes a similar degree of alignment in organisations. When managers perceive organisations as cybernetic systems and attempt to control them as such to achieve a desired state (Hatch, 1997: 328), any meaning-making differing from the meaning made by those managers

tends to be perceived in light of Shannon & Weaver's sender/receiver model (1949) as misunderstandings or noise that threaten to derail the control and feedback loops on which such management relies. 'Strategists are dependent upon other organisational members to act in ways that produce strategic objectives (as opposed to pursuing self-interest)' (ibid: 329), but I would add that strategists—according to this view—depend on others to interpret strategic objectives in the same way that they themselves do, and to value similarly what is beneficial to the organisation. TOGAF assumes that organisations are cybernetic systems and prescribes gathering, modelling, and analysing information before planning a change and then basing the planning and execution of actual changes on the models. This way of working

takes into account the complete set of gaps between the Target and Baseline Architectures in all architecture domains, and logically groups changes into work packages within the enterprise's portfolios. This is an effort to build a best-fit roadmap that is based upon the stakeholder requirements, the enterprise's business transformation readiness, identified opportunities and solutions, and identified implementation constraints (Open Group, 2013: 132).

In other words, TOGAF factors in to the change plan these aspects and elements in a way that relies on these being deterministic, static for the duration of the change initiative, and completely and correctly identified and modelled. To assume that this is possible, one must assume a Kantian view of causality as being more linear and formative rather than Stacey's & Mowles' (2016:256-257) view of causality as being more circular and transformational. Reflecting on this in light of what I write above about functional stupidity, orthodox enterprise architecture seems to encourage functional stupidity to a high degree. The question then arises why we would do that, given how much we talk about contributing to innovation, thinking out of the box, and disrupting businesses?

I have argued for perceiving orthodox enterprise architecture frameworks and methods as a means for organisational control that can be functional to the extent that we can accurately predict what will emerge when we gesture into a situation. Situations which Mannheim (mentioned earlier) would characterise as administration, already formed, seem more amenable to such an approach than do situations which Mannheim would characterise as politics, in the process of being formed. In my words, orthodox frameworks and methods in my field may be more helpful when managing and optimising standardised production than when innovating and disrupting. My provisional argument must thus also include that overreliance on orthodox frameworks and methods can contribute to what Alvesson and Spicer calls functional stupidity, which can be functional and useful, but which can also dampen reflection and reflexivity and thus decrease the likelihood that something genuinely novel emerges. In other words, it can lead to efficiency at executing what is already defined, but a loss of innovation and adaptation to the unexpected.

Trustful relationships help us tackle the unexpected together when we meet it

Taking a step back to reflect on the overall story, what appears actually to happen is that the state of affairs, our *habitus*, does change. It does so minutely all the time. If it did not, different business units and other groupings within the larger organisation would not over time have developed their own norms, values, language, and thought styles. They have, however, done so, and groupings on many levels in and even transcending the organisation are constantly negotiating and developing new we-identities. The multitude of different we-identities and thought styles, in turn, provides a challenge to ensuring collaboration on large-scale changes that have to be coordinated across different groupings in longer and longer action chains. These we-identities, as well as the identities of individuals,

emerge through identifying development processes. Being is processual. The problem of individual identity throughout life cannot be intellectually grasped, as may now be more clearly seen, until one takes account of the process-nature of a human being, and until people have at their disposal adequate conceptual tools, linguistic symbols for identifying development processes. (Elias, 1991:186).

Organising what we do and doing what we do are two aspects of the same process and so is negotiation of what to do together, who ‘we-together’ are, and how ‘we-together’ should behave—what Elias calls our social *habitus*. Using the nation as his example of a we-group, Elias (ibid:209) explains what I find applies to all we-groupings, which is that we often overcome ‘the contradiction between ... self-perception’ and our ‘emotional involvement in the we-group ... by a strategy of encapsulation’. I take this to mean that we have a self-perception and a perception of the group which we see as two distinct entities, and rarely do we articulate that it is us together who are forming the we-identity of the group, our *habitus*, just as much as our *habitus* forms us and enables and constrains what can emerge. Quite often I find that we do articulate that we are not ourselves entirely free to choose what to do. We do so with sentences such as ‘it had to be done’ or ‘there was no other alternative’. When we think and talk about the actions of others, however, it appears that we interpret most actions made by others as expressions of autonomous free will. We seem to assume that others are more in control of what is going on than we are. Similarly, the figuration of power that enables and constrains our own actions is often located (i.e. falsely assumed to reside) in ‘a person who exercises it’ (Elias, 1978:93-94).

When top executives formulate a new strategy and state that it is our goal as an organisation to become the leading digital bank in the Nordic region, it is, of course, an act that influences our we-identity. My argument, however, is that it is likewise influential how Aatto, Tolvi, Sobeska, and all the other team members including myself interpret what it means to be a leading digital bank and how we therefore choose to act in our daily work life. The power to influence is not equally distributed, but neither is it entirely monopolised. Strategy documents are artefacts that have a meaning when they are interpreted in action, and

they have the meaning they are interpreted to have relative to action. In these interpretations, there frequently are conflicts between views on what we individually take such artefacts to mean and equally frequent negotiations about what they should mean for us together, that is, our we-identity. Thus, we-identities emerge in somewhat unpredictable processes of everyday negotiations between participating members of we-groups. Such we-groups can be a team within a project-group, the wider project, or even people from different companies, for example, collaborating on bringing to market a new way of banking digitally. The artefacts are themselves produced in complex processes such as the process narrated in my P2. It is not a given, however, that those who were influential in the production of the artefacts are influential to the same extent in the process of interpreting the artefacts.

In former jobs, I have a number of times experienced ‘career advances’ that gave me greater responsibility for a larger portion of the architecture of the enterprise for which I worked. This however led to a steady increase in the distance I felt between the people whom I was supposed to guide and me. My guidance increasingly took the form of ‘thin simplifications’ (Scott, 1998), which left more and more to the interpretation and initiative of those I was supposed to guide. In my current job, which I took between P2 and P3, I feel that I am engaging much more directly with the people whom I am supposed to guide, and this has resulted in a very different dynamic. I do not have the empirical foundation for prescribing ‘moving closer to the action’ as a generally applicable prescription, but, for me, this change in approach appears currently to work more satisfactorily than what I have experienced in the recent past. This change also means that I engage more directly with people who come from a different habitus and thought collective than mine.

I find that to guide collaboration I must constantly work on what Collins and Evans (2002) terms ‘interactional expertise’, work on improving relationships and trusting that with stronger relationships we can create stronger results together despite, or perhaps because of, our differences. I strive to increase my inclusiveness and accept complexity, uncertainty, and the web of intentionality. In other words, I argue that I have to trust others to trust me sufficiently to be able to move on without a completely shared understanding, without predictable outcomes, but with a belief that we can tackle the unexpected when we meet it. I agree with Scott (1998) that we would learn more if we were better at remaining sceptical. Since I do not believe that it is possible to evolve our skills at modelling sufficiently ‘to be able to represent, analyse, and provide decision support for strategy making, planning, design, and orchestration of changes’, I must look for different ways of making prudent decisions. In this, it seems to help to put more effort into improving the quality of relating and accepting the web of intentionality as generative of ethical decisions.

Epilogue

The development programme is now well under way. In a meeting of the Programme Management team roughly a month into development, we were discussing how to get closer to being able to present to upper management how things are progressing according to plan. Our plan is of course not fully formed yet, and

there are too many variables for us simply to form it. Being mostly veterans, I did not sense much fuss over the fact that things are not entirely settled yet. We have 24 teams, but staffing is of course difficult and takes time, so not all teams have all their members yet. Many of those who have already joined the teams are mightily confused since so many things are different in this programme from what they have experienced before. A lot of decisions were made just before we started, and a lot of decisions are still being made after we have started, and the consequences of these need to be assessed and addressed. We agreed that this is as it must be at this stage, and we will continue incrementally to improve things as we move on, and we found an acceptable way to present our progress so far and our continuing challenges.

Concluding thoughts and a look ahead

In this project, my objectives have been to understand better how day-to-day conflicting, negotiating, and politicking is conducted. With these ends-in-view (Martela, 2015:553-555), I have inquired into my practice as an enterprise architect and challenged some assumptions of orthodox frameworks and methods in my field exemplified by TOGAF. I argue against assuming that a small group can plan and control the evolution of the enterprise, and against individuals being capable of harnessing complexity and determining how the enterprise evolves by adhering to the prescriptions of TOGAF. I argue that we organise what we do together as an aspect of what we do together. In other words, we cannot separate the acts of doing something from the acts of organising that something. Doing and organising are aspects of the same acts. The enterprise is an intentional process of organising—it is the organising which emerges and evolves when some people together intentionally pursue some *raison d'être*. Even if the people who make up the enterprise agree on what the *raison d'être* is, however, it will never be the only intention they pursue. Each will have multiple intentions. Among them will most likely be intentions to take care of themselves and their careers, and also to live up to commitments made towards others with whom they have strong relational ties. Some of these intentions are disclosed, others are not, some require people to collaborate, and some require people to compete to an extent. This web of intentions, the people, and their relational ties to each other make up a figuration. That figuration enables and constrains them. The influence from the figuration can be felt as a compulsory force. We have a tendency to locate this compulsion as emanating from a powerful individual, but it is the figuration itself that forms us, while simultaneously being formed by us together. What emerges from this simultaneous forming of and being formed by the figuration are, among other things, groupings, inclusions, exclusions, belongings, and not belongings, and thus identities. Defining who and what 'we' are is a key aspect of organising, and changing who and what 'we' are is a key aspect of 'managing' changes to the enterprise. When I say 'managing', I do not mean that any individual can 'decide' which identity should emerge, and 'control' what evolves so that that identity does emerge. Too many people with too many intentions are constantly engaged in conflicts and negotiations for one single member of the organisation to control it. However, all of us can and do influence what emerges. Our conduct as we conflict and negotiate, the quality of relating, does make a difference to what is more likely to, or even is possible to, emerge. In

situations where we want to generate ideas and innovate, it seems helpful to work towards improving the quality of relating itself, to establish trusting relationships, to become more aware of providing openings and paying attention to what others are contributing, and attempting to build on that, even when their contributions are not fully understood. In other situations, where we want to follow an already formulated plan efficiently, a measure of functional stupidity may actually be functional but may also suppress problems that we could benefit from addressing. Trust may be lost and may be difficult to re-establish later. Making sound ethical judgements about how to conduct ourselves is thus situational, and it may help one's ability to interpret the situation if one can become more detached about one's involvement.

Synopsis and critical appraisal of my research

New orthodox theories and methods have not improved our rate of success consistently and sustainably

As an enterprise architect, I work with managing organisational changes involving exploitation of technology and infrastructure, which in today's society is often Information Technology and Information Systems (IT/IS). Enterprise is the intentional activity of interdependent collaborating people, and it evolves over time. Since it takes time to develop infrastructure and technology, it is a challenge to ensure that the enterprise is at all times effectively and efficiently supported by infrastructure and technology including IT/IS. At a NATO conference in 1968 problems with “a widening gap between ambitions and achievements” in Software Engineering was called the “software crisis” (Naur & Randell, 1968:70-71), and as reflected in my first project (P1 in short) these problems have persisted even though many new frameworks and methods have been devised since then which guaranteed success to those who followed their prescriptions. I continued to experience some improvements, some failures and some disputed results rather than consistent and continuous improvements, and decided to inquire into why that might be.

Complex responsive processes of relating are a radically different perspective on organising

In my research I have therefore explored a radically different perspective on organising developed at the University of Hertfordshire called complex responsive processes of relating. In this perspective organisation is perceived as process. Interdependent people form social figurations in which organising what we do together is an aspect of doing it, which cannot be split as such from other aspects of doing things together (Stacey, 2011, 2012; Mowles, 2008, 2015; Stacey & Mowles, 2016; Griffin, 2002). This perspective draws on sociology and particularly on social behaviourism (Mead, 1934, 1936; Elias, 1978, 1991; Bourdieu, 1977). There are of course other theories that are critical of orthodox enterprise architecture. I chose to research on the Doctor of Management programme, and to study this perspective extensively, after having been acquainted with the perspective during my Diploma. I knew before I joined the programme that I did not fully understand the perspective, but it seemed promising with regard to understanding how people in enterprises influence each other and play power games, which seemed important for an Enterprise Architect.

Through my research projects I inquire into how I manage changes as an enterprise architect

In my projects I inquire into how I conduct my practice and into how well my conduct is explained by different theories. I have chosen TOGAF (The Open Group Architecture Framework) version 9 and ADM (Architecture Development Method), which is a widely used and referenced Enterprise Architecture framework and method⁶ (Open Group, 2013), and which is similar in its origin and taken-for-granted assumptions to other frameworks and methods for enterprise architecture (Giachetti, 2010:110-112), as my basis for comparison with orthodox theory. I hope that by using a well-known framework and method as a

⁶ I refer to ‘TOGAF and ADM’ as TOGAF. There were roughly 35.000 certified TOGAF version 9 professionals when I wrote P2, and 50.000+ when I wrote P4. This indicates that TOGAF is still a dominant framework and method.

reference point, most readers will be able to follow the distinctions I make. I compare and contrast these views with select other views which I find to be influential in the field of Software Engineering and Enterprise Architecture (Jacobson et al., 2013; Ross et al., 2006), and I compare and contrast all of this with the perspective of complex responsive processes of relating.

My way of researching and writing at the Doctor of Management programme

I have undertaken to augment my original training in the engineering and architecture fields by pursuing an inquiry into what Elias (1991) calls ‘social control’ and ‘self-control’, which he suggests arise both at the same time. The goal of my inquiry is not to produce a new framework and method, but to contribute new understanding to the field of enterprise architecture. I have taken a pragmatist standpoint inquiring with these ends-in-view, as suggested by Martela (2015) who is drawing on Dewey, into our conduct, and into how thinking differently about what we are doing might open up possibilities for considering different conduct.

When I began my research, I did not know and understand the method I was obliged to follow. Thus, my projects have also been learning experiences for me through which I have come to understand better the method I have been asked by faculty to follow. As a researcher at the Doctor of Management programme I am asked to take my experience when conducting my profession seriously, and to render the structures of my thinking about these experiences explicit (Mowles, 2015:31), including assumptions that I take for granted and am thus not normally consciously aware of. Achieving critical awareness of my habitual ways of thinking has been difficult, and has required much help from my learning set consisting of a supervisor and three fellow researchers with whom I regularly discuss our research in depth, as well as the complete faculty and cohort of fellow researchers on the programme with whom I discuss various theories and how they are taken up in practice. As mentioned in P2 there are of course taken-for-granted assumptions underlying any theory, and as observed by Alvesson & Sköldböck (2009:6) ‘we never see single sense-data, but always *interpreted* data... Seeing is inseparable from the perspective, it is *perspectival*’. Drawing on Alvesson (2009:162), I write in P2 that my reflective narrative research process entails a ‘struggle to ‘break out’ from the taken-for-grantedness of a particular framework that is already quite familiar’ and a ‘struggle with the dilemma of closeness/distance, balancing the two and knowing where to draw the line’. What I attempt to break out from is a “thought collective” (Fleck, 1935:82-99), and the struggle also entails breaking in to a different ‘thought collective’ with a distinct ‘thought style’. It has been equally challenging to achieve critical awareness of taken-for-granted assumptions both of the ‘thought style’ of my formal training, and also the ‘thought style’ which I have been ‘learning by doing’ as a researcher on the Doctor of Management programme.

I work reflectively and reflexively with narrative inquiry taking my experience of conduct seriously

Researchers on this programme are encouraged to take their work as an object of research using narrative inquiry to describe what is going on in their particular organisation or area of work focusing in particular on

how they influence and are influenced by their colleagues and how they account for the dynamic of stability and change. In this way researchers are asked to develop a critical understanding of the oeuvre of the Complexity and Management Group to become able to discuss its relevance for their own work by comparing and contrasting the perspectives they learn with other critical and more orthodox theories of organising. Thus, I have produced four projects and a synopsis in which I seriously engage with my experience of practicing Enterprise Architecture in an organisational setting, reflect upon my practice, and work reflexively with how I think about my practice, what it is that informs my habitual way of thinking, and how thinking differently might provide different opportunities. I use reflective narrative as empirical material describing my experiences and my thinking. I find narrative to have the potential of providing a rich insight into my intentions, actions, surprises, emotions and more. This approach is inspired by what Alvesson (2009) calls 'at-home ethnography' which concentrates on exploring the richness of a few situations, and then relies on one's general knowledge for evaluating what is fairly typical. Claims to generalisability are related to our ability (both author and reader) to refer to other situations in which we recognise the same theme or pattern. This indicates that the experienced situation is of some relevance for illuminating recognisable chunks of the organisational context in which the experienced situation plays out. My learning set comment regularly and thoroughly on my exploratory reflective narratives, and sometimes present me with probing questions that require me to reconsider and elaborate on my narrative, and sometimes present me with conflicts between my own understanding and those of others. Such conflicts of understanding provide an opportunity for reflexivity which Anderson (2006) describes as self-conscious introspection guided by a desire to better understand both self and others through examining one's actions and perceptions in reference to and dialogue with those of others. Reflexivity thus entails what Gadamer (1975) describes as foregrounding of prejudice. Gadamer defines prejudice as experience-based decision making including our taken-for-granted assumptions. Since understanding is emergent and always provisional, development of understanding requires awareness of a conflict between current and alternative understandings, current and alternative assumptions. Gadamer claims that we can use sincere questioning to suspend prejudice and open up possibilities, keeping them open so that our prejudices are properly brought into play by being put at risk. I have found meetings in my learning set and meetings with faculty and the wider cohort of researchers to provide such opportunities to explore conflicts between own and others' understandings. Holding on to questions and suspending the validity of answers however runs counter to norms at my work, in my profession, and in my schooling before joining this program. Any progress I may have made in this area has been laborious and messy.

I take a pragmatist position and use abductive reasoning, a position we could label ontological experientialism

I use a method termed 'abduction' by Alvesson and Sköldbberg (2009) to interpret an often surprising single case from various hypothetical overarching patterns, which if true explains the case in question. The method has some characteristics of both induction and deduction, but adds new, specific elements. During the

process the empirical area of application is successively developed and the theories (the proposed overarching patterns) are also adjusted and refined. In its focus on underlying patterns, abduction also differs advantageously from induction and deduction in that it includes understanding as well. I do not seek to provide an alternative that ‘can be followed’ but aim to contribute to an understanding of what is happening more generally in practice, rather than just illustrate that sometimes what happens in a particular situation is not what one might expect according to dominant theories. Abduction suits my purpose. I draw on theory from different fields in a multi-disciplinary exploration to the extent that such theory contributes interpretation that adds to understanding, or are representative of a view I want to compare and contrast to my own view to render my own position more explicit and clear. With reference to Charles Sanders Peirce, Martela (2015:539-540) posits that ‘the notion of abduction emerged originally as part of pragmatist philosophy’ and a pragmatist starting point ‘means that experience is taken as primary’. In my inquiry, I have taken a pragmatist position which ontologically ‘means an attitude that takes seriously the fact that ... we are living in a world in which we need to act’, which is a position we could label ‘as opposed to realism or constructivism – as *ontological experientialism*’ (ibid). Basing my research on pragmatism has implications for how I work with empirical material. As a researcher, I cannot take up an objective position outside of the domain I research and produce objective data describing it in the realist natural scientific meaning of the word objective. Engaging in local interactions, which is what we all do, what I can and do provide are insights gained from reflexive narratives where I attempt to attain a degree of detachment about my involvement (Elias, 1956). My empirical material is narrative accounts of ‘experience of interactions with others’ which must fit within the format of the research programme. I have had to be selective providing fragments of experiences narrated as honestly as I am capable of. I have not shared my narratives with those others who figure in them even though they may experience the situations differently, since my objective is not to give expression to every point of view. My narratives do not provide the truth about the situations and experiences I describe from a realist natural scientific standpoint, but instead offer deeper than usual insights into how I respond to situations with emotions, thoughts and actions. This enables me to demonstrate reflectivity and reflexivity, which I believe is central to learning especially when progressing beyond the level of novice or beginner in a field towards becoming an expert (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986:16-51). I have shared my narratives and reflective and reflexive analysis with my fellow researchers and supervisor on the program, and developed my inquiry in conversations with research colleagues. By responding to and reflecting on challenges towards the honesty of my narratives from my colleagues I have striven to arrive at something that is more objective and plausible than simply my subjective opinions.

I render my ends-in-view explicit and seek to provide good enough understanding to bring my inquiry to rest
Martela (2015:540-541) posits that

Dewey wants to replace the words *belief* and *knowledge* with the term *warranted assertability* to emphasise the ever-evolving nature of human convictions (Dewey, 1938, p.7). Warranted assertions are outcomes of inquiry that are so settled that we are ready to act upon them, yet remain always open to be changed in the future...

Individuals ... come up with their convictions ... as parts of a community of inquirers which further sets norms for reasoned justification of one's warranted assertions... we might call the epistemological position of pragmatism *fallibilistic instrumentalism*.

In my case the norm setting community of inquirers has been the faculty and fellow researchers at the Complexity and Management Group. For a reader who is not a member of this thought collective it may appear that I accept unquestioningly the particular perspective of this community as gospel truth from the very outset, and that my criticism of other theory is unsubstantiated. My claim though is that throughout my research I have worked with empirical material from my professional career, and I have conducted reflective and reflexive analysis where initially each theory and perspective has been given equal opportunity to explain what is occurring in my empirical material. I have then chosen to emphasise those explanations that I felt to be most warranted. I have not included every theory in existence in this inquiry, and it would be impossible for me to do so in the three-year period in which I have conducted the research. Thus, I have in my research pre-selected the perspective of complex responsive processes of relating as included, and I have excluded some other perspectives and theories. I have included those perspectives and theories that I deemed most influential in my profession as an enterprise architect and in the wider field of change management. According to Martela (2015:553), Dewey uses the term “ends-in-view” to describe ‘aims of the inquiry [which] are not things lying outside of inquiry but something that arises and function within it... [and] ends-in-view is what can “finally bring [inquiry] to rest”’. For me this means that my inquiry is “good enough” when I contribute something to academia and practice that has warranted assertability and satisfies my ends-in-view. In this inquiry, my ends-in-view have been as stated in P1 to study ‘more thoroughly the premises of the dominant methods and frameworks of my field and compare these to alternative views on processes for being influential in an organisational setting working as an expert with the complex domain of business changes involving IT/IS’. Throughout my inquiry, I have revised my question and in P4 I undertake ‘to understand better how [the] day-to-day conflicting, negotiating and politicking is conducted, how this compares and contrasts with our officially chosen framework and method for Enterprise Architecture known as TOGAF, and what I might do differently to improve how I engage in all of this’. With these ends-in-view I find my method appropriate.

Critique of my method and of the perspective of complex responsive processes of relating

My method and the social figuration within which I conduct my inquiry, like any social figuration, enables and constrains what emerges through my inquiry. I play a part in this myself in my adaptation to what I find

to be socially acceptable on the Doctor of Management program influenced by my relationships with others and the unequal distribution of power in this particular figuration between faculty members, researchers on the program, the University ethics board, to name a few. Among the things that we frequently negotiate on the programme is what it takes for something to be a 'good enough' narrative. I have come to understand that on this programme any 'good enough' narrative must exhibit the tensions between actors in the social figuration in which the narrated action takes place, so that readers get an impression of what is at stake for the actors. Thus, empirical material produced using this method is more enabling of inquiry into interpersonal relationships, since human intentionality inevitably leads to tensions, and more constraining of inquiry into for example the role of materiality, since material objects have no intentionality and feel no tension. What I find to be the most important critique of the method followed on the programme more generally is therefore that it leads to a filtering of experiences before reflective and reflexive analysis is conducted. As a result, research on the programme emphasises social figuration and more or less ignores materiality except in its role in social objects in social figuration. I have chosen to write about working with materiality beyond what is described in my narratives as such, which is not strictly in accordance with the method of the programme, because I deem this to be necessary for arriving at an analysis relevant to my field of Enterprise Architecture, which includes the interplay between engineering of the physical objects themselves and emergence of ways of acting towards these as an element of social objects. I consider the relationship between physical and social objects a central theme for the profession of Enterprise Architecture.

At the time of writing P3 I struggled with addressing issues that I found to be important, and reflecting on how that played out I believe it to be tied to the critique of the method I have just given. One of the issues I struggled with during P3 is that the perspective of complex responsive processes of relating perceives organising entirely as patterns of interaction between people (Stacey, 2012:9-22) i.e. the interplay of actions conducted by people only, whereas I see organising as an interplay of action conducted by people and scripted action conducted by physical mechanisms i.e. including exploitation of physical objects and engineering of physical objects to be exploited later. Stacey & Mowles (2016:371) draw on Mead in writing for example that 'from a complex responsive processes perspective [a National Health Service trust in the UK] is the iterated patterning of communicative interaction between large numbers of interdependent persons and groupings of them'. To augment this perspective with insights into how we shape materiality and construct physical objects, which can later have function for us as elements of social objects, I draw therefore primarily on Andrew Pickering (1993) and Bruno Latour (1988; 2005). Latour (2005:8, 63-86) claims that taking-for-granted which (e.g. human) actors should be included in the social and which (e.g. non-human) actors should be excluded confuses what should be explained with the explanation. I agree with Latour that what he calls non-human actors or actants, what I call physical mechanisms or technological

tools, cannot be excluded from an inquiry such as mine, since my declared ends-in-view entails contributing understanding of how we work with Enterprise Architecture.

There are other authors who are critical towards orthodox enterprise architecture, software engineering and information systems theory. Claudio Ciborra (2002:9) for example attempts to contribute ‘passion and improvisation; moods and bricolage; emotions and workaday chores’ to the information systems field, and describes how rationalisations of actions and orthodox theories can reinforce each other and ‘reproduce a self-sealing blindness to the new and the extant’ (ibid:175). I have included only a few critical authors since my objective is not to summarize every warranted critique of orthodox ways of working, but rather to augment a very orthodox way of perceiving and going about influencing changes with a different perspective of what it means to be influential, exercise power and engage in the politics of organising and re-organising.

Stacey (2011:450) describes how the generalised tendency to act towards technology is particularised when technology is acted towards as an element of a social object in a given situation. ‘The possibility of technological transformation arises in this particularising as techniques are spontaneously adapted to variations in specific situations and then potentially amplified’. I agree with Stacey’s view on how physical objects are acted towards by human user as elements of social objects once the physical object exists. However, I disagree with Stacey’s view on how technological objects come into being. By comparing, contrasting and combining elements of Stacey’s view with elements of the views of Latour and Pickering I have developed a view of how mechanisms and other man-made physical objects come into being where it is only *demand* for function provided by objects that emerges in particularisations of generalisations, but where an actual mechanism as a physical object which may or may not satisfy this demand arises in a mangle of practice i.e. accommodation of physical resistance (Pickering, 1993) where we transcribe scripted action (Latour, 1988) into the mechanism. Building a smartphone app for example requires among other things that glass and aluminium for the smartphone are physically constructed from sand and aluminium ore (accommodation of physical resistance) and that software is programmed (transcription of scripted action). Neither of these processes can be entirely done by simply having conversations. More than conversations and more than people are involved in organisation of this kind – it requires also sand, aluminium ore, a great amount of energy, and of course also the collaboration of many interdependent people in an action-chain spanning several companies.

I contribute warranted assertability of knowledge that I find useful to the Enterprise Architecture discourse

What I contribute is not what positivist scientists conceive of as universally valid. As stated above, that is not my goal. In the words of Mannheim (1936:167) who objects to the position in “positivism” as a “style of thought” where ‘nothing is regarded as “true” or “knowable” except what could be presented as universally valid and necessary ... it is easily possible that there are truths or correct intuitions which are accessible only

to a certain personal disposition or to a definite orientation of interests of a certain group'. What I rather attempt is to

- render my ends-in-view explicit,
- provide narratives where I exhibit my experiences of actions,
- provide reflective interpretation of these experience,
- provide reflexive analysis of how I habitually interpret so as to
 - render my assumptions and prejudices explicit, and
 - question what other assumptions, prejudices and ways of interpreting might contribute.

Hereby I aim to provide you as a reader with the best possible means to judge for yourself whether you find my assertions warranted to a degree where acting upon them makes sense.

Critical appraisal of my research projects and further reflective and reflexive analysis

(P1) Why are attempts at helping others by providing useful IT/IS often not deemed successful?

In my first project (P1) I explore how I became who I currently am. This provides the reader of my thesis with some insight into my scientific position and how I came to take this position.

Despite frequent improvements to theories and methods our rate of success has not improved

Since childhood I have been fascinated by the seemingly endless possibilities for helping others by exploiting information technology and information systems (IT/IS). This interest led me to seek a career in the field of Enterprise Architecture, where I came to see 'enterprise' as process (i.e. doing business) and 'architecture' as a means to influence how we are doing business, including but not limited to deploying IT/IS that perform part of the action⁷ of doing business. I describe how throughout my career my colleagues and I adopted one method after the other to ensure that we created the IT/IS solutions that were needed (Zachman, 1987; Sowa & Zachman, 1992; Beyer et al. 1988, 1991; Doucet et al. 2009; Open Group, 2013), and note at the time of writing P1 that none of these methodological changes seemed to make much of a difference i.e. our rate of success seemed unaffected by changes to our methods described as improvements.

I would add now, that these methods are all based on the assumption that we can bring about a pre-determined future state (of affairs) stepwise in a controlled manner, and that before we begin to bring it about we can determine through analysis of facts which steps we need to take to arrive at this desired 'future state'. What I rather experienced was not only 'resistance to change' from people who seemed to feel misrepresented in our description of our desired 'future state', but also an apparent inability to predict which effects a given change would have and thus an inability to correctly determine which steps were needed to arrive at our desired 'future state'. Although the ability to coerce or persuade seems central to avoiding

⁷ By action I do not here mean the wilful action of a self-conscious being, but merely something performed by someone or something including the workings of a mechanism.

‘resistance to change’ these methods typically do not mention power and power-plays, which I found increasingly puzzling. Over time this has led me to inquire into how social control and self-control are acted out in practice.

Others in my field have posited critique of orthodox theories and methods for example Len Fehskens (2011), Vice President of Skills and Capabilities at The Open Group, who critiques in a blog post that ‘we refer to an enterprise as a ‘sociotechnical system’, but the ‘socio’ too often gets short shrift while the “technical” gets the bulk of the attention’. Fehskens distinguishes between architecture of the entire enterprise, which he claims must be a ‘soft’ discipline, and architecture of an enterprise’s IT assets and capabilities, which he calls Enterprise IT Architecture. Fehskens posits that it is ‘not possible to specify an enterprise’ completely and in detail, and it is also not necessary to do so. It may be possible to do so for Enterprise IT Architecture, ‘and maybe that’s where the idea that the same can be said of the enterprise as a whole comes from’. Many authors make similar distinctions between architecture of IT (to support some business) and architecture of organising that business, and between an architectural scope of one organisation/company and an architectural scope of the entire process of fulfilling someone’s needs, in which a particular company/organisation may play a limited role (Lapalme, 2012:39), (Graves, 2012), (Guenther, 2013).

In a later blog post, Fehskens (2012) addresses the high number of different views in the discourse concerning what Enterprise Architecture is. He mentions that in his study of different views and why they are different he has noticed that people make different assumptions and take different approaches, but that they are ‘almost never explicit about them’ and that ‘one of the most widespread and consequential assumptions we make is that we all share the same assumptions’.

I will be as clear as possible about the assumptions I make in my thesis, and will in my summary render explicit my current assumptions and compare and contrast these with assumptions underlying various theories and perspectives. I find the distinction Fehskens makes between architecture of the IT of an enterprise, and architecture of the enterprise itself, interesting and will return to this later.

Rendering explicit my assumptions and adopting a different way of thinking required extensive help

Reflecting on my work in P1 I became curious about investigating more thoroughly the premises of the dominant methods and frameworks of my field, and hence my own taken for granted assumptions and prejudices. I sought to formulate a research question while writing P1, contextualised via an autobiographic reflective narrative which describes key influences and formative experiences in relation to my being, thinking and acting. I experienced writing on the Doctor of Management programme as a thoroughly disturbing process through which my very identity as a professional was being questioned and reformed. I also experienced it as a thoroughly social process however, in which my supervisor, fellow researchers and faculty commented on what I was writing, questioned my particular interpretations as well as my ways of

interpreting, pointed me towards theories that might provide alternative and interesting interpretations and thus helped me question my taken-for-granted assumptions critically and investigate alternatives. My habitual ways of thinking and acting are somewhat automatic and hasty, and since we are normally not consciously aware of our taken-for-granted assumptions the help I received from my fellow researchers and faculty was crucial for me to develop a different way of thinking and acting.

Reflecting on what I wrote in P1 compared to how I now begin to perceive things, I find that my emphasis and focus has shifted. In P1 I use the word ‘complexity’ in the way it is typically used within my field where the meaning is taken to be similar to ‘complicated’ albeit stronger. I describe how I have worked throughout my career with complexity at an ever increasing scale, when in fact I was conscious at the time only of having to construct increasingly complicated models to capture what I found at the time to be important aspects of reality that needed to be modelled as suggested by for example Kotter (1995) and TOGAF (Open Group, 2013) in order to understand the current (as-is) state of affairs, and the desired (to-be) state of affairs so that a transition from as-is to to-be could be controlled. Throughout my career my awareness grew of the multiplicity of aspects that influences changes. Relative to the changes we desired, it became increasingly impossible within reasonable time for my colleagues and me to model it all. Initially I did not reject however the idea that there is linear causality between means and ends and thus that it makes sense to plan change processes by backtracking from desired ends to necessary means, and then control change by bringing about those means that will result in the desired ends. In retrospect, I will add that I also did not challenge that change processes were normally carried out as projects i.e. temporary organisations with a start and an end date, and that actual changes to how business was conducted were usually excluded from the project’s scope and left for ‘the business’ to deal with after the project had ended.

Exploring how I became who I currently am has also provided me with a background for reflectivity and reflexivity. For example, I reflect in P1 on how I reversed roles with my mother, in effect becoming her primary care person. To some extent I see a similar pattern of relating expressed in my sincere intention of helping my direct manager in P2, which is typical (or habitual) behaviour for me. Through conversations with others I can glean that it is somewhat atypical behaviour for others. In a specific discussion of my narratives with others I was thoroughly questioned about whether this behaviour is good both for me and for the persons I so seek to help. I find it to be valuable to reflect on such patterns of behaviour. Reflection and reflexivity helps me consider whether to seek to change my habitual behaviour or whether to seek to hold on to it. I am not saying that I can consciously simply “change my mental models”, but becoming aware of such patterns of behaviour and their roots helps in potentially changing or accepting them.

The research question that emerged from my reflections (cf. page 2424) emphasises the problematic nature of the use of models. These are idealised simplifications of desired ends, and means deemed necessary to bring about these ends. I also reflect on the polarisation of ‘IT’ as something apart from ‘the business’ which

I perceive as a pattern of splitting (Smith & Berg, 1987:216-217;222). More generally I problematise the absence of interpretations of political games and power plays in methods and theories of change management processes widely adopted within my field.

(P2) Organising as figurations of relationships always in flux, rather than stable states of affairs

The experience I explore in P2 took place in my former job as an enterprise architect in Nykredit, the fifth largest Bank and largest borrower in Denmark.

In each particular situation our relationships with others enable and constrain what it is acceptable to do

I got engaged in negotiating the role of IT in a new corporate strategy being formulated following a shake-up. The CEO and COO had just been replaced and the CIO and many other employees had left the company. In this strategising process I negotiated my own role feeling simultaneously enabled to do some things through my relationship with other participants and constrained from doing other things. The other participants were all vice presidents, and one was my line manager. I did not mention in the project that I have at different times actually also reported to the other two, and we all knew each other and usually got along quite well. What I did mention was that I sensed an absence of the usual jovial banter, relaxedness and openness and interpreted this as an undercurrent of jockeying for power between the vice presidents in the wake of the shake-up.

At the time of writing P2 I received a lot of help from my learning set with becoming aware of gestures that could be seen as power plays and understanding better the political power games that were also occurring mixed in with the more technical work. I think it helped that two of my fellow students were Israeli and very attuned to power games. It took some time for me to understand what were pertinent details in a narrative, and what were not. The fact that I had a long and intimate history with each of these vice presidents for example I regard today as a pertinent detail, but at the time I did not recognise its importance and I therefore did not mention it.

In this particular setting, I felt constrained from being as critical towards my manager's viewpoints as I normally was when we were alone. Here I feared to weaken her position relative to other vice presidents if I undermined her suggestions. The vice presidents did not agree on a course of action, but were very guarded when responding to suggestions from the others that conflicted with their own suggestions.

Organisational changes emerge through myriad interactions between people with or without a plan

As the negotiations progressed we included another vice president in our group, after which the dynamics of the group changed. Here I should probably add that I had less of a history with that particular vice president. He had earlier been the manager of my manager before she was elevated to the rank of vice president herself, and when we were alone she insinuated that she resented not feeling recognised by him as an equal now. In the group, we had earlier agreed that we wanted to present a number of scenarios to the board of directors.

The newest group-member suggested presenting instead the optimum IT solution. This was rejected by the others in the group. We then discussed each of the particular scenarios we wanted to present. Each of these scenarios was critiqued in turn, and the newest group-member criticised them to the point of rejecting them. Fearing that all scenarios but one would be discredited I found myself as a non-manager able to react somewhat more strongly against this than any of the others seemed willing to do. As I did so I used humour to mask my resistance, which is a pattern often seen when speaking up against authority (Scott, 1990). We ended up sticking to the idea of presenting scenarios. It is impossible for me to say whether my intervention caused this or whether it would also have ended like this without my intervention.

At a later meeting, I found that we were underreporting in our presentation certain unintended but potentially severe adverse effects for our business of one of our proposed scenarios. I felt enabled and compelled to speak up more forcefully than the others. This time my protests were overruled however. Later in the process I had the opportunity to speak directly with the COO, and she accepted a brief outlining these potential adverse effects. I learned later that when the scenarios were finally discussed with the board, it was decided to conduct an investigation of the potential adverse effects for our business of this particular scenario.

Reflecting on this experience it became clear to me that the process I described emerged not according to some blueprint or design, but rather through myriad interactions between people who all influence the outcome. None of the participants could control or determine the outcome alone, not even the COO or CEO. I perceive strategising as political negotiations where ethics emerge from shifting patterns of relationships, and where ethics is thus always situational. It is neither possible nor perhaps even desirable to eliminate ambiguity and uncertainty (Jackall, 2010). I have relationships with all of the other people who are also engaged in this process. When acting, I take into consideration that I do not want to endanger relationships that are important to me. The simultaneous enabling and constraining that I experience can be interpreted as power differentials inherent in any relationship where one person has function for another. The person who depends relatively more on the function provided by the other typically has less power in that particular relationship. Since people are included into, or excluded from, groupings all the time these myriad power differentials form a relational figuration always in flux and never in a stable state (Elias, 1978, 1991).

A social theory of interdependence would argue that people are born into relationships with our primary care persons and others (Burkitt, 2008), and that we depend on the function that care persons and other persons have for us. We learn over time that certain patterns of behaviour enhance the likelihood of maintaining relationships to others who provide function for us. We likewise learn that other certain patterns of behaviour increase the likelihood that such relationships will wither away. We generalise our perception of how others typically respond to certain behaviour. Thus, we form an expectation of the general tendency (not certainty) of others to act in certain ways given certain circumstances. This general tendency to act, we take into account when we act ourselves, even though this is often done unconsciously (Mead, 1934). Since we

depend on others and thus value relationships we discipline ourselves as we grow up into behaving in a socially acceptable (i.e. civilised) way, based on experience from myriad interactions with others in which we experienced valued relationships to be either strengthened or weakened by certain behaviour of ours. Drawing on Elias (1978, 1991) I posit that civilisation emerges in this way as a global pattern from myriad local interactions without any prior blueprint or plan. Organising in smaller groups – such as among the employees and owners of a company – emerges in a similar fashion, and will emerge whether or not there is a blueprint or plan.

I challenge idealisation of stability and perception of change as occurring temporarily between stable states

Götze (2013) describes how orthodox theories understand an organisation as a system where processes are predefined and people participate by playing out and sticking to predefined roles (Smith & Erwin, 2005). In contrast, I find that I constantly negotiate my role. I problematise the use of process reduced language and the idealisation of stability, which is characteristic of commonly used methods and theories in my field. As examples of this general tendency I describe how we model a current (as-is) state (of affairs), a desired (to-be) state and then perform a gap analysis where we assume that certain means will lead to certain ends if all other influential factors remain stable, thus implicitly assuming linear causality (Kotter, 1995; Open Group, 2013).

In a relational process view of organisation perceived as interdependent people organising their working together, meaning emerges through the social act of gesturing and responding and meaning is thus influenced by all those who participate, who have intentions and motives I cannot know. As a participant, I do not know in advance how my own gestures will be recognised and responded to, nor do I therefore know what meaning will arise from making them (Mead, 1934). Complexity in this view means that causality is transformative and non-linear which means that the smallest change in stimuli can have vast effects or none at all, commonly referred to as ‘the butterfly effect’. When a lot is at stake, it is this unpredictability that makes these complex responsive processes of relating so exiting – and yet sometimes so frightening – to engage in (Stacey, 2011, 2012).

The influence towards orthodox ways of thinking extends well beyond methods and frameworks of my field

In P2 I critique a general tendency in my profession towards applying with little reflection the simplifying frameworks and context-free or simplified prescriptive rules described in methods such as TOGAF, and even see a widespread drive towards becoming certified practitioners of such methods. I perceive this as a form of “isomorphism” common to professions, which can create ‘a pool of almost interchangeable individuals who occupy similar positions across a range of organisations’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Particularly in the financial sector regulatory authorities can also be seen to contribute to the phenomenon of isomorphism. I will now provide an example of regulatory requirements which we are in Nordea obliged to comply with,

and will seek to demonstrate some of the assumptions and approaches underlying this particular regulatory requirement.

According to the Bank of International Settlements⁸ (BIS) Nordea must as a global systemically important bank (G-SIB)⁹ comply with for example ‘Principles for effective risk and data aggregation and risk reporting’ (BIS, 2013:§14). Adhering to the principles is assumed to ‘enhance risk management and decision-making processes at banks’ (ibid:§9). The principles prescribe that banks ‘strive towards a single authoritative source for risk data per each type of risk’ (ibid:§36d) catalogued in a framework of models accompanied by a “dictionary” of the concepts used, such that data is defined consistently’ (ibid:37). The data in the models should inform decisions which could include decisions concerning ‘any new initiatives, including acquisitions and/or divestitures, new product development, as well as broader process and IT change initiatives’ (ibid:§29b), and only the data in the models should inform such decisions:

Reliance on expert judgment in place of complete and accurate data should occur only on an exception basis, and should not materially impact the bank’s compliance with the Principles. When expert judgement is applied, supervisors expect that the process be clearly documented and transparent so as to allow for an independent review of the process followed and the criteria used in the decision-making process (ibid:§25).

Materiality ... means that data and reports can exceptionally exclude information only if it does not affect the decision-making process in a bank (i.e. decision-makers ... would have been influenced by the omitted information or made a different judgement if the correct information had been known) (ibid:§23).

I interpret this to assume that it is possible to create models that reflect every piece of information which can and should inform decisions, which in turn assumes that we can pre-determine which information will be required to make decisions in the future i.e. a degree of determinacy which I have argued against drawing on Mead, Elias and Mannheim. This I see as an example of what I describe drawing on Scott (1998:304-305) as “high-modernist” ideology which idealises knowledge represented in artefacts constructed and codified in a certain “scientific” way, and a similar mistrust of knowledge of a practical nature such as *phronetic* expertise. I experience the requirement to comply with such ideological regulatory requirements as hindering the adoption of techniques and approaches that are radically different from the dominant discourse in organisational theory and orthodox enterprise architecture, even when these as described in my projects seem to have a positive effect on how we go about making changes to how we conduct business.

⁸ BIS is an international regulator of financial institutions made up of 60 member central banks, representing countries from around the world that together make up about 95% of world GDP.

⁹ Source: ‘G-SIBs as of November 2014 allocated to buckets corresponding to required level of additional loss absorbency’ [Online]. Available at: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/gsib/gsibs_as_of_2014.htm [Accessed 26th June 2016].

(P3) Self-disciplining by resisting and surrendering to influences and learning reflexively

Between writing P2 and P3 I took on a job as chief enterprise architect in Nordea, the largest financial services group in the Nordic and Baltic region. In Nordea I took part in establishing Digital Banking, a newly formed profit & loss business unit.

Organising is an aspect of getting things done and the figuration is always in flux and never in a stable state

I explore in P3 how my colleagues and I go about changing Nordea's ways of working. What we attempt is to bring to market IT/IS aiming at helping corporate customers (businesses) improve their ways of managing their financials. To do so we seek knowledge about the financial needs of our customers and how well these needs are met by customers' current ways of managing their financials. In a meeting in Stockholm I described for my new colleagues some techniques inspired by design thinking whereby we can map out what we think customers do to have their financial needs fulfilled, and how they feel emotionally while doing it. This technique is called 'Customer Journey Mapping' (Guenther, 2013:147). I sensed some raised eyebrows and generally felt that concepts like emotions and customer journeys were unfamiliar to my colleagues, but also sensed that everyone was excited at attempting to take the perspective of customers. We solicited help from management consultants and a design bureau and began mapping customer journeys while negotiating what we wanted to bring to market. During a review, I tried to articulate that I thought that we had neglected a particular aspect, which during our workshops seemed important to us. In this situation, I felt alone in voicing critique and felt that consultants took turns rejecting my invitation to rethink and map this aspect. Realising *in situ* an unfortunate dynamic of conversation I attempted to engage a colleague, who had expressed earlier that this aspect was important, by asking him directly what he thought about it. He did express guarded sympathy for my views, but also stated that we should listen to the consultants who were the experts. Sensing that I could not mobilise a coalition in support of my views I abandoned further resistance.

Reflecting further on this episode I would like to draw attention to how coalitions form (e.g. among consultants) or do not form (e.g. among my colleague and me) spontaneously as an aspect of doing what we are doing. The figuration of relationships and groupings, and stronger or weaker belonging to groupings, is constantly being negotiated and is always in flux. Considering what I later wrote in P4 about awareness of our relative positions in a figuration I will add that the consultants had at that time a 5-week contract with Nordea, and we were in the 4th week during this review. My Nordea colleagues and I were just embarking on an initiative that we expected to take years to complete. The consultants probably hoped that by delivering convincing material they might sway Nordea's managers to hire them again later, and we actually did hire them for another period later. Earlier in my career I would have excluded such observations as irrelevant to how important it was to deal with that aspect, but now I see them as central to understanding the power plays that occurred during the meeting, and as important to take into account when judging whether what we arrived at was 'good enough' for us as a group in this particular situation. By 'good enough' I mean here a

socially negotiated acceptance, which is not an idealisation but deals with the messy reality of being able to take the next step together.

By acting into an emerging figuration we learn something about it which we cannot know before we act

As we got closer to building or acquiring a solution we could bring to market a lot of hard choices had to be made. Returning from a weeklong vacation I discovered that some decisions had of course also been made while I was not present. Figuring out what these decisions meant was difficult though, even after only a week of vacation. What we communicated in one-line sentences in fleeting encounters in the hallway conveyed little meaning and provided poor conditions for learning about the implications of what had been decided. Over time I learned that we had decided to reuse requirements from another initiative, which bothered me, but which I was not immediately able to overturn. Later our customer/user experience specialist demonstrated sketches of what our user interface might look like. Using her sketches, I drew attention to how the steps supported in this solution, should we build it, differed from what was described in our customer journeys. We consequently decided to modify our design through a couple of workshops.

Reflecting on these experiences I notice how our understanding of certain terms such as ‘customer journey’ evolves over time. We negotiate the meaning of such terms with the people we immediately interact with (Mead, 1934), and thus when we are excluded from some grouping, even temporarily, the meaning might change without us noticing it immediately. More generally language as well as understanding evolves continuously in social circles in which that language is used to communicate emerging understanding. Individuals frequent multiple social circles where language and understanding evolves differently. Jargon for example can be incomprehensible if one was not included in the social circles where that jargon evolved (Elias, 1991:171). Inquiring into how understanding emerges I combine the views of Gadamer (1975:280-310), who suggest using reflective questioning to suspend the validity of our taken-for-granted a priori judgments (prejudice), with the views of Mead (1934:98-99), who claims that delayed reaction is necessary for us to make intelligent or reflective choice among alternative responses.

When we reviewed sketches, these acted as a question which temporarily at least suspended our prior judgment that requirements from a different initiative would work well enough. This opened up a possibility of achieving movement of understanding by probing reflectively into the differences between what we expected and what we experience when reviewing the sketches. I begin to see conflicts as recognition of such differences between expectations and experiences, which can be taken as invitations to reflectively question our prejudice. Such an invitation can of course also be rejected, as illustrated with the prior example where I challenge that we have dealt sufficiently with a particular aspect of the customer’s journey. Movement can never be guaranteed, and we therefore have to weigh the social cost of conflicting (e.g. risk of exclusion) against the value of potentially achieving movement.

While writing P3 I was struggling a lot with suspending the validity of my own taken-for-granted a priori judgements. Throughout my career, I had developed habits of thinking very hastily and not very deeply. I was advised by faculty members to slow down my thinking, but at work slowing down my thinking runs counter to dominant norms and values. The facilitation conducted by consultants is an example of our habitual conduct which does not promote significant reflection about our judgments such as why we value one way of working over another. Shallowness may aid in being able to suggest recognisable solutions, and hastiness may aid in being able to do so quickly. Both of these traits are valued positively, and this contributed to my discomfort while struggling to slow down my thinking to become more reflective and aware of my taken-for-granted assumptions.

To follow prescriptions in particular situations we must interpret them, which has ethical implications

In another narrative, some colleagues discuss how to apply our method. The method can be seen as a set of prescriptions for how certain things should generally be done. When using the method, we must interpret how to follow prescriptions in the particular situations we find ourselves in. Drawing on Mead, Stacey & Mowles (2016: 366-367) and Griffin (2002: 115-122) refer to this as generalising and particularising. Often generalisations encompass value judgements, for example that one way of working is judged to be generally better than other ways of working, which is referred to as an idealisation. In our everyday work, we are always in a particular situation when we draw on generalisations and idealisations, and in order to determine how to adhere to them we must interpret what they mean in relation to this particular situation. This is often not straight forward as multiple generalisations and idealisations might apply in any given situation, and these may be ambiguous and may conflict to some extent. Furthermore, different people may be inclined to interpret these differently. I will provide examples of this in the following drawing on my narratives here in P3, and I will return to this in P4.

Our manager challenged whether all sections of a description were useful for those who depended on having such descriptions available. In this particularisation of the abstract generalisations of the method he judged that we could skip certain sections in our particular situation and save ourselves some work, without causing other problems. Later a colleague and I challenged our use of the term ‘delighter’ to label some quite mundane functions of the solution we were building. Our requirements managers stated that the method prescribes labelling any function in the solution, which does not already exist, as a ‘delighter’. In everyday language however, the word “delight” means ‘a cause or source of great pleasure’¹⁰ which is not what that particular function causes. Our objection to using this word to describe a quite mundane function can be seen as an invitation to reflect and deliberate about how to particularise the generalisations of our methods, and functionalise the idealisation of certain language use. Perhaps we even challenge how positive word uses are

¹⁰ Oxford Dictionaries. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/delight> [Accessed 14th August 2016]

habitually valued over negative or even neutral word uses. Instead of just following the method as we normally do, without considering how appropriate it is in this situation, we can be seen to invite to critical and deeper thinking. If we adhere unreflectively to the letter of the method we introduce a split between *techne* and *phronesis*, which I describe in P3 drawing on Gadamer (1975) who draws in turn on Aristotle, in that we then defer judgements of a practical nature to those who created the method, and we execute the method mechanically (*techne*) without making practical judgements of our own (*phronesis*). When I argue in the situation for thinking critically, I argue for using *phronesis* to determine *in situ* the extent to which we should stick to the letter of the method, and the extent to which we should improvise and adapt the method to our particular situation. As I argue in P2 the use of *phronesis* requires more than schooling. It requires experience, reflection and reflexive analysis, which I cannot expect of all employees especially the less experienced. There are other considerations however also to take into account in this situation such as ‘if we *did* change how we particularise and functionalise, would our requirements specialist then feel compelled to change all the work she has already done so as to avoid inconsistencies?’ If that was how she was thinking, it might have had many negative consequences (e.g. could have led to stress) if I had persisted.

Another thing to consider is that we were inviting her to make a judgment which carries the risk that if something then went wrong she might get blamed for it later. If we just followed the method, it would be more difficult to blame her for whatever might go wrong. Thus, we also invited her to take a risk, which has ethical implications. As she was clearly not inclined to follow our suggestions, I made another judgement call in the situation and decided to trust her to make the best decision for herself. As I have become increasingly aware of opportunities for particularising generalisations and functionalising idealisations, I have also become increasingly aware of ethical dilemmas like these. In my practice, I am more conscious of inviting to critical thinking and making practical judgments, and less inclined to attempt to persuade or coerce others into making difficult ethical choices that may have negative consequences for them.

Mechanisms are incapable of adjusting the scripted action transcribed into them and are thus predictable

In TOGAF ‘the architect is developing a snapshot of the enterprise’s decisions and their implications at particular points in time’ (Open Group, 2013:46) and then this snapshot is used later for guiding development of solutions supporting what has been decided. In contrast, I argue in P3 that we negotiate language, meaning, values and norms in social circles that form interwoven planes of *habitus*. Drawing on Elias (1991:16;44) I argue that the collaboration between ‘specialised functions’ takes the form of ‘action-chains’, and that changing our ways of working requires a coordinated effort across this chain of actions performed by specialists all of whom can adjust their conduct taking into account the attitudes of those they collaborate with. I then draw on Latour (1988:305-309) to describe how when we automate action, we transcribe a repertoire of scripted-action into mechanisms which cannot of their own accord adjust their conduct taking the attitudes of others into account. Only renewed transcription can change the repertoire of

scripted-action of a mechanism, which also prescribes certain ways of acting (for the mechanism to be useful) on the user of the mechanism. The mechanism is useful only insofar as the tool-maker has anticipated correctly the script to transcribe. Changes to our ways of working therefore potentially destroy the value of mechanisms since elements of the original ways of working that have been transcribed into mechanisms cannot accommodate new ways of working. In this way, the introduction of mechanisms has a tendency to render action less fluid.

When I now reflect on how interdependent people in social figuration mutually-adjust to maintain relations with others who have function for us, and how in contrast material mechanisms can only act out the particular repertoire of scripted-action which has been transcribed *a priori* into the mechanism, it seems to me that the views of TOGAF concerning a system consisting of parts that must be aligned to each other actually makes sense, *not* when considering social figuration, but when considering material mechanisms. I posit that IT/IS solutions are systems, but organisations are not. Perceiving organisations *as if* they were systems tends to lead us to ignore aspects of organising that seem important. With TOGAF's roots in IT architecture it is not surprising, but in my view also not useful, that TOGAF prescribes analysing organisation as if it was a system. I referred earlier to how Fehskens (2011, 2012) distinguishes between assuming that future states of the enterprise can be modelled and then brought about in a controlled fashion, from assuming that this can be done for the IT of an enterprise alone. I have however also pointed to how when we deal with IT alone, we still deal with the construction of a physical object, which users will later act towards as elements of a social object in a not yet fully formed social figuration. Thus, if we include 'implementation' of new IT/IS into the scope of what we work with, we still end up working with emergent social figuration and without the degree of predictability and control assumed in orthodox Enterprise Architecture. When IT/IS projects fail to meet pre-determined ends, bad implementation is often perceived as the cause. It takes time, often several years, to transcribe scripted action that reflects and supports our pre-determined future into mechanisms. I posit that the primary reason that failures are so frequently experienced as occurring during implementation is simply that it is only when we begin what we call implementation that assumptions made while pre-determining a future state are confronted with the obstinate emergent reality of social figuration in the process of becoming. In other words, many of our assumptions have been wrong all along, but we only find out that they are wrong by acting into what emerges. Implementation is the time at which people begin to respond to gestures of mechanisms, acting out scripted action, incapable of adjusting their action to be any more appropriate in a given situation than what has been anticipated by the engineers who constructed those mechanisms.

Any change simultaneously destroys the existing figuration, the status quo, and creates a new figuration

Reflecting on all of this I conclude in P3 that I have expectations that it 'ought' to be easier to conduct changes than it is, which is an unjustified prejudice of mine. Changes to figurations of power differentials is

as much a destruction of prior figurations, influences and status as it is a creation of a new figuration. Members of organisations may legitimately resist such threats to their position, status and influence, which however can be interpreted negatively as ‘resistance to change’ in general. I begin to see the value of sometimes preserving established practices and become more selective in what I seek to change. For example, I will happily work according to some method based on assumptions I perceive as unwarranted, if I assess that the method is useful anyway in my particular situation and that it would be costly to replace it.

(P4) *Shaping that which is in the process of becoming, and being simultaneously shaped by it*

I continued the work as an enterprise architect in the Digital Banking P&L unit of Nordea, and continued my inquiry into how the day-to-day conflicting, negotiating and politicking was conducted through which we sought to influence how the enterprise evolved.

Decisions with consequences for people are never only technical but always also political

I am a member of the Product Management team which is in charge of, and relies on, several other teams who build IT/IS which we want to bring to market. I describe in a narrative how I had consulted architects from one of the teams and how we had devised a feature to be built to gain experience with servicing customers in different countries. However, when I approached the Product Owner who is in charge of that particular team, she refused to have her team build that feature. I accepted her judgement even though I had initially judged that building the feature would be useful. I trusted that in her own judgement she was taking into account knowledge about her team which I did not possess. Actually, she did not refuse me outright when I told her that I needed a team to build this feature. Instead she ambiguously wished me “Good luck with that”. I resisted my habitual tendency to act (Mead, 1934) which would be to treat the decision as a rational technical decision and attempt to use rational arguments to sway her. Instead I accepted her remark at face value. Reflecting on her wording of what I took to be a refusal it seems similar to how I interpreted my own use of humour in P2 to mask a rupture of the hidden transcript (Scott, 1990). I begin to perceive ambiguity as useful in allowing resistance to those who are formally superior, in a way that is at least not overtly disrespectful.

I argue against Collins and Evans (2002) who posit that we can make a distinction between “technical decisions” and “political decisions” i.e. that it is the decision itself that is either technical or political, and that technical expertise should be privileged when making what they call technical decisions. Drawing on Elias (1978, 1991), I see the involved parties form a figuration of interdependence where power is never equally distributed and where we cannot separate concerns since any leverage obtained for any reason can be used to further one’s interests in other areas. It seems more useful to make the distinction Mannheim (1936:112-113) makes between that which “has already become”, which he calls administration, and that which is “in the process of becoming”, which he calls politics. What I take this concept of politics to mean is exactly such power plays into a not yet fully formed situation in which, according to Mannheim, we can only

ever have partial knowledge. Politicking is in other words not reserved for domains such as parliament or upper management. Mannheim (1936:113) further claims that there is a tendency in society to ‘include as much as possible in the realm of the rational and to bring it under administrative control’.

Linking this back to the conflicts I described in P3 where some of my colleagues and I challenge particular prescriptions of our method, and where another colleague recites definitions from our method almost literally in order to prove that she has the right of it, I begin to see this as an example of bringing what we do under such administrative control and turning what could otherwise have been a situational judgment call into *a priori* defined context free rules, which is an example of what Griffin (2002:119-120) describes as a split between thought and action. Griffin draws attention to the apparent lack in orthodox organisational literature of perceived ‘paradox in thinking that a system that is supposed to be autonomous is nevertheless thought to be controlled by an individual’. Linking this observation to what I argue concerning the distinction between human self-control and mutual adjustments in social figuration, and material mechanisms such as IT/IS that are only able to act out the particular repertoire of scripted-action which has been transcribed *a priori* into the mechanism, I posit that by supporting some business with IT/IS we contribute to transforming it from the realm of politics into the realm of administration. The particular repertoire of scripted-action cannot adapt to changing circumstances, changing demands for function, changing attitudes of others, etc. without renewed transcription. Cunningham (1993) describes a gap between the functions demanded and the functions provided by IT/IS as ‘technical debt’ and perceives this as stemming from problems with correctly analysing the demand for function when IT/IS are built. I claim that even if we correctly analyse what is needed at the time of building IT/IS, the circumstances, demand, attitudes and more will continue to evolve and this will contribute to continued growth of ‘technical debt’. Determining which action to transcribe into mechanisms is thus a highly political decision with significant ramifications for members of the organisation.

The enterprise is not itself an entity with intentionality, but presenting it as such can mask our power plays

In another narrative I described how I worked in a team with different stakeholders from different Business Units, and here a conflict erupted. Aatto, a Finnish colleague from Markets, was uncharacteristically agitated and frustrated with what he perceived as my attempts to steer Nordea towards taking on responsibility for aspects of financial management on behalf of our customers far beyond what we had historically taken on, and beyond what he and his colleagues had expertise in. I attempted to explain why I saw this as a necessary change, but he appeared to take my initial response as an insult rather than as an acceptable rationale for proceeding with what I had proposed. I was at a loss about how to proceed without damaging our relationship even further when another colleague from Corporate Strategy and Development intervened and attempted to explain why these decisions had been made, and that they had been made in close cooperation with upper management, and that we were soliciting as much help as we could muster from different business units and external partners. Slowly we found our way back into a more trustful relationship in

which we later managed to devise together innovative solutions for our customers. In this situation, we seemed to me to be politicking about that which was ‘in the process of becoming’ and that included ‘what we do, and what we are therefore recognised as being’ which is our identity as a group – what Elias (1991:184) calls our ‘we-identity’. This was one of many conflicts in local interactions through which a global patterning emerged. The General Executive Management team had publicly declared that Nordea wants to become the leading digital relationship bank in the Nordic region, an example of what I refer to above as idealisation. In teams such as this one, we had to functionalise this idealisation which meant that we had to negotiate how to interpret these decisions and how to act on our interpretation in our daily work. There are myriad constellations of people who functionalise such idealisations every day, and since their personality, historicity and intentionality influences how they functionalise we can only gain limited influence (and not control) over what emerges by making general and idealised statements concerning what has been decided.

Reflecting further on this we seem to frequently talk about the company we work for as if it was an individual with intentions, objectives and values. When we say that ‘Nordea wants’ to become the leading digital relationship bank in the Nordic region, it appears as if Nordea is an entity with a mind, and that Nordea has made up its mind to seek to gain this particular position. This masks who actually has these intentions. Since intentionality is always multiple, as I have noted before, idealisations like this sets the scene for conflicts emerging between each individuals own values and the cult values of the group. According to Griffin (2002:116), Mead argued ‘that “cult values” were an idealisation of the collective, imagined as an enlarged personality’ that justifies actions and ‘divert people’s attention from the ethics of their daily actions’. As mentioned above Mead posits that in conflicts such as this one we have to functionalise such idealised cult values, which means to negotiate and politick about what they should mean in the particular context of what it is that we are presently doing. This involves interpretation since cult values can be ambiguous for a particular individual in a particular situation. What I experience is that we declare with these values what is ‘good’ and what is ‘bad’ in highly abstract terms. If we do not interpret cult values in context of the situations we find ourselves in, but apply cult values directly and literally, people are silenced into conformity (ibid:117). What I take Griffin to be saying is that when we functionalise cult values we are judging *in situ* what is good enough here and now, whereas the cult value itself can be seen as a judgment *a priori* of a universal and idealised common good in any situation. Griffin points to how ‘as soon as cult values become functional values in real daily interaction, conflict arises and it is this conflict that must be negotiated by people in their practical interaction with each other. This is how they are continually constructing the future’ (ibid:117). In these negotiations, we are negotiating *how* to functionalise the cult values of Nordea, and cult values of our respective business units, and other values and intentionality.

Deliberate change, evolutionary change and apparent stability all emerge in the same fashion

Through this process of negotiation, we could both sustain identity or bring about change. This is what I mean, when I write drawing on Elias (1991) that a central theme is to negotiate we-identity and I-identity. Members of groups to some extent share norms and values that make up the groups we-identity, and our conduct is held to the norms and values of the group when a judgement is made about whether our conduct is socially acceptable or not in that group. Thus, social control and self-control is tightly related to we-identity and I-identity. I argue that multiple we-identities are at play such as the identity of the company, various business units, and teams, and that even the groupings themselves and belongings to groups are in flux all the time. We had invited 80 members of 17 other business units to revise with us the 'Target Picture' for Digital Banking which as a gesture could itself be seen as a very strong play in the game to influence the emerging we-identities (Elias, 1978:81-88), which is a game where we mutually influence each other and where none of us are in control of the overall changes (Elias, 1978, 1991). In the conflict, I felt an increased awareness of the situation that each of us are in, which helps me to accept gestures that can be interpreted as power plays intended (maybe unconsciously) to maintain the current power figuration, which I can now accept as fair and good enough gestures. My former self may have interpreted the same gestures as unreasonable selfish gestures of 'resistance to change' as described in P3. Thus, my changing awareness has led also to some extent to what Mead (1908:313) describes as a changing or 'reconstructed self' which in my own case I experience as a self which through reflectivity and reflexivity has become more aware of my own assumptions and prejudices, and more aware of the positions of others in the figuration, and of what is enabled and constrained in both my own and their position. I use this increased awareness of the attitude of others in making ethical judgments about how to respond, and I sometimes get it wrong. It is important to note that I cannot of course arrest action to gain time to think. In practice, there is no possibility of splitting thought from action, which means that sometimes I stumble into something before realising what it is I am in the process of doing. When I became aware for example that I was in a clash with Aatto, I was already in it. If I pause to think then my pausing is also a gesture, is also action, which is interpreted and responded to by others and becomes meaningful. My reflections and reflexivity drawing on some experience serves me well however in later situations. It is not an infallible process, but I have the ability to test solutions in my conduct (Mead, 1923:247) and over time develop an increasingly useful feel for the game.

At the time of writing this synopsis, Aatto and I are actively engaged in pursuing further collaboration between our two business units. I take this as an indication that our relationship was strengthened rather than weakened by our conflicting.

Providing openings allows others to contribute what we cannot contribute ourselves into what is emerging

A former researcher on the programme, Henry Larsen (2005:36), introduces the term 'opening' to denote moments of attention to incomplete change. In his view, an invitation can be seen as taking the risk of

presenting an opening to another in a relationship. In the first narrative I extend an invitation to a Product Owner, but that invitation is rejected. In the second narrative, an opening presented itself and together we managed to question our different *a priori* judgments about what banking is or could be long enough for a new understanding to emerge from the interplay of our different partial knowledge. In retrospect, I doubt this understanding could have emerged from any one of us individually. This leads me to perceive working with the quality of relating to be an important aspect of arriving at good enough holding of anxiety and sufficiently trustful relationships (Stacey, 2011) to be able to provide and protect together sufficient openings and invitations to allow others to contribute what we ourselves cannot. This particular quality of relating is not always present, and I narrate a situation where we seem to me to deliberately switch into a mode of execution where efficiency is privileged over critical reflection. This Alvesson and Spicer (2012:1201) describes as ‘functional stupidity’, emphasising both the functional and efficient aspects as well as the risks associated with a lack of critical reflections.

Taking a step back to reflect on the overall story, I begin to perceive the state-of-affairs, our *habitus*, to change minutely all the time, which is also how groupings over time develop their own norms, values, language and ‘thought styles’ (Fleck, 1935). Although we are normally not aware of it, it is we together who form the we-identity of the group, our *habitus*, just as much as our *habitus* forms us and enables and constrains what can emerge (Elias, 1991). The multitude of different we-identities and thought styles in turn provides a challenge to ensuring collaboration on large-scale changes that have to be coordinated across different groupings in longer and longer action chains.

Summary of my argument

Through explorative research, I have come to assert that certain perspectives and assumptions are sufficiently warranted for me to change my conduct in accordance with them, and to reject certain other perspectives and assumptions as unwarranted. I will now provide a concise argument of what my research has led me to respectively adopt and reject.

Organising is enabling and constraining social figuration in the process of becoming

Drawing on the perspective of complex responsive processes of relating I perceive organising to be an aspect of doing what we do together. Each of us has needs, wants and intentionality, and we depend on each other to have our needs fulfilled through ever lengthening action-chains. We form groups that get things done and in these groups social control is predominantly exercised as mutual and self-control in that we adjust our own behaviour to what we deem to be socially acceptable so that others will continue to have function for us. We are simultaneously enabled by others in that they have function for us, and constrained by others in that we have to behave in a socially acceptable fashion in order for others to want to provide function. To assess what is acceptable to others, we take the attitude of the other, and over time we accumulate a sense of how others are more generally likely to respond. Our sense of self is related to our sense of how others perceive

us and sense of differences between our own tendency to act in certain ways in certain situations and tendencies of others to act. One who depends relatively more on the function provided by a particular other has to adapt relatively more, which can also be expressed as the other having relatively more power in their relationship to each other. In different situations, it may differ who depends relatively more on the function provided by the other. More generally society is a social figuration of relationships in which power is never equally distributed, and which is always in flux. What emerges is organised conduct of collaboration and competition towards having needs fulfilled. To have influence on this we constantly negotiate and engage in politicking. Among other things we negotiate what is socially acceptable, i.e. norms and values or *habitus* or organisational culture.

Orthodox Enterprise Architecture assumes that without control we will have chaos

I chose TOGAF to represent orthodox frameworks and methods for Enterprise Architecture, since it is widely adopted¹¹, and since it is similar in its origin and taken-for-granted assumptions to other frameworks and methods for Enterprise Architecture (Giachetti, 2010:110-112). TOGAF aims for organisational control and promises a ‘tested and repeatable process’ that ‘allows organizations to transform their enterprises in a controlled manner in response to business goals and opportunities’ (Open Group, 2013:10). TOGAF embraces ISO/IEC 42010:2007, which is an engineering standard for documenting systems (Open Group, 2013:9), and assumes based on this standard that an organisation is a system existing in an environment and consisting of interoperating parts, and that one can understand the workings of the system by arriving at an understanding of the component parts and their interactions. In my view, social figurations are not systems. Drawing on Elias & Scotson (1965) I argue that social figurations are irreducible in that one cannot understand the figuration by investigating only its components parts and the interactions of component parts.

Cybernetics (Green & Welch, 1988:289) and the sender-receiver model of communication (Shannon & Weaver, 1949) assume determinacy (Watson, 1913). From cybernetics TOGAF inherits the assumption that we can (and must) build a comprehensive detailed model of the desired future situation before we begin to act out changes to the current situation, and to maintain control it is these models that must inform how we transform the situation into the desired future situation. The sender-receiver model assumes that the sender has knowledge or meaning, and can send this knowledge or meaning to others, and that any difference between the knowledge or meaning of sender and receiver is a result of noise which can and should be eliminated. Drawing on Scott (1998) I posit that the models we create are ‘thin simplifications’ that fail to represent many important aspects of organising such as people’s intentions, fears, power, and relative influence over each other and that we cannot attain the degree of control assumed in cybernetics over what emerges as described in the previous section as a figuration in the process of becoming.

¹¹ 58,028 professionals certified in TOGAF version 9. The Open Group (1995-2016). *Directory of Certified People*. [Online]. Available at: <https://togaf9-cert.opengroup.org/certified-individuals> [Accessed 22nd July 2016].

The organisation is assumed to be separated from the environment by a permeable boundary much like people are assumed to be separated from society by the same. People are assumed to be autonomous and to act rationally. TOGAF prescribes a process for transitioning the organisation into a pre-determined different form (Open Group, 2013:10) and assumes a dual causality in that while the organisation as a system unfolds a mature form of itself (one causality where the mature form is assumed to be derived from 'the DNA' of the system and actors in the system are autonomous), enterprise architects and managers are assumed to be capable of observing the system objectively as if from the outside and rationally decide on, and bring about, a new form (another causality where managers can control the realisation of a different mature form). Griffin (2002:119-120) describes this dual causality as a split between thought and action, and he draws attention to the apparent lack in orthodox organisational literature of perceived 'paradox in thinking that a system that is supposed to be autonomous is nevertheless thought to be controlled by an individual'. I argue that change cannot be controlled in this sense by an individual. Drawing on Mead (1934) who argues against determinacy, I posit that we cannot use simplified models to predict or understand the resistance and counter plays others offer in response to our desire to transform the organisation into a particular figuration.

TOGAF describes the organisation like an entity and traits are ascribed to this entity which we would normally only associate with a person such as having needs and wants of its own. An organisation is, for example, said to have strategic goals and a strategy for achieving these, which I refute arguing instead that it is rather influential people who make up the organisation that have more or less overlapping strategic goals and agree more or less on a strategy for achieving these. Knowledge is assumed to be a trait of the organisation or is at least assumed to be shared without restrictions, whereas I argue drawing on Mannheim (1936) that we can only ever have partial knowledge about that which is in a process of becoming, and drawing on Jackall (2010) and Scott (1990) that there can be legitimate political motives for not sharing knowledge freely. TOGAF assumes that enterprise architects can create a comprehensive model of the current and desired state (of affairs), sufficient to inform controlled transformation of the enterprise from current to desired state. TOGAF does acknowledge a measure of uncertainty in that 'there will always be risk with any architecture/business transformation effort' and prescribes to classify risks according to the effect they could have and the frequency with which they occur and to plan mitigation 'that will reduce the risk to an acceptable level'. Even 'residual level of risk', which is risk that persists 'after implementation of mitigating actions (if any)' is assumed to be quantifiable (Open Group, 2013:313-316). The assumption, that any risk including even residual risk is predictably quantifiable and can be brought under control is an assumption shared also with some regulators (BIS, 2013) as described above, but is not what I experience in change programmes like the ones I describe in my narratives where every choice I make with regard to how to conduct myself and play into that which is emerging carries an unquantifiable risk of being judged 'not acceptable' by others.

More generally, orthodox enterprise architecture literature idealises control and assumes (as exemplified on page 132 with the capability maturity model) that without control we will have informal and unpredictable processes that are wasteful (Bernard, 2012: 30). Even authors who express scepticism towards some of the above assumptions, but who belong to this thought collective, struggle to come up with ways to obtain control. Their answer is often that we must either harness complexity or simplify the organisation as exemplified in Bernus et al. (2015:6-8). I claim that organising is not chaotic even in the absence of plans and blueprints, since social control is primarily mutual and self-control which is inherent to human behaviour. Thus, in the absence of control in the cybernetic sense of the word, we do not have chaos but rather emergent social figuration enabled and constrained by social control and self-control.

Influential contemporary books often claim to bring novelty but stick to the assumptions of orthodoxy

There are a number of books that provide prescriptions on how to conduct enterprise architecture, which is newer than TOGAF or which claims to be based on more sound empirical material. I have chosen the book ‘Enterprise Architecture as Strategy’ as a frequently quoted representative of this genre. The authors, Jeanne Ross, Peter Weill and David Robertson (2006:20), promise to describe ‘how your company can achieve greatness with a foundation for execution’ where they take a foundation for execution to be comprised of an operating model, an enterprise architecture and an IT engagement model. The authors draw on a number of case studies and surveys from businesses they deem to be successful and search for similarities in their conduct. This empirical approach resembles the approach taken by Kotter (1995) whom I critique in P2 drawing on Elias (1978:160). I do not refute that the empirical material does indeed illustrate how some characteristics of some prior figuration were a *necessary precondition* of some later figuration, but I find it problematic to use this as proof that if certain conditions are established then this will inevitably *lead to* a particular change into a desired figuration – so, necessary, but not sufficient as philosophical logic would term it. The cases demonstrate that certain companies were successful as measured by particular indicators, and how prior to that these companies used digitisation to render what the authors call their foundation for execution more durable and efficient. This does not prove that any company which mimics this approach in each of their own particular situations will achieve the same result.

On the basis of their empirical material the authors posit that ‘managers cannot predict what will change, but they can predict some things that won’t change. And if they digitise what is not changing, they can focus on what is changing. In this way, the foundation for execution becomes the foundation for agility’ (ibid:12). I perceive the assumption that managers can predict ‘what won’t change’ to be no different in nature from the assumption underlying TOGAF that future states of affairs can be brought about in a controllable and repeatable manner by a manager or architect. I do not believe that managers can *predict* what won’t change, but a manager may decide to do all that is in his or her power to prevent a particular capability from changing including digitising i.e. transcribing scripted-action into a digital mechanism which renders that

particular repertoire of scripted-action more durable and potentially also more efficient (Latour, 1988). When thinking about such a move in retrospect, it may appear to have been based on a prediction that happened to come true, but it could also be that the actions taken based on that apparent prediction contributed themselves to bring about what was predicted. Furthermore, I find it impossible to judge from the cases presented whether the *demand* towards the repertoire of action which was in this fashion rendered relatively more durable, also ceased to evolve i.e. whether or not this success is really sustainable in the longer term.

What I have tried to do here is to draw attention to some of the assumptions underlying these views, which I find not to be mentioned by the authors, and to challenge some of the reasoning. I have not studied empirically the effects of following particular prescriptions given by the authors and make no claim for or against their validity as such, but merely draw attention to how I perceive the authors themselves not offering what I would judge to be warranted assertability that these prescriptions will lead to the same degree of success in every situation. I offer critique of this particular book because it is sometimes presented as a break with mainstream Enterprise Architecture like TOGAF, but I find it to be based on similar assumptions and approaches.

In P1 I give an account of how my colleagues and I were striving always to adhere to current 'best practice', but even though what appeared to be significant advances in science were adopted by us in our practice, it appeared to make little difference. I begin to believe that because the underlying assumptions and approaches are not much different, applying this new method will also not make a big difference.

One of the prescriptions Ross, et al. (2006:71-83) give is to increase the architectural maturity of the organisations through a series of stages whereby the authors claim that one can achieve greater global flexibility in exchange for local flexibility. This is a particular example of what is more generally called a maturity model. Maturity models are abundant within my field. The idea of maturity models can be traced back to the Capability Maturity Model for Software (SW-CMM) of the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University (Paulk, 1996). 'The SW-CMM defines a five-level framework for how an organisation matures its software process. These levels describe an evolutionary path from ad hoc, chaotic processes to mature, disciplined software processes' (ibid:1) i.e. it is assumed that without discipline what emerges will be chaotic and only by disciplining employees can a manager achieve mature processes.

Contrary to this I have argued that even without overt disciplining, people will always mutually adapt and discipline themselves into behaviour that they deem to be socially acceptable and some variation in what is socially acceptable will occur, but what emerges is not chaotic. In this maturity model the five levels are labelled 'initial, repeatable, defined, managed, and optimising'. These levels demonstrate how repeatability is perceived to be a universal good in any situation. John Zachman expresses in a foreword to another widely quoted book on enterprise architecture a similar idealisation of predictability (Bernard, 2012: 8) when he writes that without simplified models that allow us to understand the elementary parts which enterprises

perceived as systems are comprised of, enterprise architecture 'is not a science and is not predictable and it is not engineering and manufacturing Enterprises'. Such a universal good is, as I have described earlier drawing on Griffin (2002), a cult-value. I perceive repeatability and predictability to be a cult-value which SW-CMM shares with TOGAF and more generally with orthodox enterprise architecture literature. It is not questioned whether increased repeatability will always be beneficial even when one attempts to achieve learning and innovation. My goal is not to argue for or against the particular prescriptions offered by SW-CMM, however I do not accept without critical questioning that repeatability is a universal good. Sometimes I prefer spontaneity and thinking-out-of-the-box. I wanted to draw attention to some underlying values and assumptions in the highly influential maturity model, and draw attention to how values and assumptions are not rendered explicit or questioned critically in any significant way.

Agile approaches assume a degree of agreement between stakeholders which I do not recognise

In the initiative I describe in P3 and P4, we are not following one specific framework and method, but we claim to be generally influenced by recent developments in Software Engineering and in particular to strive to adopt lean agile principles and a build-test-learn paradigm. I have chosen to illustrate some of the underlying assumptions and values in the lean agile approaches we are inspired by, by drawing on 'The Essence of Software Engineering' by Ivar Jacobsen et al. (2013). This book describes 'the Essence kernel', an Object Management Group (OMG) standards process, which make up the core of the Software Engineering Method and Theory, or SEMAT, perspective developed initially by Ivar Jacobson, Bertrand Meyer, and Richard Soley (ibid:xxv).

The authors distinguish between stakeholders, who are going to use a given software mechanism when it has been created, and the team who is creating the software. The authors seem to acknowledge that shared understanding and agreement cannot be presumed for example when they show that the team developing software may not understand stakeholders (ibid:8) and may initially at least follow different practices (ibid:46). However, what I perceive the authors to gloss over or simply assume not to be possible is that stakeholders themselves may not share an understanding of what is needed and may not agree or value the same solution similarly. They assume that when a team begins to 'develop or change a software system' an opportunity exists which 'represents the team's shared understanding of the stakeholder's needs, and helps shape the requirements for the new software system by providing justification for its development' (ibid:25-26). In a checklist for these requirements practitioners are prescribed to ensure for example that

- The stakeholders agree on the purpose of the new system.
- The rationale behind the requirements is clear.
- The stakeholders accept the requirements as accurately capturing what they require to fully satisfy the need for a new system.

- There are no outstanding requirement items preventing the system from being accepted as fully satisfying the requirements.
- The stakeholders accept the system as fully satisfying the requirements (ibid:30-31).

When I compare and contrast this with what I write in P3 and P4, I find that in my organisational setting the 17 business units from which we invite representatives to participate in shaping a Target Picture for our initiative are all influential stakeholders and we hope that they will support the initiative and resultant way of doing banking. However, since we are devising a new digital way of doing banking with our customers, our customers are clearly also important stakeholders, and since banking is heavily regulated so are the regulatory authorities. There are more stakeholders, and I am critical towards even assuming that we can identify all of them, let alone represent their intentionality completely in models. Within all of these groupings there are individuals with individual positions of power, status and more to protect and each individual can also be seen to be a stakeholder. I have argued against assuming that one software solution can be devised, that can be used to change how we do banking business together with our business partners, customers, authorities, and more, which all of these stakeholders will value uniformly. We are influencing the emergence of social figurations and some stakeholders will benefit from some changes in this figuration and others will not. Some of the intentions of stakeholders are socially acceptable and can be expressed openly, and others are less acceptable and must be dealt with by making less overt political moves. I disagree that it is useful to attempt to model or in any way capture and express in written form this web of intentionality, values and needs.

This is an example of what I begin to perceive as treating the social in a way that we have found useful when dealing with materiality. I do find this and other similar books provide useful ideas about how to work with materiality, and I begin to think that it would be equally a mistake to treat materiality in ways that work well when making political plays into an emergent social figuration. Therefore, I am not as such claiming that to be inspired by these and similar ideas when attempting to build useful software mechanisms is a mistake. What I do claim is that these assumptions do not to apply when dealing with emergent social figuration. In his foreword to the book Richard Solely claims that ‘the youth of the computing field... is never more evident than in the lack of a grand unifying theory to underpin the software development process’ (ibid: xxiv). To this I will say that it seems to me to be more useful to have different theories to underpin ‘physical construction of material objects’ and ‘emergence of social figurations’. It might be an equal mistake to attempt to use what works in ‘social emergence’ to describe the field of ‘material construction’, as it is to attempt to use what works well in ‘material construction’ to describe and work within the field of ‘social emergence’, which is what I find to some extent to be a tendency in orthodox Enterprise Architecture (Zachmann, 1987; Open Group, 2013; Bernus et al., 2015; Ross et al., 2006).

The perspective of complex responsive processes opens up for different ways of thinking and acting

The perspective of complex responsive processes of relating brings to the centre stage how we engage with others in everyday conflicting, negotiating and politicking. It accepts that people who make up organisations do not necessarily agree, do not disclose everything, have both shared and personal needs such as striving for position, status and recognition, and that people will find different ways of bringing their own intentionality into accordance with intentionality negotiated in groupings they are part of such as the company they work for, their own department etc. This perspective allows us to explore what happens when we find ourselves in a situation where our intentionality clashes with simple rules, thin simplifications and cult values. In order to decide on a particular way of acting in a specific situation, we have to functionalise or particularise the idealisations and generalisations which orthodox Enterprise Architecture – and orthodox managerialism more generally – is so ripe with. It is in the everyday functionalisation and particularisation that ethical judgements have to be made. It can be intimidating to have to make judgements when in doubt, and functional stupidity (Alvesson & Spicer, 2012) can be seen as a means to avoid taking charge, making judgements, and thus becoming liable for being blamed if something unexpected and undesirable happens. I claim though, that it is exactly when I am functionalising idealisations and particularising generalisations that there is a potential for making a difference that matters. By slowing down my thinking and deliberating on how to functionalise and particularise, by becoming more critically aware of my habitual ways of thinking/acting and the assumptions, approaches and prejudices these are based on, I find that opportunities for new ways of acting begin to present themselves to me.

The perspective of complex responsive processes pays insufficient attention to how physical objects arise

I first encountered the perspective of complex responsive processes of relating during my Business School Diploma. The critique offered towards systems theories (Stacey, 2003) resonated with all of the things that had troubled me, puzzled me, and frustrated me about our ways of working as described in P1. However, since we are working with shaping technology and infrastructure, typically in the form of IT/IS, so as to make tools that will become useful to the emerging enterprise, it bothered me that there was very little mention of man-made physical objects and how they come into being. During my research on the Doctor of Management programme, that worry has grown. I now claim that for those who work with shaping technology and infrastructure, the perspective of complex responsive processes of relating cannot alone explain in a satisfactory way what it is that we are doing. Ideas that have proven useful for my practice include Pickering's (1993) concept of repeatability in accommodating material resistance in the 'mangle of practice' and Latour's (1988, 2005) concept of 'transcription of scripted-action into mechanisms' leading to mechanisms not being able to act spontaneously or in any way adjust their behaviour i.e. not participate in the mutual self-adjustment which is central to human interrelating. These concepts about how man-made physical objects come into being and act augment in useful and important ways my emerging understanding

of how people act towards physical objects as elements of social objects in what is ‘in the process of becoming’ – emergent enterprise.

Shaping technology to be useful in emergent enterprises requires a multi-perspective understanding

I suspect that if other researchers were sufficiently interested in my findings to begin to look further for ideas with which to augment this perspective, it would be possible to achieve further movement in our understanding of both the social, materiality, and the interplay between the two in enterprising. Bernus et al. (2015:10;13) posit that

EA must become holistic and non-reductionist in its conception and framing of organisational realities... We must enrich EA’s view of communication processes in organisations ... which cannot be modelled using traditional binary and linear enterprise models. A number of systems theories are feasible candidates for extending and enriching EA in order to achieve exactly that effect.

Any credible development of the discipline must equally cover and explain deliberate change and evolutionary change in a system of socio-technical systems.

I do not find systems theories or variants thereof to be feasible candidates for enriching Enterprise Architecture with sufficient understanding of what happens in emergent enterprises, and I think it neither feasible nor useful to attempt to produce all-encompassing models in an attempt to gain control. I have presented a radically different perspective that I find to have greater explanatory power both with regard to deliberate change, evolutionary change, and apparent stability which are all the result of myriad interactions between interdependent people.

I argue that we require multiple perspectives, and that the perspective I have found to have the most explanatory power when attempting to understand that which ‘is in the process of becoming’ is complex responsive processes of relating. However, I have found this perspective to lack explanatory power when attempting to understand how man-made objects are physically constructed. I therefore believe that we need to adopt a multi-perspective approach, but more importantly, that we must remain critically aware of the assumptions we make and the approaches we adopt, and always be ready to challenge and replace these if they do not stand the test of being successfully put into action. In the words of Mannheim (1936:133):

Only through acting in the situation do we address questions to it, and the answer we derive is always in the form of the success or failure of the action. Theory is not torn from its essential connection with action, and action is the clarifying medium in which all theory is tested and develops.

More generally we habitually ignore or misrecognise knowledge of a practical nature, and succumb to functional stupidity in refusing to draw our own conclusions and challenge our theories when it turns out that ‘there is a difference between theory and practice’.

Taking the attitude of the engineer requires phronesis which is knowledge that cannot be taught

Mead (1934:276-277) describes the ‘attitude of the engineer’ as a fusion to some extent of the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ or in other words an enlarged sense of social self and attitudes of others. To achieve this attitude, we must have anticipation of how others are likely to respond to particular gestures including social objects. When deliberating about attitudes towards a social object, which does not exist yet because it is the organisation of responses including responses to a man-made object which has not yet been constructed, a split can therefore be seen to occur. This has ethical consequences, since we transcribe scripted action into an object, which will constitute the full repertoire of responses the object can make to the gestures of users. Thus, we make *a priori* ethical judgments of what is acceptable action conducted by the object in future situations. When we engineer man-made objects our own collaborative engineering efforts are of course also complex and responsive processes of relating. We need to combine *techne*, knowledge of a technical nature such as how to physically construct an object, and *phronesis*¹², practical judgment such as what it is socially acceptable to transcribe into an object.

When component parts of a physical object need to interoperate, precision is required. Since mechanisms are not responsive, do not self-adjust, and have no intentionality there is in this type of work repeatability, and attention to minute details, comprehensive modelling, and comprehensive testing is both possible and useful. The ‘attitude of the engineer’ however is about anticipating what others will need in a situation that is still in the process of becoming and is thus not repeatable but rather paradoxically predictably unpredictable. Making assumptions about what might emerge requires a well-developed feel for the game and even so it is not something where even the best of experts will always get it right. Such experts may get it right more often than novices relying on context free rules and thin simplifications though.

Summary of my contribution to practice

I have posited that by slowing down my thinking and deliberating on how to functionalise and particularise, by becoming more critically aware of my habitual ways of thinking/acting and the assumptions, approaches and prejudices these are based on, opportunities for new ways of acting begin to present themselves to me. I will here summarise examples of opportunities I have become more aware of as a result of movement in my habitual way of thinking/acting as also mentioned in the critical appraisal of my research projects.

¹² *Phronesis* is a kind of knowledge that cannot be taught but must be acquired through practice since *phronesis* cannot be expressed in a few simple rules, nor in a long list of context free rules – it is a situational practical judgment. In order to achieve *phronesis* one must develop a high situational awareness, or what Bourdieu (1977) calls a ‘feel for the game’.

I am most influential when I participate directly in particularisation and functionalisation

Since I no longer attempt to create comprehensive models I have gained more opportunities to meet with others, both among the 300+ people in our feature teams who are transcribing scripted-action into the mechanisms we are producing, and with stakeholders. Through conversations with my colleagues I can influence how they functionalise and particularise the requirements and directions they are provided with. It is also through conversations that I can engage in day-to-day politicking and negotiations about directions and intentionality with the many stakeholders in the management team of this initiative, upper management, other business units, partners, and customers. By playing into everyday conflicting, negotiating and politicking as honestly and openly as I find prudent I have much more influence on how we functionalise and particularise than I have when I distribute memos, models and guidelines to people. These artefacts all have to be functionalised and particularised and if I do not engage with people directly, I have little influence over how that is done. I posit that being more detached about my involvement, a phrase borrowed from Elias to denote reflexivity, allows me to be felt and to feel others more sincerely which is important in order to participate in an ethical way in this messy conflictual process. In P3 I provide an example of how coalitions form or do not form spontaneously as an aspect of doing what we do. Since social figuration of relationships and groupings, and stronger or weaker belonging to groupings, is constantly being negotiated and is always in flux, a risk associated with making political moves is that my belonging to groups, where I have an opportunity to be influential, could be weakened.

I am more aware of ethical implications of arguing for critical awareness and making practical judgments

It has ethical implications to argue for thinking critically. As I argue in P2 the use of *phronesis* requires more than schooling. It requires experience, reflection and reflexive analysis, which I cannot expect of all employees especially the less experienced. If an employee accepts an invitation to make a judgment call, that individual also takes on increased risk of getting blamed rather than if they simply followed a prescription. As I have become increasingly aware of opportunities for particularising generalisations and functionalising idealisations, I have also become increasingly aware of ethical dilemmas like these. In my practice, I am more apprehensive about inviting to critical thinking and making practical judgments, and less inclined to attempt to persuade or coerce others into making difficult ethical choices that may have negative consequences for them. That being said, I am also wary of conduct that leads to functional stupidity. The efficiency promised by the functional aspects of this type of conduct comes with an increased risk of not becoming aware of unwarranted assumptions and prejudice. This in turn has a tendency to lead to problems in the implementation phase since it is, as argued earlier, at this time people begin to respond to gestures of the mechanisms we have constructed. Thus, assumptions made while pre-determining which solution to build are put to the test during implementation.

I acknowledge that change involves destruction of the status quo and is thus not universally good

In P3 I conclude that I have had expectations that it 'ought' to be easier to conduct changes than it is, which was an unjustified prejudice of mine. Changes to figurations of power differentials are as much a destruction of prior figurations, influences and status as it is a creation of a new figuration. Members of organisations may legitimately resist such threats to their position, status and influence. In orthodox literature, this is often interpreted negatively as general 'resistance to change' but I have begun to see the value of sometimes preserving established practices and become more selective in what I seek to change. When working with IT/IS however, I also claim that even if we correctly analyse what is needed at the time of building IT/IS, the circumstances, demand, attitudes and more will continue to evolve and this will contribute to continued growth of 'technical debt'. The value of IT/IS is therefore not constant after its introduction, and determining which action to transcribe into mechanisms is thus a highly political decision with significant ramifications for members of the organisation.

When we get frustrated with stuckness in conversations we habitually tend to say something like: 'Let's stop talking and start acting'! Lately I have begun to attempt to achieve movement in conversation instead and am worried that if we each act on our own, we do not have any opportunity to combine our individual partial knowledge. However, figuring out how to achieve movement is no easy task. In a recent article authors who experienced a high degree of success with an initiative to prevent falls in hospitals found that even though they had arrived at a practice that demonstrably worked, they had to struggle enormously to figure out what it was that was working and how it was working (Norman et al., 2015). I begin to believe that some of the practices of agile and lean software engineering such as providing opening for teams to discuss retrospectively how they can improve their practice may be more useful in achieving movement than many of the prescriptions of more orthodox methods, but I also believe that more experimentation and more research is required to fully understand why and how certain conversations seem to get us more and more stuck while other conversations seem to achieve movement.

I cannot split thought from action but have benefitted from becoming more detached about my involvement

My changing awareness has led to some extent to what Mead (1908:313) describes as a changing or 'reconstructed self' which in my own case I experience as a self which through reflectivity and reflexivity has become more aware of my own assumptions and prejudices, and more aware of the positions of others in the figuration, and of what is enabled and constrained in both my own and their position. I use this increased awareness of the attitude of self and others in making ethical judgments about how to respond, and I sometimes get it wrong, which does not worry me as much as it used to. In this sense, I can even be said to have developed a greater capability to live with uncertainty.

It is important to note that I cannot of course arrest action to gain time to think. In practice, there is no possibility of splitting thought from action, which means that sometimes I stumble into something before

realising what it is I am in the process of doing. When I became aware for example that I was in a somewhat tapered conflict with Aatto, I was already in it. If I pause to think then my pausing is also a gesture, is also action, which is interpreted and responded to by others and becomes meaningful. My reflections and reflexivity drawing on some experience serves me well however in later situations. It is not an infallible process, but I have the ability to test solutions in my conduct (Mead, 1923:247) and over time develop an increasingly useful feel for the game.

The practice of Enterprise Architecture

Enterprise architects are not, and in my view should not be, alone in influencing emergent social figuration of enterprises and how technology and infrastructure is to be exploited in that figuration. We can have a valuable role to play, since we have a better than average partial understanding of technology, and technology is increasingly important for many enterprises. Becoming more detached about our involvement and developing a feel for the game will allow us to play into what is emerging with more political awareness and expertise. My overall contribution to practice is to suggest that we accept that emergence is complex, and that gaining expertise in what Mead calls taking the attitude of the engineer requires both *phronesis*, which is more art than hard science, and *techne*, which includes our engineering skills. We need both when engineering material mechanisms so that they can be used to support an emergent enterprise.

In my practice, I have become more engaged in the politics of determining which solutions to engineer in support of our emerging enterprise, and have become more accepting of different people and groupings vying for power and playing into this political game with different intentionality. I have come to see power and politics as a necessary aspect of shaping the emerging enterprise. I no longer feel compelled to urge others to embrace change, and feel myself more comfortable with living with uncertainty. I enjoy spending much less time and energy on making comprehensive models before acting and focus instead on assessing what I experience when I act, and on adjusting assumptions accordingly.

Summary of my contribution to knowledge

It is neither useful to treat the social as the physical nor to treat the physical as the social

I have argued that it is problematic to treat the social as the physical, which is a trap I believe orthodox Enterprise Architecture, as well as orthodox managerialism more generally, has fallen into. It would be equally problematic to treat the physical as the social, which is a trap I think that one could easily fall into when following the perspective of complex responsive processes of relating. Stacey & Mowles (2016) do not say much about technology perceived as an element of social objects, and say less about the challenges of constructing physical objects which will later play an important role in social objects. Furthermore, the method which researchers on the Doctor of Management programme are obliged to follow has a tendency

not to recognise scripted action acted out by physical objects as important, which I have felt to constrain my ability to engage satisfactorily with this subject on this programme.

I have therefore augmented this perspective with ideas that I have found useful for inquiring into how physical objects are shaped before they become useful as elements of social objects in social figuration. These contributions are not novel as such, but draw primarily on Pickering (1993) and Latour (1988, 2005). By bringing these different perspectives together however, I arrive at a fuller understanding of the interplay between shaping materiality and exploiting materiality when shaping social figuration, which is new.

It may be useful to combine architecture, design and ethnographic methods for learning

A tool cannot choose to provide or withhold function, but in a sense objects do provide specialist function through their very design. Mead (1934:278) gives the example of a chair which invites you to sit in it. The meaning is in the response of sitting and enjoying the comfort of sitting in the chair. If it is a very modern and artful chair, it may not be comfortable to sit in and we may not feel that sitting is our tendency to respond. Then the chair ceases to mean sitting, in a sense ceases to be a chair, and becomes in effect a piece of art insofar that we respond to it as a piece of art. It is the designer of the object that thus has to learn the meaning of his or her design by becoming attuned to the tendency to respond to the object being designed by those for whom it is being designed. I have found a few contemporary examples of authors who write about design in this way, acknowledging that you cannot know in advance of experiencing someone's response what it is you have designed (Guenther, 2013; Ries, 2011). Acknowledgement of this is however missing entirely from orthodox literature on Enterprise Architecture, and what I contribute is therefore new within my field.

During my research projects I have had very little opportunity for working in practice with learning from how our customers act towards our designed objects, but based on my experience during my research project with at-home-ethnography I begin to think that ethnographic methods might be useful in learning from such experiences. With this insight, I identify opportunities for further research by me and others.

I am increasingly sceptical towards the idea of an all-encompassing theory of change management

Above all what I attempt to contribute to knowledge with this thesis is to raise the question of whether it makes sense to attempt to pursue a single theory that can explain everything related to making changes. I have found the perspective of complex responsive processes of relating to have more explanatory power towards emergent social figuration, enterprise in the process of becoming, than do systems theories and derivatives thereof. However, I have found the concepts introduced by Pickering (1993), Latour (1988, 2005) et al. to have more explanatory power towards engineering physical objects, materiality in the process of being shaped to have function for human users. I try not to demonise Systems Theory and idealise the perspective of complex responsive processes of relating uncritically, but to rather render explicit differences between assumptions and approaches behind these very different ways of explaining organisation, and to

provide assertions concerning situations in which one or the other is more useful as warranted by my empirical material and analysis. I have found these two aspects of organising to be sufficiently different, and have found human actors and scripted mechanisms to be sufficiently different, to become increasingly sceptical towards the usefulness or feasibility of developing a single theory encompassing both of these aspects. To encompass all of this a theory would have to revert to a degree of abstraction where it would lose all meaningful detail, nuance and richness. This would defeat the purpose of having such a theory in the first place.

By working with an approach which takes experience seriously and uses narrative as empirical material, I have developed awareness of the importance of pertinent details, nuance and richness for arriving at sufficient understanding of the complexity of human local interaction and global patterning to attain expertise via reflections and reflexivity in what Mead (1934:276-281) calls the 'attitude of the engineer'. I have brought concepts from social research methods and philosophy to bear in what I perceive as a predominantly technical discipline – enterprise architecture – which aspires to being scientific. In other words, drawing on Mannheim, Mead, Elias and others I have developed a scientific approach which is relevant to the emergent discipline of enterprise architecture, and which takes it further into the social and political realm than does the so-called socio-technical systems theory approaches. This I posit is useful when our aim is to architect i.e. influence not only the IT/IS of enterprises but enterprises themselves, because influencing the development of the enterprise itself *is* social and political to its core.

The empirical material of my research draws on my own experience from practicing Enterprise Architecture. By drawing attention to ideas that are radically different from orthodox Enterprise Architecture, and different from other critical voices in the Enterprise Architecture discourse, I hope to inspire other practitioners and researchers in this field to experiment and inquire further into their practice drawing on similar ideas. In my view these ideas are more promising than many of the ideas which have been adopted over the last decades in my profession, since they are based on radically different assumptions and approaches, and since perceiving organising as emergent process opens up opportunities for useful new ways of acting.

I posit that influencing change relies on making judgement calls that are situational and require *phronetic* knowledge. *Phronetic* knowledge cannot be taught and cannot be expressed in simple context free rules. Creating every model in a framework like TOGAF will not provide enough information to ensure infallible control over the movements of a social figuration. Enterprise architects would be better served by taking our experience and the attitudes of others seriously and develop expertise in making the judgement calls necessary to influence what is in the process of becoming. Even with such expertise there are no guarantees however that what emerges will be exactly what we desired initially.

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