Comparing mutuality and solidarity in its application to disaster ethics

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Abstract

Often it has been observed that in disaster situations, people (including victims) become altruistic and are very willing to listen, obey and act in a manner that would help bring an end to the situation. In this chapter, linking disaster ethics and human rights, it is argued that this indeed is how it should be, disaster or otherwise, and that we have moral duties to oneself and to others. An individual exhibiting solidarity, comradery and altruism during a disaster is indeed behaving as a reasonable Self, and exercising ethical individualism as per Gewirthian philosophy. It is the duty of the State and society to act as a supportive State and a caring society. In order to do this, we need to be conditioned for ethical rationality before any whiff of disaster arises, i.e. in our day-to-day conduct and decision-making, at a personal, institutional and transnational level. Our ethical resilience during disasters can only be as robust as our rational moral compass during ‘peace-time’. This chapter argues that Gewirthian solidarity ethics (GSE) should play a role in European policy and action in order to provide a system that conditions ethical rationality and in order to fulfil human rights. This involves addressing our current understanding of human rights as distinct categories of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and to effect a shift towards a more holistic understanding of human rights, whereby the hierarchy of fulfilment does not always prioritise civil and political rights.

Keywords

Solidarity, ESC rights, human rights, disaster ethics, resilience, European disaster preparedness, moral duties

Index terms

Gewirth, solidarity, mutuality, Reasonable self, Supportive state, sustainable development goals, right to development, positive rights, negative rights, social contribution thesis, Gewirthian solidarity ethics

Introduction

Often it has been observed that in disaster situations, people (including victims) become altruistic and are very willing to listen, obey and act in a manner that would help bring an end to the situation. This observation applies differently to different people at different points in time – before, during or after the tragic event, but nevertheless there is a definite sense of solidarity, comradery and altruism that can be detected amongst those affected, amongst those responding and in some cases the onlookers. In this chapter, it is argued that this indeed is how it should be, disaster or otherwise, and that we have moral duties to oneself and to others. An individual exhibiting solidarity, comradery and altruism during a disaster is indeed behaving as a reasonable Self, and exercising ethical individualism as per Gewirthian philosophy. It is the duty of the State and society to act as a supportive State and a caring society. It is also noted that in order for the right ethical decisions to be taken in response to disasters, we must already be conditioned to do so by embedding ethical rationality in our preparedness for disaster response, both from the individual point of view as well as the institutional perspective, and also be willing to espouse the same approach in the recovery
stages. In order to do this, we need to be conditioned for ethical rationality before any whiff of disaster arises, i.e. in our day-to-day conduct and decision-making, at a personal, institutional and transnational level. Our ethical resilience during disasters can only be as robust as our rational moral compass during ‘peace-time’. This is the only reasonable expectation we can hold; anything beyond this is a bonus. But perhaps exceptionally, some behaviour during disaster situations can defy conditioning and make super humans of us.

This chapter argues that Gewirthian solidarity ethics (GSE) should play a role in European policy and action in order to provide a system that conditions ethical rationality and in order to fulfil human rights. In the process, this involves addressing our current understanding of human rights as distinct categories of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and to effect a shift towards a more holistic understanding of human rights, whereby the hierarchy of fulfilment does not always prioritise civil and political rights.

Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) is a deontological theory and states that we have moral duties to oneself and to others (Gewirth 1978). Gewirthian solidarity is understood as a categorical imperative, one without a choice, i.e. we are to accept that humans have a duty to protect and uphold human dignity, which, as Beyleveld states, is foundational to action (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001). In this paper, I argue that while there are numerous conceptions or assumptions about solidarity in official policy discourses, a notion of solidarity on which European solidarity needs to be built has to rely on a strong conception of solidarity as laid out by Gewirth and Beyleveld, if we are to ensure that it is in keeping with our obligations under human rights law. While the applicability of human rights law in the aftermath of disasters has not been so widely examined by regional or international human rights bodies (Barber 2008), it is justified to assume that human rights protection is still integral to disaster reponse. Mutuality in Gewirthian ethics is not reciprocal, but one based on ‘basic needs’ and works hand in hand with a caring society and a supportive state. A moral structure is built around this idea of mutuality wherein human rights is actually a ‘community of rights’, and where there is a deep concern about the ‘freedom’ and ‘well-being’ of all members of society.

Altruism and Solidarity in Disaster situations

Widespread altruistic behaviour is observed in survivors of disasters as well as onlookers, both online and in-situ. This has been described as the ‘compulsion to help’ (Griswold 2013), such as when after the 9/11 attacks, people felt an overpowering sense to volunteer. Crowds have been observed as being benevolent during emergencies (Drury, Cocking and Reicher 2009). Recent research even argues for an altruistic brain (Pfaff 2015). In a study that looked into the likely responses by different groups to a bio-terrorist attack, it was found that officials would expect deviant behaviour, but individual citizens would mostly behave altruistically and rationally (Fischer III 2000; Donald & Cantor 1992).

Solidarity is exhibited in groups and communities in various ways. The early reports that came out of the terrorist bombings in a Belgian airport and underground transport station in March 2016 recount acts of altruism by victims towards other victims and of those who were not injured towards those affected by the incidents¹. In 2007, during the London bombings,

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researchers found ‘high levels of mutual aid amongst survivors and witnesses of the bombings’ (Drury, Cocking and Reicher 2009). Selfishness was more common during the daily rush hour on the tube than during the London bombings on the tube, a telling observation about the desensitisation of individuals on a day-to-day basis. Following the November 2015 terrorist shootings in Paris, companies such as Google pitched in by making their internet call-service free of charge for a certain period. The altruistic behaviour of people in donating blood following the Madrid terrorist bombings in 2004, although not needed for such incidents, was nevertheless in response to an urge to help. A side effect of altruism is also observed. Altruism as a hindrance rather than a help is not uncommon in disaster situations, and points to the duty that exists on members of society to take informed decisions about actions. This inadvertent hindrance can be averted by Gewirthian self-interested rational agents, because their exercise of ‘moderate altruism’ (Gewirth 1998, 88), does not discount the duty to inform oneself.

In the aftermath of the chemical gas attack in Halabja in northern Iraq in 1988, in the absence of any institutional response, the people of the town buried the dead, demonstrating the poignancy of altruism when their own government ordered the disaster (Hart and Clevestig 2009). During the Tokyo sarin gas attack by the group Aum Shinrikyo in 1995, the lack of obvious signs as to the nature of the attack meant that the first responders to victims were their fellow travellers (Pangi 2002). Reports of callous behaviour of passengers towards ‘passengers in discomfort’ on the trains in Tokyo could be explained by the fact that there was no obvious sign of an attack. Murakami, in his book that recounts interviews of victims and responders, talks about passengers wanting to distance themselves from the situation by changing trains (Murakami 2000). Perhaps this behaviour is at the cusp of the ‘daily commuter syndrome’ of indifference and the altruistic individual phenomenon that occurs during an obvious disaster.

Policies that respond to disasters in Europe take into account these behaviours and accommodate, indeed count on, altruism and solidarity. Various initiatives such as EU Aid volunteers provide outlets for such altruism in a structured manner. In the 2009 chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) plan adopted by the EU Commission, the principle of solidarity exists as a top level principle. States have the responsibility primarily in protecting against CBRN threats, but EU initiatives are guided by the EU solidarity principle (Council of the European Union 2009). Article 222 of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) incorporates the ‘spirit of solidarity’ in order to bring together the resources of European states to respond to disasters, and is being infused into the CBRN action plan (Konstadinides 2013, 475). In the US, the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism highlights the need to develop a ‘Culture of Preparedness’, and it seems natural to assume solidarity as integral to this culture. While the US is politically less enamoured by solidarity, it has embedded solidarity in its culture of preparedness statement – which incorporates ‘vocabularies of cultural change’ Culture of information sharing between departments as opposed to a culture of need to know. Although not a radical step in solidarity, but a essential first step towards it.

Solidarity amongst niche victim groups, as a result of tragedy, can also be potent in the context of disaster relief and prevention. The notion of moderate altruism is stretched to its limit to accept and support such groups, and such acceptance should be based on self-interested rationality, i.e. as a necessity, at the very minimum. Families Against Terrorism and Extremism (FATE) talks of resilience as a way out of the pain, shame and guilt of a loved one
being involved in terrorist activities by helping prevent others from getting involved. The Network of Associations for Victims of Terrorism (NAVT) has as one of its aims to promote solidarity with victims of terrorism and better citizenry. The Common Bond Project promotes solidarity among young people who are victims of terrorism.

**Reasonable Self, Ethical Individualism**

Alan Gewirth, a Chicago philosopher, and a neo-Kantian theorist, has elaborated the PGC (the Principle of Generic Consistency) theory which supports the self-chosen purpose of an individual, and in order for it to be achieved, states that that the individual, who is generalized as an ‘agent’ has what is called generic needs. The rights to generic needs are known as generic rights. It would not be rationally possible to deny these rights for oneself as an agent or for any other who displays the characteristics of an agent with a self-chosen purpose. Freedom and well-being are seen as generic needs in order for the agent to be able to act at all. Gewirth uses a dialectically necessary method to arrive at generic needs. The dialectically necessary method is as follows: If A is an agent, i.e. wanting to act for a voluntarily chosen purpose, then A should also accept (to herself, that she values the purpose so as to aspire to achieve it. By combining the dialectic method with logic, Gewirth then arrives at the position that what is true for oneself as an agent, i.e. the need to have generic needs fulfilled, should also be true for all agents. Hence a logical link is created with other agents. Gewirth also uses a dialectically contingent method to arrive at generic rights. In it, he states that the framework of human rights is predicated on the notion of generic rights. This will be picked up in the next section when discussing the state and society as a supportive state and a caring society.

So, to sum up, the PGC states that

“A person is generically inconsistent or inconsistent in a fundamental way, if, while exercising his own capacities of agency, he rejects, either in thought or in action, the possession or exercise of those capacities on the part of other persons”

Based on the PGC theory, Gewirth elaborates various concepts such as the Reasonable Self, Ethical Individualism, Supportive State and Caring Society. these concepts have been referred to earlier, and will be explained and discussed in this section. Solidarity expressed as altruistic behaviour was the subject of the discussion in the earlier section illustrating responses to disasters. This section will involve analysing solidarity as ethical individualism and altruistic behaviour as rational ethical conduct. Solidarity is further analysed in terms of its acceptable extent, under the notion of moderate altruism.

A Reasonable Self can be understood as a generically consistent agent. The notion of a Reasonable Self is a perspectival construction. It is constructed from the the point of view of a community. So from the perspective of the community, the generically consistent agent in the PGC statement is a Reasonable Self. In order to understand the Reasonable Self, a comparison with the Hobbesian notion of self will help. A Reasonable Self is very different to a Hobbesian Self in that the Hobbesian Self is more atomistic in her individualism. A Hobbesian Self would be generically inconsistent and would not be exercising ethical individualism. The Reasonable Self recognises that there is a rational basis for treating others’ needs as having some bearing on the fulfilment of one’s own needs.

Because of the contributions made to an individual by society, the individual, to an extent, is a ‘social product’, which is Gewirth’s social contribution thesis (Gewirth 1996, 83). An
individual then recognizes that he or she has an obligation towards society because of society’s contribution to their agency. Ethical Individualism is therefore egoistic in that ‘all persons are helped to develop their abilities of agency, is regarded by each individual simply as the price she must pay to fulfil these personal rights for herself’, and the ‘society should be so structured institutionally that it promoted equal rights and mutuality’ (Gewirth 1996, 85). Collectively, the notions of the Reasonable Self, Social Contribution thesis and Ethical individualism form Gewirthian solidarity ethics (GSE). The current framework of human rights acts as a barrier to GSE and to achieving solidarity as a policy goal. While the philosophical understanding that human rights are indivisible are embedded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention has a much restricted view of rights, mainly confined to the first generation of human rights.

Therefore civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights are one but different in name. They are interrelated and indivisible. In GSE there is no need to make a reference to these differences. But from the political and legal point of view, this is essential for an understanding of how GSE can have a true harmonising impact to bring about a broad and year-round European disaster ethics policy. The artificial division between positive (social, economic and cultural) and negative rights (civil and political) is a barrier in fully realising solidarity as a policy goal. GSE too prioritises rights, but not in a similar fashion to the human rights regime. Gewirth lays out a hierarchy of needs (basic, non-subtractive and additive goods), these categories of needs do not coincide fully with the human rights notion of first, second and third generation human rights.

**Mutuality as the nature of positive rights**

To fully understand how the Reasonable Self behaves, one must turn to the notion of mutuality. Mutuality has a definite basis in non-reciprocity in Gewirthian ethics.

While reciprocity can be understood as tit for tat – equal amounts of something exchanged between two persons – mutuality should be understood as giving or receiving something so as to secure to the other his or her generic rights. Full stop.

The other aspects that distinguish mutuality from reciprocity are:

1. In a mutual relationship, giving or receiving can be one directional, but in a reciprocal relationship, B gives something to A only if A has something to give or has given something to B.
2. In a relation of reciprocity, the beneficiaries are limited to one’s prior benefactors, unlike in mutuality, where they are owed to all agents.

Because of mutuality, we see the conception that generic rights are connected in action, or in other words mutuality animates the community of rights, as an essential basis for the existence, development and flourishing of a community of agents. Mutuality puts solidarity on a rational basis. Solidarity cements a community in a lasting fashion.

Picking up on the contingent argument for human rights developed by Gewirth and also by Beyleveld and Brownsword, the argument goes that as the global community (States, individuals and other non-natural persons) has acknowledged the existence of human rights, most notably through the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequently through numerous human rights treaties, it can be shown, using a dialectically contingent argument that human rights are nothing but a crystallisation of generic needs of agency
Human rights then acquire a rational foundation. Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001) argue that it follows from the acceptance of human rights that legal systems that recognise human rights must treat the PGC as a necessary criterion of legal validity, on pain of denying that they recognise human rights.

In the light of PGC, positive rights need to be fulfilled just as much as negative rights in order to create conditions for day-to-day altruism and solidarity. States risk being incongruent if they do not assume this position. Recognising positive rights is conducive to mutuality, as it supports mutuality-based solidarity behaviour by agents on a day-to-day basis. Such mundane solidarity, and more of it, is key to solidarity during disasters.

Positive and negative rights are used to distinguish and justify different types of human rights obligations owed by states to the recipients, and increasingly other entities that may have obligations under human rights law. The argument is that human rights that are negative in nature impose less onerous obligations on the State, for example for the fulfilment of the freedom of speech, it only requires that the State does not intervene. In contrast, for the fulfillment of the right to food, there is a need to invest resources on a large scale. While there are differences in how different human rights are fulfilled, that there is a qualitative difference between the two categories is not convincing. Even in the case of fulfillment of negative rights, the costs can be huge given that enforcement mechanisms need to be put in place, such as the provision for a judiciary and the police. Viewed from the Gewirthian perspective, a rational justification for positive rights provides more support for the resources spent, their core being embedded in mutuality, otherwise there is an inherent contradiction in the system. Acceptance of positive rights provides a justification for mundane solidarity to be practiced and reinforced.

The recognition of positive rights in a society makes the practice of Gewirthian solidarity ethics more natural, thereby creating conditions that make solidarity-based disaster reponse a default paradigm. This is closely reflected in the ‘resilience paradigm’, which spans ‘from comprehensive disaster management through disaster-resistant community, disaster-resilient communities, sustainable development, sustainable hazards mitigation, invulnerable development, to comprehensive vulnerability management’ McEntire et al. (2002) Manyena (2006).

In terms of the scope of altruism, writing in his last book Self-Fulfillment, Gewirth (1998) argues that the standard that is set is not one of a saint, but that of a self-interested individual. Such is the expression of the trait of moderate altruism. Ethical individualism focusses on expanding the self, while moderate altruism approaches this from the perspective of balancing the interests of the Self and the other. Prospective purposive agents or, in other words, Gewirthian actors should provide for the vulnerable while taking care of one’s own needs as well as ‘aspiration-fulfillment’. A fuller conception of ‘aspiration-fulfillment’ and its place in purposive action of agents is precluded in this short exposition of GSE.

**Supportive State and Caring Society**

Gewirthian actors exhibiting solidarity, comradery and altruism during a disaster are indeed behaving as moral and rational agents and their impact depends on institutional frameworks as well as their own effort. It is the duty of the State, to shape itself around such a reasonable Self to protect and promote a Reasonable Self, ever present to reinforce this idea by the development of responsive institutions. The state and society need to provide the scaffolding
by being a Supportive State and a Caring Society in order to increase the chances that all agents are fulfilled in their human rights as much of the time as possible, and this includes during disasters.

At one level, being a Supportive State means that the state supports other states by supporting itself and others during times of disasters. (Inigo chapter 9 of this book, page 5), on the other hand, it means that it has a human rights framework that it supports. Duties and obligations of States arise from generic rights that are embedded in policy as human rights. A Supportive State has an obligation to develop Positive Rights and Negative Rights. In discussing the indirect application of the PGC, Gewirth requires the transition from a minimal state to a Supportive State. The Supportive State should give more of a role for the crowd to render help during emergencies (Drury et al. 2009) so that the institutional structure that harbours Gewirthian agents supports mutualism, and not egoism (Gewirth 1996). Gewirth (1996) points out that the distribution of political power is a decisive factor, and hence the responsibility is institutional rather than individual.

The debate on negative and positive rights, or first and second generation human rights, has been too long mired in geopolitical debates between the capitalist and the socialist countries. There is a real need for a holistic conception of human rights, as inequality increases in every society and the welfare state wanes. The recognition of positive rights will provide a stronger footing for an altruistic state. The General Assembly resolution on Promotion and protection of human rights in post-disaster and post-conflict situations in 2013 requests human rights ‘mainstreaming’ in disaster relief in all its members states, including in Europe (UNGA 2013). In 2015, the final report of the Human Rights Advisory Committee to the United Nations General Assembly on mainstreaming human rights into disaster responses stated:

Rights relating to the basic necessities of life (in particular relating to food, drinking water, shelter, clothing, adequate health services and sanitation), physical security and integrity (protection of the right to life and the right to be free of assault, rape, arbitrary detention and kidnapping, and threats to these rights), civil and political protection needs (rights to religious freedom and freedom of speech, personal documentation, political participation, access to courts, and freedom from discrimination) and other economic, social and cultural protection needs (such as access to education, to receive restitution or compensation for lost property and to work) should be protected and respected through the design and implementation of concrete initiatives and mechanisms at all levels.

It is clear that the UN lays emphasis on positive and negative human rights. In the event of a CBRN incident, the application of human rights, both positive and negative, still stay important and should be equally protected. What the Gewirthian framework provides is a means of prioritising the needs, in a way that positive rights are not always disadvantaged. Gewirth lays out a hierarchy of needs known as basic, non-subtractive and additive needs. Basic needs compass features that are needed for the very possibility of action, including life itself, providing the capability to be involved in making choices and the possession of mental equilibrium sufficient to enable one to these. Non-subtractive needs are features needed to be able to act successfully, without thereby being needed for the very possibility of acting. Additive needs are features that are needed to be able to improve one’s capacities for successful action, regardless of one’s purposes. These needs are conceptualised hierarchically based on the possibility of successful action, therefore in the case of conflict for fulfilment of needs, rights to non-subtractive needs outweigh rights to additive needs, and the rights to basic needs outweigh non-subtractive and additive needs. A number of sustainable development goals
(SDGs) enshrine objectives that will help secure basic needs. SDG 1 and 2 require states to commit to eradicating poverty and hunger. SDG 3 commits states to working to achieve good health for its citizens. Non subtractive needs include decent work (SDG 8), education (SDG 4) gender equality (SDG 5). Additive needs include participation in partnerships for success of goals, climate action, etc. The report rightly supports a pivotal role for women in disaster situations. It is clear that women play an important role in the achievement of Sustainable development goals, by playing a disproportionate role in issues such as food security. Their ability to act in a mutually reciprocal manner warrants their special status as rational agents.

Solidarity plays a role in European security policy. Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Article 222 calls upon member states to work together to assist one another in the event of a terrorist attack, a man-made disaster or a natural disaster. While this is a necessary inclusion in the policy, there is room for criticism. The reference to a ‘spirit of solidarity’ in Article 222 can be seen as a weak provision, with the potential to be trumped by weaker values. However the reference to joint action is refreshing and acts as a mellowing factor to a potentially watered down solidarity requirement. GSE would require that post-disaster recovery should continue to see the Supportive State in action. Konstantines (2013) rightly argues that the positioning of Article 222 in the Treaty is indicative of its limited significance, casting doubts on solidarity as a policy goal. A clearer approach to Article 222 would be to read ‘the solidarity clause in terms of a kind of mutual insurance tool able to minimize the risks at a common minimal cost but not in any case an altruistic tool created in order to provide aid for those countries that are not able to face the challenges posed by major crisis situations on their own’. (Inigo chapter 9 of this book, page 5)

It is in the remit of the Supportive State to not hinder, but support the development of caring communities. Disaster relief can be called for unexpectedly and in unknown scales, therefore having caring communities to call upon can provide for fulfillment of agents’ needs. However, CBRNE incidents bring out rational and moral behaviours of individuals irrespective of a widespread caring community that exists, and this is a point made earlier through examples of actual incidents of bombings in major European capitals, terrorist shooting in Paris and chemical attacks in Iraq and Tokyo. In order to address the peculiarities of the relationship between CBRNE, mutuality and solidarity, three points need to be made. First, that the incident and the immediate aftermath attract the most mutuality underpinned actions. Second, the knowledge that it is a CBRNE incident is essential to kindle the mutualistic propensity. Finally, solidarity in its deepest form, i.e. mutuality has more chance of being spontaneously displayed during a CBRNE event than during other events that triggers altruistic behaviour.

Caring communities are motivated and organized (Cretney 2016). It is interesting that in some less ordered societies, state officials (acting as if in their private capacity) can exhibit much more rational ethical behaviour than in the case of officials of developed States. This is perhaps based on cultural values that pervade strongly in many societies. Cultural values in societies can play a strong role in ethical behaviour for resilience (Kenney and Phibbs 2015). The role of social organisations in organizing relief has become increasingly better and important in the context of disaster relief. Groups have shown independence in defining the resilience framework they need. In this context, communities need to proactively work to infuse ‘caring’ and shape what this means for their work. There is lack of clarity in the indicators for community resilience because of the neglected status of community resilience (Manyena 2016). Central to Gewirth’s conception of caring communities is his social contribution thesis.
This thesis should help apportion obligations and shape appropriate indicators for community resilience. Community resilience should work better on mutualistic foundations as was demonstrated in the Dunedin earthquake mobilization in a locality that was badly hit (Manyena 2016). Sustainable Development Goal 11 provides a mutualistic framework, in keeping with Gewirthian social contribution thesis. By 2030, it aims to enhance capacity for participatory human settlement planning and management in all countries, thereby providing individuals the opportunity to give back to the communities and fulfil their role as mutual agents (SDG 2015). All members of society are enrolled into social contributions, except that the social contribution thesis does not operate in its full scope for those born into extreme deprivation, because unless they are helped by society first, they are not able to become productive agents, to then take on responsibilities.

The right to development (RtD) is pertinent in the discussion of caring communities. RtD is a controversial third generation human right. Gewirth stakes a claim via the social contribution thesis for a ‘collective right of the community to an institutionalised system of support from those it has benefited’, which could be very much likened to RtD. This is an interesting way to demonstrate a caring community, i.e by demanding something. But that is the reality and complexity of communities. The caring community gives as well as takes, so as to be able to give, and take!

Caring communities play a role in reducing the impact of future disasters. The adaptive capacity of the caring communities is greater than that of non-caring communities. Pre-disaster community activities contribute to better community resilience, and these are examples of Gewirthian caring communities in action, operating with heightened awareness that disasters are part of modern societies. Social support and social participation have been identified as elements of pre-disaster societies that have helped respond and adapt post-disaster (Cretney 2016). Working towards SDG 11 to make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable would go a long way in realising Gewirthian values. A key target, by 2020, is to substantially increase the number of cities and human settlements adopting and implementing integrated policies and plans towards inclusion, resource efficiency, mitigation and adaptation to climate change, resilience to disasters, and develop and implement, in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, holistic disaster risk management at all levels (SDG 2015).

Conclusion

Construing solidarity as Gewirthian mutuality in disaster ethics creates a rational human rights framework that operates as a ‘community of rights’. It provides a worthy framework during a difficult situation where moral decisions are taken within a structure already made conducive to human rights and human dignity. Mutuality is a key human rights concept, manifesting in the recognition and promotion of positive human rights law in a Supportive State and provides continuity between resilience and disaster paradigms. The role of communities in disaster relief and resilience is often ignored or only grudgingly tolerated, however Gewirthian solidarity ethics places the community in an integral position for the fulfilment of human rights. This chapter seeks to reconcile altruistic behaviour with a human rights framework that recognises and builds upon this phenomenon.
References


