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What are autobiographical memories? A reply to Bauer, Baker-Ward, Krøjgaard, 
Peterson, and Wang.
 
 
  
 
 
1Shazia Akhtar, 2Lucy V. Justice, 3Catriona M. Morrison, 1Martin A. Conway, and 
1Mark L. Howe 
  
1Department of Psychology, City, University of London 
2Department of Psychology, Nottingham Trent University  
3Department of Psychology, University of Bradford 				
Professor Martin A. Conway 
Department of Psychology 
City, University of London 
The Rhind Building 
Northampton Square, 
London, EC1V 0HB 
 
Email: Martin.Conway.1@city.ac.uk 		
Wednesday,	12	June	2019	
	 	
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Abstract			Bauer,	et	al.	(2019)	argue	that	Akhtar	et	al.	(2018)	state	that	infants	and	young	children	have	no	memory.	But	what	we	actually	argued	is	that	infants	and	young	children	do	not	in	the	main	have	conceptually	rich	autobiographical	memories	comparable	to	those	of	adults.	What	infants	and	young	children	do	have	is	the	ability	to	retain	some	fragments	of	previous	experience	–	early	episodic	memory.	One	powerful	implication	of	this	is	that	when	adults	provide	conceptually	rich	accounts	of	memories	dating	to	approximately	the	age	of	3	years	and	younger	it	is	most	probably	the	case	that,	in	many	instances	(estimated	at	about	40%	in	Akhtar,	et	al.),		these	are	adult	embellishments	of	poorly	remembered	details,	facts	told	them	about	their	childhood,	family	stories,	and	so	on.	They	are	what	we	termed	fictional	first	memories.			 	
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Consider	the	following	account	of	a	childhood	memory:	“I	really	wanted	to	say	something	to	my	mother	but	had	not	yet	learned	to	talk”	The	person	who	recalled	this	memory	was	in	their	30s	and	they	dated	the	memory	to	below	the	age	of	one	year.	But	is	it	really	possible	to	remember	not	being	able	to	talk?	Consider	several	more	accounts	of	memories:	“Sitting	in	a	pram	with	my	younger	brother	he	was	a	very	small	baby	at	the	time,	I	am	14	months	older	than	my	brother	so	I	must	have	been	2	or	younger.	I	remember	being	in	the	pram	the	rain	cover	was	on	and	my	brother	was	under	a	white	blanket.	I	remember	having	a	feeling	of	warmth	and	security.”		Aged	2,	age	at	recall,	46/50.	“I	have	a	good	Photographic	memory	which	may	explain	why	I	remember	a	certain	part	in	the	past	when	I	was	only	2	months	old.	I	am	now	33	years	old.	Memory:	I	can	see	myself	positioned	outside	my	parents	dark	green	Morris	Minor	(with	dark	wood	trims	looking	about	4	meters	facing	the	back	of	the	car).	The	car	is	on	the	left	hand	side	of	a	road,	weather	is	bright,	colours	are	vivid.	Tall	grass	either	side	of	the	road.	I	think	the	back	doors	are	shut.	I	can	see	no	one.	When	mentioned	to	my	parents,	they	thought	it	was	impossible	at	the	age	I	was	at	the	time,	told	as	being	2	months	old.”	“Sitting	on	my	'potty'	listening	to	the	radio	(Listen	With	Mother)	while	my	own	mother	took	my	brother	to	school.”	Aged	2	or	below,	age	at	recall	41/45.	Could	a	2-month	old	know	what	a	Morris	Minor	is	or	a	2-year	old	what	a	rain	cover	is?	Is	it	possible	to	remember	the	radio	program	one	was	listening	to	aged	2?		The	evidence	suggests	not,	which	is	why	we	argued	that	these	accounts	are	best	described	as		fictional	memories	and	they	are	part	of	the	life	story	formed	by	the	self-memory	system	(Conway,	Justice,	&	D’Argembeau,	in	press;	
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Conway	&	Pleydell-Pearce,	2000)	a	major	part	of	which	is	autobiographical	memory	(AM).	Autobiographical	memory	consists	of	conceptual	knowledge	of	one’s	life,	represented	at	different	levels	of	specificity,	and	episodic	memories	that	contain	experience-near	fragmentary	details	(Conway,	2009).	Indeed,	this	is	what	we	meant	by	the	term	‘full’	AMs.	Episodic	memories	are	then	event-specific	and	are	embedded	in	experience-distant	associated	networks	of	conceptual	knowledge.	The	simple	reason	why	infants	and	young	children	do	not	have	AMs	is	that	they	have	yet	to	develop	the	conceptual	knowledge	networks	in	which	fragmentary	episodic	memories	will	eventually	become	embedded.	On	the	other	hand	we	also	believe	that	at	3	years	of	age	and	younger	infants,	although	lacking	full	autobiographical	memories,	may	well	have	mental	representations	that	at	lest	approximate	to	episodic	memories.	One	critically	important	aspect	of	conceptual	knowledge	is	in	the	development	of	the	self.	Indeed,	Bauer	et	al.	acknowledge	that	“there	is	consensus	that	the	memory	must	be	of	a	specific	past	event	and	that	it	be	self-
referential”	(italics	ours;	see	page	5	of	the	commentary).	As	most	people	would	also	agree,	this	self	does	not	emerge	until	around	2	years	of	age,	(of	course	there	will	be	large	individual	differences	here	and	in	any	case	the	development	of	the	self	is	likely	a	process	extended	in	time).	Nevertheless,	and	to	clarify,	our	point	is	that	to	the	extent	that	the	self	does	not	exist	or	exists	only	in	rudimentary	form	there	can	be	no	AMs	(e.g.,	Howe,	2000;	Howe	&	Courage,	1993,	1997;	Howe,	Courage,	&	Edison,	2003;	Ross,	Hutchison,	&	Cunningham,	in	press).		Another	issue	here	is	what	is	meant	by	“memory	…	of	a	specific	past	event.”	We	know	from	numerous	studies	(see	Conway,	2005,	2009)	that	memories	of	specific	events,	‘episodic	memories,’	are	fragmentary,	time	compressed,	and	
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contain	many	unconscious	and	conscious	inferences.	But	the	schemas	and	conceptual	networks	that	support	such	‘filling	in’	of	episodic	memory	details	are	only	just	taking	shape	in	infants	and	young	children	and	are	hardly	present,	if	at	all,	in	neonates.		Thus,	observations	that	an	infant	can	recognize	a	row	of	objects,	look	at	a	new	item	in	a	display,	even	recall	some	detail,	is	hardly	surprising.	This	is	the	beginning	of	the	development	of	episodic	memory,	but	not	yet	AM	itself.	This	is	where	our	view	of	AM	differs	from	that	of	Bauer	et	al.	,	Our	point	being	that	what	fragments	remain	in	memory	from	early	experiences	become	integrated	into	the	life	story	making	them	consistent	with	current	beliefs.	It	is,	during	the	process	of	integration	into	the	life	story	memories	are	altered	to	fit.		Thus,	the	fact	that		infants	and	young	children	show	evidence	of	memory	does	not	mean	that	they	have	full	conceptually	rich	autobiographical	memory.	It	follows	from	this	that	adults	who	report	conceptually	rich	autobiographical	memories	(such	as	those	listed	above)	dating	to	below	3	years	of	age	are	giving	accounts	that	we	believe	are	highly	embellished	(see	Howe,	2013).	Such	embellishments	may	be	based	on	an	episodic	detail(s)	retained	from	these	very	early	years,	conceptual	knowledge	of	their	infancy	acquired	later,	family	stories,	etc.	Whatever	the	case	they	are	fictional	in	the	way	described	by	Akhtar	et	al.	In	agreement	with	other	research	(e.g.,	Bruce,	Dolan,	&	Phillips-Grant,	2000;	Bruce,	et	al.,	2005)	our	view	is	that	representations	approaching	the	complexity	and	richness	of	adult	autobiographical	memory	do	not	generally	begin	to	emerge	until	the	age	of	5	to	6	years	(see	Wells,	Morrison,	&	Conway,	2014).	Of	course,	and	again,	there	will	be	large	individual	differences	in	this,	although	the	mergence	of	a	range	of	full,	conceptually	rich,	AMs	we	believe	dates	to	later	rather	than	early	childhood	and	infancy.	
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