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Tourist security, terrorism risk management and tourist safety, *Annals of Tourism Research*, 89, 2021

Accepted Version

**TOURIST SECURITY, TERRORISM RISK MANAGEMENT AND TOURIST
SAFETY**

Abstract

Tourists are easy targets for terrorist activities. Drawing on the example of the 2015 Sousse (Tunisia) shootings, and using a conceptual framework informed by tourist security, terrorism risk management including terrorism risk assessment, communication and due care, we analyse the management of the terror induced security risks, and the factors influencing this process. This is achieved through a first-in-the field tourism study that applies narrative analysis to legal discourse. The study reveals that tourist security was compromised by a lack of terrorism risk communication, poor policing, and by limited integration of counter-terrorism strategies, particularly the inadequate implementation of environmental mitigation. We discuss the implications for terrorism risk assessment, management and communication and consider key propositions around tourist security responsibilities (e.g. due care). Future avenues for research are highlighted.

Keywords: terrorism; tourist security; due care; terrorism risk assessment, management and communication; narrative analysis

INTRODUCTION

Creating conditions for tourists to feel secure and safe from harm before and during a trip is critical to the success of many destinations (Araña and León, 2008). This is not an easy task as globalisation has exposed the tourism industry to a wide set of risks, one of which is terrorism. Widely understood as the 'pre-meditated use or threat of use of extra normal violence or brutality by sub-national groups to obtain political, religious or ideological objectives (Somnez, 1998; pg. 417), terrorism can induce fear amongst prospective tourists causing them to avoid destinations they believe to be associated with such threats (Araña and León, 2008). According to the Institute for Economics and Peace (2019), although the intensity of terrorism declined between 2004-2018, it has become more geographically dispersed due to 'lone wolf' attacks. The uncontrollable, involuntary and random nature of these incidents makes managing these risks and ensuring tourist security, extremely challenging for the tourism industry.

Extensive tourism research has been undertaken on the influence of security risks and safety concerns on perceptions of destination image, on tourist decision-making, and on patterns of international travel (e.g. Fourie et al., 2020; Hall et al., 2003; Mansfeld and Pizam, 2006). Terrorism has attracted the most scrutiny, focused on its impact on tourism demand and on destinations (e.g. Ahlfeldt et al., 2015; Baker, 2014; Bassil et al., 2017; Enders et al., 2014; Liu and Pratt, 2017), on tourist decision-making, destination choice and behaviour (e.g. Seabra et al., 2020; Walters et al., 2019), and on tourists' perceptions of risk, security and safety (e.g. Bowen et al., 2014; Coca-Stefaniak and Morrison, 2018; Fourie et al., 2020; Fuchs and Reichel, 2011; Malečková and Stanišić, 2014; Mansfeld and Pizam, 2006; Seabra et al., 2013; Seabra et al., 2014).

A lacuna of knowledge exists on how terror-related risks are managed by tour operators and third party sellers, specifically in relation to the legal and ethical obligations imposed by their duty of care (also called due care). Moreover, to date no studies exist within tourism on terrorism risk management in relation to a lone wolf attack. This paper addresses this knowledge gap by examining the management of terror-induced risks, the factors influencing this process and the implications for tour operators regarding due care. This is achieved through the novel application of narrative analysis to legal discourse disclosed during an inquisitional trial. The latter sought to explain the deaths of thirty UK citizens who were killed in and around the Rui Imperial Marhaba hotel, a five star complex 10km north of Sousse, Tunisia on 26th June 2015 as a result of a lone wolf terrorist attack. It was not the first time that Tunisia had experienced an attack of this nature, and a subsequent series of inquests in London raised concerns about the security and safety of holidaymakers when traveling to countries where the potential for terrorist attacks was high.

In the first part of the paper, tourist security and its relationship with tourist safety is discussed, followed by consideration of travel risks and perceptions of tourist security risks. Next, terrorism and tourism is detailed and the terrorism risk management framework is documented, alongside its related components including risk assessment, risk communication and mitigation measures such as counter-terrorism. In the second part of the paper, using the example of the 2015 shootings that occurred in Sousse, Tunisia, the management of the terror-induced risks are

analysed. Following this, the implications for terrorism risk management, tourist security and tourist safety are highlighted.

TOURIST SECURITY AND TERRORISM RISK MANAGEMENT

Tourist security is acknowledged as focusing on the protection of tourists against the possibility of global, international or local situations or events whereby harm is intended and deliberate (Tarlow, 2014; Hall et al., 2003), comprising incidents such as arson, assault, crime and terrorism (Korstanje, 2017). Where protection extends beyond the personal safety of tourists to encompass destinations and the tourism economy, the term 'tourism security' is often used (Tarlow, 2014). This involves the imposition of a system that seeks to eradicate or mitigate risk in order to protect tourists from harm or other undesirable consequences. Implicit within tourist security is the inter-connected concept of tourist safety.

While both involve tourist protection, the principal distinction between tourist security and tourist safety is that the latter relates to unintended consequences of an involuntary nature (e.g. fire or traffic accident), as opposed to deliberate intentions in the case of the former. As modern conceptions of security have evolved beyond the defense of nation-states, to encompass a variety of global to individual issues ranging from threats from military actions, climate change, resource scarcity, international crime, health, and biosecurity (Hall et al., 2003), the distinction between both concepts has become less clear. Blurred boundaries exist, as implied within Cohen (1972) and Plog's (1974) tourist 'drifter', 'explorer' and 'allocentric' typologies, all of whom are motivated by novelty and are risk averse (Seabra et al., 2014). Moreover, in some tourism forms (e.g. backpacking and adventure tourism), thrill and sensation-seeking, and possible physical harm are core to the tourism experience (Adam, 2015; Holm et al., 2017). Despite the issue of semantics around security and safety as terms, they conjointly influence intentions to travel internationally (e.g. Sonmez and Graefe, 1998), with tourists' risk perceptions about personal safety and destination security impacting such decisions (Seabra et al., 2014).

Travel risks and tourist security risk perceptions

Risk is embedded in everyday life and perceptions vary depending on the individual. Mansfeld (2006; pg. 272) refers to tourist risk as 'a wide range of uncertainties regarding tourists' ability to fulfil their travel motivations without being exposed to unfortunate situations'. Although a variety of travel risks have been identified ranging from financial, psychological, time, physical and social (Seabra et al., 2014), many do not cause actual bodily harm to tourists; those that do, irrespective of being unintended or deliberate, may directly and indirectly do so, through their potential to damage infrastructure, disrupt supply chains, challenge law and order, and/or create chaotic and spin-off crisis situations. Examples include extreme weather, natural disasters, pandemics, political instability, crime, and terrorism which pose travel risks to tourist security and safety (e.g. Hall et al., 2003; Fuchs and Reichel, 2011; Sonmez, 1998) (see Figure 1).

[Figure 1]

Perceptions or feelings of being protected from factors that cause harm are integral to tourist security and safety. Researchers posit that perceived risk as opposed to actual risk has received the greatest attention as the latter determines behaviours (e.g. Roehl and Fesenmaier, 1992). Risk is multidimensional and its complexity affects tourist decision-making where risk perceptions may be situation specific (Roehl and Fesenmaier, 1992), and judgements are highly individual, based upon personal factors including personality traits (Reisinger and Mavondo, 2005), culture and nationality (Kozak et al., 2007), past travel experience and demographics (Seabra et al., 2013), income and education (Floyd and Pennington-Gray, 2004), everyday contact with crime and violence (Brunt et al., 2000) and sought benefits. Situation-specific risks may outweigh perceived risks when taking the final decision (Sönmez and Graefe, 1998). The most frequently examined safety concerns within tourists' risk perceptions are political instability and unrest, health and terrorism and the relationship to destination choice and intentions to visit (Araña and Leon, 2008; Sönmez and Graefe, 1998).

Terrorism and due care

Terrorism and political instability create fear amongst tourists (Sönmez and Graefe, 1998), with younger generations ranking war, terrorism and political tension as their top concerns (Deloitte, 2017). Whilst terrorist-induced deaths have declined in the last three years, political conflict is a key driver of instability globally (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019), and a significant number of terrorist incidents have occurred at tourist destinations (Korstanje, 2017). Terrorist attacks have targeted/involved tourism infrastructure and destinations (e.g. Fourie et al., 2020). Global cities have become particular targets given the media attention they attract exemplified by recent terror attacks on Sydney and Melbourne (Australia), Paris (France), Brussels (Belgium), and Manchester and London (UK). Each incident was high impact but low in frequency. Running parallel to this, is a randomness in the spatial and temporal occurrence of terrorist incidents (Walters et al., 2018).

A perennial challenge which these risks pose is the thorny issue of the tourism industry's responsibility for safeguarding tourists. A limited range of studies address 'who is responsible for tourist safety?' (Cavlec, 2002; Lovelock, 2003; Mansfeld, 2006; Pizam et al., 1997). This is often a tautological discussion where some positions highlight the tourism sector's responsibility for tourist security and safety (e.g. Cavlec, 2002; Mansfeld, 2006; Pizam et al., 1997). Cavlec (2002) in particular, emphasized the legal requirement of due care to avoid or minimize risks to an acceptable level. Its legal definition is the dispensation of reasonable care to manage risk and encompasses activities such as policy enforcement, implementing counter measures, and encrypting data. The fulfilment of due care involves practicing due diligence that involves developing security structures, formulating security policies, standards, guidelines and procedures. Implicit within due diligence is monitoring, auditing and providing verification that due care actions have been carried out and are being followed (Barner, 2019).

For tour operators, travel agents and third party sellers of tourism products in many EU countries, due care results in inevitable tensions between moral responsibility, legal requirements and profitability. Lovelock (2003; pg. 277) claimed that travel agents are often caught between two sets of ethics: 'the humanitarian one

that advocates not sending tourists to dangerous places and the business ethic, which calls for a hard sell regardless of the risk involved'. Mansfeld (2006) expected that tour operators avoided selling high security risk destinations, providing security-oriented information to make customers aware of the potential risks (Lovelock, 2003). Thus, the need to manage the risks posed by terrorism is vital if both the industry and tourists are to be safeguarded.

Terrorism risk management

Rooted within the broader framework of security risk management, terrorism risk management has emerged as a specialised branch of expertise. It focuses on terror-induced incidents and minimising the deliberate actions geared towards inflicting harm to an individual, organization, business and destination. It is derived from generic risk and security risk management processes, involving the identification and evaluation of risks (e.g. the frequency and severity of attack at strategic and operational levels) to inform the design of terror risk communication, management and mitigation (Smith and Brooks, 2013). When applied to terrorism, it evaluates the threat (high versus low), criticality (urgent versus non-urgent), vulnerability (high versus low), probability (likely versus unlikely) and impact (high versus low) of the risks posed. Although vital, knowledge of the nature of terrorist threats alone is insufficient. Consequently, unless there is awareness and understanding among business, industry bodies, leadership teams and the public, of terrorism risks and how these are to be mitigated including roles and responsibilities, terrorism risk management is likely to be ineffective. Thus, a key element of terrorism risk management also involves communication.

Terrorism risk communication entails the application of risk communication principles, but focuses solely on the provision of information to the public regarding possible terrorist attacks and level of risk (Freedman, 2006). For tourism, it primarily concerns the probable occurrence and likely risk of a terror-related event affecting a travel decision, and is targeted at tourists and the tourism sector (Mansfeld, 2006). Implementing this involves the dissemination of real-time intelligence and threat estimates, with the purpose of offering guidance on future intentions and behaviours of known terrorist cells and individuals, and conveying a range of possibilities that might occur as a result (Freedman, 2006). It tends to be preventative in nature highlighting terror risks that would otherwise not be taken into consideration, and like risk communication, it builds understanding amongst stakeholders so that informed decision-making and behavior change can mitigate exposure and impact (Freedman, 2006; Wang and Lopez, 2020).

All forms of risk communication are increasingly undertaken utilizing computer-mediated communication in conjunction with mass media outlets and terrorism risk communication is no different. Social media enables information dissemination to the public directly and the collection of valuable real-time information using the public as eye witnesses (Latonero and Shklovski, 2011). The minimisation of terror-related risk and/or threats however are informed not only by the availability of security information, their level of exposure to it, its nature, quality and credibility (Mansfeld, 2006), but also by decision and buying behaviours and perceptions of risk, fear and safety. Consumer behaviour theories (e.g. Psychoanalytical, Veblenian Social-Psychological, Reasoned Action, Motivation-

Need, and Hawkins Stern Impulse Buying), provide insights into the former, whilst regarding the latter, several studies (e.g. Roehl and Fesenmaier, 1992; Seabra et al., 2013) demonstrate heterogeneity in risk perceptions. Seabra et al. (2013) for example revealed the carefree nature of many international travellers who feel no significant risk in any dimension, pointing to the need for tailoring terrorism risk communication to different market segments. This contention is reinforced by Wang and Lopez (2020), who found that safety messages positively impact visit intentions, particularly amongst low risk, high self-efficacy tourists.

There are also limits to what tourists can do to protect themselves when the degree of personal risk and danger is difficult to calculate (Freedman, 2006). Information about potential terrorist activity is poor, particularly concerning sub-state groups and individuals operating covertly as they are harder to track and their attack options are numerous (Freedman, 2006). Moreover, any threat assessment is likely to be reflexive since terrorists are able to change their plans in light of the knowledge they gain from any terror risk communications (Freedman, 2006). Despite these complexities, communication is an important component of terrorism risk management because in the absence of doing nothing, governments and industry sectors stand accused of failing in their duty to protect their citizens.

Barriers to terrorism risk management

The application of terrorism risk management is a complex task primarily because destinations are rarely managed by a single actor, but instead by a diversity of organizations, interacting within complex networks. Tourist destinations must contend with the added challenge of managing a large transient tourist population whose knowledge of actual risk is generally low (Morakabati et al., 2017). Managing terror-related risks and ensuring tourist safety in crowded public spaces such as beaches, parks and shopping malls is particularly problematic. These spaces are easily accessible, are widely available, they may have little or no protective security, and are densely packed at certain times of day. Moreover, they often lie at the heart of the tourist experience, and so as not to heighten perceptions of fear, terror risk management must be finely balanced with tourists' desire for fun, entertainment and relaxation.

Consequently, terrorism risk management involves multiple actors operating at a variety of levels, including: the macro (e.g. which countries are safe to visit); meso (e.g. which resorts within the country are safe); and, the micro (e.g. which areas/hotels within a resort are safe). Mitigation might also focus on tourists, through the provision of specific advice on precautionary action and risk minimization. With reference to all levels, terrorist-related risks are assessed and communicated through formal, informal, and experiential travel information (Walter et al., 2019). One important formal mechanism are travel warnings, issued by governments as part of an extra-territorial policy to protect their citizens, and to mitigate exposure to risk during international travel. In determining the safety of destinations, tour operators and travel agencies usually follow advice from government issued travel advisories and from established, credible industry bodies. In the UK for example, all tour operators seek additional assurance from the Association of British Travel Agents (ABTA).

At the macro-, meso- and micro-levels, the police and security services play a fundamental role in ensuring that tourists and destinations are secure from terrorist attacks (and conventional crime). As public spaces have been the targets of terrorist attacks globally, recent activity is focused on assessing, managing and mitigating the terror-related risks at crowded public spaces and/or at components of the tourist infrastructure such as sporting venues, commercial centres, transport, and hotels, bars, night clubs and restaurants. Action primarily involves counter-terrorism, notably crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED). This refers to the ways in which environments are security proofed through the design of buildings and public spaces, encompassing also security hardware (e.g. CCTV and lighting), thereby making targets less accessible to perpetrators and more visible to potential witnesses.

At the meso- and micro-levels, national, regional and/or local government bodies produce security and terrorism risk management plans, while each individual component of the tourism industry, engages in risk assessment, management and mitigation. Multiple actors operating at various levels are involved in terrorism risk management with much of this activity undertaken in a siloed, non-collaborative manner (Morakabati et al., 2017). Consequently, the question of who is responsible for tourist security has created controversy. Mair et al. (2016) argue that it rests with destination management organisations and/or managers; conversely, Varghese and Paul (2014) suggest it lies with individual tourism stakeholders. In terms fulfilling due care for tourist security and demonstrating due diligence, the processes entailed within terrorism risk management must be undertaken (see Figure 2).

[Figure 2 here]

Tourist security and safety is a complex issue that fundamentally involves the application of terrorism risk management. For these reasons, we seek to analyse, through a case study of the 2015 Sousse shootings, the management of security risks posed by terrorism and the factors influencing management effectiveness.

METHODOLOGY

Research setting: The Sousse terrorist attack at Port El Kantaoui in 2015

Tunisia is no stranger to the disruptive effects of political events on its tourism sector. Lanouar and Goaled (2019) outlined the long-run effects of politically-inspired instability namely Tunisian Jasmine revolution and two terrorist attacks in 2015 (e.g. at the Bardo National Museum on March 18, 2015 which killed 22 people and the tourist resort attack at Port El Kantaoui, Sousse on June 26, 2015 where 38 were killed, 30 of whom were British tourists). The attack in June 2016 were the result of a single gunman, disguised as a tourist, who attacked the five-star Riu Imperial Marhaba Hotel at Port El Kantaoui. This was a coastal resort located ten kilometres north of Sousse which contained 565 guests, the majority from Western Europe. The gunman fired at each person they encountered until they were eventually killed by Tunisian security forces. The tourism sector in Tunisia in 2014 accounted for 8 per cent of GDP based on 6 million international visitors, many from Western Europe provided much needed foreign currency. Following the attack the governments of

Great Britain, Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden banned travel to Tunisia.

In January 2017, the first hearing of an inquest, at the Royal Courts of Justice in London and a coroner ruled the victims of the attacks were "unlawfully killed". A separate and independent Tunisian investigation of the Sousse shootings was undertaken by Judge Akremi was undertaken.

Research approach employed

This study employs an interpretive research paradigm and case study approach to analyse the process and outcome of the phenomenon under investigation. Two reasons informed case study selection. First, it provides an example of a lone wolf terrorist attack that specifically targeted tourists at a well-known tourist destination. Second, Tunisia has been a notable absentee from academic discussions of terrorist attacks on tourists. Although a case study approach may be criticised for lack of validity and generalisability, the advantages of its application to this study outweigh criticisms. This is because this terrorist incident raises broader questions concerning terrorism risk management and tourist security, which are of relevance to all overseas destinations, and are only evident from an in-depth single case study analysis.

Method of analysis: Narrative analysis

Narrative inquiry was selected as a technique to evaluate the terror risks and their management as it is a powerful tool to explore the complexities of social realities and social agents (Mura and Sharif, 2017). It is an under-used method within tourism analysis as traditionally, it has been employed to analyse stories elicited from tourist experiences. The approach adopted in this particular study therefore is very different to that employed in the extant literature, utilised to analyse the evidence provided by those who were present in all or part of the terrorist incident and from those key agencies responsible for the safety of UK tourists. Narration plays a central role in legal discourse as it involves the reconstruction of multiple stories divulged within a court-room; witness cross-examinations, and opening and closing statements all contain narrative elements. Given that investigations and inquests are essentially fact-finding exercises, conducted when an individual has died in certain circumstances, a narrative approach was preferred over content analysis as the focus was problem-centred, extending beyond textual considerations (Mishler, 1995). It is concerned with the sequence and consequences of the stories presented, thereby enabling the events relating to the attack to be identified, organised, connected and evaluated (Reismann, 2008). A narrative approach enables these stories or as Reismann (2008; pg. 32) terms 'representations of realities' to be less concerned with finding one grand truth, and to reveal instead several macro- and micro-narratives.

Dara sources employed

The study data were produced from two independent sources. Firstly, from the UK Inquests during which oral and written evidence regarding the terrorist

incident was presented by 81 people, some of whom were eyewitnesses, police officers, and employees of the tour operator TUI UK Ltd, and one was a senior manager at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) (Opus 2 International, 2017). The trial commenced on Monday 16 January 2017, and ended on 28 February 2017. Secondly, the outcome of a separate and independent Tunisian investigation of the Sousse shootings undertaken by Judge Akremi was used. This consists of 72 witness accounts from a range of individuals employed at the Imperial Marhaba Hotel, were members of the public, or were attached to the police, and other local, regional and national governmental security providers. The findings of this investigation were subsequently provided to the UK Inquests as evidence (Leek et al., 2017).

Within the UK, inquests are presided by a Coroner, whilst in this particular case, a judge led the Tunisian investigation of the Sousse shootings. The Coroner and the Judge play key roles in determining the proceedings, examining the witnesses and reaching an impartial verdict. The purpose or macro-narrative of the UK Tunisia Inquests was to consider how the 30 British victims died on 26th June 2015, whilst the focus of the Tunisian investigation was to examine the security response to the shootings. Data with direct relevance to the management of the terror risks were considered. Therefore, 35 out of the 81 persons involved in the UK Inquests, and 23 of the 72 persons included in the Judge Akremi investigation provided relevant evidence, with some providing insights into more than one aspect (see Table 2).

[Table 2]

Data analysis

Given this factual focus, initially, a structural as opposed to an interactional approach to narrative inquiry was deemed the most appropriate analytical practice, because it enables comparisons to be drawn between multiple narrative accounts thereby facilitating a critical evaluation of terrorism risk management. Since the story is the object of the study, Mishler's narrative analysis typology (1995), specifically category one – reference and temporal order: the "telling" and the "told", enabled individual stories to be drawn out inductively. A comparative analysis was then undertaken of these micro-narratives in relation to the teller (witness) and to the sequence and critical moments of the telling (the incident). Several micro-narratives were revealed. These included: the security response; the terrorism-related travel advice offered to tourists; and, the security in place at Sousse beach and the hotel on the day of the attack and preceding it. Given that the meanings attached to these micro-narratives are less important as opposed to their explanatory power in shedding light on the management of terror-induced risks, the data then underwent a second level of deductive thematic analysis, facilitated through the employment of NVivo 12.

Narration themes

The terrorist security response

In order to establish the cause of death of 30 Britons in Sousse on 25th June 2015, the Inquests focused on the security response. Overall, 20 police witnesses, two local workers, one holiday-maker and one eye-witness to the event, suggested that the security response was ineffective. One witness for instance, the Director of the National Security Police stated that,

‘he discovered that the Station Head for National Security did not intervene to stop the attack, remaining outside the Hotel.....none of the coastal, quad-bike, mounted or coastguard patrols intervened at the Hotel.....(Akremi, 2017, cited in Leek et al., 2017; pg.14).

He also stated that,

‘...two guards came down to the beach after the attacker, heading toward the swimming pool.....the second guard started to get rid of his uniform and mingled with the crowd of onlookers’ (Akremi, 2017, cited in Leek et al., 2017; pg.14).

This account was confirmed by another police witness, the Commander of the Coastguard Headquarters in El-Kantaoui. He stated that,

‘He was overcome with terror, slipped and fell onto the floor and dropped his weapon.....He hid behind a parasol until he saw the offender leaving the scene.....’ (Akremi, 2017, cited in Leek et al., 2017; pg. 23).

Further investigation of the security response revealed a variety of explanations as to why it was ineffective. These include a reluctance to engage with the perpetrator, poor leadership, and a lack of fire arms and situation awareness training (Table 3).

[Table 3]

Based on this evidence, it not surprising that the terrorist security response was criticised by the Coroner, who described it as: ‘.... at best shambolic, at worst cowardly’ (Opus 2 International, Day 17; pg. 16). One possible explanation for this failing is because the security services in Tunisia are managed in a top-down, state-centred, hierarchical and militaristic manner, the antithesis of a transnational collaborative approach to terrorism risk management (e.g. Morakabati et al., 2017), involving key stakeholders (e.g. the local community). This lack of collaboration proved to limit the terrorism security response further since the community’s use of social media might have provided information about the whereabouts and movement of the terrorist (Latonero and Shklovski, 2011), critical knowledge that was not otherwise available (Akremi, 2017, cited in Opus 2 International, Day 5, 2017).

Terrorism risk communication

The Inquests pursued two lines of inquiry to ascertain the cause of deaths of 30 Britons in Sousse, and examined (a) the nature and appropriateness of the terrorism travel advice provided by the FCO to tour operators including TUI UK Ltd, and (b) the dissemination of such advice to prospective tourists. The evidence suggests that there were several shortcomings concerning terrorism risk communication provided

at the macro- and meso-scales. In the case of the first line of enquiry, a FCO Senior Manager stated that,

'In the case of terrorism, we will only advise against travel in situations of extreme and imminent danger, where the threat is sufficiently specific, large-scale and endemic to affect British nationals severely' (Opus 2 International, Day 1, 2017; pg. 12).

Following the receipt of an Islamic State threat in 2014, warning of the possibility of terrorism, and the terrorist attack on the Bardo Museum (Tunis) on 15th March 2015, the FCO reassessed its travel advice (Opus 2 International Day 2, 2017). Given that the threats posed were deemed to not be specific or large enough to adversely affect British nationals, they did not advise against travel; instead strengthened language was inserted, warning of likely further attacks. This judgement is questionable in light of the Sousse shootings on the 25th June 2015. Moreover, their failure to issue an advisory against all travel to Tunisia immediately after the Sousse shootings is perhaps more worrying. Whilst, TUI UK Ltd suspended all outbound travel on Sunday 28th June 2015, the FCO did not change their terrorism travel advice until 9th July 2015, 13 days after the attack.

With respect to the second line of enquiry, the Inquests examined the terrorism risk communication provided to those tourists who booked their trip through a TUI operated or independent high street travel agency selling TUI products. In 2015, despite there being a joint venture between the FCO and the travel industry entitled 'Know Before You Go' (KBYG), implemented to better prepare British travellers abroad, the KBYG logo was not displayed in TUIs brochures. Furthermore, the tourism industry was expected to highlight the FCO's travel advice to prospective tourists. However, the Inquests demonstrated that none of the six employees of such retail outlets questioned, stated that they referred to any previous attack and to the advice provided by the FCO during the sale. This finding was confirmed by all of the seven tourists questioned, who had purchased their holidays through a retail outlet. Some even claimed that they were told during the sale that the destination was safe, and that it was only after the point of sale, that information was provided on where to find advice about destination safety (Opus 2 International Day 17, 2017).

TUI UK Limited's website did not also present any of the FCOs travel advice about the increased possibility of terrorist attacks following the Bardo Musuem incident. Prior to the Sousse attack, TUI's websites did not prominently display logos and links to the UK Government's Travel Aware programme, which provided detailed travel advice for every country on the FCO website (Opus 2 International, Day 17, 2017). Instead, a crib sheet was issued to online sales staff, which, according to the Coroner, was a flawed approach. This was because:

'Firstly, it does not give any details of the attack and only refers to "the incident that took place there yesterday". Secondly, it does not mention the word "terrorism" or the phrase "risk of terrorism". And thirdly, although it refers to the FCO advice, it does not give any guidance as to where it can be found' (Opus 2 International, Day 17, pp. 41-42).

Overall, it therefore appears that terrorism risk communication was not successfully imparted to TUIs customers; many were not alerted to the terrorist risks at the time of booking or directed to the FCO's travel advice either at a retail store or online, and TUIs website did not contain the most recent FCO travel advice. Given that Tunisia had experienced previous terrorist attacks, this is a serious oversight as good security communication enables people to make informed travel decisions (Mansfeld, 2006).

Security at Sousse beach and Imperial Marhaba Hotel

In addition to the security response, the Inquests also examined security provision at Sousse beach and Imperial Marhaba hotel. Evidence provided by TUIs Director of Risk and Compliance revealed that after an earlier attack occurring in March 2015 at the Bardo museum in Tunis, the management company, Tunisotel, responsible for overseeing the Imperial Marhaba, reviewed its security arrangements and recommended numerous enhanced security measures (Opus 2 International, Day 4 and 17, 2017). These included many *CPtED* design principles and strategies such as increasing the number of security guards, increasing the number of CCTV points within all hotels, and strengthening counter-terrorist security measures (Opus 2 International, Day 17, 2017).

However, evidence presented by a Detective Superintendent of the Metropolitan Police's Counter Terrorism Command, who examined the security arrangements around and within the Imperial Marhaba post-attack, revealed some *CPtED* failings. First, the main gate between the beach and the hotel grounds was unmanned and unlocked during the day, and remained so sometimes at night, thus providing the potential for unchallenged access. Second, he highlighted the existence of poor surveillance arrangements stating there were only six cameras covering the beach and hotel, two of which were not working. Those working were on the main gate, the delivery drive, and on the north and south side of the lifts. In contrast, the two located within the hotel (one at the front door and one on the terrace doors) were not and there was no control room (Opus 2 International, Days 1 and 17, 2017). When compared to other hotels in Sousse, all had significantly more CCTV cameras and one or more control room (Opus 2 International, Days 1 and 17, 2017). The lack of surveillance might also have contributed the ineffective security response to the attack, a reason outlined by a number of Tunisian security personal. According to the Constable who worked in the National Security Police Operations Room, due to limited information, personnel had to draw on their local knowledge; for some units this was impossible since they operated outside of the locality (Akremi, 2017 cited in Opus 2 International, Day 5, 2017).

It also emerged from the Inquests that there was inadequate terrorist risk management at the hotel. While there were plans in place for gas, fire and flooding emergencies, one specifically focused on a terrorist incident, was absent (Opus 2 International, Day 17, 2017). Additionally, the hotel staff had received no training to deal with such an incident and there was no procedure in place for an evacuation (Opus 2 International, Day 17, 2017). Ultimately what these deficiencies resulted in was no delineation of clear roles and responsibilities amongst the hotel's employees generally but specifically amongst the hotel's security staff. Tourists took unaided refuge anywhere they could, assisted by non-security staff. For example, the

Excursion Liaison Officer (witness AO) stated that 'He took them [tourists] to the reception and helped them to take refuge in the basement and in the hotel's shops' (Akremi, 2017, cited in Leek et al., 2017, pg. 2).

The Inquests data revealed that the risk assessment of the Imperial Marhaba neglected to consider potential risks to tourists' security as a result of a terrorist attack. According to TUIs Director of Risk, Compliance, it only focuses on business risk. This is because mitigating actions and controls are different depending on the nature, location and size of the risk (Opus 2 International, Day 4, 2017). More specifically, this witness stated (Opus 2 International, Day 4, 2017; pg.15),

'.....overseas we have to rely on the controls and actions of our suppliers, and therefore, to assure ourselves, as best we can that Federation of Tour Operators (FTO) standards are being met, we commission audits of hotels'.

TUI out-sourced risk audits of hotels within their portfolio to independent specialists but at the time of the Sousse attack, such assessments did not include hotel security and thus did not meet FCO guidance (Opus 2 International, Day 4, 2017).

Overall, the Inquests revealed that terrorism risk assessment and management undertaken by TUI UK Ltd was limited. Responsibility was delegated to accommodation providers. Although assurances were provided to TUI UK Ltd by the Tunisian Consul that security had increased at all hotels within the company's portfolio (Opus 2 International, Day 17, 2017), TUI UK did not undertake its own checks that adequate steps had taken and implemented. More crucially, there were no security advisors on TUIs board, a concern noted by the Coroner (Opus 2 International, Day 17, 2017). The evidence presented demonstrates that security within the hotel and its grounds was poor. Certainly if all the CCTV cameras had been operating and the beach gates locked, access to the hotel would have been much more difficult. Whilst this action would not have stopped this lone terrorist incident, it might have deterred any such attack by reducing points of weakness and vulnerability, or limited its severity.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This paper provides a critical assessment of the tourist security and safety nexus and contributes to research on terrorism, tourist security and due care. We identify an important research gap – namely that, tourism research has insufficiently considered terror risk assessment, management and communication, particularly in the context of lone wolf attacks and due care. Lone wolf attacks have more recently been recognized as hugely challenging, particularly in how countermeasures are devised (Hartleb 2020) and arguably reflect a leaderless form of terrorism that has seen a major upsurge (Michael 2012 Spaaaj 2012) although clearly this has not featured significantly in this context despite concerns around this issue that reached changed thinking on this issue, according to Spaaaj (2012) after the Norwegian 2011 terrorist attacks in Oslo (a car bomb which killed 8 people) and a mass shooting at a Labour Youth camp on the Island of Utøya which killed 77 people. Key bodies like the European Police Chiefs Association and Europol acknowledged that solo actor terrorists were now a key threat that were not as easy to surveil as the team-based terrorist attacks that had been the norm in most settings.

Our study reveals that the risk assessment undertaken in Sousse was not terrorism specific and only partially undertaken. As well as undertaking threat, vulnerability, criticality, likelihood and impact assessments (Figure 1), our study posits the importance of analytically distinguishing between *generic terror risks* (i.e. those that are commonly identified and associated with general locations, events and/or activities) and *dynamic terror-related risks* (i.e. lone wolf attack). This requires continued assessment of changing socio-economic and geopolitical environments, especially the terrorist landscape. Thus, it is imperative that the influence of the operational context is recognised also if terrorism risk assessments are fit for purpose. This is especially true of this particular example, since Tunisia has been the victim of terrorism for decades with attacks occurring in 1995, 2002, 2013 and between 2015 and 2020. Additionally, the legacy of a post-colonial past means that it is not uncommon for police forces, despite democratic transitions, to still lack self-efficacy, and be characterised by inner turmoil, poor working conditions and low salaries (Pino and Watrowski, 2016).

Our study highlights the critical need for a portfolio of terrorism specific risk management plans that address the diversity of attack scenarios that a destination may experience. Each should be thoroughly evaluated in order to understand how they perform in different terror situations such as when threats come from unexpected sources, when attackers use varied attack types and when there is a change of strategic and tactical behavior. Preventative and mitigation strategies that perform well across a range of possible futures are by implication more resilient. This activity should also be accompanied by training of all stakeholders and their staff in order to build capacity and knowledge of specific plans and leadership in their implementation. For the police and security services, regular firearms and situation assessment training is required so that key personnel are confident and combat ready.

Our study also revealed clear deficiencies in terrorism risk communication which require the urgent attention of tour operators and third party sellers in order to ensure the implementation of measures to avoid the exposure of clients to terrorism security risks; neglecting this could lead to legal exposure. Although the Inquests did not find any failure in due care by TUI UK Ltd, the Coroner was highly critical of the company's practice of due diligence (Opus International, Day 17, 2017) as more should have been done to highlight the occurrence of previous attacks. Reinforcing Mansfeld's (2006) contentions, decisions around the content of security risk communication should be made alongside but independently of FCO travel advice, and risk assessments of the destination and of hotels and their surroundings, should be publicly available so informed calculated risk travel decisions can be made. However, given the distinctive problems with communicating prospective terror risks (Freedman, 2006), there needs to be greater understanding of how best to do this. This might be achieved by combining the insights provided by consumer behavior theories (e.g. Psychoanalytical, Veblenian Social-Psychological, Reasoned Action, Motivation-Need, and Hawkins Stern Impulse Buying) with travel risk behaviors (e.g. Roehl and Fesenmaier, 1992) and tourist risk perception typologies (e.g. Seabra et al., 2013). This may help identify distinct consumer segments to more effectively target tailored terror risk communications to specific audiences. Such targeting

should also be accompanied by the testing of messages, their likely impact and effectiveness.

Our study also highlights a methodological gap in terrorism risk management research and showcases the use of a narrative approach to analyse tourist-related inquests, which has not been undertaken before. This is surprising given that the Tunisian Inquests are one of a number of inquisitional trials involving tourist destinations and tourists, with the London Bridge attack in June 2017 and subsequent Inquest being a more recent example. The approach we adopt is novel and innovative for two reasons. First, existing studies employing narrative analysis focus predominantly on positive tourist experiences (e.g. Mura and Shariff, 2017) and the dialogue is flexible, allowing the respondent to develop the topics. In contrast, when using legal discourse, the interviewer, albeit the Judge or Coroner, decides on the sequencing of events, and determines the line of questioning. There are key differences here in the frame of telling, the telling and the told. Second, the frames of reference set this research apart from existing studies; they undertake this post-interview in order to capture the context, the event, the characters, and the feelings experienced. With Inquests, the rules about what is considered relevant are determined by the Coroner, including the degree of detail and presumed objectivity of witness testimonies. Assumptions about what makes a testimony valid influences the telling and re-telling of the events that trials seek to narrate. Thus, the roles played by the Coroner and witnesses are integral to the co-production of knowledge about the circumstances surrounding an inquest. Above all, it is the quest for inter-subjectivity, for the truth, which drives narratives of this nature.

As well as highlighting a research gap, our study compliments existing research on terrorism risk management by re-emphasising the importance of counter terrorism as a core element of terrorism risk management. Greater adoption by all facilities, open spaces and services of crime prevention design-in principles is needed. All infrastructure should be blast resistant, secured against hostile entry, capable of preventing unscreened vehicle access, and have better all-round surveillance. Such action must be sensitively undertaken and not contribute to heightened perceptions of risk. In high risk locales, there should be a greater presence of private security guards within hotels and their surroundings, combined with the establishment of a robust surveillance network that is regularly checked and maintained. Not only will the latter provide valuable information about any terrorist reconnaissance activity, but will also enable the movements of terrorists to be tracked and monitored. In addition, it is important that intelligence is collected from local communities concerning the potential radicalization of individuals (Bakker and de Graaf, 2010).

Moreover, this study compliments existing research and reinforces the notion that a robust framework is required to guide terrorism risk management (Freedman, 2006), comprising a core set of components – risk assessment, risk management, risk communication and counter-terrorism – that are couched within security governance and accountability including due care (Figure 3). All components are inherently inter-woven, with a successful outcome influenced by the extent to which all are comprehensively undertaken. Omitting to evaluate the range of possibilities and vulnerabilities posed by ‘dynamic’ risks such as those associated with lone wolf attacks is likely to have disastrous knock-on consequences for the preparedness of

the police, security services, the hotel and tour operator, and their subsequent ability to effectively manage the incident. Our study also reiterates the importance of a collaborative approach to the planning and management of such emergencies (Morakabati et al., 2017). Given the acknowledged barriers to terrorism risk management, together with the need to ensure that layers of protective strategies are in place and performance tested at the micro-, meso- and macro-levels, it highlights the urgent need for Destination Management Organisations to coordinate and lead in terror-related strategic planning, implementation, management and evaluation.

[Figure 3]

To conclude, using the conceptual underpinnings of terrorism risk management, we used a narrative analysis of Inquest evidence to establish measures needed to enhance tourist security and safety. Our objective was to illustrate how the pitfalls associated with poor terrorism risk assessment, management, and communication, and the limited application of the counter-terrorism principles (i.e. CPtED) could be addressed. Our study contributes to terrorism risk management, emphasising the need for greater scrutiny of the role of tour operators in tourists' security. This has global ramifications for every tourist-receiving country, particularly those targeted by terrorism. Although the concept common and collective security already exists (Hall et al., 2003), the responsibility of all external and internal organisations, businesses and agencies for terrorism risk management within a destination has been neglected. In doing so, this research highlights several avenues for further research. Firstly, greater knowledge is required of the tourist industry's awareness, understanding and practice of their legal and ethical obligations toward due care. Secondly, more in-depth understanding is necessary of the level of destination security and associated costs and benefits that tourists are prepared to accept. Thirdly, research is needed of indicators of performance monitoring of terrorism risk strategies at micro-, meso- and macro-levels, whilst fourthly, studies are required of the effectiveness and impact of terrorism risk communication to tourists.

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