

CHAPTER FIVE

CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND CONCEPTUALISATION: MENTAL SPACES, BLENDED SPACES AND DISCOURSE SPACES IN THE BRITISH NATIONAL PARTY

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1. Introduction

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a multidisciplinary holistic, consisting of a number of different theoretical approaches to the microlevel analysis of text and talk that has to do with the social and/or political. These various methodological approaches are unified, however, by a macrolevel social critique which maintains that social inequality may be enacted, sustained and legitimised through elite language use, discourse.¹

At the microlevel, then, according to Weiss and Wodak (2003: 12), “one specific methodology is not characteristic of research in CDA”. However, as Chilton (2005: 21) states, CDA “has tended to draw . . . on linguistics of a particular type” where “Halliday’s systemic functional grammar has supposedly provided the toolkit for deconstructing the socially-constructed (and thus linguistically constructed) machinery of power” (ibid.). Historically, this can be traced to Critical Linguistics which later became subsumed by CDA. Conceptual approaches to discourse, on the other hand, have been largely neglected in mainstream CDA (cf. Chilton 2005).² This is especially surprising given the ideational qualities of conceptualisation, where conceptualisation is the construction of world knowledge, including “social knowledge” of people, objects, events, processes and states of affairs in the world. Furthermore, to quote Lakoff (1996: 37), “any ideology is a conceptual system of a particular kind”. Where ideology is world view, then, conceptualisation is ideology; conceptualisation is a particular construal of reality.

At the macrolevel, discourse is perceived to be in a dialectical relationship with social structure, whereby discourse may be constitutive of social inequality. Within the sociocultural approach to CDA, Fairclough illustrates this conception with a

three-dimensional model in which “the connection between text and social practice is seen as being mediated by discourse practice” (1995: 133). Within the sociocognitive approach to CDA, discourse and social structure are mediated by social cognition, which is defined as “the system of mental representations and processes of group members” (van Dijk 1995: 18).³ The sociocognitive approach to CDA, it may be argued, represents the most lucid model, for as Chilton (2005: 23) states:

If language use (discourse) is, as the tenets of CDA assert, connected to the ‘construction’ of knowledge about social objects, identities, processes, etc., then that construction can only be taking place in the minds of (interacting) individuals.

Yet conceptual approaches to discourse have not even featured in the sociocognitive approach to CDA. One area of contemporary inquiry in which linguistic and conceptual structure has been a principle focus of attention, however, is Cognitive Linguistics (CL). As such, CL provides tools with which CDA can specifically attend to conceptualisation. Indeed, CL seems an ideal tool; broadly speaking, CL like sociocognitive CDA, explores the relation between language, cognition and society. In this chapter we will apply two recent discourse-based theories from CL: Conceptual Blending Theory (Fauconnier and Turner 2002) and Discourse Space Theory (Chilton 2004). By applying CL theories in CDA, this chapter aims: 1) to illuminate the role of conceptualisation in the discursive (re)production of racism and thus the discursive constitution of social inequality; and 2) to develop a coherent model of CDA in which conceptualisation holds a significant place. To this end, we will take for illustration a chapter from the 2005 general election manifesto of the British National Party (BNP) entitled *Immigration: A Crisis without Parallel* (appendix).⁴

2. Conceptual Blending Theory

Conceptual Blending Theory (BT) is a theory of online meaning construction. It accounts for some of the conceptual operations performed during discourse. BT is founded upon its precursor, mental space theory (Fauconnier 1994, 1997). In mental space theory, words do not refer directly to entities in the world but rather prompt for the construction of mental spaces, which contain certain elements. According to Fauconnier and Turner (1996: 113):

Mental spaces are small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action. They are interconnected, and can be modified as thought and discourse unfold.

Elements in a mental space are, *inter alia*, the entities, objects, actions, and processes referred to explicitly or implicitly in discourse. In any stretch of discourse, a number of interconnected mental spaces may be constructed, where “linguistic expressions will typically establish new spaces, elements within them, and relations holding between the elements” (Fauconnier 1994: 17).

Amongst other phenomena such as reference and metonymy, metaphor is one particular kind of linguistic expression which prompts for the construction of a number of mental spaces. In the case of metaphor, mental spaces constructed during discourse undergo a specific conceptual blending operation whereby they are manipulated in an integrated network, producing inferential structure. Metaphor is a linguistic and conceptual phenomenon of particular significance for CDA. Where Hodge and Kress (1993: 15) contend that ideology involves “a systematically organised presentation of reality”, metaphors are ideological in so far as they “define in significant part what one takes as reality” (Chilton and Lakoff 1995: 56). According to Chilton (1996: 74), metaphors “can contribute to a situation where they privilege one understanding of reality over others”. As Charteris-Black (2004: 28) states, then, “metaphor is . . . central to critical discourse analysis since it is concerned with forming a coherent view of reality”.

In BT, metaphor is treated as a conceptual projection involving four mental spaces. BT adopts a particular diagrammatic notation based in mathematical set theory to represent mental spaces and conceptual blending patterns. In the “basic diagram” of a conceptual blending network, mental spaces are represented by four large circles and elements within mental spaces are represented by points inside the circles. Whilst this diagram represents a “static” illustration of the conceptual blending operation, it is important to recognise, as Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 46) stress, that “such a diagram is really just a snapshot of an imaginative and complicated process”.

2.1 Input spaces

Blends arise in networks of mental spaces. The basic blending network consists of four mental spaces: two input spaces, a generic space, and the blended space.⁵ According to Coulson (2000: 23), “a new space is . . . set up when utterances concern objects or events that require different background assumptions”. Metaphorical utterances in discourse are of precisely this kind; they involve spaces which contain elements belonging to two different (potential) scenarios with different background frames or assumptions. As metaphorical discourse unfolds, then, a space is created for each scenario. These spaces are *input space*₁ and *input space*₂. In conceptual integration, the two input spaces share counterpart connections between elements, represented in the notation by solid lines.

Counterpart connections can be of many different kinds, generally referred to as *vital relations*. Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 89-111) identify a number of vital relations including identity, role, intentionality, time, space, and category. Dashed lines connecting the elements inside the four spaces represent conceptual projections across the network. These connective lines correspond to neural coactivations and bindings (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 46).

2.2 Generic space

In addition to the two input spaces there is the *generic space*. The generic space contains abstract structure which is common to the counterpart elements in both of the input spaces. In other words, “at any moment in the construction of the network, the structure that inputs seem to share is captured in a generic space” (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 47). Elements in the generic space project onto the counterpart elements in the input spaces. The generic space may also be projected back to from the blended space. We can think of structure in the generic space in terms of *theta roles*, semantic categories which structure the ideational representation in discourse of a given scenario. For example, with regard to who did what to whom, where, and how.

2.3 Blended space and emergent structure

Finally, the fourth space, the *blended space*, is arrived at via conceptual blending operations. It receives structure from both the input spaces and has *emergent structure*, represented in the notation by a box inside the blended space and its contents.

In blending, structure from two input spaces is projected to a separate space, the ‘blend’. The blend inherits partial structure from the input spaces, and has *emergent structure* of its own. (Fauconnier and Turner 1996: 113)

The blended space also receives structure from the generic space. “Generic spaces and blended spaces are related: blends contain generic structure captured in the generic space” (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 47). Emergent structure is structure unique to the blend. That is, the blended space contains structure which is not copied there directly from the input spaces but which rather is a product of blending operations. Emergent structure is generated by three blending processes: *composition; completion; elaboration*.

2.4 Composition

Through composition, the projections in the blending network create new relations in the blended space. In Fauconnier and Turner's (2002: 48) words, "blending can compose elements from the input spaces to provide relations that do not exist in the separate inputs". Counterpart elements can be composed to produce two separate elements in the blended space. However, in the case of metaphor, a special kind of composition occurs, referred to as *fusion*. Here, counterpart elements in the input spaces get projected into the blended space, creating a single compound element. It is important to note that the relation, or topology, between counterpart elements is maintained in the blend.

2.5 Completion

Completion occurs as relevant structure from background knowledge associated with the elements in the input spaces is recruited into the blend. Such background knowledge may take the form of contextual information or conceptual frames, for example. According to Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 48):

We rarely realise the extent of background knowledge and structure that we bring into a blend unconsciously. Blends recruit great ranges of such meaning . . . We see some parts of a familiar frame of meaning, and much more of the frame is recruited silently but effectively to the blend.

A conceptual frame is a cognitive-based, stable but modifiable knowledge structure for (potential) scenes or scenarios stored in long-term memory. According to Fillmore (1985: 224), "a frame represents the particular organisation of knowledge which stands as a prerequisite to our ability to understand the meanings of . . . associated words". It is in this sense, then, that "mental spaces operate in working memory but are built up partly by activating structures available from long-term memory" (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 102). Frames are activated by discourse and at the same time provide background information which gives meaning to discourse. In BT terms, elements in input spaces activate the wider conceptual frames to which they belong, relevant structure from which may in turn be recruited into the blended space via the process of completion. It should be noted that not all available structure from conceptual frames necessarily gets projected into the blended space, only that which is relevant to the speaker's intention in constructing the blend. This is known as *selective projection* and is guided by normal pragmatic constraints.

Selective projection in conceptual blending contributes to the ideology of metaphor. Elements available for recruitment may not get projected into the blended space. Where selective projection in conceptual blending networks is a pragmatic phenomenon, integration networks are constructed according to speakers' communicative (and rhetorical) intentions. In other words, ideologically, speakers may choose to recruit particular structure in order to promote a certain perception of reality.⁶

2.6 Elaboration

Elaboration is the most significant stage in the blending process.⁷ It is the "running of the blend". Fauconnier (1997: 151) states that elaboration "consists in cognitive work performed within the blend, according to its own emergent logic". Herein lays the importance of conceptual blending for CDA. As a function of emergent structure in the blended space, metaphor is "cognitively real". Moreover, metaphor in discourse thus has absolute consequences for further cognitive processes. "Blended spaces are sites for central cognitive work: reasoning . . ., drawing inferences . . ., and developing emotions" (Fauconnier and Turner 1996: 115). After a highly theoretical discussion, let us now see how BT may be applied in CDA.

3. Conceptual blending patterns in the BNP

In the opening paragraph of the BNP text, immigration is presented metaphorically as a threat to Britain. Furthermore, a metonymy is constructed in which immigration and terrorism are linked.


Britain's very existence today is *threatened* by immigration. As a nation we must rebuild trust in the immigration system amongst the British electorate whilst simultaneously ensuring that National Security is maintained in the era of global terrorism. (paragraph 1)

In paragraph 2, the movement of people is presented metaphorically as a "flood of asylum seekers":

If Tony Blair can say that it is 'neither racist nor extremist' to raise 'genuine concerns' about the *flood of asylum seekers*, then it is no longer feasible to pretend the crisis doesn't exist. (Paragraph 2)

If we consider how a blending network for “flood of asylum seekers” might be constructed, as in figure 5-1, a number of consequences of this construction can be observed.

Fig. 5-1. Conceptual blending network for “flood of asylum seekers”




Here, prompted by “flood” and “asylum seekers”, two mental spaces are constructed which enter into a conceptual integration network. Emergent structure arises in the blended space in which the two counter-part elements in each input space are fused through composition. The blending process, then, produces emergent structure in which the migration of people is conceptualised as a flood of water (a *topoi* of danger). Notice here that a flood is an event whereas migration is a (demographic) process. Events and processes are closely related, where events are often the consequence of processes. This relation is captured in the generic space. In the blended space, emergent structure arises in which immigration is conceptualised as an ongoing event, or an *event-process*.⁸ Importantly, the kind of action one is likely to take during a flood is different to that which one would take after the event. The conceptualisation of an ongoing “flood of asylum seekers” immediately warrants the implementation of restrictive immigration policy in order to “stem the flood”.

In paragraph 14, a process does provide the counter-part element in input space₁ to the demographic movement of people in input space₂. Here, immigration is presented metaphorically in terms of the tide.

We will do what is required and we have firm plans as regard our policy on ending illegal immigration immediately, and *reversing the tide of immigration* in the longer term. (Paragraph 14)

Whilst the tide involves bidirectional movement, perhaps providing a basis upon which this metaphor is used, note that “reversing the tide” by human action is not a possibility within an individual’s ordinary conceptual frame for the tide, a naturally occurring phenomenon.⁹ The property of agency (in the form of implementing legislation enforcing repatriation) is recruited from the immigration policy frame activated by the relevant element in input space₂. Through completion, this structure is projected into the blended space so that emergent structure arises in which it becomes possible to “reverse the tide of immigration”. Emergent structure of this kind is possible only through the juxtaposition of two input spaces.

Fig. 5-2. Conceptual blending network for “reversing the tide of immigration”



The tide element in input space₁ activates a more general conceptual frame for the tide which contains knowledge of tidal effects such as erosion. Through completion, this structure may be recruited and projected into the blended space. Significantly, then, elaboration of such a network invites the inference that the “tide of immigration” may have “erosive” effects, an inference which again seems to immediately warrant restrictive immigration policy and possibly even repatriation policies. Indeed, as Charteris-Black (2006: 571) states:

Conceptually, since high and low tides constitute part of our knowledge of a natural process, they are politically persuasive in representing as legitimate highly controversial policies such as repatriation.

In another example, immigration is not presented as a “flood of water” but less intensely as a “flow of water”:


A BNP government would accept no further immigration from any of the parts of the world which present the prospect of an almost limitless *flow of immigration*. (Paragraph 19)

This metaphor will give rise to much of the same inferential structure as the previous examples, derived from the conceptual frame for water.¹⁰ This example is particularly interesting, though, when one considers it in conjunction with a preceding metaphor in which Britain is conceptualised as a container:

Britain is full up and the government of Britain has as its first responsibility the welfare, security and long-term preservation of the native people of Britain. (Paragraph 15)

The cohesive interaction of these two metaphors may produce a blending network as below in figure 5-3. Emergent structure arises in the blended space in which the three counter-part elements in each input space are fused through composition. The blending process, then, produces emergent structure in which the nation is conceptualised as a container and the migration of people as the flowing of water into the container. Stored in one’s conceptual frame for containers is the fact that they have a limited capacity. Where hearers are prompted to conceptualise immigration to Britain as the flowing of water into a container already at its capacity, elaboration of such a network makes available the inference that Britain could “overflow”, an inference which yet again immediately justifies restrictive immigration policy.

Fig. 5-3. Conceptual blending network for interaction of “flow of immigration” and “Britain is full up”



Whilst the themes water and people in these constructions are both entities of some kind, they are different kinds of entities. Note that part of knowledge stored in the conceptual frame for water, activated by the water element in input space₁, includes the fact that it is a mass noun such that the movement of water is conceptualised as the movement of a single entity. When projected into the blended space, this knowledge may produce emergent structure in which the migration of people is also conceptualised as a single moving entity. The configuration of such a network has a number of significant consequences after elaboration. The migration of people conceptualised as a single moving entity masks the plight of individual immigrants. It carries the inference that immigration is a simple phenomenon and makes available the inference that all cases may be treated in the same way. On the ideology of examples such as these, Santa Ana (2002: 72) states:

To characterise the movement of people as moving water might seem quite natural, but such a formulation of movement of people is not the only possible image that can be employed.

Also ideologically, notice that structure available for recruitment from the general water frame, such as its importance in sustaining life, is not selected for projection into the blended space.


An alternative construction of the nation which is particularly significant in immigration discourse involves metaphors whereby the nation is conceptualised as a house (Chilton 1994). Consider the following examples:

Every nation, no matter how *open or closed its immigration policy* may be, has the right and duty to maintain sovereign physical control of its borders. (Paragraph 7)

Our first step will be to *shut the door*. (Paragraph 19)

When these two metaphors interact cohesively, a blending network such as follows may arise.

Fig. 5-4. Conceptual blending network for interaction of “open or closed its immigration policy” and “shut the door”



In this blending network, emergent structure arises in the blended space where the counter-part elements of house and nation converge. Immigration policy and door also become fused. And to shut the door becomes fused with implementing restrictive immigration policy, both actions as captured in the generic space.

Now, part of knowledge stored in the conceptual frame for house is that it is a private dwelling, entry into which is only at the permission of the resident. Within the blended space of this integration network, then, the nation is conceptualised as a private property, where policy makers have the right to refuse entry to certain individuals. Recalling that the blended space is not only the site of reasoning and inferencing but also for developing emotions, elaboration of a network where house and nation provide counter-part elements may elicit emotional responses that have to do with violation of personal space. This is especially reinforced in the following example:

We . . . shall continue to increase budget and personnel until our borders are secure against significant *intrusion*. (Paragraph 7)

Having seen how BT may be applied in CDA, let us now turn to see how another conceptual approach to discourse may be applied, Discourse Space Theory (DST), which also seems to presuppose mental space theory.

4. Discourse Space Theory

As discourse unfolds, complexes of mental spaces are constructed for the purpose of local understanding. According to DST (Chilton 2004), simultaneously, as discourse unfolds, a *discourse space ontology* is constructed. DST can be considered a formalised version of Werth's (1999) Text World Theory. Where mental spaces are the conceptual structures which facilitate the discourse process, a discourse space is a representation of the "narrative" constructed in the discourse - the "text world" following Werth (1999). It is in this sense that DST seems to presuppose mental space theory. Following Sperber (2000), one may think of mental spaces as mental representations and discourse spaces as mental metarepresentations, where a discourse space can be viewed as a particular kind of mental space.

A discourse space is a conceptual structure consisting of three intersecting axes, along which entities given explicitly or implicitly in discourse are "positioned". Discourse space ontologies, then, are ideational and ideological constructions in which people, objects, events, processes, and states of affairs in the text world are conceptualised. The three axes are that of *space*, *time* and *modality*, each representing a scale. At the point at which these three axes intersect is a *deictic*

centre. The deictic centre is the “anchoring point” of the discourse event, where speakers are necessarily located.¹¹

With DST, then, following Chilton (2004: 57-58):

We are suggesting that in processing any discourse people ‘position’ other entities in their ‘world’ by ‘positioning’ these entities in relation to themselves along (at least) three axes, space, time and modality. The deictic centre (the Self, that is, *I* or *we*) is the ‘origin’ of the three dimensions. Other entities (arguments of predicates) and processes (predicates) ‘exist’ relative to ontological spaces defined by their coordinates on the space (*s*), time (*t*) and modality (*m*) axes.

Importantly, the position of entities within the discourse space is not precisely calculable. Hearers do not assign a mathematical value to entities and position them accordingly in a grid-like space. Rather, as discourse unfolds, discourse spaces are built in which entities in the text world are positioned in topological relation to each other, the speaker, the hearer, the discourse event, and other fixed concepts such as truth and morality. After Chilton (2004: 58):

It is not that we can actually measure the ‘distances’ from Self; rather, the idea is that people tend to place people and things along a scale of remoteness from the self, using background assumptions and indexical cues.

4.1 Spatial axis

Spatial deictic expressions prompt for the positioning of entities along the spatial axis (*s*). “Here” is located at the deictic centre of the discourse space, whilst “there” is located at the remote end of the spatial axis. Pronouns are particularly important structures in the construction and polarization of “us” versus “them” categories. “We”, “us”, and “our” are located at the deictic centre of the discourse space. According to Chilton (2004: 58), “at the remote end of *s* is Other”. So “they”, “them”, and “their” are located at the opposite end of the spatial axis.¹² It is important to recognise here that the distance along *s* between a given group and deictic centre need not be a reflection of geographical distance, but rather, for example, may be a function of perceived geopolitical or cultural “distance”. Thus, to borrow Chilton’s (2004: 58) example, “to English people Australia might seem ‘closer’ than Albania”.

4.2 Temporal axis

According to Chilton (2004: 58), “on the t axis, the origin is the time of speaking, surrounded, so to speak, by the area that counts as ‘now’”. Historical events, for example, will always be positioned at a relative “distance” from deictic centre along t_{past} . Similarly, predicted events, for example, get positioned at a relative “distance” from deictic centre along t_{future} .¹³ As is the case in spatial deixis, it is important to recognise that the “distance” from deictic centre at which events are positioned along t does not necessarily reflect the elapse of time. Thus, a historic event may be positioned “closer” to deictic centre in order to make it more salient. Likewise, a predicted event may be positioned “closer” to deictic centre to achieve a sense of “imminence”.

4.3 Modal axis

With regard to the modal axis (m), “the general idea”, for Chilton (2004: 59), “is that Self is not only *here* and *now*, but also the origin of the epistemic *true* and the deontic *right*”. Whilst we refer to a single modal axis, then, actually m may take a number of related but ultimately distinct forms. Whilst m in its epistemic capacity represents degrees of certainty, in its deontic capacity m represents a scale of morality (Chilton 2004).¹⁴ Let us now turn to see how DST may be applied in CDA.


5. Discourse space ontologies in the BNP

Consider the following from the BNP manifesto:

We will reform the laws and law enforcement of the UK so that, with respect to refugees and illegal immigrants, there are no blind eyes turned to violations, no amnesties to reward law-breaking, and no extensive appeals against legal decisions . . . (Paragraph 10)

At deictic centre along the spatial axis is “the UK”. The temporal axis does not seem especially significant. It is the modal axis, though, which is particularly significant, engaged in its deontic capacity (denoted by m_d). Consider figure 5-5:

Fig. 5-5. Discourse space ontology for Paragraph 10




Law and morality are closely intertwined, where what is legal is also moral. At deictic centre of m_d , then, are “laws”, “law enforcement”, and “legal decisions”. According to Chilton (2004: 60), “that which is morally or legally ‘wrong’ is distanced from Self”. “Illegal”, “violations”, and “law-breaking”, then, are located at the remote end of m_d . Significantly, “we”, the BNP, are positioned at deictic centre not only along s and t but also m_d where, by inference, agents of law are also moral agents. The use of “illegal”, “law-breaking”, and “violations” prompts for “refugees” and “immigrants”, on the other hand, to be positioned at the remote end of m_d as well as s , thus ascribing to them immorality. This conceptualisation legitimises the BNP’s immigration policy.

Consider another stretch of the text in which the focus is on the modal axis engaged this time in its epistemic rather than its deontic capacity:

On current demographic trends we, the native British people, will be an ethnic minority in our own country within sixty years. By 2020, an extra 5-7 million immigrants will have entered Britain . . . (Paragraph 11)

Notice the two inclusive pronouns “we” and “our” which prompt for the hearer to locate themselves with the speaker at deictic centre of the discourse space. Similarly, notice the ethnonym “the native British people” and the toponym “Britain”. These linguistic structures are located at the deictic centre of the discourse space whilst “immigrants” are positioned at the remote end of the spatial axis. Consider figure 5-6:

Fig. 5-6. Discourse space ontology for Paragraph 11



The modal auxiliary verb “will” in “will have entered Britain” engages the modal axis in its epistemic capacity, denoted by m_e . According to Chilton (2004: 59), “the epistemic scale represents [a] commitment to the truth of a proposition”. “Truth” and “fact” are located at the deictic centre with “falsity” and “fiction” at the remote end of m_e .¹⁵ In “by 2020, an extra 5-7 million immigrants will have entered Britain”, then, the use of “will” is a commitment on behalf of the speaker to the certainty of his proposition. Furthermore, by relaying statistics the speaker is here employing an epistemic legitimising strategy, which serves to encourage the hearer

to accept the speaker's commitment to the truth of his propositions. Thus, "will" prompts hearers to position the assertions of the speaker "closer" to deictic centre along m_e where they are more likely to be taken by hearers as propositionally true.

Prompted by the prepositional phrase "by 2020", the temporal axis is also engaged, where "2020" is located along t_{future} . The arrow between the point at which the entities on s , t , and m_e meet and deictic centre represents the movement of "immigrants" and "2020" towards the "here" and "now" at deictic centre. In the case of "immigrants" this is a literal movement; the demographic process of migration. Where hearers are induced to conceptualise themselves as located at deictic centre, the physical movement of people towards deictic centre has the effect of presented immigration as of direct and immediate consequence to hearer. In conjunction with the topoi of number and displacement in "an extra 5-7 million immigrants" and "an ethnic minority in our own country" respectively, the physical movement of people towards "here" is presented as a threat to Britain (reinforced of course by the opening sentence of the text). In the case of "2020" this is metaphorical movement, where points in time (future) are often conceptualised as entities moving towards ego (Evans 2006; Lakoff and Johnson 1999).¹⁶ A sense of imminence is created, then, as a function of the positioning of "2020" as "close" to "now" at deictic centre and getting ever "closer". Where Cap (2006) identifies *proximisation* as a strategy which draws on the speaker's ability to present the events in the text world (or events on the "discourse stage" after Cap) as directly affecting the hearer, we can say that the arrow in figure 5-6 represents the conceptual realisation of spatial and temporal proximisation strategies.

6. Toward a model of CDA and conceptualisation

Socio-cognitive CDA maintains that discourse occurs in short-term memory (STM) against knowledge stored in long-term memory (LTM) (van Dijk 2002). Similarly, conceptual blending and discourse space building are conceptual operations performed in STM, or working memory, online as discourse unfolds, against structures in LTM such as conceptual frames. Blending networks, though, can become embedded in LTM through a process of *entrenchment*, and there are no theoretical grounds on which to assume that discourse space ontologies can not likewise become entrenched.

Mental spaces are built up dynamically in working memory, but they can also become entrenched in long-term memory . . . entrenchment is a general possibility not just for individual mental spaces but for networks of spaces. (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 103)

Within the socio-cognitive model, LTM is further broken down into episodic and semantic (or social) memory (van Dijk 2002). Social cognitions, which are social “because they are shared and presupposed by group members” (van Dijk 1993: 257), reside in semantic memory. Entrenched spaces and networks of spaces will likewise comprise part of semantic memory, given their socially shared nature:


Blends themselves can also become entrenched . . . giving rise to conceptual and formal structures shared throughout the community. (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 49)

Blending networks and discourse space ontologies are inherently social since they are grounded in discourse, which according to the tenets of CDA is always socially situated. Furthermore, recalling that social cognition is defined as “the system of mental representations and processes of group members” (van Dijk 1995: 18), we may characterise entrenched spaces and networks of spaces as social cognitions in one particular form. Entrenched conceptual blending networks and discourse space ontologies are precisely mental representations and processes of group members. Where the discursive constitution of social inequality depends on the (re)production of social cognitions, then, entrenchment is (re)production. Furthermore, with regard to blending networks, Fauconnier (1997: 168) states that “when blends are successful they become our new construal of reality”. In this sense, conceptual blending networks certainly are ideological.

The conceptual processes described in BT and DST occur during the discourse event, after which conceptual structures may become entrenched or may be discarded by hearers. Not all conceptual structures, then, become entrenched. Conceptual structures associated with linguistic structures used conventionally in discourse, however, are much more likely to become entrenched. Of course, in the case of linguistic structure in social and political discourses, according to the macrolevel social critique of CDA, conceptual structures prompted by linguistic structure in elite discourses will become entrenched over and above those in alternative discourses to which we only have restricted access.

We may offer a model of the dialectical relationship (denoted by the bidirectional arrows) between discourse and social structure, as depicted in figure 5-7 overleaf, whereby discourse can be constitutive of social inequality mediated by entrenched conceptual structures. The shaded area represents the microlevel focus of CDA on linguistic analysis.

Fig. 2-7. Model for conceptualisation in CDA



7. Conclusion

In this chapter we have considered the important role of conceptualisation in the discursive constitution of social inequality. In developing the model above we have suggested that conceptualisation be treated within the sociocognitive approach to CDA. Illustrating the ideational and ideological qualities of conceptualisation, we have qualitatively analysed linguistic and conceptual structure in one particular text. However, since entrenchment depends in part on conventionality of usage, a complete and lucid framework requires quantitative analysis across different discourse genres in order to determine which linguistic structures are used conventionally in elite discourses and, by implication, which conceptual structures are most likely to be (come) entrenched. The entrenchment of conceptual structures such as those discussed in this chapter equates to the spread of anti-immigration attitudes, which in democratic society facilitate social inequality through institutionalised discriminatory practices.

Notes

¹ *Text* and *talk* are here conceived of as *discourse* in written and spoken form respectively, where *discourse* is used in its concrete sense to refer to actual instances of language use situated in time and place.

² Recent exceptions to this are Charteris-Black (2004) and Maalej (present volume) who both develop models of CDA designed to attend to metaphor, which to a lesser or greater

extent rely on Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) Conceptual Metaphor Theory. The model proposed by Charteris-Black (2004) is defined as the "integration of cognitive semantic and pragmatic approaches . . ." (p.13). The model proposed by Maalej (present volume) "offers a version of CDA totally reliant on Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) theory" (p.X). Outside explicit CDA, Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) has been applied in critical metaphor analyses across a range of discourses (Beer and De Landtsheer 2004; Chilton 1996; Chilton and Lakoff 1995; Lakoff 1991, 1996, 2003; Santa Ana 2002). See Hart (forthcoming) and O'Halloran (present volume, forthcoming) on theoretical tensions between Conceptual Metaphor Theory and CDA.

³ Social cognitions may be defined more abstractly as "attitudes", "ideologies", "beliefs" or "_isms".

⁴ Whilst the BNP are a fringe party located on the extreme right of the political spectrum, they have recently enjoyed unprecedented media attention and have achieved record results in both general and local elections. In the 2005 general election, they won a total of 192,746 votes, an increase of over 300% on their performance in the previous 2001 election. In the 2006 local elections, the BNP more than doubled its number of councillors, increasing the number from 20 to 52.

⁵ Conceptual integration always involves at least these four spaces (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 279). However, cases of *multiple blends* exist in which blends themselves can enter into a *blending chain*, functioning as inputs in further blending networks.

⁶ The "choice" that speakers make in selective projection need not necessarily be a conscious one but may be more intuitive, guided by rhetorical intention.

⁷ It is important to note that, although it is convenient to present it as such, elaboration is not a final stage in the blending process. Conceptual blending is a kind of parallel rather than serial processing.

⁸ This conceptualisation is only possible through the juxtaposition of the two input spaces and the subsequent projection back to the generic space, and cannot be accounted for by the asymmetrical mapping described in Conceptual Metaphor Theory.

⁹ Again, the Lakoffian model of an asymmetrical mapping from source to target domain cannot explain how this conceptualisation is arrived at. This can be explained, however, in terms of conceptual blending.

¹⁰ This metaphor can be also be observed to occur throughout Enoch Powell's 1968 *Rivers of Blood* speech, which raises the interesting question addressed by Musolff (present volume): can we explain such diachronic observations with regard to a "discourse history" or are we merely observing repeated instances of an ahistorical conceptual operation?

¹¹ Significantly, in social and political discourse, person deixis can induce hearers to conceptualise themselves as belonging to the same group as the speaker. This may be reinforced with spatial and temporal deixis which may induce hearers to conceptualise themselves as located in the same physical space and time as the speaker.

¹² *Referential* (or *nomination*) strategies, which construct group identity in terms of in-group and out-group, may be conceptually realised through distance construed between referents

along the spatial axis in a discourse space, prompted by the use of inclusive versus exclusive pronouns. Further, metaphors for immigration in which a container of some sort (e.g. a container of water or a house) and nation provide counter-part elements that become fused in the blending process may also conceptually realise a referential strategy through distance construed between referents along the spatial axis in a discourse space, where the inherent topology of the container schema (Johnson 1987) denotes *insiders* versus *outsiders*, which, assuming that the centre-periphery structure of the container schema maps on to the spatial axis in discourse space, will be positioned at opposite ends of the spatial axis with *insiders* at deictic centre.

¹³ It is worth noting that frequently in discourse, concepts of space and time are blended to produce utterances such as “near future” or “distant past”.

¹⁴ *Evaluative* strategies, which are manifested in the positive representation of the in-group and the negative representation of the out-group, may be conceptually realised through distance construed between referents along the modal axis in a discourse space, engaged in its deontic capacity or a more general *evaluative* or *axiological* capacity (after Hart 2006 and Cap 2006 respectively).

¹⁵ Again, it is worth noting that concepts of space and epistemic modality are often blended in discourse to produce utterances such as “close to the truth” or “far from the truth”.

¹⁶ As evidenced by utterances such as “a new century has come”. Contrasting with this moving-time perspective, in an utterance such as “we are approaching a new century”, ego is conceptualised as moving towards a static point in time (future).

Appendix – *Immigration: A crisis without parallel*

1. Britain's very existence today is threatened by immigration. As a nation we must rebuild trust in the immigration system amongst the British electorate whilst simultaneously ensuring that National Security is maintained in this era of global terrorism.
2. We are proud of the fact that at a time when several other political parties and many sections of the media are finally awakening to this issue we alone of all the political parties have a decades-long record of pointing it out. If even Tony Blair can say that it is ‘neither racist nor extremist’ to raise ‘genuine concerns’ about the flood of asylum seekers, then it is no longer feasible to pretend that this crisis does not exist. All those persons and organisations who have endured years of abuse for telling the truth are owed a serious apology by their critics.
3. To take just one example, it is a hard fact that, according to official figures, 15% of the UK's male prison population is black, despite black people accounting for only 2% of the total population. Victim-reported figures concerning the race of criminals give the lie to the leftist argument that this is due to discriminatory prosecution. It is an inescapable statistical fact that immigration into Britain increases the crime rate.

4. Figures for unemployment, welfare dependency, educational failure, and other social pathologies tell a similar story for most other foreign ethnic groups. There is simply no escaping the fact that choosing to admit such persons into the country in significant numbers means choosing to become a poorer, more violent, more dependent and worse-educated society . . .
5. Every nation, no matter how open or closed its immigration policy may be, has the right and duty to maintain sovereign physical control of its borders. We will begin by increasing the funding of existing border controls by 500% and shall continue to increase budget and personnel until our borders are secure against significant intrusion. In particular, the first company of British troops to be withdrawn from Iraq on the day a BNP government assumes office would be redeployed to secure the Channel Tunnel and Kent ports against illegal immigration.
8. The regime propagates the myth that Britain cannot, in the face of modern international travel and trade, secure its borders at reasonable cost and convenience. This is also obviously untrue, as the border control example of other advanced nations (the most relevant being that other great island state, Japan) proves.
9. Under present circumstances we would abide by our obligations under the 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees. We recognise the existence of legitimate international refugees from persecution and war, but point to the fact that international law provides that such persons must be given – and must seek – refuge in the nearest safe country. So, unless a flood of refugees from a civil war in France or Denmark shows up on our shores, these refugees are simply not Britain's responsibility and have no right to refuge here . . .
10. We will reform the laws and law enforcement of the UK so that, with respect to refugees and illegal immigrants, there are no blind eyes turned to violations, no amnesties to reward law-breaking, and no extensive appeals against legal decisions. We will place the burden of proof upon the claimant to prove his or her legitimate presence in this country. We will require persons whose cases are pending to be held in refugee centres, not at large in the community . . .
11. On current demographic trends we, the native British people, will be an ethnic minority in our own country within sixty years. By 2020, an extra 5-7 million immigrants will have entered Britain, whilst immigrant communities already resident here are having more children than the indigenous British people. The estimates for the numbers of illegal immigrants resident in the country vary from 250,000 to over a million.
12. To ensure that we do not become a minority in our own homeland, and that the native British peoples of our islands retain their culture and identity, we call for an immediate halt to all further immigration, the immediate deportation of all bogus asylum seekers, all criminal entrants and illegal immigrants, and the introduction of a system of voluntary resettlement whereby those immigrants and their descendants who are legally here are afforded the opportunity to return to their lands of ethnic origin assisted by a generous financial incentives both for individuals and for the countries in question.

13. We will abolish the 'positive discrimination' schemes that have made white Britons second-class citizens. We will also clamp down on the flood of 'asylum seekers', the vast majority of whom are either bogus or can find refuge much nearer their home countries. Britain is full up and the government of Britain has as its first responsibility the welfare, security and long-term preservation of the native people of Britain.
14. One of the most important rights that any nation possesses is the right to decide who shall enjoy citizenship and residence within its national borders. In a time of global terrorism, asymmetric warfare and open trade borders, the issue of illegal immigration must be considered as an aspect of National Security and not just an issue of social policy . . .
15. We are the only political party that is pledged to take action on illegal immigration. We do not dodge the issue by using vacuous sound bites and shallow headlines, as the old parties do with their 'promises to do something' but intentions of doing next to nothing. We will do what it is required and we have firm plans as regards our policy on ending illegal immigration immediately, and reversing the tide of immigration in the longer term.
16. Our first step will be to shut the door. A BNP government would accept no further immigration from any of the parts of the world which present the prospect of an almost limitless flow of immigration: Africa, Asia, China, Eastern and South Eastern Europe, the Middle East and South America would all be placed on an immediate 'stop' list. This would later be subject to review in the case of genuine students accepted for training as part of our long-term policy of helping to build up Third World economies in order to facilitate the voluntary return of their nationals or their descendants under our long-term resettlement programme . . .

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