Focusing on the manifesto provided by Gallagher and Zahavi's The Phenomenological Mind, this paper critically examines how we should understand and asses the prospects of allying phenomenological approaches to mind with ...

Rudd is right to observe that it is, “significant that the paper repeatedly mentions “basic” or “primitive” emotions” (Rudd: this volume). And he is sensitive enough to note that, “ Hutto does recognize that the “basic” ...

This paper argues against causalism about reasons in three stages. First, the paper investigates Professor Davidson's sophisticated version of the claim that we must understand reason-explanations as a kind of causal ...

There are two importantly different ways in which consciousness resists incorporation into our familiar object-based conceptual schema which, when analysed, help to explain why it is regarded as such a philosophically ...

There is no utterly clean, clear and neutral account of what exactly is covered by the concept of consciousness. The situation reflects, and is exacerbated by the fact that we speak of consciousness in many different ways ...

Professor Davidson's anomalous monism has been subject to the criticism that, despite advertisements to the contrary, if it were true mental properties would be epiphenomenal. To this Davidson has replied that his critics ...

In the action-space account of color, an emphasis is laid on implicit knowledge when it comes to experience, and explanatory ambitions are expressed. If the knowledge claims are interpreted in a strong way, the action-space ...

Folk psychology is a philosopher’s label for the practice of making sense of intentional actions, minimally, by appeal to an agent’s motivating beliefs and desires. It is the sort of thing one does, for example, when ...

There has been a long-standing interest in the putative roles that various so-called ‘theory of mind’abilities might play in enabling us to understand and enjoy narratives. Of late, as our understanding of the complexity ...