Now showing items 1-20 of 59

    • Against passive intellectualism : reply to Crane. 

      Hutto, D. (John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2006)
      Crane finds fault not with my positive conclusions, but with my description of the current lay in the land in the philosophy of mind. And, as he claims my assessment is false, he concomitantly rejects my diagnoses of its ...
    • Articulating and understanding the phenomenological manifesto 

      Hutto, D. (2008)
      Focusing on the manifesto provided by Gallagher and Zahavi's The Phenomenological Mind, this paper critically examines how we should understand and asses the prospects of allying phenomenological approaches to mind with ...
    • Beyond physicalism 

      Hutto, D. (John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2000)
      Beyond Physicalism attempts to establish the nature of the limits to our understanding of basic experiences and to stake out the consequences these have for an appropriate metaphysics. The argument of the book advances in ...
    • Both Bradley and Biology : reply to Rudd. 

      Hutto, D. (John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2006)
      Rudd is right to observe that it is, “significant that the paper repeatedly mentions “basic” or “primitive” emotions” (Rudd: this volume). And he is sensitive enough to note that, “ Hutto does recognize that the “basic” ...
    • A cause for concern : reasons, causes and explanation 

      Hutto, D. (1999)
      This paper argues against causalism about reasons in three stages. First, the paper investigates Professor Davidson's sophisticated version of the claim that we must understand reason-explanations as a kind of causal ...
    • Cognition without representation? 

      Hutto, D. (Plenum Press, 1999)
      In addressing the question “Do representations need reality?”, this paper attempts to show that a principled understanding of representations requires that they have objective, systematic content.It is claimed that there ...
    • Consciousness and conceptual schema 

      Hutto, D. (John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2001)
      There are two importantly different ways in which consciousness resists incorporation into our familiar object-based conceptual schema which, when analysed, help to explain why it is regarded as such a philosophically ...
    • Consciousness demystified 

      Hutto, D. (1995)
    • Consiousness 

      Hutto, D. (Continuum, 2011)
      There is no utterly clean, clear and neutral account of what exactly is covered by the concept of consciousness. The situation reflects, and is exacerbated by the fact that we speak of consciousness in many different ways ...
    • Current issues in idealism 

      Coates, Paul; Hutto, D. (Continuum, 1996)
      Focused on the idealist/realist dispute, contributors also discuss the relation of idealism to ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology. The volume further explores the differences between ontological and conceptual forms of ...
    • Davidson's identity crisis 

      Hutto, D. (1998)
      Professor Davidson's anomalous monism has been subject to the criticism that, despite advertisements to the contrary, if it were true mental properties would be epiphenomenal. To this Davidson has replied that his critics ...
    • Embodied expectations and extended possibilities : reply to Goldie. 

      Hutto, D. (John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2006)
      Although he is generally sympathetic to my larger programme, Goldie- like Myin, De Nul and Crane – holds that my attempt to expose the philosophical damage caused by a misguided commitment to the object-based schema fails ...
    • Enacting is enough : Commentary on Dave Ward’s 'The agent in magenta' 

      Myin, E.; Hutto, D. (2009)
      In the action-space account of color, an emphasis is laid on implicit knowledge when it comes to experience, and explanatory ambitions are expressed. If the knowledge claims are interpreted in a strong way, the action-space ...
    • First communions : mimetic ability versus theory of mind accounts 

      Hutto, D. (John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2008)
      It is widely held that the gradual development of metarepresentational Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities constituted at least one important hominid upgrade. Are such abilities really needed to explain hominid (i) tool-making, ...
    • Folk psychological narratives : The sociocultural basis of understanding reasons 

      Hutto, D. (MIT Press, 2008)
      Folk psychology is a philosopher’s label for the practice of making sense of intentional actions, minimally, by appeal to an agent’s motivating beliefs and desires. It is the sort of thing one does, for example, when ...
    • Folk psychological narratives and the case of autism 

      Hutto, D. (2003)
      This paper builds on the insights of Jerome Bruner by underlining the central importance of narratives explaining actions in terms of reasons, arguing that by giving due attention to the central roles that narratives play ...
    • Folk psychology as narrative practice 

      Hutto, D. (2009)
      There has been a long-standing interest in the putative roles that various so-called ‘theory of mind’abilities might play in enabling us to understand and enjoy narratives. Of late, as our understanding of the complexity ...
    • Folk psychology re-assessed 

      Hutto, D.; Ratcliffe, Matthew M.; Philosophy; School of Humanities; Social Sciences, Arts & Humanities Research Institute (Springer, 2007)
      This groundbreaking text examines contemporary ideas about folk psychology. It draws together disciplines that are as independent to one another as cognitive science and anthropology, whilst authors examine the consensual ...
    • Folk psychology without theory or simulation 

      Hutto, D. (Springer, 2007)