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dc.contributor.authorBourne, C.
dc.date.accessioned2010-10-21T07:29:16Z
dc.date.available2010-10-21T07:29:16Z
dc.date.issued2007-09
dc.identifier.citationBourne , C 2007 , ' Numerical Quantification and Temporal Intervals ' , Logique et Analyse .
dc.identifier.issn0024-5836
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 187309
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 9925f6b5-f775-4577-ad95-7b25d07e2c6f
dc.identifier.otherdspace: 2299/4908
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 64949154937
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/4908
dc.description.abstractArthur Prior states that ‘It will be/was/is that p’ is true iff ‘p’ will be/was/is true, and that is all that needs to be said about the matter. This appears to avoid any need to invoke the existence of non-present entities and accounts for tensed truths with very little ontological cost. However, as David Lewis notes, this version of presentism gives the wrong results when applied to numerically quantified tensed propositions. I show how presentism can accommodate numerical quantification by introducing a more appropriate tense operator. Further, I argue that it is implausible to think that we can have a primitive understanding of it; the correct semantics involves quantification over past and future times. I go on to show what kind of ontology can complement this semantic story, whilst remaining presentist in nature.en
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofLogique et Analyse
dc.rightsOpen
dc.subjectpresentism
dc.subjecttense
dc.subjectidentity over time
dc.subjectnumerical quantification
dc.subjecttemporal intervals
dc.subjectArthur Prior
dc.subjectDavid Lewis
dc.titleNumerical Quantification and Temporal Intervalsen
dc.contributor.institutionPhilosophy
dc.description.statusPeer reviewed
dcterms.dateAccepted2007-09
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue
herts.rights.accesstypeOpen


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