When am I? A tense time for tense theorists?

dc.contributor.author	Bourne, C.
dc.date.accessioned	2012-05-28T12:02:32Z
dc.date.available	2012-05-28T12:02:32Z
dc.date.issued	2002-09
dc.identifier.citation	Bourne , C 2002 , ' When am I? A tense time for tense theorists? ' , Australasian Journal of Philosophy , pp. 359-371 . https://doi.org/10.1080/713659472
dc.identifier.issn	0004-8402
dc.identifier.other	PURE: 188587
dc.identifier.other	PURE UUID: 24fa12ad-a96b-45d6-9e79-42d6452a1b51
dc.identifier.other	dspace: 2299/4900
dc.identifier.other	Scopus: 24944548479
dc.identifier.other	ORCID: /0000-0002-4980-8911/work/32558786
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2299/8627
dc.description.abstract	Is there anything more certain than the knowledge we have that we are present? It would be a scandal if our best theory of time could not guarantee such knowledge; yet I shall show that certain theories of time (such as Tooley's growing block model and McCall's branching model) cannot guarantee it. Only Presentism and the tenseless theory survive. The rest must be rejected.	en
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartof	Australasian Journal of Philosophy
dc.subject	time
dc.subject	present
dc.subject	branching model
dc.subject	growing block
dc.subject	presentism
dc.subject	tense
dc.title	When am I? A tense time for tense theorists?	en
dc.contributor.institution	Philosophy
dc.description.status	Peer reviewed
rioxxterms.versionofrecord	https://doi.org/10.1080/713659472
rioxxterms.type	Journal Article/Review
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessed	true