dc.contributor.author | Larvor, B. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-01-08T17:29:11Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-01-08T17:29:11Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Larvor , B 2008 , ' Moral particularism and scientific practice ' , Metaphilosophy , vol. 39 , no. 5 , pp. 492-507 . https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2008.00562.x | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0026-1068 | |
dc.identifier.other | dspace: 2299/4792 | |
dc.identifier.other | ORCID: /0000-0003-0921-1659/work/130151034 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2299/9515 | |
dc.description | ‘The definitive version is available at : http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9973 Copyright Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. | |
dc.description.abstract | Particularism is usually understood as a position in moral philosophy. In fact, it is a view about all reasons, not only moral reasons. Here, I show that particularism is a familiar and controversial position in the philosophy of science and mathematics. I then argue for particularism with respect to scientific and mathematical reasoning. This has a bearing on moral particularism, because if particularism about moral reasons is true, then particularism must be true with respect to reasons of any sort, including mathematical and scientific reasons. | en |
dc.format.extent | 162839 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Metaphilosophy | |
dc.title | Moral particularism and scientific practice | en |
dc.contributor.institution | Philosophy | |
dc.contributor.institution | School of Humanities | |
dc.contributor.institution | Social Sciences, Arts & Humanities Research Institute | |
dc.description.status | Peer reviewed | |
rioxxterms.versionofrecord | 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2008.00562.x | |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | |
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessed | true | |