Faith, Belief and Fictionalism
Malcolm, Finlay; Scott, Michael
Citation: Malcolm , F & Scott , M 2017 , ' Faith, Belief and Fictionalism ' Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , vol 98 , no. S1 , pp. 257-274 . DOI: 10.1111/papq.12169
Is propositional religious faith constituted by belief? Recent debate hasfocussed on whether faith may be constituted by a positive non-doxastic cognitivestate, which can stand in place of belief. This article sets out and defends thedoxastic theory. We consider and reject three arguments commonly used infavour of non-doxastic theories of faith: (1) the argument from religious doubt;(2) the use of ‘faith’ in linguistic utterances; and (3) the possibility of pragmaticfaith. We argue that belief is required to maintain a distinction between genuinefaith, pretend faith, and fictionalist faith.
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Finlay Malcolm and Michael Scott, ‘Faith, Belief and Fictionalism’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, December 2017, which has been published in final form at DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12169. Under embargo until 5 August 2018. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
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