Browsing by Author "Hutto, D."

Now showing items 41-59 of 59

    • Non-conceptual content and objectivity 

      Hutto, D. (1998)

    • Philosophical clarification, its possibility and point 

      Hutto, D. (2009)
      It is possible to pursue philosophy with a clarificatory end in mind. Doing philosophy in this mode neither reduces to simply engaging in therapy or theorizing. This paper defends the possibility of this distinctive kind ...

    • Philosophy of mind’s new lease on life : autopoietic enactivism meets teleosemiotics 

      Hutto, D. (2011)
      This commentary will seek to clarify certain core features of Thompson’s proposal about the enactive nature of basic mentality, as best it can, and to bring his ideas into direct conversation with accounts of basic cognition ...

    • The presence of mind 

      Hutto, D. (John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1999)
      Is our daily account of ourselves justified by a new science? Or, will our self-understanding be unaffected? This text argues that beliefs and desires have a rightful place in the explanation of action. Eliminativist ...

    • Presumptuous naturalism : a cautionary tale 

      Hutto, D. (2011)
      Concentrating on their treatment of folk psychology, this paper seeks to establish that, in the form advocated by its leading proponents, the Canberra project is presumptuous in certain key respects. Crucially, it presumes ...

    • Questing for happiness: augmenting Aristotle with Davidson 

      Hutto, D. (2004)
      Drawing heavily on Aristotle, Tabensky attempts to establish ‘an ethic that flows from the very structure of our being’, but he also calls on Davidson’s arguments about the essentially social character of rationality to ...

    • Radical enactivism and narrative practice: implications for psychopathology 

      Hutto, D. (Schattauer GmbH, 2010)
      Many psychopathological disorders – clinical depression, borderline personality disorder, schizophrenia and autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) – are commonly classified as disorders of the self. In an intuitive sense this ...

    • The reign of Prince Auto : psychology in an age of science 

      Hutto, D. (1992)
      The principle of autonomy (hereafter Prince Auto) is a doctrine which commits physicalistic philosophers to mechanical explanations of human behaviour. In this paper I argue that physicalism (in all its forms) presents a ...

    • Starting without theory: confronting the paradox of conceptual development 

      Hutto, D. (Guilford Press, 2005)
      There is a paradox about how our social understanding develops if we take seriously both theory theory and the cognitivist dictum that all skilful interaction has robust conceptual underpinnings. On the one hand, it is ...

    • The story of the self: narrative as the basis for self-development 

      Hutto, D. (Rodopi, 1997)
      There is an on-going debate between those who believe selves are stable kinds of pre-linguistic entity and those who maintain that selves, are themselves, formed by our linguistic practices specifically our capacity to ...

    • Turning hard problems on their heads 

      Hutto, D. (2006)
      Much of the difficulty in assessing theories of consciousness stems from their advocates not supplying adequate or convincing characterisations of the phenomenon (or data) they hope to explain. Yet, to make any reasonable ...

    • Two Wittgensteins too many: Wittgenstein's foundationalism 

      Hutto, D. (Ashgate Publishing, 2004)
      In his contribution to this volume, Avrum Stroll makes the assertion that there is ‘a feature of [Wittgenstein's] later philosophy that occurs only in On Certainty. This is a unique form of foundationalism that is neither ...

    • Understanding fictional minds without theory of mind! 

      Hutto, D. (2011)
      This paper explores the idea that when dealing with certain kinds of narratives, ‘like it or not’, consumers of fiction will bring the same sorts of skills (or at least a subset of them) to bear that they use when dealing ...

    • Understanding others through primary interaction and narrative practice 

      Hutto, D.; Gallagher, S. (John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2008)
      We argue that theory-of-mind (ToM) approaches, such as “theory theory” and “simulation theory”, are both problematic and not needed. They account for neither our primary and pervasive way of engaging with others nor the ...

    • Unprincipled engagements : emotional experience, expression and response. 

      Hutto, D. (John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2006)
      Philosophically speaking, emotions are a nuisance, even the good ones. There are several reasons for this. First, it is thought that they are a hangover of our animal natures that interfere with our rationality : they gum ...

    • Voices to be heard 

      Hutto, D. (2005)

    • Was the later Wittgenstein a transcendental idealist? 

      Hutto, D. (Continuum, 1996)
      In his paper "Wittgenstein and Idealism" Professor Williams proposed a 'model' for reading Wittgenstein's later philosophy which he claimed exposed its transcendental idealist character. By this he roughly meant that ...

    • Wittgenstein and the end of philosophy : Neither theory nor therapy 

      Hutto, D. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003)
      What is the ultimate value of Wittgenstein's input to philosophy? Opinions on this are strongly divided. However, most assessments rest on certain popular misreadings of his purpose. This book challenges both "theoretical" ...

    • The world is not enough: shared emotions and other minds 

      Hutto, D. (Ashgate Publishing, 2002)
      It is the aim of this chapter to argue that the conceptual problem of other minds cannot be properly addressed as long as we subscribe to an individualistic model of how we stand in relation to our own experiences and the ...