Now showing items 1-5 of 5

    • Fatalism and the Future 

      Bourne, C. (Oxford University Press, 2011)
      I discuss how we should respond to the view that says that the truth of future-tensed statements entails that the future could not have been otherwise. Much fatalist reasoning of this type is rather uninteresting since it ...
    • Future Contingents, Non-Contradiction and the Law of Excluded Middle Muddle 

      Bourne, C. (2004-04)
      I show how to hold the view that future contingents are not either true or false without having to reject either the law of excluded middle or the law of non-contradiction. This is achieved without resorting to ...
    • Numerical Quantification and Temporal Intervals 

      Bourne, C. (2007-09)
      Arthur Prior states that ‘It will be/was/is that p’ is true iff ‘p’ will be/was/is true, and that is all that needs to be said about the matter. This appears to avoid any need to invoke the existence of non-present entities ...
    • A Theory of Presentism 

      Bourne, C. (2006-03)
      Most of us would want to say that it is true that Socrates taught Plato. According to realists about past facts, this is made true by the fact that there is, located in the past, i.e., earlier than now, at least one real ...
    • When am I? A tense time for tense theorists? 

      Bourne, C. (2002-09)
      Is there anything more certain than the knowledge we have that we are present? It would be a scandal if our best theory of time could not guarantee such knowledge; yet I shall show that certain theories of time (such as ...