Browsing by Author "Coleman, Sam"

Now showing items 1-14 of 14

    • The Ins and Outs of Conscious Belief 

      Coleman, Sam (2022-02-28)
      What should advocates of phenomenal intentionality say about unconscious intentional states? I approach this question by focusing on a recent debate between Tim Crane and David Pitt about the nature of belief. Crane argues ...

    • Intentionality, Qualia, and the Stream of Unconsciousness 

      Coleman, Sam (2022-06-01)
      According to Brentano, mentality is essentially intentional in nature. Other philosophers have emphasized the phenomenal-qualitative aspect of conscious experiences as core to the mind. A recent philosophical wave – the ...

    • Mental Chemistry : Combination for Panpsychists 

      Coleman, Sam (2012-03)
      Panpsychism, an increasingly popular competitor to physicalism as a theory of mind, faces a famous difficulty, the ‘combination problem’. This is the difficulty of understanding the composition of a conscious mind by parts ...

    • The Merits of Higher-Order Thought Theories 

      Coleman, Sam (2018-12-28)
      Over many years and in many publications David Rosenthal has developed, defended and applied his justly well-known higher-order thought theory of consciousness. In this paper I explain the theory, then provide a brief ...

    • Natural Acquaintance 

      Coleman, Sam (Oxford University Press (OUP), 2019-11-27)
      First (§1) I isolate the form of acquaintance that interests me, and next (§2) note some of its key epistemological and metaphysical features. Then (§3) I explore a promising metaphysical framework for naturalising ...

    • Neuro-Cosmology 

      Coleman, Sam (Oxford University Press (OUP), 2015-08-20)
      I argue from the an identity theory of the mind (with the brain) plus the irreducibility of qualia to a neutral monist position about matter throughout the universe.

    • Panpsychism and Neutral Monism: How to Make Up One's Mind 

      Coleman, Sam (Oxford University Press (OUP), 2016-11-03)
      With reference to Chalmers's taxonomy of combination problems, I argue that while the subject combination problem reveals panpsychism as ultimately theoretically unmotivated, a rival neutral monist/panprotopsychist theory ...

    • Panpsychism and Russellian Monism 

      Coleman, Sam; Alter, Torin (Routledge, 2019-12-16)
      Russellian monist positions such as panpsychism are widely believed to have crucial advantages over mainstream physicalist and dualist positions. Physicalism disregards or distorts the distinctive features of consciousness, ...

    • Personhood, consciousness, and god : how to be a proper pantheist 

      Coleman, Sam (2019-02-15)
      In this paper I develop a theory of personhood which leaves open the possibility of construing the universe as a person. If successful, it removes one bar to endorsing pantheism. I do this by examining a rising school of ...

    • Quotational higher-order thought theory 

      Coleman, Sam (2015-10-01)
      Due to their reliance on constitutive higher-order representing to generate the qualities of which the subject is consciously aware, I argue that the major existing higher-order representational theories of consciousness ...

    • The Real Combination Problem : Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence 

      Coleman, Sam (2014-02)
      Panpsychism harbors an unresolved tension, the seriousness of which has yet to be fully appreciated. I capture this tension as a dilemma, and offer panpsychists advice on how to resolve it. The dilemma, briefly, is as ...

    • Russellian Monism and Mental Causation 

      Coleman, Sam; Alter, Torin (2019-10-22)
      According to Russellian monism, consciousness is constituted at least partly by quiddities: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. If the theory is true, ...

    • Russellian Physicalism and Protophenomenal Properties 

      Alter, Torin; Coleman, Sam (2020-07-01)
      We consider an argument from Morris and Brown that there cannot be a genuinely physicalist version of Russellian monism, and rebut that argument. The rebuttal involves making a distinction between ways protophenomenal ...

    • There is no argument that the mind extends 

      Coleman, Sam (2011)
      On the basis of two argumentative examples plus their ‘parity principle’, Andy Clark and David Chalmers argue that mental states like beliefs can extend into the environment. I raise two problems for the argument. The first ...