dc.contributor.author | Floridi, L. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-11-06T08:58:55Z | |
dc.date.available | 2007-11-06T08:58:55Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Floridi , L 2006 , ' The logic of being informed ' , Logique et Analyse , vol. 49 , no. 196 , pp. 433-460 . | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2295-5836 | |
dc.identifier.other | dspace: 2299/1025 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2299/1025 | |
dc.description.abstract | One of the open problems in the philosophy of information is whether there is an information logic (IL), different from epistemic (EL) and doxastic logic (DL), which formalises the relation a is informed--that p (Iap) satisfactorily. In this paper, the problem is--solved by arguing that the axiom schemata of the normal modal logic (NML) KTB (also known as B or Br or Brouwer's system) are well suited to formalise the relation of being informed . After having shown that IL can be constructed as an informational reading--of KTB, four consequences of a KTB-based IL are explored: information overload; the veridicality thesis (Iap ! p); the relation between IL and EL; and theKp ! Bp principle or entailment property, according to which knowledge implies belief. Although these issues are discussed later in the article, they are the motivations behind the development of IL. | en |
dc.format.extent | 309101 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Logique et Analyse | |
dc.title | The logic of being informed | en |
dc.contributor.institution | Philosophy | |
dc.description.status | Peer reviewed | |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | |
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessed | true | |