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dc.contributor.authorCoates, Paul
dc.contributor.editorMacpherson, F.
dc.contributor.editorPlatchais, D.
dc.identifier.citationCoates , P 2013 , Hallucinations and the Transparency of Perception . in F Macpherson & D Platchais (eds) , Hallucination : Philosophy and Psychology . MIT Press , Cambridge: Mass , pp. 381-398 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 522414
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 5eb706cc-4f2b-4800-824b-74f0b17cbcac
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84942067282
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the way in which concepts of a low-level classificatory kind occur in different kinds of experiences, and what happens when subjects of deceptive musical hallucinations re-assess their experiences and come to realise that they are hallucinating. Drawing upon this account, it is shown how it is possible for subjects to adopt different conceptual stances with respect to veridical perceptual experience. The issue of the seeming “transparency” of perceptual experience is explored, and it is argued that the sense in which perceptual experience is transparent is compatible with the Critical Realist version of the causal theory of perception: hallucinatory phenomena show how perception can be intentionally direct, yet causally mediated. Transparency does not provide any special support for Direct Realist or Disjunctivist theories of perception.en
dc.publisherMIT Press
dc.subjectPerceptual experience; transparency; hallucination; causal theory of perception; critical realism; direct realism; disjunctivism.
dc.titleHallucinations and the Transparency of Perceptionen
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Humanities
dc.contributor.institutionSocial Sciences, Arts & Humanities Research Institute
dc.description.statusNon peer reviewed

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