Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorRudd, Anthony
dc.identifier.citationRudd , A 2008 , ' Natural doubts ' , Metaphilosophy , vol. 39 , no. 3 , pp. 305-324 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 2319709
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: bccb7bc1-7063-4627-89f4-121a69d02407
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 61049382562
dc.description.abstractMany philosophers now argue that the doubts of the philosophical sceptic are unnatural ones, in that they are not forced on us by considerations that any reasonable person would have to accept as compelling but only arise if one has already accepted certain controversial theoretical commitments. In this article I defend the naturalness of philosophical scepticism against such criticisms. After defining “global ontological scepticism,” I examine the work of a number of anti-sceptical philosophers—Michael Huemer, Michael Williams, and John McDowell. Although McDowell does move the debate to a deeper level by interpreting scepticism as a challenge to the very possibility of the mind's apprehending reality by being in a rational rather than a merely causal relation to it, none of them succeeds in showing that global ontological scepticism is, in the relevant sense, unnatural. This is not to say that the sceptic is correct; simply that it has not been shown that we can reasonably dismiss the sceptical questions and thereby evade the need to engage seriously with the sceptical argumentsen
dc.titleNatural doubtsen
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Humanities
dc.contributor.institutionSocial Sciences, Arts & Humanities Research Institute
dc.description.statusPeer reviewed
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review

Files in this item


There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record