Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorMoyal-Sharrock, Daniele
dc.date.accessioned2013-11-12T09:31:10Z
dc.date.available2013-11-12T09:31:10Z
dc.date.issued2013-07
dc.identifier.citationMoyal-Sharrock , D 2013 , ' Wittgenstein's Razor : The Cutting Edge of Enactivism ' , American Philosophical Quarterly , vol. 50 , no. 3 , pp. 263-279 .
dc.identifier.issn0003-0481
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 930473
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 14663408-449a-48c8-b807-e8b9778e158a
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84880559861
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/12107
dc.description.abstractAction, in Wittgenstein, is everywhere – not only at the origin of thought and language for the human species and for all individual human beings, but at the origin of any human thought or utterance. That is, it has regained its rightful place in the description of our human mindedness; a place usurped by an inflated intellect and brain, in the form of content, propositions, representations, engrams or intelligent neurons. This paper fleshes out how action – and not any of these – is, for Wittgenstein, at the logical foundation of thought, making him an enactivist through and through. Indeed, perhaps the first enactivist.en
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofAmerican Philosophical Quarterly
dc.rightsOpen
dc.subjectWittgenstein, epistemology, memory, On Certainty, enactivism
dc.titleWittgenstein's Razor : The Cutting Edge of Enactivismen
dc.contributor.institutionPhilosophy
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Humanities
dc.contributor.institutionSocial Sciences, Arts & Humanities Research Institute
dc.description.statusPeer reviewed
dc.relation.schoolSchool of Humanities
dc.description.versiontypeFinal Accepted Version
dcterms.dateAccepted2013-07
rioxxterms.versionAM
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue
herts.rights.accesstypeOpen


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record