| dc.contributor.author | Moyal-Sharrock, Daniele | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-02-13T13:28:52Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2014-02-13T13:28:52Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2005 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Moyal-Sharrock , D 2005 , ' Quand les mots sont des actes : les 'énoncés spontanés'chez Wittgenstein et la dissolution du problème corps-esprit' ' , Revue de theologie et de philosophie , vol. 137 , pp. 1-17 . | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2299/12829 | |
| dc.description.abstract | According to Wittgenstein, our spontaneous utterances are not descriptions, but expressions more akin to behaviour than to language: a new sort of speech-act. Rather than conventional performatory words, spontaneous utterances are deeds through their very spontaneity. This gives language a new dimension of reflex, which, as I argue against Peter Hacker, makes the boundary porous between the categories of language and of action, thus dissolving the gap between mind and body | en |
| dc.language.iso | fra | |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Revue de theologie et de philosophie | |
| dc.subject | Wittgenstein, spontaneous utterances, mind-body problem, speech-act | |
| dc.title | Quand les mots sont des actes : les 'énoncés spontanés'chez Wittgenstein et la dissolution du problème corps-esprit' | fr |
| dc.title.alternative | When words are deedsWittgenstein's 'spontaneous utterances and the dissolution of the mind-body problem | en |
| dc.contributor.institution | School of Humanities | |
| dc.contributor.institution | Social Sciences, Arts & Humanities Research Institute | |
| dc.contributor.institution | Philosophy | |
| dc.description.status | Peer reviewed | |
| rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | |
| herts.preservation.rarelyaccessed | true | |
