dc.contributor.author | Hodges, Jennefer Anne | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-07-02T16:55:48Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-07-02T16:55:48Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014-04-29 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2299/13889 | |
dc.description.abstract | Searle’s theory of Biological Naturalism has been largely ignored in the philosophical literature and Searle’s commentators are confused by his seemingly contradictory views. In this dissertation I attempt to make sense of Biological Naturalism. In chapter 2 I will ascertain which concerns prevent Searle’s readers from understanding his position. The remaining chapters aim to dissolve the tensions and dispel any confusion.
Chapter 3 considers Searle’s notion of first-person ontology, finding that it expresses a belief that experiences are essentially subjective and qualitative. In chapter 4 I consider the notions of levels of description, causal reduction and what Searle means by causation and realisation. Chapter 5 turns to the question of how to categorise Searle’s position. Many of his critics charge him with being a property dualist. By highlighting the difference between the meaning of irreducibility intended by the property dualist and Searle I show that there is sufficient difference in their use of the term so as to reject an interpretation of Biological Naturalism as a form of property dualism. Chapter 6 is where I turn to the other end of the physicalism/dualism spectrum and assess whether Searle should be seen as holding a form of identity theory. I first argue for a neutral form of identity that I call real identity, which does not include the inherent reductive privileging of standard identity. I then argue that Searle should be seen as advocating a form of real identity theory; a form of token identity theory which does not privilege the physical over the mental.
In chapter 7 I return to the main barriers to making sense of Biological Naturalism which I identified in chapter 2 and lay out my response to each. I conclude with a coherent interpretation of Searle’s position. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | University of Hertfordshire | en_US |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en_US |
dc.subject | John Searle | en_US |
dc.subject | Biological Naturalism | en_US |
dc.subject | levels of description | en_US |
dc.subject | real identity theory | en_US |
dc.subject | mind-brain identity | en_US |
dc.subject | privileging the physical | en_US |
dc.subject | mental causation | en_US |
dc.title | Making Sense of Biological Naturalism | en_US |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.18745/th.13889 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.18745/th.13889 | |
dc.type.qualificationlevel | Doctoral | en_US |
dc.type.qualificationname | PhD | en_US |
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessed | true | |