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dc.contributor.authorHodges, Jennefer Anne
dc.date.accessioned2014-07-02T16:55:48Z
dc.date.available2014-07-02T16:55:48Z
dc.date.issued2014-04-29
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/13889
dc.description.abstractSearle’s theory of Biological Naturalism has been largely ignored in the philosophical literature and Searle’s commentators are confused by his seemingly contradictory views. In this dissertation I attempt to make sense of Biological Naturalism. In chapter 2 I will ascertain which concerns prevent Searle’s readers from understanding his position. The remaining chapters aim to dissolve the tensions and dispel any confusion. Chapter 3 considers Searle’s notion of first-person ontology, finding that it expresses a belief that experiences are essentially subjective and qualitative. In chapter 4 I consider the notions of levels of description, causal reduction and what Searle means by causation and realisation. Chapter 5 turns to the question of how to categorise Searle’s position. Many of his critics charge him with being a property dualist. By highlighting the difference between the meaning of irreducibility intended by the property dualist and Searle I show that there is sufficient difference in their use of the term so as to reject an interpretation of Biological Naturalism as a form of property dualism. Chapter 6 is where I turn to the other end of the physicalism/dualism spectrum and assess whether Searle should be seen as holding a form of identity theory. I first argue for a neutral form of identity that I call real identity, which does not include the inherent reductive privileging of standard identity. I then argue that Searle should be seen as advocating a form of real identity theory; a form of token identity theory which does not privilege the physical over the mental. In chapter 7 I return to the main barriers to making sense of Biological Naturalism which I identified in chapter 2 and lay out my response to each. I conclude with a coherent interpretation of Searle’s position.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Hertfordshireen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectJohn Searleen_US
dc.subjectBiological Naturalismen_US
dc.subjectlevels of descriptionen_US
dc.subjectreal identity theoryen_US
dc.subjectmind-brain identityen_US
dc.subjectprivileging the physicalen_US
dc.subjectmental causationen_US
dc.titleMaking Sense of Biological Naturalismen_US
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisen_US
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen_US
dc.type.qualificationnamePhDen_US
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue


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