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dc.contributor.authorMoyal-Sharrock, Daniele
dc.date.accessioned2016-12-05T17:53:12Z
dc.date.available2016-12-05T17:53:12Z
dc.date.issued2015-06-01
dc.identifier.citationMoyal-Sharrock , D 2015 , ' A Certeza Fulcral de Wittgenstein ' , Dissertatio: Revista de Filosofia , vol. 1 , no. Special issue , pp. 3-30 .
dc.identifier.issn1983-8891
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/17390
dc.descriptionThe final, definitive version of this paper has been published in Dissertatio Revista de Filosofia, Vol 1 Special Issue pp 3-30, and is available on line at https://periodicos.ufpel.edu.br/ojs2/index.php/dissertatio/article/view/8563/5586 © 2016. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.description.abstractThis paper works on the assumption that much of On Certainty is devoted to fleshing out the distinction between certainty and knowledge. Our basic certainties – or 'hinge certainties', or 'hinges' – make up our world picture and underpin knowledge, not being themselves, however, of an epistemic nature. Wittgenstein's deliberations in On Certainty show him to realize that our basic certainties share the following conceptual features; they are all: nonepistemic, indubitable, nonempirical, grammatical, nonpropositional, ineffable, enacted and foundational. The necessary features of hinges are discussed at some length in the paper.en
dc.format.extent28
dc.format.extent519009
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofDissertatio: Revista de Filosofia
dc.subjectWittgenstein
dc.subjectcertainty
dc.subjectepistemology
dc.subjecthinges
dc.subjectbasic beliefs
dc.titleA Certeza Fulcral de Wittgensteinen
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Humanities
dc.contributor.institutionPhilosophy
dc.description.statusNon peer reviewed
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue


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