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dc.contributor.authorMoyal-Sharrock, Daniele
dc.contributor.editorGlock, Hans-Johann
dc.contributor.editorHyman, John
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-11T20:39:08Z
dc.date.available2017-01-11T20:39:08Z
dc.date.issued2017-01-17
dc.identifier.citationMoyal-Sharrock , D 2017 , Knowledge and Certainty . in H-J Glock & J Hyman (eds) , A Companion to Wittgenstein . new edition edn , Blackwell Companions to Philosophy , John Wiley & Sons Australia Ltd , Milton, QLD, Australia , pp. 547-562 .
dc.identifier.isbn1118641167
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-118-64116-3
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 639119
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: a35c3545-b9df-4b80-91a4-ca1b25ed37c1
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85021019453
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/17495
dc.descriptionDaniele Moyal-Sharrock, ‘Knowledge and Certainty’ in Hans-Johan Glock and John Hyman, eds., Blackwell Companion to Wittgenstein (Milton: Wiley Blackwell, 2017), eBook ISBN: 978-1-118-64116-3
dc.description.abstractIn On Certainty, Wittgenstein subverts the traditional picture of basic beliefs. They are not indubitable or self-justified propositions, but animal certainties. With the word 'animal', he does not mean to reduce these basic certainties to brute impressions or to intuitions, but to say that they are nonreflective and nonpropositional. So that what philosophers like Descartes and Moore put forward as propositions susceptible of falsification and thereby of scepticism are in fact heuristic formulations of certainties whose status is logical or grammatical, and whose only occurrence qua certainty is in action – that is: in what we say (e.g. 'I'll wash my hands') and in what we do (e.g. we wash our hands). So that although they often look like empirical conclusions, our basic certainties constitute, not objects of knowledge, but the ungrounded, necessary, nonpropositional basis of knowledge. This paper delineates Wittgenstein's route to this conclusion, while countering the epistemic and/or propositional readings of 'hinge propositions' put forward by Michael Williams, Crispin Wright, Annalisa Coliva and Duncan Pritchard. It is argued that only a nonepistemic and nonpropositional reading of hinge certainty allows it to solve epistemology's core problem: the infinite regress of justification.en
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherJohn Wiley & Sons Australia Ltd
dc.relation.ispartofA Companion to Wittgenstein
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBlackwell Companions to Philosophy
dc.subjectWittgenstein
dc.subjectepistemology
dc.subjectcertainty
dc.subjectknowledge
dc.subjectOn Certainty
dc.titleKnowledge and Certaintyen
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Humanities
dc.contributor.institutionSocial Sciences, Arts & Humanities Research Institute
dc.contributor.institutionPhilosophy
dc.description.statusPeer reviewed
dc.identifier.urlhttp://eu.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-1118641167.html
dc.relation.schoolSchool of Humanities
dcterms.dateAccepted2015-08-03
rioxxterms.versionAM
rioxxterms.typeOther
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue
herts.rights.accesstypeclosedAccess


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