| dc.contributor.author | Hutto, D. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2008-04-02T15:33:15Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2008-04-02T15:33:15Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Hutto , D 2007 , ' The narrative practice hypothesis: origins and applications of folk psychology ' , Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , vol. 82 , pp. 43-68 . https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246107000033 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1358-2461 | |
| dc.identifier.other | PURE: 187623 | |
| dc.identifier.other | PURE UUID: d8cff7f3-410a-42b8-b24e-a5a0437ec72e | |
| dc.identifier.other | dspace: 2299/1853 | |
| dc.identifier.other | Scopus: 84927043976 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2299/1853 | |
| dc.description | The original article can be found at: http://journals.cambridge.org/--Copyright The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors & Cambridge University Press DOI : 10.1017/S1358246107000033 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Psychologically normal adult humans make sense of intentional actions by trying to decide for which reason they were performed. This is a datum that requires our understanding. Although there have been interesting recent debates about how we should understand ‘reasons’, I will follow a long tradition and assume that, at a bare minimum, to act for a reason involves having appropriately interrelated beliefs and desires. | en |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements | |
| dc.rights | Open | |
| dc.title | The narrative practice hypothesis: origins and applications of folk psychology | en |
| dc.contributor.institution | Philosophy | |
| dc.description.status | Peer reviewed | |
| dcterms.dateAccepted | 2007 | |
| rioxxterms.versionofrecord | https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246107000033 | |
| rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | |
| herts.preservation.rarelyaccessed | true | |
| herts.rights.accesstype | Open | |
