Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorLippitt, John
dc.date.accessioned2017-11-28T17:56:27Z
dc.date.available2017-11-28T17:56:27Z
dc.date.issued2017-11-27
dc.identifier.citationLippitt , J 2017 , ' Forgiveness: a work of love? ' Parrhesia: a journal of critical philosophy , vol 28 , pp. 19-39 .
dc.identifier.issn1834-3287
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 10920167
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 8eb59ce7-b418-47e3-8096-871d7ac359ab
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/19561
dc.description© 2017 The Author. This is an Open Access article made available under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/, which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
dc.description.abstractWhat difference would it make to our understanding of the process of interpersonal forgiveness to treat it as what Kierkegaard calls a ‘work of love’? In this article, I argue that such an approach – which I label ‘love’s forgiveness’ - challenges key assumptions in two prominent philosophical accounts of forgiveness. First, it challenges ‘desert-based’ views, according to which forgiveness at its best is ‘conditional’ upon such features as the wrongdoer’s repentance and making amends. But second, it also avoids legitimate worries raised against some forms of ‘unconditional’ forgiveness (such as Derrida’s claim that true forgiveness can forgive only ‘the unforgivable’). I argue that ‘love’s forgiveness’ neither endorses the Derridean view, nor communicates to the wrongdoer that no judgement is being made on her action. ‘Love’s vision’, I argue, has a crucial role to play in interpersonal forgiveness. I consider the objection that viewing forgiveness as a work of love is problematic because love involves a certain wilful blindness. Drawing on both Kierkegaard and some contemporary work in the philosophy of love, I examine Troy Jollimore’s argument that love has epistemic standards of its own, further arguing that in the relevant respects claims about romantic love and friendship can be extended to the case of agapic love of neighbour. By developing this view in relation to several key sections of Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, I show the importance of understanding ‘love’s forgiveness’ in the light of other virtues, especially hope and humility.en
dc.format.extent21
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofParrhesia: a journal of critical philosophy
dc.rights/dk/atira/pure/core/openaccesspermission/open
dc.subjectKierkegaard
dc.subjectLove
dc.subjectForgiveness
dc.subjectTroy Jollimore
dc.subjectHumility
dc.subjectArts and Humanities(all)
dc.titleForgiveness: a work of love?en
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Humanities
dc.contributor.institutionPhilosophy
dc.description.statusPeer reviewed
dc.identifier.urlhttps://www.parrhesiajournal.org/parrhesia28/parrhesia28_lippitt.pdf
dc.relation.schoolSchool of Humanities
dc.description.versiontypeFinal Published version
dcterms.dateAccepted2017-09-27
rioxxterms.versionAM
rioxxterms.versionVoR
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue
herts.rights.accesstypeopenAccess


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record