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dc.contributor.authorJavarone, Marco
dc.contributor.authorMarinazzo, Daniele
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-11T16:20:51Z
dc.date.available2018-04-11T16:20:51Z
dc.date.issued2017-11-14
dc.identifier.citationJavarone , M & Marinazzo , D 2017 , ' Evolutionary dynamics of group formation ' , PLoS ONE , vol. 12 , no. 11 , 11 , pp. e0187960 . https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0187960
dc.identifier.issn1932-6203
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 13213876
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: bcfee8ce-0858-4b47-91f6-4039c71605ca
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85033776592
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/19971
dc.descriptionThis is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License CC BY 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
dc.description.abstractGroup formation is a quite ubiquitous phenomenon across different animal species, whose individuals cluster together forming communities of diverse size. Previous investigations suggest that, in general, this phenomenon might have similar underlying reasons across the interested species, despite genetic and behavioral differences. For instance improving the individual safety (e.g. from predators), and increasing the probability to get food resources. Remarkably, the group size might strongly vary from species to species, e.g. shoals of fishes and herds of lions, and sometimes even within the same species, e.g. tribes and families in human societies. Here we build on previous theories stating that the dynamics of group formation may have evolutionary roots, and we explore this fascinating hypothesis from a purely theoretical perspective, with a model using the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory. In our model we hypothesize that homogeneity constitutes a fundamental ingredient in these dynamics. Accordingly, we study a population that tries to form homogeneous groups, i.e. composed of similar agents. The formation of a group can be interpreted as a strategy. Notably, agents can form a group (receiving a ‘group payoff’), or can act individually (receiving an ‘individual payoff’). The phase diagram of the modeled population shows a sharp transition between the ‘group phase’ and the ‘individual phase’, characterized by a critical ‘individual payoff’. Our results then support the hypothesis that the phenomenon of group formation has evolutionary roots.en
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofPLoS ONE
dc.rightsOpen
dc.subjectevolutionary theory
dc.subjectstatistical physics
dc.subjectcomputational model
dc.titleEvolutionary dynamics of group formationen
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Computer Science
dc.description.statusPeer reviewed
dc.description.versiontypeFinal Published version
dcterms.dateAccepted2017-11-14
rioxxterms.versionVoR
rioxxterms.versionofrecordhttps://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0187960
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue
herts.rights.accesstypeOpen


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