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dc.contributor.authorBourne, Craig
dc.contributor.authorCaddick Bourne, Emily
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-13T15:06:01Z
dc.date.available2018-04-13T15:06:01Z
dc.date.issued2018-01-29
dc.identifier.citationBourne , C & Caddick Bourne , E 2018 , ' Explanation and Quasi-Miracles in Narrative Understanding: The Case of Poetic Justice ' Dialectica , vol 71 , no. 4 , pp. 563-579 . DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12201
dc.identifier.issn0012-2017
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 10760735
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: fbfd6240-2bed-4891-8f40-8878abce24d3
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85041073043
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/19982
dc.descriptionThis is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Craig Bourne, and Emily Caddick Bourne, ‘Explanation and Quasi‐miracles in Narrative Understanding: The Case of Poetic Justice’, Dialectica, Vol. 71 (4): 563-579, January 2018, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12201. Under embargo until 29 January 2020. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
dc.description.abstractNarratives provide understanding of the events they represent, organising them, as David Velleman (2003) puts it, into an intelligible whole. Saying what kind of understanding this is, and how narratives furnish it, is a matter of debate. One influential proposal (Carroll (2001)) is that narratives provide understanding by offering causal explanations of events. But, it has been argued, the phenomenon of poetic justice – where fictional characters get their due apparently by happy accident – shows that this account is wrong. Gregory Currie (2006) proposes that in cases such as poetic justice, we take the fictional world to be inherently responsive to reasons; geared, for example, towards reward and retribution. In other words, audiences see the connections between the fictional events as instantiations of normative laws. We shall argue that while it may be right to treat some fictional worlds as governed by such laws, this is not what is fundamental to poetic justice. We suggest a new account of this feature of narratives, based on a development of the notion of a ‘quasi-miracle’ introduced by David Lewis (1986a). A quasi-miracle is a particular kind of extraordinary and striking event. Whilst Lewis’s intention was to solve a problem concerning the semantics of counterfactuals, we propose to take the notion of a quasi-miracle outside that debate, and use it in a new way. There is much philosophical work to be done by examining how quasi-miracles function – including, importantly, the responses they invite when we encounter them. Exploring this allows us to pinpoint what it is to regard certain events – such as those involved in poetic justice in narratives – as cases of remarkable coincidence.en
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofDialectica
dc.rights/dk/atira/pure/core/openaccesspermission/embargoed
dc.titleExplanation and Quasi-Miracles in Narrative Understanding: The Case of Poetic Justiceen
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Humanities
dc.contributor.institutionPhilosophy
dc.description.statusPeer reviewed
dc.date.embargoedUntil2020-01-29
dc.relation.schoolSchool of Humanities
dc.description.versiontypeFinal Accepted Version
rioxxterms.versionAM
rioxxterms.versionofrecordhttps://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12201
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2020-01-29Z
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue
herts.date.embargo2020-01-29Z
herts.rights.accesstypeembargoedAccess


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