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dc.contributor.authorGheyoh Ndzi, Ernestine
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-30T18:01:09Z
dc.date.available2018-04-30T18:01:09Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.citationGheyoh Ndzi , E 2017 , ' UK Shareholder Voting on Director's Remuneration: Has Binding Vote Made any Difference? ' , Company Lawyer , vol. 38 , no. 5 , pp. 139-149 .
dc.identifier.issn0144-1027
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 11443525
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 08502103-c1a0-4bad-a5ab-a690b87b8bb4
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/19997
dc.descriptionThis is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Company Lawyer following peer review. The definitive published version [Ernestine Gheyoh Ndzi, ‘UK Shareholder Voting on Director's Remuneration: Has Binding Vote Made any Difference?’, Company Lawyer, Vol. 38 (5): 139-149, 2017] is available online on Westlaw UK or from Thomson Reuters DocDel service .
dc.description.abstractDirectors’ remuneration has been a contentious issue in the UK since the early 1990s. The Companies Act 2006 gives the shareholders voting rights and highlights the shareholders as responsible for monitoring and curbing directors’ excessive remuneration. However, shareholders have consistently been less active in using their votes to monitor directors’ pay. Shareholders often tend to abstain from resolutions on directors’ remuneration more than they would abstain in other resolution. This article argues that shareholders are not interested/incapable of monitoring directors’ remuneration. Some of the reasons explored in this article share ownership which is mostly in the hands of overseas investors; the complexity of the remuneration package and the technicalities involved in the determination of pay which the shareholder find difficult to understand; and the drivers of directors remuneration. The article recommends that the Companies Act 2006 should make basic provisions on directors’ remuneration because shareholder voting alone is failing.en
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofCompany Lawyer
dc.rightsOpen
dc.subjectDirector's remuneration
dc.subjectShareholder's vote
dc.titleUK Shareholder Voting on Director's Remuneration: Has Binding Vote Made any Difference?en
dc.contributor.institutionHertfordshire Law School
dc.description.statusPeer reviewed
dc.identifier.urlhttp://login.westlaw.co.uk/maf/wluk/app/document?&srguid=i0ad8289e0000015b8013fc14904803ff&docguid=IA452E0201B5E11E7B91D80F1CDB008CF&hitguid=IA452E0201B5E11E7B91D80F1CDB008CF&rank=2&spos=2&epos=2&td=3000&crumb-action=append&context=5&resolvein=true
dc.relation.schoolHertfordshire Law School
dc.description.versiontypeFinal Accepted Version
dcterms.dateAccepted2017
rioxxterms.versionAM
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue
herts.rights.accesstypeOpen


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