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dc.contributor.authorMalcolm, Finlay
dc.date.accessioned2018-06-05T16:10:39Z
dc.date.available2018-06-05T16:10:39Z
dc.date.issued2018-03-31
dc.identifier.citationMalcolm , F 2018 , ' Testimonial Insult: A Moral Reason for Belief? ' , Logos and Episteme , vol. 9 , no. 1 , pp. 27-48 . https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme2018912
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 13716264
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 14b05cb3-e9fe-4a60-b279-22c2e48d734b
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85045935207
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/20131
dc.description© 2018 Filiala Iași - Institutul de Cercetări Economice şi Sociale "Gh.Zane"). Reproduced by permission from Logos & Episteme. Content in the UH Research Archive is made available for personal research, educational, and non-commercial purposes only. Unless otherwise stated, all content is protected by copyright, and in the absence of an open license, permissions for further re-use should be sought from the publisher, the author, or other copyright holder.
dc.description.abstractWhen you don’t believe a speaker’s testimony for reasons that call into question the speaker’s credibility, it seems that this is an insult against the speaker. There also appears to be moral reasons that count in favour of refraining from insulting someone. When taken together, these two plausible claims entail that we have a moral reason to refrain from insulting speakers with our lack of belief, and hence, sometimes, a moral reason to believe the testimony of speakers. Reasons for belief arising from non-epistemic sources are controversial, and it’s often argued that it’s impossible to base a belief on non-epistemic reasons. However, I will show that even if it is possible to base a belief on non-epistemic reasons, in the case of testimonial insult, for many or most cases, the moral reasons for belief don’t need to be the basis of our doxastic response. This is because there are, in many or most cases, either sufficient epistemic reasons for belief, or sufficient moral reasons for action that guide our response to testimony. Reasons from testimonial insult, in many cases, simply lead to overdetermination. Even if there are such moral reasons for belief, they are therefore practically unnecessary in many cases. There are, though, some cases in which they play an important role in guiding belief. This perhaps surprising conclusion is one unexplored way to defend epistemic over pragmatic reasons for belief.en
dc.format.extent22
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofLogos and Episteme
dc.subjectBelief
dc.subjectEpistemic
dc.subjectInsult
dc.subjectMoral
dc.subjectReasons
dc.subjectTestimony
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.titleTestimonial Insult: A Moral Reason for Belief?en
dc.contributor.institutionPhilosophy
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Humanities
dc.description.statusPeer reviewed
dc.identifier.urlhttp://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85045935207&partnerID=8YFLogxK
rioxxterms.versionVoR
rioxxterms.versionofrecordhttps://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme2018912
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue


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