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dc.contributor.authorPinder, Mark
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-16T00:12:55Z
dc.date.available2018-08-16T00:12:55Z
dc.date.issued2017-05-20
dc.identifier.citationPinder , M 2017 , ' How to find an attractive solution to the liar paradox ' , Philosophical Studies , pp. 1-20 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0928-z
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 12009365
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 1db39a23-7e77-442a-a0cb-a28a62760023
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85019647526
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/20384
dc.descriptionThis document is the Accepted Manuscript version of the following article: Mark Pinder, ‘How to find an attractive solution to the liar paradox’, Philosophical Studies, May 2017. Under embargo. Embargo end date: 20 May 2018. The final publication is available at Springer via https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11098-017-0928-z.
dc.description.abstractThe general thesis of this paper is that metasemantic theories can play a central role in determining the correct solution to the liar paradox. I argue for the thesis by providing a specific example. I show how Lewis’s reference-magnetic metasemantic theory may decide between two of the most influential solutions to the liar paradox: Kripke’s minimal fixed point theory of truth and Gupta and Belnap’s revision theory of truth. In particular, I suggest that Lewis’s metasemantic theory favours Kripke’s solution to the paradox over Gupta and Belnap’s. I then sketch how other standard criteria for assessing solutions to the liar paradox, such as whether a solution faces a so-called revenge paradox, fit into this picture. While the discussion of the specific example is itself important, the underlying lesson is that we have an unused strategy for resolving one of the hardest problems in philosophy.en
dc.format.extent20
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophical Studies
dc.rightsEmbargoed
dc.subjectComplexity
dc.subjectLewis
dc.subjectLiar paradox
dc.subjectMagnetism
dc.subjectMetasemantics
dc.subjectTruth
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.titleHow to find an attractive solution to the liar paradoxen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of Hertfordshire
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Humanities
dc.description.statusPeer reviewed
dc.date.embargoedUntil2018-05-20
dc.identifier.urlhttp://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85019647526&partnerID=8YFLogxK
dc.relation.schoolSchool of Humanities
dc.description.versiontypeFinal Accepted Version
dcterms.dateAccepted2017-05-20
rioxxterms.versionAM
rioxxterms.versionofrecordhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0928-z
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2018-05-20
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue
herts.date.embargo2018-05-20
herts.rights.accesstypeEmbargoed


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