dc.contributor.author | Andrews, Samuel | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-09-10T10:47:42Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-09-10T10:47:42Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018-09-10 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2299/20534 | |
dc.description.abstract | What are we justified in asserting when constructing an ontology of time? I believe a version of Presentism to be the only justified theory. ‘Justified’ here refers exclusively to a basis of empirical and epistemological evidence. What can we assert about the metaphysics of time when we start from a justificationist epistemology? Putnam and Rietdijk argue that the relativity of simultaneity supports Eternalism. My investigation examines the strength of justification Eternalism attains from the special theory of relativity (STR) and will argue that Eternalism is not justified by STR. I will also suggest that an alternative metaphysical theory of time, Point Presentism, attains justification from STR. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en_US |
dc.subject | Metaphysics | en_US |
dc.subject | Philosophy of time | en_US |
dc.subject | Justificationism | en_US |
dc.subject | Special Relativity | en_US |
dc.subject | Putnam | en_US |
dc.subject | Stein | en_US |
dc.subject | Presentism | en_US |
dc.subject | Eternalism | en_US |
dc.subject | Point-presentism | en_US |
dc.title | The Justified Ontology of Time | en_US |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.18745/th.20534 | |
dc.type.qualificationlevel | Masters | en_US |
dc.type.qualificationname | MA | en_US |
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessed | true | |