Anscombe’s Intentions

Abstract

Philosophers commonly talk of Anscombe's book Intention as a single unified Account produced at a particular moment in time. Yet we have a tendency to refer to the Text of the second (1963) edition while citing the first (1957) on 1 . Between these two 1958 second impression of the first edition, Some significant alterations reported by Anscombe herself. This paper offers a detailed consideration of the differences between these three Publications, as well as earlier Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society "Intention". In what follows the catalog the various changes she made with the Clarification, it makes sense, in light of them, to talk of an early and late Intention . I Conclude that while this would be going too far, Anscombe's views on action description And practical reasoning have changed in ways in which it would be profitable for Philosophers of action and moral psychology to track.