Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorLiu, Michelle
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-01T01:02:22Z
dc.date.available2019-11-01T01:02:22Z
dc.date.issued2019-04-29
dc.identifier.citationLiu , M 2019 , Phenomenal Experience and the Thesis of Revelation . in Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics . Routledge , New York , pp. 227-252 . https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429462658-13
dc.identifier.isbn9781138615939
dc.identifier.isbn9780429870286
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-4427-1235/work/68611773
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/21832
dc.description.abstractIn the philosophy of mind, revelation is the claim that the nature of qualia is revealed in phenomenal experience. In the literature, revelation is often thought of as intuitive but in tension with physicalism. While mentions of revelation are frequent, there is room for further discussion of how precisely to formulate the thesis of revelation and what it exactly amounts to. Drawing on the work of David Lewis, this chapter provides a detailed discussion on how the thesis of revelation, as well as its incompatibility with physicalism, is to be understood.en
dc.format.extent26
dc.format.extent239311
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherRoutledge
dc.relation.ispartofPerception, Cognition and Aesthetics
dc.subjectArts and Humanities(all)
dc.titlePhenomenal Experience and the Thesis of Revelationen
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Humanities
dc.contributor.institutionPhilosophy
dc.date.embargoedUntil2021-10-29
dc.identifier.urlhttp://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85069184850&partnerID=8YFLogxK
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.4324/9780429462658-13
rioxxterms.typeOther
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record