dc.contributor.author | Malcolm, Finlay | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-02-19T01:12:06Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-02-19T01:12:06Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020-04-15 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Malcolm , F 2020 , ' The Moral and Evidential Requirements of Faith ' , European Journal for Philosophy of Religion , vol. 12 , no. 1 , pp. 117-142 . https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v0i0.2658 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1689-8311 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2299/22288 | |
dc.description | © 2019 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion. | |
dc.description.abstract | What is the relationship between faith and evidence? It is often claimed that faith requires going beyond evidence. In this paper, I reject this claim by showing how the moral demands to have faith warrant a person in maintaining faith in the face of counter-evidence, and by showing how the moral demands to have faith, and the moral constraints of evidentialism, are in clear tension with going beyond evidence. In arguing for these views, I develop a taxonomy of different ways of irrationally going beyond evidence and contrast this with rational ways of going against evidence. I then defend instances of having a moral demand to have faith, explore how this stands in tension with going beyond and against evidence, and develop an argument for the claim that faith involves a disposition to go against, but not beyond evidence. | en |
dc.format.extent | 26 | |
dc.format.extent | 243663 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.relation.ispartof | European Journal for Philosophy of Religion | |
dc.title | The Moral and Evidential Requirements of Faith | en |
dc.contributor.institution | Philosophy | |
dc.contributor.institution | School of Humanities | |
dc.description.status | Peer reviewed | |
dc.identifier.url | https://philpapers.org/rec/MALTMA-5 | |
rioxxterms.versionofrecord | 10.24204/ejpr.v0i0.2658 | |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | |
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessed | true | |