Restoring Certainty

dc.contributor.author	Moyal-Sharrock, Daniele
dc.date.accessioned	2021-05-24T15:00:02Z
dc.date.available	2021-05-24T15:00:02Z
dc.date.issued	2019-10-29
dc.identifier.citation	Moyal-Sharrock , D 2019 , ' Restoring Certainty ' , International Journal for the Study of Skepticism , vol. 11 , no. 2 , pp. 143–158 . https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-20191419
dc.identifier.issn	2210-5697
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2299/24524
dc.description	© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2019. This is the accepted manuscript version of an article which has been published in final form at 10.1163/22105700-20191419
dc.description.abstract	This paper addresses the objections, Genia Schönbaumsfeld makes in The Illusion of Doubt, to my view of hinge certainty as a 'certainty', as nonepistemic, nonpropositional and animal. It also addresses her related dissatisfaction with Wittgenstein's notion of 'the groundlessness of our believing'.	en
dc.format.extent	17
dc.format.extent	222358
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartof	International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
dc.subject	Wittgenstein
dc.subject	Hinge Epistemology
dc.subject	Basic Beliefs
dc.subject	On Certainty
dc.title	Restoring Certainty	en
dc.contributor.institution	School of Humanities
dc.description.status	Peer reviewed
rioxxterms.versionofrecord	10.1163/22105700-20191419
rioxxterms.type	Journal Article/Review
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessed	true