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dc.contributor.authorLiu, Michelle
dc.date.accessioned2021-08-02T13:15:01Z
dc.date.available2021-08-02T13:15:01Z
dc.date.issued2021-07-02
dc.identifier.citationLiu , M 2021 , ' Revelation and the Intuition of Dualism ' , Synthese . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03299-x
dc.identifier.issn0039-7857
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 25511735
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 2c2f6456-ae54-4888-a9b0-10afd3247d83
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-4427-1235/work/98164053
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85110766984
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/24942
dc.description© 2021 Springer Nature Switzerland AG. This is the accepted manuscript version of an article which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03299-x
dc.description.abstractIn recent literature on the metaphysics of consciousness, and in particular on the prospects of physicalism, there are two interesting strands of discussion. One strand concerns the so-called ‘thesis of revelation’, the claim that the essences of phenomenal properties are revealed in experience. The other strand concerns the intuition of dualism, the intuition that consciousness is nonphysical. With a particular focus on the former, this paper advances two main arguments. First, it argues that the thesis of revelation is intuitive; it is part of our ordinary, implicit conception of experience. Second, it brings the two strands of discussion together and puts forward a rational explanation of the intuition of dualism in terms of the intuitiveness of the thesis of revelation.en
dc.format.extent30
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofSynthese
dc.titleRevelation and the Intuition of Dualismen
dc.contributor.institutionPhilosophy
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Humanities
dc.description.statusPeer reviewed
dc.date.embargoedUntil2022-07-12
rioxxterms.versionAM
rioxxterms.versionofrecordhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03299-x
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue


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