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dc.contributor.authorSandis, Constantine
dc.date.accessioned2021-08-19T11:00:02Z
dc.date.available2021-08-19T11:00:02Z
dc.date.issued2021-07-01
dc.identifier.citationSandis , C 2021 , ' Virtue Ethics and Particularism ' , Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume , vol. 95 , no. 1 , pp. 205-232 . https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akab013
dc.identifier.issn0309-7013
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 24902956
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 3c2eae50-e376-4836-9fb6-ec43108b81f6
dc.identifier.otherBibtex: 10.1093/arisup/akab013
dc.identifier.otherBibtex: 10.1093/arisup/akab013
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/24983
dc.description.abstractMoral particularism is often conceived as the view that there are no moral principles. However, its most fêted accounts focus almost exclusively on rules regarding actions and their features. Such action-centred particularism, I argue, is compatible with generalism at the level of character traits. The resulting view is a form of particularist virtue ethics. This endorses directives of the form ‘be X’ but rejects any implication that the relevant x-ness must therefore always count in favour of an action.en
dc.format.extent28
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
dc.titleVirtue Ethics and Particularismen
dc.contributor.institutionPhilosophy
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Humanities
dc.description.statusPeer reviewed
rioxxterms.versionVoR
rioxxterms.versionofrecordhttps://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akab013
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue


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