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dc.contributor.authorHutto, D.
dc.identifier.citationHutto , D 2009 , ' Interacting? Yes : But of what kind and on what basis? ' , Consciousness and cognition , vol. 18 , no. 2 , pp. 543-546 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 188619
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: e91ae38d-f692-4f0c-bc4c-b212a5f5a5e0
dc.identifier.otherdspace: 2299/3423
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 67349262477
dc.descriptionOriginal article can be found at: Copyright Elsevier Inc. DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.12.006 [Full text of this article is not available in the UHRA]
dc.description.abstractDe Jaegher’s (2009) paper argues that Gallagher, who aims to replace traditional theory-of-mind accounts of social understanding with accounts based on direct perception (hereafter DP), has missed an important opportunity. Despite a desire to break faith with tradition, there is a danger that proponents of DP accounts will remain (at least tacitly) committed to an unchallenged, and perhaps unnoticed, sort of individualism inherent in traditional theories (i.e. those that regard our engagement with others as a ‘problem’ to be solved: a problem of other minds). Taking a more root and branch approach, De Jaegher recommends a complete shift of focus. She proposes that a more thoroughgoing and fruitful response to traditional approaches must attend to, and seek to understand, interactional phenomena proper—for it is the nature of interactions themselves that importantly influence individuals. Hence, it is the processes of interacting which ‘span individuals’ and their specific, dynamic evolution over time that should take pride of place in research into social cognitionen
dc.relation.ispartofConsciousness and cognition
dc.titleInteracting? Yes : But of what kind and on what basis?en
dc.description.statusPeer reviewed
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review

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