dc.contributor.author | Hutto, D. | |
dc.contributor.editor | Zlatev, J | |
dc.contributor.editor | Racine, T.P. | |
dc.contributor.editor | Sinha, C. | |
dc.contributor.editor | Itkonen, E. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-05-21T08:13:47Z | |
dc.date.available | 2009-05-21T08:13:47Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Hutto , D 2008 , First communions : mimetic ability versus theory of mind accounts . in J Zlatev , T P Racine , C Sinha & E Itkonen (eds) , The Shared Mind : Perspectives on Intersubjectivity . John Benjamins Publishing Company , pp. 245-278 . | |
dc.identifier.isbn | 978 90 272 3900 6 | |
dc.identifier.other | dspace: 2299/3425 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2299/3425 | |
dc.description | Full text of this chapter is not available in the UHRA. | |
dc.description.abstract | It is widely held that the gradual development of metarepresentational Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities constituted at least one important hominid upgrade. Are such abilities really needed to explain hominid (i) tool-making, (ii) social cohesion, or even (iii) basic interpretative and language formation/learning capabilities? I propose an alternative explanation of what underlies these sophisticated capacities – the Mimetic Ability Hypothesis (MAH). MAH claims that a vastly increased capacity for recreative imagination best explains the kinds of sophisticated intersubjective engagements of which hominids would have been capable – and that these constituted an important basis for the development of complex language. This proposal puts the idea of the evolution of ToM devices under considerable strain. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.publisher | John Benjamins Publishing Company | |
dc.relation.ispartof | The Shared Mind | |
dc.title | First communions : mimetic ability versus theory of mind accounts | en |
dc.contributor.institution | Philosophy | |
rioxxterms.type | Other | |
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessed | true | |