The Distributive Role of Managerial Incentives in a Mixed Duopoly

dc.contributor.author	Saha, B.
dc.contributor.author	Sensarma, R.
dc.date.accessioned	2009-06-03T08:26:18Z
dc.date.available	2009-06-03T08:26:18Z
dc.date.issued	2008
dc.identifier.citation	Saha , B & Sensarma , R 2008 , ' The Distributive Role of Managerial Incentives in a Mixed Duopoly ' , Economics Bulletin , vol. 12 , no. 27 , pp. 1-10 .
dc.identifier.other	dspace: 2299/3466
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2299/3466
dc.description	Original article can be found at: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2008/volume12/EB-08L10033A.pdf
dc.description.abstract	We study a mixed oligopoly where a partially public firm competes with a private firm. When the private firm offers managerial incentives, there is a redistribution of profit and output from the private to the public firm, but the aggregate output and social welfare may remain unchanged. When the private firm is foreign owned, the extent of privatization is less while managerial incentives are milder.	en
dc.format.extent	132378
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartof	Economics Bulletin
dc.title	The Distributive Role of Managerial Incentives in a Mixed Duopoly	en
dc.contributor.institution	Hertfordshire Business School
dc.description.status	Peer reviewed
rioxxterms.type	Journal Article/Review
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessed	true