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dc.contributor.authorMoyal-Sharrock, Daniele
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-14T08:24:19Z
dc.date.available2009-09-14T08:24:19Z
dc.date.issued2000
dc.identifier.citationMoyal-Sharrock , D 2000 , ' Words as deeds: Wittgenstein's ''spontaneous utterances'' and the dissolution of the explanatory gap ' , Philosophical Psychology , vol. 13 , no. 3 , pp. 355-372 . https://doi.org/10.1080/09515080050128169
dc.identifier.issn0951-5089
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 188122
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 5aa06840-f1c9-4d3a-b15f-21b6ddd000b4
dc.identifier.otherdspace: 2299/3840
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/3840
dc.descriptionOriginal article can be found at: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713441835~db=all Copyright Informa / Taylor and Francis. DOI: 10.1080/09515080050128169
dc.description.abstractWittgenstein demystified the notion of ''observational self-knowledge''. He dislodged the long-standing conception that we have privileged access to our impressions, sensations and feelings through introspection, and more precisely eliminated knowing as the kind of awareness that normally characterizes our first-person present-tense psychological statements. He was not thereby questioning our awareness of our emotions or sensations, but debunking the notion that we come to that awareness via any epistemic route. This makes the spontaneous linguistic articulation of our sensations and impressions nondescriptive. Not descriptions, but expressions that seem more akin to behaviour than to language. I suggest that Wittgenstein uncovered a new species of speech acts. Far from the prearranged consecration of words into performatives, utterances are deeds through their very spontaneity. This gives language a new aura: the aura of the reflex action. I argue, against Peter Hacker, that spontaneous utterances have the categorial status of deeds. This has no reductive consequences in that I do not suggest that one category is reduced to another, but that the boundary between them is porous. This explodes the myth of an explanatory gap between the traditionally distinct categories of saying (or thinking) and doing, or of mind and body.en
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophical Psychology
dc.rightsOpen
dc.titleWords as deeds: Wittgenstein's ''spontaneous utterances'' and the dissolution of the explanatory gapen
dc.contributor.institutionPhilosophy
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Humanities
dc.contributor.institutionSocial Sciences, Arts & Humanities Research Institute
dc.description.statusPeer reviewed
dc.relation.schoolSchool of Humanities
dcterms.dateAccepted2000
rioxxterms.versionofrecordhttps://doi.org/10.1080/09515080050128169
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue
herts.rights.accesstypeOpen


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