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dc.contributor.authorGoff, P.
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-16T12:43:07Z
dc.date.available2010-07-16T12:43:07Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.citationGoff , P 2010 , ' Ghosts and sparse properties : why physicalists have more to fear from ghosts than zombies ' , Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , vol. 81 , no. 1 , pp. 119-139 . https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00352.x
dc.identifier.issn0031-8205
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 187358
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 0e450ead-3752-4c56-911a-4a1491d9f513
dc.identifier.otherdspace: 2299/4662
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 77954408747
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/4662
dc.descriptionThe definitive version can be found at: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/ Copyright Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC. [Full text of this article is not available in the UHRA]
dc.description.abstractZombies are bodies without minds: creatures that are physically identical to actual human beings, but which have no conscious experience. Much of the consciousness literature concerns how threatening philosophical reflection on such creatures is to physicalism. There is not much attention given to the converse possibility, the possibility of minds without bodies, that is, creatures who are conscious but whose nature is exhausted by their being conscious. We can call such a 'purely conscious' creature a ghost. [opening paragraph]en
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
dc.titleGhosts and sparse properties : why physicalists have more to fear from ghosts than zombiesen
dc.contributor.institutionPhilosophy
dc.description.statusPeer reviewed
dcterms.dateAccepted2010
rioxxterms.versionofrecordhttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00352.x
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue


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