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dc.contributor.authorStajano, Frank
dc.contributor.authorWong, Ford-Long
dc.contributor.authorChristianson, B.
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-26T11:29:16Z
dc.date.available2010-08-26T11:29:16Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.citationStajano , F , Wong , F-L & Christianson , B 2010 , ' Multichannel protocols to prevent relay attacks ' , Lecture Notes in Computer Science , vol. 6052 , pp. 4-19 . https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14577-3_4
dc.identifier.issn0302-9743
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 95737
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: a6975545-4ed8-416d-99e8-2fff7b2a39b7
dc.identifier.otherdspace: 2299/4807
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000286416700004
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 77955312523
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/4807
dc.description“The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com”. Copyright Springer
dc.description.abstractA number of security systems, from Chip-and-PIN payment cards to contactless subway and train tokens, as well as secure localization systems, are vulnerable to relay attacks. Encrypting the communication between the honest endpoints does not protect against such attacks. The main solution that has been offered to date is distance bounding, in which a tightly timed exchange of challenges and responses persuades the verifier that the prover cannot be further away than a certain distance. This solution, however, still won't say whether the specific endpoint the verifier is talking to is the intended one or not - it will only tell the verifier whether the real prover is "nearby". Are there any alternatives? We propose a more general paradigm based on multichannel protocols. Our class of protocols, of which distance bounding can be modelled as a special case, allows a precise answer to be given to the question of whether the unknown device in front of the potential victim is a relaying attacker or the device with which the victim intended to communicate. We discuss several instantiations of our solution and point out the extent to which all these countermeasures rely, often implicitly, on the alertness of a honest human taking part in the protocol.en
dc.format.extent16
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofLecture Notes in Computer Science
dc.titleMultichannel protocols to prevent relay attacksen
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Computer Science
dc.contributor.institutionScience & Technology Research Institute
dc.description.statusPeer reviewed
rioxxterms.versionofrecordhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14577-3_4
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue


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