Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorAllo, P.
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-09T08:40:43Z
dc.date.available2011-05-09T08:40:43Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.citationAllo , P 2011 , ' The logic of 'being informed' revisited and revised ' , Philosophical Studies , vol. 153 , no. 3 , pp. 417-434 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9516-1
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 186442
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: c3262ec2-c2c2-4021-9e59-81ccc8fef790
dc.identifier.otherdspace: 2299/5747
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 79952644296
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/5747
dc.description“The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com” Copyright Springer
dc.description.abstractThe logic of 'being informed' gives a formal analysis of a cognitive state that does not coincide with either belief, or knowledge. To Floridi, who first proposed the formal analysis, the latter is supported by the fact that unlike knowledge or belief, being informed is a factive, but not a reflective state. This paper takes a closer look at the formal analysis itself, provides a pure and an applied semantics for the logic of being informed, and tries to find out to what extent the formal analysis can contribute to an information-based epistemology.en
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophical Studies
dc.titleThe logic of 'being informed' revisited and reviseden
dc.contributor.institutionPhilosophy
dc.description.statusPeer reviewed
rioxxterms.versionofrecordhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9516-1
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record