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dc.contributor.authorHutto, D.
dc.contributor.editorPllykkanen, P.
dc.identifier.citationHutto , D 2001 , Consciousness and conceptual schema . in P Pllykkanen (ed.) , Dimensions of Conscious Experience . Advances in Consciousness Research Series , John Benjamins Publishing Company , pp. 15-43 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 187873
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 6bf17369-dd4f-428c-b373-453dedf1661c
dc.identifier.otherdspace: 2299/5973
dc.descriptionFull text of this chapter is not available in the UHRA
dc.description.abstractThere are two importantly different ways in which consciousness resists incorporation into our familiar object-based conceptual schema which, when analysed, help to explain why it is regarded as such a philosophically recalcitrant phenomena. One concerns the nonconceptual nature of basic forms of conscious experience, the other concerns the fact that attempts to understand the nature of such experience in an object-based schema, as is demanded by some forms of physicalism, is inappropriate. My concern in this paper is to show how certain central problems concerning our attempts to understand consciousness can be recast or dissolved if we take note of these aspects of phenomenal experience.en
dc.publisherJohn Benjamins Publishing Company
dc.relation.ispartofDimensions of Conscious Experience
dc.relation.ispartofseriesAdvances in Consciousness Research Series
dc.titleConsciousness and conceptual schemaen

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