| dc.contributor.author | Hutto, D. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2011-06-14T12:36:29Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2011-06-14T12:36:29Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1999 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | In : Understanding Representation in Cognitive Science, Does Representation Need Reality?, edited by Riegler, A.; Peschl, M. chapter 5, pp.57-74 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.isbn | 978-0306462863 | |
| dc.identifier.other | 905481 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2299/5975 | |
| dc.description | Full text of this chapter is not available in the UHRA | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | In addressing the question “Do representations need reality?”, this paper attempts to show that a principled understanding of representations requires that they have objective, systematic content.It is claimed that there is an interesting form of nonconceptual, intentionality which is processed by non-systematic connectionist networks and has its correctness conditions provided by a modest biosemantics; but this type of content is not properly representational. Finally, I consider the consequences that such a verdict has on eliminativist views that look to connectionism as a means of radically reconceiving our understanding of cognition. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Plenum Press | en_US |
| dc.title | Cognition without representation? | en_US |
| dc.type | Book chapter | en_US |
| herts.preservation.rarelyaccessed | true | |
