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dc.contributor.authorHutto, D.
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-20T08:37:11Z
dc.date.available2011-06-20T08:37:11Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.identifier.citationIn : Radical Enactivism : Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative; Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto, edited by Menary, R., pp.231-247en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-9027241511
dc.identifier.isbn9027241511
dc.identifier.other103305
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/6009
dc.descriptionFull text of this chapter is not available in the UHRAen_US
dc.description.abstractGallagher writes, “ My limited aim, in agreement with Hutto, is to suggest that there is no need to appeal to overly mentalistic theory-of-mind explanations for how we understand others” and that “narrative competence suggests an alternative to TOM approaches” (Gallagher: this volume). Those familiar with my previous writings on narrative and folk psychology will recognise that all of this is music to my ears (Hutto 1997, 2003b, 2004). Indeed, making an extended case for these sorts of claims is the primary focus of several of my new papers, edited volumes and my forthcoming book, Folk Psychology Narrative. In this reply I highlight some aspects of the approach that I have been developing in those works.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherJohn Benjamins Publishing Companyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesConsciousness and Emotion Book Series;
dc.titleNarrative practice and understanding reasons : reply to Gallagher.en_US
dc.typeBook chapteren_US
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue


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