| dc.contributor.author | Hutto, D. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2011-06-20T08:41:21Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2011-06-20T08:41:21Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2006 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | In : 'Radical Enactivism : Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative; Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto', edited by Menary, R., pp.45-64 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.isbn | 978-9027241511 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 9027241511 | |
| dc.identifier.other | 103300 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2299/6011 | |
| dc.description | Full text of this chapter is not available in the UHRA | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | Myin and De Nul suggest that there may be no “precise link between what Hutto calls the object-based schema and the family of ‘hard problems’ about consciousness (including the ‘problem of phenomenal experience’ as well as the ‘other minds problem’).” They hold that the true source of these problems might be a more general ‘objectivism.’ I do not think that the hard problems can be solved but I do hold that adherence to the object-based schema (OBS) is the source of such problems when it comes to thinking about experience because it is the source of the temptation to think that they admit of straight solutions, at least possibly. That is and has long been my claim about the precise link between the OBS and much current thinking about consciousness. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | John Benjamins Publishing Company | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Consciousness and Emotion Book Series; | |
| dc.title | Impossible problems and careful expositions : reply to Myin and De Nul. | en_US |
| dc.type | Book chapter | en_US |
| herts.preservation.rarelyaccessed | true | |
